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Civil society and the anti-pizzo movement: the case of Ercolano, Naples

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Civil society and the anti-pizzo movement: the case of Ercolano, Naples

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

University of Bath

Department of Politics, Languages & International Studies

September 2017

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Abstract

The history of the *mezzogiorno* region of Italy is interwoven with the role of mafia-type associations, whose influence has affected the lives (and profits) of businesspeople from whom they collect *pizzo* “protection money”. The fear of reprisals and the lack of trust in law enforcement agencies make it very difficult for businesses approached by these groups for the first time to report the extortion. Once paid, the repeated, normalised and regularised cycle of paying the *pizzo* is difficult for businesses to break away from. Using the case study of the town of Ercolano, this thesis analyses how a community characterised by entrenched norms of paying the *pizzo* was able to overcome and uproot its localised extortion rackets to become a model of the anti-mafia movement in Italy. It considers how the *pizzo* may be best understood, how one community responded to it and to a localised mafia-type association in turn.

Using a methodology that includes a ten month ethnography in the town, a questionnaire for members of the local antiracket association, and interviews with businesspeople, representatives from Civil Society, law enforcement agencies and the judiciary, this thesis analyses the defeat of Camorra extortion rackets through the mobilisation of Civil Society and its relationship with law enforcement agencies in a town characterised by deeply-rooted norms of *pizzo* paying. At the same time, it analyses the response of various Civil Society Organizations and the State to the Camorra on a cultural level, fostering attitudes that make it difficult for it to thrive.


The thesis presents an empirical study based on fieldwork of a town previously characterised by a substantial influence by Camorra clans. In particular, it identifies culture and cultural norms that maintain the dominance that mafia-type associations have over communities as an area of focus for the anti-mafia movement more broadly.

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Maps



40.8518° N, 14.2681° E

The city of Naples in Italy

(Googlemaps)



40.7745° N, 14.3294° E

The Gulf of Naples


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40.8079° N, 14.3482° E

The town of Ercolano in the Naples Metropolitan area

(Googlemaps)



“Welcome to Ercolano” Free tourist map

Glossary

Glossary of terms

	Definition
Area grigia	Grey Zone. Specifically referring to the space between legal and illegal activity where mafia groups attempt to place themselves.
Camorrista	Individual member of Camorra clan.
Camorristi	Plural of camorrista.
Capoclan	Camorra boss.
Carabinieri	Italian military police. They are charged specifically with investigations regarding Organized Crime and Terrorism.
Codice Penale	Italian Penal Code.
Comune	Commune/town. Referring both to the local government, and the town itself.
DC	Democrazia Cristiana (Christian Democrats), a now-dissolved political party that dominated Italy in the post-war period until the Tangentopoli scandal.
Federazione Antiracket Italiana (FAI)	Italian Antiracket Federation. A group encompassing local antiracket associations throughout Italy. It is supported by the Italian Ministero dell'Interno, and enjoys support from law enforcement agencies: http://www.antiracket.info/home
Fondazione Pol.i.s.	“Politiche Integrate di Sicurezza per le Vittime Innocenti della criminalità e i Beni Confiscati”: Integrated security policies for innocent victims of crime and confiscated assets. A non-profit foundation under the jurisdiction of the Campania regional government. It publishes information relating to transparency and activities taken against corruption, in addition to the funding of research projects, documentation centres and publications on organized crime and the fight against it on a regional level.
Giunta	Local comune administration.
Herculaneum	The Roman settlement upon which the city of Ercolano is built. It was destroyed by pyroclastic flows in the Plinian Eruption of 79AD, and rediscovered in the 18 th century. It has received both public and private funding (the Hewlett Packard foundation),

	and the 16 th most visited tourist attraction in Italy. It is a UNESCO World Heritage site, and is widely regarded as exemplary in Conservation management.
Libera	NGO. National association of associations that manage assets and properties confiscated from mafia-type associations.
Mafia / mafia	When used with a capital “M”, it refers to the Sicilian Cosa Nostra. With a small “m”, it refers to mafia-type associations in Italy in general.
Mafiosità	Mafia-ness. The extent to which something is of, or for the (m)afia
Mezzogiorno	The South of Italy. Broadly understood as the regions which were formerly controlled by Il Regno delle due Sicilie before Italian Unification in 1861.
Ministero dell’Interno	Italian Ministry of the Interior / Home Office.
Napoli	Italian name for Naples.
NGO	Non-governmental organization
Omertà	Commonly associated with the Cosa Nostra, this word refers to the wall of silence that communities have regarding everything related to mafia associations. This is upheld by members of mafia associations, as well as individuals in the communities in which they operate. See Sciascia’s <i>Il giorno della civetta</i> (1961)
PD	Partito Democratico (Democratic Party), originating from the PCI (Partito Comunista Italiana – Italian Communist Party), the PDS (Partito Democratico della Sinistra – Democratic Party of the Left) and La Margherita (a Christian-Left party)
Pizzo	The payment of money or services by a legal business to a mafia association
Pizzo “a tappetto”	The obligation of pizzo payment by every business in an area
Pizzo periodico	The frequency of pizzo payment when it is limited to three or four times a year at specific festivals
Pubblico Ministero (PM)	Italian investigating magistrate. In the Italian legal system, the PM is active in the investigation and collection of data in a case as well as presenting the evidence in the Courtroom. The PM communicates directly with law enforcement agencies, often with particular referent officers
Quartiere (sing.)	District/area of a city

Regno delle due Sicilie	The Kingdom of the two Sicilies. The State that stretched the whole of the <i>mezzogiorno</i> region until its incorporation into the Kingdom of Italy in 1861.
Resina	Former name of Ercolano up until 1960s/1970s
Scavi	Excavation site. Referring specifically to Herculaneum
Tangente	Tribute. This refers specifically to the money paid by a smaller organized crime group or a business to the Camorra clan within whose area they conduct activities. With this payment they may be paying “rent” to use the area, or a “bribe” to access the illicit market
Tipo mafioso	“mafia-type” association. The classification of mafia associations in Italy
Vesuvio	Mount Vesuvius. The dormant volcano that overlooks Naples

Glossary of names

Name	
Bossa, Luisa	Mayor of Ercolano between 1995-2005 for centre-left coalitions that later became dominated by the PD. She is currently a deputy for the PD/Articolo 1, and a member of the commissione Parlamentare Antimafia.
Buonaiuto, Antonio	Mayor of Ercolano for the DC. Murdered by associates of the Ascione clan in the run up to the 1990 election.
Buonajuto, Ciro	PD. Mayor of Ercolano 2015-present. Nephew of Antonio.
Daniele, Nino	Mayor of Ercolano between 2005-2010, member of PD, current Councillor for Culture and Tourism for city of Naples, current president of Ercolano per la legalità (antiracket association)
Filippelli, Pierpaolo	Pubblico Ministero (PM) for Ercolano from the mid-2000s to 2015. Currently based in Torre Annunziata.
Di Fiore, Antonio	Former Lieutenant of the Ercolano Carabinieri
Grasso, Tano	Honourary President of the FAI. Founded an anti-racket association in his native Sicily. Was a principal actor in the foundation of Ercolano per la legalità.
Incoronato, Pasquale	Ercolano-based Priest. Principal organiser of La Tenda, La Locanda di Emmaus and a youth association linked to his parish, Centro Pastorale Giovanile
Ottaviano, Raffaella	Honourary President of Ercolano per la legalità. A clothes store owner who denounced the Camorra to the Carabinieri in 2004
Scognamiglio, Giuseppe	President of Radio Siani coop.
Scudo, Fausto	Ascione camorrista, turned <i>pentito</i> . Decoded the Ascione ledger.
Siani, Giancarlo	Former journalist for Il Mattino, murdered in 1985 by the Camorra.
Strazzullo, Vincenzo	Deputy Mayor of Ercolano 2005-2010, Mayor of Ercolano 2010-2015. Accusations of wrongdoings with regard to the provisions of public work during his time as Mayor led to his decision not to stand for the PD mayoral primaries in 2015

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Before and after fieldwork I cannot do justice to the friends, past and present, who put up with me and kept me relatively sane during the long and arduous writing process. This project would not have been possible if it weren't for the guidance and support from my friends, family and colleagues.

Preamble

Anyone who owns a car or scooter in Naples will tell you that if you want to go out in the evening and park your vehicle in the centre, you will have to pay individuals in the street referred to locally as *parcheggiatori abusivi*, illegal parking attendants. As you approach a spot they unsubtly catch your eye, indicating *prego prego!* Come on! Park here! Don't worry! When you eventually park they state that they would like a bit of money for their trouble, since they helped you park after all, asking only for a bit – maybe a few euros, just as a tip, don't worry, have a nice evening mister. Charging drivers for the parking spot would be illegal, since the property is not theirs to rent, so instead they ask for a “tip”. This social trap obliges the driver to pay. Non-payment has two main considerations. On the one side, in refusing to pay they know that they have to spend the rest of the evening with the worry that their car has been damaged whilst they are not there to keep an eye on it. On the other side, refusing to pay the individual who has, though unwarrantedly, assisted in parking the car would be a rather impolite and tight-fisted thing to do. It's only a few euros after all. Perhaps it is a dishonest way to make money, but no one wants to seem tight-fisted - I'd rather enjoy my evening without the hassle at the back of my mind, and it's a fairly normal phenomenon around these parts anyway, so maybe it's better just to pay.

One day I went with some friends by car to an area of the city where we saw there were some *parchggiatori* patrolling the area. We had a good look around to see if we could park somewhere else instead, but no luck. We parked a bit further away so as to try and stay out of their view, but by the time we got out of the car one of them approached us. We decided to ignore him, claiming ignorance as non-Neapolitans and just greeted them with a *ciao* whilst continuing to walk past and left it at that. He started muttering under his breath – how mean, uncivil and dishonourable we were to refuse to give him a tip (despite not even giving him a chance to provide his phony valet service).

Despite its clear purposeful design by the *parcheggiatori*, where violence and criminal damage is only ever subtly insinuated rather than actualised, the passive acceptance of this relationship by drivers, in effect, is extortion. Extortion has many different shades. Obvious extortion would be an overt threat for the purpose of extracting something of value. The passive relationship in our case is something more subtle and grey, where not only is the driver party to the transaction (i.e. they willingly give a “tip”), but also the extorter arrives with a smile, asking for a kind contribution – one that is difficult to refuse due to the miniscule sum, the social politeness trap that the *parcheggiatori* set, and the imagined fear of retribution if the sum is refused.

This attitude towards the *parcheggiatori*, and the often passive acceptance of their activities are illustrative of the ability of criminality, petty or serious, to exist in an area relatively unchallenged. A condition was created whereby there is little incentive (neither financial nor social) to stand up to this incivility and illegality. A driver is left with a “rational” decision of *definitely* losing a few euros, or *maybe* paying 100 or more in damages and in addition to the inconvenience, where individuals are more likely to opt for the less inconvenient option. There are other factors to consider which influence the decision-making process, such as the existence of private parking (i.e. a legal business on privately owned land) which is far more expensive than the tip that the *parcheggiatori* charge, but also more importantly the inability for local law enforcement to prevent this widespread phenomenon. Since there is little option to act in a way that keeps money away from the *parcheggiatori*, and therefore other probable criminal enterprises, there is no incentive to act like a “good citizen” by refusing to pay.

This thesis approaches the nature of extortion with regard to mafia associations and their collection of so-called “protection money” from businesses. Like the *parcheggiatori* and their requests for “tips”, the imagined violence that they evoke and the perceived lack of support from law enforcement to react to such crimes place businesspeople in a troubling situation. This study examines how this has presented itself in a town affected by mafia-type associations, and how this same town was able to pushback against their extorters and win.

i. Introduction

Introduction

During the arrest of a known camorrista at his home in Ercolano in 2009, a small ledger was found in a kitchen cupboard. The ledger detailed, area by area, street by street, every business in the town that his clan was receiving extortion money from, alongside the name or nickname of the owner, the frequency of payment and how much they paid (see Figure 1). Despite the fact that eighty businesses were listed, only six businesses in the area at that time had actually denounced an attempted extortion by the local clans, meaning, for whatever reason, a large number of businesses were paying the local clan in silence without reporting it to the local police. It was clear that the local law enforcement agencies were unable to demonstrate to businesspeople that they would take denunciations seriously. However, with a list of businesses that paid the clan, the police began visiting the businesses one-by-one, assuring them that they could denounce without concerns for their safety. In the subsequent trial, forty-one defendants from the Ascione clan were in court facing forty businesspeople-cum-accusers backed by the local antiracket association for the charge of extortion dating back to the previous decade. They were successfully imprisoned, effectively removing all of the major actors of the extortion racket in the area.

After a series of denunciations against the two local Camorra clans between 2004 and 2009, the refusal of a local baker to pay the Birra clan was met with a bomb being placed in her bakery. The antiracket association and the law enforcement agencies reacted to this by staging a march through the town: demonstrating to the citizens and businesspeople in the town that there was an alternative to paying the clans. They wanted to show that law enforcement agencies were genuinely standing alongside the business community against the clans. The trial that followed was a product of the denunciation of the baker, as well as a number of other local businesses who had decided to denounce together.

Using the case study of the town of Ercolano, Italy, this thesis seeks to understand the process of awakening of civil society and overcoming vicious circles of distrust. It studies how businesspeople and members of Civil Society fought locally rooted mafia-type associations and beat them. In other words, this thesis analyses the process whereby a community previously characterised by distrust in the authorities and the apathetic conviction that things would never change, was able to become the model for the anti-mafia movement. In this, I propose to test two hypotheses: (1) extortion money (the pizzo) paid by businesses to mafia-type associations is best understood as a systemic tax; (2) the process of changing attitudes towards mafia-type associations has become the focus for the anti-mafia movement.

In the rest of this introductory chapter I present a review of the relevant literature where I define the key terms, before stating my hypotheses and their related theoretical framework, followed by my methodology.

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ISAR ALISE	400
COLLETTA B. N. M. M. M. M. M.	200

Figure 1. An excerpt of the Ascione ledger.

As we can see, five different areas/streets are shown, with the name of the business and the pizzo amount to be paid in euros.

(La Repubblica, 8 July 2010)

1 Defining our terms

It is important to define in detail what exactly we mean when we talk of specific terms so as prevent confusion. If words and terms are merely pictures of ideas that speakers exchange between one another, then it is important to get the picture right, whilst also noting that the words each contain contestable ideas. This section is aimed at making sure that when use a term we have the correct picture and the correct ideas.

1:1 Defining organized crime, mafia, Camorra

Similarly to other writers on the topic, I must begin by acknowledging that there is no accepted definition of organized crime in academia. In order to avoid getting caught in a labyrinth of definitions, I have adopted the definition of an organized crime group (OCG) given by the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime:

a structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit (UNODC, 2004, p.5).

This is a fairly broad definition of organized crime that helps us differentiate it from one-off criminals, whilst also placing importance on the necessity of “serious crimes or offences” (UNODC, 2004, p.5) being committed, an aspect which differ in scope from State to State. The character of the offence is determined by various historical, socio-economic and structural conditions, individual and organisational agency, activities (both licit and illicit) conducted by different OCGs in different geographical (or virtual) locations. Following Alison Jamieson (2000), I reject the notion that organized crime is extraneous to society, on the grounds that its formation, organisational history and future trajectory are as much a product of society as they are a determinant of the society around it. This makes the study of organized crime a rather holistic enterprise, where it is important to consider the cultural and historical context in which they exist, as much as the structure of the group itself, where each has the power to shape the other. Given the variety of groups that we have on our planet, the categorisation of certain “types” of organized crime becomes important, so that we may understand and confront them better. Researchers such as Von Lampe (2008) have been wary of comparing “apples and oranges”, distinguishing between (1) entrepreneurial activities and structures, (2) criminal structures that serve a social function and (3) organisations that serve quasi-governmental functions. In the first of these, Von Lampe identifies economic criminal structures aimed purely at financial or material gain. The second refers to providers of contacts, status, or a specific criminal/localised value system. The third

refers to those organisations that enforce rules of conduct or settle disputes in a quasi-legal way in a given territory (Gambetta, 1993; Varese, 2001). Finally, it is important to appreciate that some associations can and do use politics as a means of solidifying and profiting further from their economically profitable activities. As Armao aptly puts:

It might be useful, at least for social scientists if not for politicians and investigators, to consider and define organized crime as a *genus*, including many different *species* depending on the geopolitical and historical context. In other words, we may imagine a sort of *continuum*, starting with organized crime in the sense of a group of individuals who act together to commit crimes of different types (such as robbery, drug pushing, etc.), even on a transnational basis; then moving on to crime syndicates as well structured criminal groups with different hierarchical roles devoted to the search for profits, acting first of all as entrepreneurs; and finally at the other end of the *continuum* mafia, as the most specialized criminal group, also using politics (which means the totalitarian control of a territory) to obtain profits (2003, p.28).

We are able to refer to the organized crime genus as encompassing its broad and literal meaning (i.e. crime that is organised by its perpetrators) as well as the use of local and national politics by a mafia association to gain capital. Within this context comes the question as to how we define *mafia* and how it may differ from an organized crime group in general, an area of debate amongst theorists. Given that, at least in the Anglophone world, the word came into the public eye through cultural assets such as *The Godfather* and other films, plays or books which tend to depict Italian (or Italian-American) organized crime, there is a tendency to equate organized crime in general with *mafia* (like the “Japanese Mafia” or the “Nigerian Mafia”). We should resist this generalisation. The Italian penal code goes some way to addressing this ambiguity, in classifying what it considers to be a *tipo mafioso* (mafia-type) association. Article 416-bis states that:

An organisation is considered mafia-type when those members who take part in the organisation use the force of intimidation and the conditions of subjugation and *omertà* that derive from committing offence, in order to directly or indirectly acquire the management and, therefore, control of economic activities, concessions and public services or to gain profits or unjust advantages for the organisation itself or for others (legge 13 settembre, 1982 n. 646).¹

¹ All translations from the Italian, unless otherwise stated, are mine.

Whilst this provides us with a sufficient cleavage to distinguish the broad UNODC “organized crime group” and slightly less broad “mafia-type” definitions, there is further difficulty when we compare the varying structures and activities of different criminal groups (mafia-type or otherwise). For example, there is a significant difference between the single structure Sicilian Cosa Nostra and the multitude of individual Camorra clans that operate in and around Naples, but they are both to be considered as mafia-type. The former has been theorised as a vertically structured organisation consisting of separate groups (*cosche*), who are ultimately under the jurisdiction and control of the bosses above them (Hess, 1973; Arlacchi, 1988; Dickie, 2007) specialising in selling private protection and trust (Gambetta, 1993). The latter have been theorised as a collection of separate and fragmented clans with no overall control over the area – much less monolithic and often in competition with other local, and often similarly structured, organisations (Saviano, 2007; Behan, 1996; Allum, 2001), at times closer to urban “street gangs” than the cultural image of the *mafia*. For convenience, the terms “mafia” and “mafia-type” association will be used interchangeably as applying to a group understood in this sense in Italian law.

The mafia-type “association” relevant to this thesis is the Camorra, whose members we refer to as *camorrista* (sing.) and *camorristi* (pl.). They originate from the Southern Italian region of Campania, particularly the cities of Naples and Caserta, though they are present throughout the region and conduct their activities throughout the rest of Italy and the world (Sales, 1988; Behan 1996; 2009; Saviano, 2007; Roberti, 2008; Varese, 2011; Allum, 2016). The term “Camorra” alone could be misleading, as it implies that there is one overarching organisation, but the reality is that of individual associations (clans) that sometimes share similar cultural and structural characteristics. In this sense, I share Lamberti’s view that the Camorra as a unitary organisation does not exist, and has never existed (2009, p.484).

Individual clans are geographically rooted in their respective community, “comune” (town) or “quartiere” (district), though they often conduct their activities and have contacts elsewhere. The number of clans and the lucrativeness of the criminal activities that they conduct frequently lead to conflict and alliances between different clans. The clans are often named after the head of the clan and their family, though the clans themselves are not always strictly family orientated and organised. As noted by Di Gennaro, the history of the Camorra is more closely linked with individual urban and family histories who expand into their own territories through illegal economic activities, rather than as one overarching group or federation (2016, p.25). Individual Camorra clans generally represent what Von Lampe would refer to as “family clans”, whose membership is defined by blood, marriage and extended family through bonds of trust, but also share features of what he refers to as “territorial mafia-like” associations, such as the claim to control over legal and illegal

economic activity (2008, p.12). As the influence of a particular family name within a clan changes, so too does the name of the clan. For example, the clans with which this thesis is most concerned are the “Ascione clan” (named after its founder, Raffaele Ascione) and the “Birra clan” (named after its founder, Giovanni Birra). As in Italian, they are referred with the definite article: for example the Ascione clan is referred to as “the Ascione”. Both clans are based in Ercolano and have alliances with other clans in the surrounding area. Alliances which combine the resources of previously separate clans are denoted by a dash (e.g. the Ascione-Papale clan), though often the more powerful/well known/influential clan is preferred. To avoid confusion in this sense, I will always distinguish between individual clans to refer to localised mafia-type groups in the Campania region, and small m “mafia” for mafia-type associations in Italy in general as prescribed in 416-bis of the Italian penal code. This includes, but is not limited to, the Cosa Nostra/Mafia, Camorra clans, ‘Ndrangheta and the Sacra Corona Unita, operating respectively in Sicily, Campania, Calabria and Puglia.

It is common to refer to criminals who operate in Campania *in general* as “Camorra” or somehow related to Camorra, but this is inaccurate. Whilst it has been common in the media and in speech to refer to the collection of separate Camorra clans in general as “the Camorra” rather than “this clan” or “that clan”, it is perhaps more useful to refer to broad assortment of groups that influence localised social and economic life as a “system” – in which we may include these smaller peripheral criminal groups. This is reflected in locally spoken Neapolitan language which refers to the phenomenon as ‘o sistema (Saviano, 2007; Lamberti, 2009), indicating Camorra clans as a dominant aspect of interlinking and localised power relations. In this sense, much like the use of “mafia”, the word “Camorra” is used for the sake of convenience, given that individual clans referred to as “Camorra” differ in specific history and the activities they conduct, whilst at times sharing a similar location and networks.

This system involves Camorra clans as well as other complimentary actors operating in the gap between the legal and the illegal spheres. This not only benefits these actors, but also expands the networks of the system and increases the influence of such a system in society. The system is elaborated in a visible way (clientelism, counterfeit goods, prostitutes in the street, drugs dealers, news headlines of arrested camorristi, cash-only payments, informal work in cash, etc.) but it is also elaborated in an assumed atmospheric sense whereby one looks at each of these and links it back to the Camorra. The assumption that the shop on the corner is paying protection money; that the women sat on the balcony all day watching passers-by is a look-out; that the group of young men hanging out in the same place day-to-day are discussing dodgy dealings; that the fireworks you see and hear during the night and sometimes during the day are not mere celebrations or kids having fun, but instead

messages between Camorra affiliates (Pine, 2012). Some of these assumptions are correct, some of them are just assumptions, but the innuendo that they could be true is played upon by camorristi and observers alike, thereby helping to foster a unique atmospheric presence which then affects how one interacts with the community to the clans' benefit.

The lucrative/material purpose and logic of organized crime groups in the UNODC definition of the phenomenon is important, as is the distinction made by law 416-bis, but they do not tell the whole story. Difficulty arises when we consider mafia-type associations as having a character that transcends financial or material benefit, such as quasi-governmental functions (Von Lampe, 2008) or the “atmospheric” influence like *o’ sistema*. This is also true when we consider collaboration/infiltration of camorristi in local politics, and the extent to which *o’ sistema* is able to condition a population to reproduce norms and behaviours which are favourable to the clan. This is precisely what we refer to when we talk of the extent to which “mafia” groups on our organized crime continuum have the ability to influence politics. In short, the manner in which a criminal group is able to influence (1) formalised political power – such as politicians/counsellors on how an area is governed and (2) what we could describe as “subtle” political governance such as the conditioning or manipulation of a community, its behaviours and norms in general. In Foucauldian terms this type of power is termed *gouvernementalité*: the manner in which the State governs or exerts control over a population (Foucault, 2008 [1978-79]; Dean, 2009), which we apply here to mafia-type associations in general and Camorra clans in particular, and the manner in which some have been able to shape and mould their “population” without the need for force. This can take various forms. In a very crude sense we can refer to strict politicking – the “carrot” rather than the stick, where a group attempts to demonstrate the advantage of its continued existence to a population.² In a more subtle sense we can refer to the process whereby a mafia is able to gradually assimilate and shape local economic relations, whilst simultaneously moulding societal norms and individual behaviours to serve them through atmospheric assumptions alongside actual activity.

As noted by D’Alessandro (2009) Camorra strategies in a community are such that they attempt to assume a dominant role in relationship networks that create trust between both economic and non-economic actors, assuring greater rootedness in a community in socially, networked and territorial ways. Similarly, according to Sciarrone (2011) it is through the attainment of a certain level of “social consensus” that mafias are able to adapt to social change and (re)produce itself. A mafia’s interlinking networks and structures do this by accumulating and exerting “social capital” (Coleman, 1990; Putnam, 1993), appropriated by

² For example, analysing the account book of a Chicago-based OCG, Levitt & Venkatesh (2000) noted that the group placed money aside to pay for “community events”.

individuals to achieve their own strategic goals (Sciarrone, 2011, p.7). This (re)production involves the (re)defining of behavioural, cultural and social norms that already exist, making a group's existence in an area easier, if not desirable for sections of the populations. I agree with Sanzone (2014) that, whilst the politico/judicial and socio-economic dimensions of the Camorra are important, the cultural aspects that help sustain a clan in an area have been rather understated. As he notes, "there is always a rapport between criminal behaviour and value systems, the culture that sustains, nurtures and often legitimises these types of actions" (2014, p.21). It is here where we can see parts of *'o sistema* in action. I return to this in greater detail in the "theoretical framework" subsection with a particular focus on Gramsci (1999 [1916-1935]) and Bourdieu (1986). Some parts of the population actually want and need *o' sistema* to exist as it provides them with some kind of service (its members, associates, their families, third-party contacts, etc.), others reproduce the cultural signs that the group emits, whereas the rest are placed in a situation where they passively accept its existence.

In this section we have seen that it is important to make the distinction between "organized crime", "mafia" and "Camorra". Organized crime is a broad term and has been used to describe the phenomenon in general, from criminal activity that is organized in a group, to the control or influence of politics to gain capital. There is little or no use in drawing comparisons between a small-time organized crime group and a mafia-type association because they interact with their communities in vastly different ways. The umbrella term of mafia/mafia-type at the other end of the continuum uses politics – both formal and subtle to accomplish their goals in the form of territorial and economic domination without the need for violence. In this thesis we refer to these types of organisations as Camorra clans.

1:2 Protection money, tangente and pizzo

The widespread payment of extortion money in Ercolano is typical of the *mezzogiorno* region (Griboaudi, 2009; Gunnarson, 2014; Grasso, 2014; Ciconte, 2015; Di Gennaro, 2015) as is, more distressingly, the *omertà* codes of silence among segments of the population and mafias themselves. This section discusses the literature around payments paid by businesses to mafias in Italy.

It has been common to refer to this type of payment as "protection money", though this can easily be accused of being nothing more than a euphemistic term, given that the type of 'protection' that is offered by the clans is protection from the clans themselves. Some historians have claimed that a business's non-payment and non-conformity to what the clan requests is not an option without (often violent) reprisals (Hess, 1973, p.103). Other theorists

have noted the contrary, convincingly claiming that there have been occasions where businesses have voluntarily paid mafias for the genuine receipt of a protection service.

Referring to the clandestine slaughtering market in Sicily, Diego Gambetta wrote that a main market for Mafia services is located where the State is unwilling to provide protection, that is, when the business that requires protection is itself illegal (1993, p.17). In this sense, the Mafia was in a position to offer private protection to those illegal businesses or enterprises that were unable to gain protection from the State. As Cayli suggests with reference to Gambetta (1993) and Blok (1974), the mafia phenomenon in Italy cannot be understood without understanding the country's political history, socioeconomic differences amongst its different regions, the lack of central authority in the Southern regions, and the culturally closed social structure of the *mezzogiorno*, where trust among individuals and towards the State was destroyed at the time of unification (2013b). The end of feudalism in the early 19th century and the expansion of the Italian State at the expense of localised traditional power structures in the South after 1860 necessitated the provision of protection and trust by private actors.³ In this context, Mafia entrepreneurs provided private protection to "legal" businesses. These businesses chose to pay for protection from these Mafia entrepreneurs because of the perceived inability of the Bourbon State to provide protection after the transition away from feudalism. In this vacuum of uncertainty, local private entrepreneurs that we now know as Mafiosi flourished, given that they were trusted more than the authorities and were able to reassurances to concerned businesses through their specialised protection. In simple terms, there was a market and demand for protection that the Bourbon State was unable to provide, in the sense that it lacked what Weber called the "monopoly on legitimate violence" (Weber, 1919), which was provided by private entrepreneurs instead. Putnam followed Gambetta and Thomas Hobbes in claiming that Mafiosi provided a kind of "privatised Leviathan", where trust and security were obtained through private Mafia protection, rather than the State or by civic norms and networks (Putnam 1993, pp.146-7). This Leviathan sold two things: protection and trust, which were bought voluntarily by a businessperson and came in the form of a Mafia entrepreneur who would punish those who harm their client's business through robbery, violence, the non-completion of business contracts and even the loss of revenue due to competition. This had a knock-on effect of non-paying businesses being made less secure, since they were protected neither by the State nor by the Mafia with the result that criminals would be more likely to target businesses

³ An account of the evolution of private protection in Italy from Unification onwards is available through VCB Securitas, 2016

that did not have explicit Mafia protection, making the payment for private protection rational.⁴

A connection has been noted between Camorra clans and independent criminal groups whereby assignments of drugs are bought from a clan, and then sold in their territory by independent criminal groups (Gribaudo, 2009). These independent groups have been observed to pay the Camorra clans an additional *tangente* (tribute) (Pine, 2012, pp.3-4). The piazza managers of the Di Biasi clan of the *Quartieri Spagnoli* district in Naples, for example, have been observed to collect a single fixed fee from these independent groups in addition to the payment for the drugs themselves, thus reducing their risks and simply acting as a protector for the dealers themselves (Gribaudo, 2009, p.216). The “product” being sold, *per se*, is both the licence to conduct a business in a territory without hindrance, and a bribe to access aspects of the illicit economy in which the Camorra is involved, including their contacts throughout other areas of the local economy. As declared by Pine:

A *tangente* refers to either a bribe extorted or a bribe paid. A *tangente* is duplicitous; it activates a relation between individuals, a relation that can itself be duplicitous. This is especially that case when paying an extorted bribe is beneficial to the “victim,” and the relation between the “extortionist” and “briber” is more like a business partnership than predatory taxation. The businesses that get entangled in such relations are typically the larger and more powerful corporations whose market success a crime clan prefers to support and enhance. (2012, p.24)

It would be incorrect to call this type of payment strictly “extortion”, in the sense that there is some kind of agreement and mutual benefit between the two parties. The *tangente* refers to this type of payment in general – whether it is a legal or an illegal business. Payment of it may also guarantee protection on behalf of the clan, but also the potential monopoly of a product in the area, where the clan would punish any other businesses that try to operate in their territory who are selling the same product, or the dealer for buying their product from another clan (Gribaudo, 2009, pp.215-6).

An intriguing proposition presents itself when we consider the relationship between legal businesses and Camorra clans to be similar to the relationship between independent criminal group and Camorra piazza managers, such as that described by Gambetta.

⁴ This is comparable to private security burglar alarms in a neighbourhood. A would-be burglar is less likely to attempt a burglary on a house with an alarm, making those houses without alarms more prone to burglaries. If a business openly refers to their Mafia protection, then the principle is the same.

Legal businesses are not “extorted” *per se*, rather, they willingly cooperate with the Camorra for mutual benefit. D’Alessandro (2009) writes of a complex relationship between some “legal” merchants and Camorra clans, as in the case of investments of dirty money into adjacent licit businesses, so that a clan has access to “clean” money. This cooperation between businesses and Camorra becomes spread throughout an area where it becomes socially accepted by the local business community (Beatrice, 2009). Where an extortion racket already exists, a business is able to choose whether to become an active part of the relationship, paying for extra use of Camorra contacts and intermediaries to benefit their business/social status (Arlacchi, 1998), or to remain a passive and extorted business who pays only to continue working. The point is that this is a payment that must be made, and a business can choose whether they are a wilful actor in this transaction or not. In the context of Campania, this is, again, linked to *o’ sistema* and the effect of Camorra socio-economic activity upon the culture and mentality of local social and economic actors.

There is some ambiguity between these different types of payment depending on the rootedness of the mafia in any particular area. As we have already noted, there is a greyness in the distinction between that which represents the Camorra, and that which represents its associates, and the economic activity that the Camorra conducts/influences. The sheer extent of the illegal and informal economy in Campania, including regular economic crimes, makes it incredibly difficult to measure the size of Camorra influence on the sector as a whole (D’Alessandro, 2009), as a result of the numbers businesses who are willing accomplices of the Camorra and those who submit to them are unknowable without detailed access to Camorra financial data.

Given the different motivations for payment, it is necessary to distinguish between those businesses who pay mafias willingly (insofar that the business is a willing partner) and those who pay against their will (insofar that any benefit from payment that they receive is not their reason for payment). For the first categories we have already mentioned these types of payments by an illegal business or enterprise for rent/protection (following Pine: *tangente*); payments by a legal business for protection where the State is unable or unwilling to offer it (following Pine and Gambetta: genuine protection money); and those *area grigia* payments by a legal business for the access to a certain part of the market that a mafia has an influence upon. The following sections examine unwilling payments by businesses where an individual is intimidated or forced to pay. We refer to this as “pizzo”.

The word “pizzo” means “lace”, as in the material. There are various accounts as to why this word has been used to denote payments. A persistent theory is its similarity to the Sicilian word for a bird’s beak, “pizzu”, and a Sicilian phrase about the amount of money taken from

different businesses by the Cosa Nostra: “not too much to ruin the business, but just enough to get the beak wet” (Zaffuto, 2012). Another theory finds its origin in Bourbon prisons in the nineteenth century. As reported by an imprisoned Duke from Lecce, Sigismondo Castromediano, the insides of these prisons were controlled by camorristi who collected “taxes” for every aspect of a prisoner’s life: bread, clothing, and even “rent” for the patch of ground where a prisoner slept. The latter of these was referred to in prison slang as the “pizzo” (Dickie, 2011, p.37-42); theory is that it then entered the vernacular as a word for an obligatory “tax” payment to the Camorra in general. In the context of the business community, the pizzo refers to protection money as an imposition, when a businessperson does not necessarily require “protection” like that ascribed by Gambetta or the *tangente*. Like the Sicilian pizzu, it is not designed to destroy a business, rather it is to take a relatively small amount of money from a business and collect it regularly. Like the pizzo of Castromediano, it is an expression of territorial dominance and the obligations that a business has to a clan to merely exist. Its imposition en-masse in a territory represents a racket, where large swathes of businesses in a community individually pay the pizzo. This general conception of the pizzo is also corroborated by Addiopizzo, a non-governmental organization (NGO) fighting organized crime, helping victims, and encouraging businesses to denounce their extorters. They define the pizzo as:

A type of extortion practiced by the Cosa Nostra and given by shopkeepers that believe that the requests are to secure “protection” on their business. Broadly, it is also a form of control over a territory, in that imposing a duty means claiming the recognition of their own sovereignty.

On a regular basis the collector comes to the entrepreneur to collect a certain amount of money, which will be used to pay salaries of affiliates in the organisation, to look after the families of members in prison, to pay court costs of the bosses and for any other criminal investments. Payment in cash is not the only type of pizzo. It may be replaced or accompanied by the imposition of staff or suppliers close to the clan (Addiopizzo, n.d)

It may come in cash payment as a start-up payment, a monthly payment or yearly payment - there have even been instances where Mafiosi receive payment several times a day of only €1 or €2 at a time, adding up to thousands over the course of a year. But there are other forms of payment which have been recorded in studies into former pizzo-payers in Palermo by Addiopizzo including, but not limited to the installation of mafia-owned “videopoker” gambling machines in shops, cafes or bars, imposed suppliers, imposed stipulation of sub-contracts, imposed staff, imposed co-partnerships (Zaffuto, 2012). In the *Quartieri Spagnoli*

district of Naples a relatively small *pizzo* was collected from businesses in the form of the “*lotteria pasquale*” (Easter lottery), whereby blocks of lottery tickets were distributed to shopkeepers for a mysterious draw. This reduced the extortionate character to the *pizzo*, particularly thanks to the small sum of *pizzo* actually requested. The pretence of mutuality through a “lottery” and the small sums involved simultaneously masked extortion to the authorities, whilst providing a system of checking the level of compliance among local businesses (Grasso, 2006).

In Campania, clans have been noted to impose several different types of *pizzo*, depending on their necessities. As reported by D'Alessandro, similar activities to the *lotteria pasquale* are becoming more common in the historical centre of Naples in the time around elections, whilst more traditional means of *pizzo* payment “a tappeto” (carpet) and “*pizzo periodico*” are becoming less frequent in the city. In the same sense that we can refer to carpet bombing of a city to mean the complete covering of a city, *pizzo* “a tappeto” refers to the carpet covering of an area in *pizzo* requests. D'Alessandro noted that this does not exist at all in the central area of Naples, but instead is more frequent in the Eastern area of the city where the clans are redrawing their presence (D'Alessandro, 2009, pp.442-3). Indeed, the President of *Sos Impresa*⁵ Luigi Cuomo suggested that the type of *pizzo* that a clan imposes gives us an idea about the situation of the clan: in areas where a clan is historically rooted, where extortion is their core business and where there are small clans that are linked with much more structured clans, the *pizzo* is a *tappeto*. Where the extortion is only a small part of the criminal activity, the request is a one-off (Confesercenti Napoli, 2012). The “*pizzo periodico*” instead refers to the periodic payment of *pizzo* at the major religious: Christmas, Easter and sometimes Ferragosto (the August bank holiday) (Gerina and Vasile, 2015).

It has been observed that the phenomenon of extortion is the most evident feature of mafia-type association and is an expression of their territoriality (D'Alessandro, 2009; Grasso, 2012). As such the imposing of *pizzo* is a purposeful operation strategy for the political control of a territory (Colletti, 2016). In judicial terms the criminal action of requesting money from a business develops a scope of “mafia” when it is constant over time, concentrated on a specific territory and carried out in association with others (Grasso, 2006). In this sense we can distinguish between organized crime and those “one time” criminals who extort businesses, and individuals acting alone. In an analysis of racketeering in Naples in the years 2002-6, Tano Grasso noted the progression from simple extortion of businesses towards a kind of territorial power that a racket actually represented:

⁵ *Sos Impresa*: An association founded in Palermo 1991 by a group of businesspeople concerned about the influence of organized crime on their businesses. It now exists as a nationwide association

[t]he decisive breakthrough occurs when the offender becomes a person “of respect” or when they come to be seen in the territory as recognised “authority”. As in the case of the pizzo: the young offender, if paid monthly by a businessperson with 10 employees for the purpose of “protection”, inevitably takes on a different role. Now this “payment” has power: he can now ask the businessperson to hire his friends and relatives or to buy from certain supplies. How can a businessperson reject such a request from his “protector”? (Grasso, 2006, p.12)

This occurs across the territory where the group operates, where the more ingrained the norm of pizzo-paying becomes, the greater power and influence the clan has over a businessperson in strictly power and political terms. This shows economic considerations to be a secondary concern: the political/power driven aspect of the pizzo for a group becomes a particularly useful tool to differentiate between different types of organized crime groups. Eliana Pezzuto noted:

the term racket or “pizzo” therefore refer to criminal conduct designed to obtain regular and systematic payment of a sum of money from economic operators in a particular area, so that they would not be subject to intimidation or retaliation from the group exercising their control. It is not a coincidence that mafias use racketeering as a source of funding as well as an instrument for acquiring consent and conditioning the social and economic life of whole areas of the country, which for years have limited the freedom of enterprise and development for their own benefit. (2015, pp.11-12)

This “conditioning” aspect of racketeering is consistent with the conflict theory strand of sociology, against the functionalist one. In accepting a broadly Marxist rather than Durkheimian understanding of the function of social norms, the pizzo is stated here as an economic imposition as well as a purposeful tactic for pacifying a territory through the creation of certain norms. This pacification and conditioning of a business community to the normality of payment expresses a mafia group’s territoriality and brings a businessperson into contact with *o’ sistema* as a structure as well as a mentality. Once the norm of paying has been established for a business or a business community, the facilitation of further payment becomes easier to collect without the necessity of threats or actual violence. It is worth noting another entity that does this too: the State, particularly when we consider taxation. Businesses pay State taxes because they are required by law to do so, but they are more likely to pay taxes if they judge that other businesses pay them too (Kirchler, 2007). In these terms we can note the similarity between the establishment of tax norms, and the governance of the population by the State, to those conducted by mafia groups. Toros and

Mavelli in particular noted the biopolitical extent to which Camorra clans, similarly to the modern State, exist in a

relation of mutuality, which goes beyond the economic dimension and invests society as a whole through the production of norms, ideas, practices, values, codes of behaviour and specific understandings of what counts as true or false. The Camorra, in other words, is a mechanism of governance/governmentality which has contributed to the production of subjectivities and of a distinctive political vision, albeit one not articulated and presented as such. (2013, p.80)

Insofar that they occupy the same geographical space as the State, Camorra clans extract taxes as their own “rights of seizure” in the form of the *pizzo* (2013, p.80), which for certain clans has been demonstrated to directly go towards a *cassa comune* (common fund) (Colletti, 2016). This fund is managed by those in the upper echelons of a clan for its general organisation, and the provision of economic and legal assistance for camorristi and their families, thus acting as a “fully integrated social security system” (Colletti, 2016, p.74). In this system, Camorra affiliates collect *pizzo* from businesses, then give this to their *capo-zona* (local boss), who gives it to their boss. This money is then pooled in the *cassa comune*, with salaries paid by pushing an amount of this money downstream to the *capo-zona* and then the affiliates (Colletti, 2016, p.59). Alongside this *cassa comune*, money obtained from *pizzo* collection has also been used to provide “clean” money to invest in the legal economy (Sciarrone, 2011). The *pizzo* paid by businesses directly contributes towards this localised social security system in a similar manner to the Liberal State and State taxes. The crucial difference for the Camorra in this context is that the money that goes towards *their cassa comune* is collected from individuals who directly benefit from social security that it facilitates. We see here at least two contrasting spheres of influence: one broadly represented by “the State”, and another broadly represented by “mafiosi”, each one with its own distinct set of socialised values and norms which they draw from one another and a broadly shared understanding of “culture”. This is, of course, a simplification. The following section addresses the issue in a more complex way with regard to Civil Society.

2:3 Civil Society

In this section we introduce the relevant debates and literature concerning Civil Society, which we then place within the context of organized crime. This will be followed by a theoretical overview. Civil society, as noted by Michael Edwards “mean[s] different things to different people, plays different roles at different times, and constitutes both problem and solution” (Edwards, 2004, vi) having been referred to as “a noun (a part of society), an adjective (a kind of society), an arena for social deliberation or a mixture of all three” (ibid.

p.4). When we speak of Civil Society it is important to ask whether we are referring to what is actually observable around us or merely the idealised vision of what it *should* be.

The etymological root of the term is to be found in Cicero's *Societas civilis*, itself deriving from the Aristotelian concept of the *polis* where Civil Society was viewed

as a rule of law and a political community, a peaceful order based on implicit or explicit consent of individuals, a zone of 'civility'. Civility is defined not just as 'good manners' or 'polite society' but as a state of affairs where violence has been minimized as a way of organizing social relations. It is public security that creates the basis for more 'civil' procedures for settling conflict – legal arrangements, for example, or public deliberation (Kaldor, 2003, p.7).

This should be placed in the context of what has been termed the *Civilizing Process* (Elias, 1978) namely: as the modern State evolved and began to have greater influence on individual's lives through education and the pacification of the population in general, individuals began to control their human excesses, developing shame and a greater cognitive awareness of those around them, subsequently reducing interpersonal violence in the community (Freud, 1908; Weber, 1919; Foucault, 1977; Elias, 1978; Pinker, 2011). The emphasis here is that this is only possible through by changing social relations away from "nature" with extra attention given to establishing the "civility" in a society which makes the *Societas civilis* possible. It is of utmost importance for a State/community to have a public monopoly on legitimate violence (Weber, 1919) which, from above, overlooks, manages and secures Civil Society in the form of the *Societas civilis* itself. Social awareness in this context becomes linked to this 'polite society', whereby selfish human urges are controlled, replaced and made subordinate to the State, and therefore, society in general, particularly with regard to abiding by the law. The law is the product of society which, through the apparatus of the State, exists on the one hand for the benefit of society and on the other exists for the State to be able to govern society more effectively as lawmakers seem prudent.

Hegelians and Marxists conceive Civil Society broadly as bourgeois society. We will refer to it as Hegel did as the *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*, whereby Civil Society is "that arena of ethical life between the [S]tate and the family" (Kaldor, 2003, p.8) which was formed with commercial society, the end of feudalism/mercantilism and the development of the bourgeoisie. Thus Civil Society is inseparable from and equated with the bourgeoisie. It is through this specific emancipation from the previous social and economic stratum that we locate the beginnings of *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft*. In the sense that the public monopoly on legitimate violence eased the need for protection in a community, enabling individuals in society to turn their attention to other matters other than protection, increased surplus of

products and the emancipation of the bourgeoisie gave the bourgeoisie more time to turn their attention to other matters other than production. Somewhat hammering the point, Hegel regarded Civil Society as:

the achievement of the modern world ... the territory of mediation where there is free play for every idiosyncrasy, every talent, every accident of birth and fortune, and where waves of passion gush forth, regulated only by reason, glinting through them. (Hegel quoted in Kaldor, 2003, pp.11-12)

Here Civil Society is about the interactions between people outside of the family and the State. Expanding upon the Marxist concept of *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft* we can also identify another cleavage through Gramsci, who instead viewed Civil Society in the words of David Forgacs as:

the sphere in which a dominant social group organizes consent and hegemony, as opposed to a political society where it rules by coercion and direct domination. It is also a sphere where the dominated social groups may organize their opposition and where an alternative hegemony may be constructed. (1999, p.420)

It is essential to note that Gramsci had a much more fluid conception of difference between State and Civil Society, contending that the “Statist” and “political elements” of civil and consensual organisations matched the disciplinary mechanisms of the State despite their voluntary aspects (Bellamy and Schecter, 1993, p.119). These disciplinary mechanisms remind us of Foucault’s concept of *biopolitique* (or rather, it is Foucault who follows Gramsci), which, combined with the idea of a ‘dominant social group’ aspiring to impose its own hegemony, serves to entrench Civil Society in a Statist (or rather, in Gramsci’s words, “ruling class”) discourse. To reiterate, the strictly Marxist and Hegelian view of *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft* places Civil Society simply in the gap between family life and the State, whereas the Gramscian conception contends that it is rather the “ensemble of organisms commonly called ‘private’” (Gramsci, 1999, p.306) that one in direct contrast with political society / the State.

Following this we can look at the largely protest- and activist-driven ‘post-Marxist’ conception of Civil Society which

presupposes a [S]tate or rule of law, but insists not only on restraints on [S]tate power but on a redistribution of power. It is a radicalization of democracy and an extension of participation and autonomy. On this definition, civil society refers to active citizenship, to growing self-organization outside formal political circles, and

expanded space in which individual citizens can influence the conditions in which they live both directly through self-organization and through political pressure.
(Kaldor, 2003, p.8)

The emphasis is on civic culture and the production and expansion of civic-ness, all in the context of democratic principles, to include aspects such social mobility, the social/political involvement of people in the world they live in and holding political power to account, whether this be purely on the local, regional, national or international level. There is not necessarily a 'need' for the State in this regard, but the utilisation of concepts drawn from Civil Society is made easier by the States cooperation and/or implementation. Civil Society contains an unavoidable political aspect, even if this is limited to the expansion of democracy, with an emphasis on acceptance, tolerance and a general anti-racist and anti-discriminatory discourse supplemented alongside the widespread inclusion of peoples in general. This Civil Society is probably much better understood as a kind of social movement or zeitgeist, with a general focus on people wanting change from the bottom-up.

The subsequent broad (neo)liberal strand of Civil Society is the most prevailing and actively enacted understanding of the term, given the rise of international institutions such as the World Bank and the post-1990 supremacy of neoliberal economics.⁶ From its roots in traditional liberal writers of the 18th century such as those associated with the French and American revolutions as well as in the 19th century through writers such as Alexis de Tocqueville (1988 [1840]). We see a comprehension of Civil Society which focusses on self-help of individuals with regard to a community would alongside a State become limited. Civil Society is viewed as necessarily separate from, but also complementary to the State. In his study on Democracy in America, Tocqueville identified the increasing foundation of voluntary associations (which we can consider Civil Society Organizations) in the United States to be a result of a non-intrusive (neo)liberal State because:

among democratic peoples all the citizens are independent and weak. They can do hardly anything for themselves, and none of them is in a position to force his fellows to help him. They would all therefore find themselves helpless if they did not learn to help each other voluntarily. (1988, pp.514-5)

⁶ The terms "neoliberalism" and "neoliberal economics" are politically loaded and have a dense literature. For clarity's sake, when I refer to them, I am referring to the broad set of policies that advocate moves away from a centralised State towards greater privatisation so as to give individuals the control of their own destinies, away from the perceivedly overbearing and intrusive State. In particular, I am referring Hayekian economics as presented in Hayek's *Road to Serfdom* (1943).

This means that the formation of associations was necessary for individuals to survive, for the community as well as the State to function better, and to improve the freedom of its citizens:

If the inhabitants of democratic countries had neither the right nor the taste for uniting for political objects, their independence would run great risks, but they could keep both their wealth and their knowledge for a long time. But if they did not learn some habits of acting together in the affairs of daily life, civilization itself would be in peril. A people in which individuals had lost the power of carrying through great enterprises by themselves, without acquiring the faculty of doing them together, would soon fall back into barbarism. (1988, pp.514-5)

Civil Society is seen as a natural outcome of the liberal State, which then further complemented the freedom, liberty and democracy of the citizens of that State. De Tocqueville further iterates what these associations entail, and how they functioned in 19th century American society

Americans of all ages, all stations in life, and all types of disposition are forever forming associations. There are not only commercial and industrial associations in which all take part, but others of a thousand different types – religious, moral, serious, futile, very general and very limited, immensely large and very minute. Americans combine to give fêtes, found seminaries, build churches, distribute books and send missionaries to the antipodes. Hospitals, prisons, and schools take shape in that way. Finally, if they want to proclaim a truth or propagate some feeling by the encouragement of a great example, they form an association. (1988, pp.513)

To de Tocqueville, not only was Civil Society in this manner complementary to democracy in the United States, but also essential for the trust bonds and general survival of the liberal State and liberal ideals in general.

The sheer breadth of all of these conceptions leads us to say that when we talk of Civil Society in general as it is fostered by the Liberal State, we are not talking about specific organisations – we are talking broadly about ideas of active citizenship, cooperation, tolerance, pluralism, social movements, associationalism and mutual interests between people which can (but does not always) manifest itself through organisations. Given the prevalence of this ideology, when we speak of Civil Society Organizations (and strictly its “organizations”) we use the definition which is provided by the World Bank:

the wide array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide array of organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based organizations, professional associations, and foundations. (World Bank, 2013)

These are sometimes used as a “complement to government action” (World Bank, 2013), which unavoidably cements the majority of action and legitimacy originating from the State. Without the State, Civil Society is unable to flourish, but without Civil Society the (liberal) State would find the achievement of democracy, liberty and freedom much more difficult. This indisputably broad definition we can see a Civil Society that is necessarily distinctive from the governments and for-profit businesses vision that can encompass cultural and personal life. The main emphasis from the World Bank definition is that of “organizations” which somewhat delimits Civil Society as “a non-profit third sector” which seeks to substitute for varying State functions (Kaldor, 2003, p.9), which, given the emphasis we also wish to give on ideas and mentality associated with Civil Society (the noun), that often exist without complimenting government action, does not tell the whole story.

The difficult definition and uses of Civil Society are important in the context of our study. In the context of the western world where (neo)liberalism is most pervasive, the idea that individuals have the power to better their own communities through Civil Society and associationalism is an important one. Likewise, different associations are founded for different reasons and thus may understand their importance for their community and the manner in which they interact with the State in different ways. Plurality in this context is key, but so is the observation that the State chooses to fund certain Civil Society Organizations, certain activities, or certain campaigns over others, broadly based on the efficient allocation of resources that facilitates Social Capital only so far as it will lead to self-help and independence from further State intervention. In this context it is important to reiterate not only that Civil Society is used and co-opted by the State, but also to stress its importance as a multitude of actors outside of State influence and its role in creating and fostering different cultures, behaviours and beliefs.

Now that I have explained my key terms, I can proceed to my hypotheses before showing my theoretical framework.

2: Research questions and hypotheses

One of the central questions that I seek to answer in this thesis is “what is the pizzo?” How does it function, and how is it enforced? The pizzo itself is the centrepiece of this project because, unlike other actions that characterise actions by mafia-type associations, it is a phenomenon that explicitly expresses a clan’s territoriality (D’Alessandro, 2009; Grasso, 2012; Colletti, 2016) and sovereignty over a local population. With this I hypothesise that for the clans, for the judiciary, for law enforcement agencies and for the businesses who pay it, the pizzo is understood as a systemic tax. I follow this line of reasoning: it is a tax in the sense that, similarly to the taxes an individual pays to the modern State, a person is duty-bound to pay it. Non-payment without good reason involves some form of disciplinary action: where the State uses fines and potential prison time, the Camorra demands extra payment and may inflict violence. It is paid to an entity which pools the money together for the benefit of what it sees fit. In the case of the Liberal State, elections ensure that the money collected from individuals across society benefits the community as a whole (at least in theory). In the case of Camorra clans, the collection of the pizzo has been demonstrated to go towards the general organisation of the clan and its own clandestine social security system, such as paying salaries of its members, their families and other essentials such as legal fees (Sciarrone, 2011; Colletti, 2016) comparable to a State civil service, for the benefit of an unelected authority represented by the boss, their family and their advisors.

Similarly to the payment of State taxes, the payment of pizzo is facilitated by established norms: as a general occurrence an individual does not pay taxes because they are scared of the repercussions of non-payment. Certainly individuals are aware of the potential repercussions of non-payment, but pay taxes because it is an established norm in a society, rather than because they are fearful of these repercussions. By hypothesising the pizzo as a systemic tax that a business is duty bound to pay, we note that there is an established norm of paying in this context. Like the State, it is hypothesised that clans have moved past the need for violence as a means of extracting money from a community in a systematic manner – businesses pay the pizzo, like they pay taxes, because there is an established norm for doing so. This is intrinsically linked to the absence of the *metus causa factum* (Pezzuto, 2015, p.10): tax is not paid due to fear of violence from the establishment, but instead because it is the norm to do so - a businessperson does not worry about tax payment, and though could complain about it, it is a generally accepted factor when managing a business. This norm has been established by multiple payments to the clan over time whereby a business becomes accustomed to the payment to the point at which it is normal and habitual to pay, here I draw similarity with La Boétie and the concept of *servitude volontaire* (1975 [1553]). This is where conflicting cultural spheres come into consideration: one that

comprehends the payment of money or services to an organized crime as a “bad” thing vs. another that views it as normal or even essential. The process of regularising pizzo payment is assumed to be like “creeping normality”, or what we can best metaphorically explain as a frog in boiling water. If a frog is placed into boiling water, it will jump out immediately. If it is placed in lukewarm water on a hob where the water is slowly brought to boil, as the metaphor goes, the frog will not realise and instead be boiled. The thought process here is the same – a business is initially approached for a small amount of money for pizzo. A cost-benefit calculation is made, whereby it is deemed more beneficial to actually pay the pizzo. At this point the Camorra increases the temperature and extracts as much as they can out of the business. From the perspective of the businesspeople, perhaps the best philosophy to consider would be the so-called “slippery slope” or in legal jargon *Principiis obsta et respice finem*,⁷ lest the businessperson become subject to the overt control and influence of the camorrista without even realising. The tyrant then imposes a kind of disciplinary mechanism which fosters the reproduction of a desired behaviour (Foucault, 1977).

On a broader societal level, the use of symbolism plays an important part of this. In a 2012 reflective article about his 1993 *magnum opus*, *The Sicilian Mafia*, Diego Gambetta referred to symbols and insinuations that influenced individual decision making. He refers to a 1986 anecdote of a Canadian research in Palermo who was nudged into leaving: “Someone had stolen his dirty laundry from his car boot, and a few days later he found it cleaned and ironed back in the boot of his car with a note that simply said “buon viaggio”” (2011, p.8) concluding his article that “I too received interesting subtle messages that encouraged a rapid exit. I thus realised that violence was not the only resource of these men.” (pp.8-9). These are examples of “aesthetic-affective effects” that Pine referred to in 2012 referring to the Camorra and its influence on culture in Naples. These “effects” refer to the atmosphere that a group is able to evoke by not actually doing very much. The idea that they were there was enough to influence one action or another (Pine, 2012, p.14). This represents the power that a mafia-type association has over an area, indeed, if anything, the need to use actual violence shows that the group is in less power than previously assumed.

In this manner the concept of the pizzo as simple “extortion” and for pure financial gain is rejected, as there is undoubtedly an element of habit and “moulding” of a certain culture of obedience being developed. The payment of pizzo has a very political and power-centric aspect to it: the amount of money that is collected can often be rather small. Other activities such as drugs trafficking and involvement in the waste disposal industry are far more lucrative, but do give a group a direct territorial sovereignty over an area. It is in the small

⁷ Resist the beginnings and think about the outcome.

amounts involved and the repeated submission to the tyrant where it is claimed that these types of disciplining mechanisms which facilitate the payment of *pizzo* make the *pizzo* similar to a tax, albeit a clandestine one that exists for the benefit of a smaller segment of society – rather than the whole of it.

In hypothesising that the *pizzo* functions as a means of social control and influence, particularly in the way in which it fosters consent and norms which favour the clans, we move towards our second hypothesis. I hypothesise that the process of changing attitudes towards mafias has become the focus for the anti-mafia movement. It is hypothesised that actions against organized crime in Italy inherently have a “social” or “cultural” angle, whereby mentalities that help to sustain a clan’s presence in an area have been purposely targeted by the State. In general terms we look towards the way in which a clan is able to continue existing in an area, whereby we point towards a general criminal/mafia (sub)culture and cultural sphere which contrasts to the culture which the State tries to develop. In more specific terms, we focus on the way that the practice of *pizzo* paying has become normalised, and then how the State and/or Civil Society react to this normality. Different Civil Society groups, State supported or otherwise, are understood to have approached the issue of organized crime as a problem of mentality, social conditions and culture. In this sense, I borrow from Bourdieu’s concept of the *habitus*, which we understand to mean the embodiment of Cultural Capital in a physical space (1986). The response of the anti-mafia movement is one which attempts to alter and reconfigure the existing *habitus* through pedagogy and engagement. This is hypothesised to be a kind of Cultural Warfare (Gunnarson, 2008), where we engage in broader notions of Cultural Hegemony (Gramsci, 1999 [1916-1935]) and the manner in which it reconfigures localised Cultural Capital. In broad terms, I point to the co-option of individuals in a society through the changing of localised cultural norms alongside the role of soft “community” policing and traditional law enforcement tactics as a means in which a deeply rooted mafia association may be defeated.

I hypothesise that given the normalised rationale for payment in the “criminal” sphere, the State/Civil Society has responded by attempting to change or shape the manner in which businesspeople view the relationship between their businesses and security. They seek to emphasise that the State *is* present and *will* react to charges of extortion, because it is on the businesses’ side. In understanding the importance of social power and culture, purposeful actions coordinated by the State but enacted by Civil Society and individualised trust networks are pursued in order to sideline and replace the socio-cultural norms that sustain criminal governance. This is not simply a process of demonstrating the existence of a Hobbesian State Leviathan, but a process that involves the co-option of Civil Society at the

expense of the clans in a broadly neoliberal approach to governance based on relationships of trust. I propose to analyse this process in one geographical area where the Camorra is very present. The State and various Civil Society groups are theorised to have approached the issue of Camorra in this context as a problem of contrasting social norms and culture that hinders good governance and that which is perceived to be a good society. The task of altering these norms is then wedded to repression by law enforcement agencies and the judiciary as a means of uprooting Camorra in an area.

The backbone of these two hypotheses is an assertion that the Camorra cannot and should not be countered purely in Statist and judicial term, and that the State and Civil Society have reacted accordingly. Judicial repression removes those who are already involved in Camorra clans and their associates, and therefore those who are a product of their environment, but it does not (at its purest) address underlying factors that cause and sustain the Camorra as a phenomenon. With regard to the *pizzo*, the nature of the relationship between the citizen and the State is examined focusing on a mixture of the breaking down of the State monopoly on violence and taxation (Weber, 1919), as well as the development of a rival “criminal”/“mafia” cultural sphere. At the very least, this sphere is understood to have partially occupied the same *habitus* as the State, claiming some localised sovereignty, and sustained by a populace who are apathetic, accustomed or outright endeared to the influence of the Camorra in their area.

3: Theoretical framework: Cultural Capital and Hegemony

Following Jamieson (2000) we reiterate that mafia-type associations are not extraneous to society. Their members and their activities part are both a product and modifier of the society and culture, with their norms, values and incentives of which they are part. As such, they should be studied through a sociological lens. Notwithstanding the existence of the State, mafia-type associations have been noted to have developed particular types of quasi-governmental functions (Von Lampe, 2008) on a localised level. It is also important to note that many of these groups continue to exist due to some kind of collaboration or consent of non-members around them. Following on from my hypotheses, this section explores two broad themes. The first is how a mafia-type association affects specific cultural norms, values and beliefs within an area. The second is the role of incentives, and how a mafia-type association and the society in which they exist incentivise (or dissuade) individuals from certain actions, particularly through those localised cultural norms, values and beliefs. Here we consider the way that these social, economic and cultural factors help to sustain a particular localised power structure by consent.

I interpret the role of social norms through the lens of conflict theory, following a broadly Marxist interpretation of society and the economy under capitalism (Marx, 1990 [1867]). Contrary to Durkheimian interpretations thereof, conflict between different sections (classes) of society under the existing economic system is understood to be the main driver in socio-economic relations. Following the discourse of 20th century Marxist scholars (such as Gramsci) that sought to explain why the capitalist system had not collapsed as Marx predicted, I point to culture, norms and hegemony that made individuals act against their own self-interest. As such I interpret social norms as serving to entrench an *élite* in a society, in a vertical and permeating manner. Following this mantra, I draw on concepts of Cultural Hegemony (Gramsci, 1999), Cultural Capital (Bourdieu, 1986) and *corps dociles* (docile bodies) (Foucault, 1977; 2008), whereby the interlinking norms of a society (an external influence on the Ego) and inter-personal relations reconfigure personal development and behaviour to be more attuned to the necessities of the *élite*. As a social class, the *élite* maximises its benefits, establishing dominance in real terms, but also in cultural and hegemonic terms. This *élite* is interpreted on multiple levels: both at the level of State and society in general, and on the local level where a local *élite* is able to influence local social norms. From a Foucauldian perspective, I note the role of governance in shaping and moulding a society to be more easily governable (*gouvernementalité*).

With regard to Cultural Hegemony, I refer to the ability of an *élite* to govern by consent. For Gramsci this referred to the process by which cultures and behaviours that help sustain the dominant economic system permeated from the *élite* down to other social strata. This simultaneously made *élite* norms, cultures, values and behaviours appealing to classes below (as an incentive for their self-improvement), but also helped maintain the status quo (Gramsci, 1999). An earlier illustration of this was provided by La Boétie (1975), who, drawing upon the socio-economic position of French serfs under feudalism, noted how society became so permeated with traditions and ideas that sustained this structure that revolt was unthinkable. In a similar fashion Alain Badiou referred to this as “enemy propaganda”:

‘The goal of enemy propaganda is not to annihilate an existing force (this function is generally left to police forces), but rather to annihilate an *unnoticed possibility of the situation*.’ In other words, they are trying to *kill hope*: the message of this propaganda is a resigned conviction that the world we live in, even if it is not the best of all possible worlds, is the least bad one, so that any radical change can only make it worse.” (Žižek, 2015, pp.233-234)

This serves to reinforce the status quo in that it renders ideas of alternatives as naïve or foolhardy, whilst also inhibiting individuals from acting out of self-interest. Similarly here I draw on the thought of Wilhelm Reich on the mass psychology of fascism, noting in particular his astonishment in the relatively low number of people who actually steal food regularly despite being hungry (Reich, 1946). They have been socialised into thinking that stealing is wrong and, therefore, starve rather than break the law, acting against their own self-interest.

For communities that have been influenced by a mafia-type association and its cultural hegemony the logic is the same. Where they have been able to gain a foothold in a community, influencing the socio-economic lives of the inhabitants, there are remnants of this kind of hegemony that affect individual behaviours that serve to benefit the group itself. This becomes particularly acute in areas where the State is largely perceived as absent or uncaring, where a mafia-type association is able to disrupt or outright replace State-emanating Cultural Hegemony, with particular regard to pedagogy and behaviour. On one side, individuals are co-opted to join these groups, or reproduce cultural and behavioural norms that sustain this status quo. On the other, the permeation of these groups into the fabric of society is enough to make other re-orderings of society and social relations unthinkable, thereby applying the logics of power in this structure to other structures too. This is a view that would be best summarised in the widely held view that the mafias are corrupt, but so too are the politicians which leads to the belief that, nothing will ever change.

⁸ This is the least bad of all worlds.

Through this quasi-governmental function they have ability to affect local socio-economic power relations, which influences the behaviour of members in this localised society and culture. In occupying this hierarchical role and influencing socio-economic power relations in place of the State, a mafia-type association is able to influence how individuals interact with the society around them, either willing it purposefully or just as a reaction to the existing power relations. This applies to an individual's decision to join or cooperate with a criminal group, as much as it applies to people who commit criminal or financial misdemeanours, and businesses who decide whether to denounce an extortion request or not.

In particular, mafia Cultural Hegemony is understood to have pacified their local population through the diffusion of cultures and behaviours that undermine trust in the State in favour of

⁸ A similarity can be drawn between Evans & Giroux's (2015) analysis of youths in the American crime series "The Wire", wherein the logic of Chess was applied to the permanence of local power relations where the structure always stayed the same. The small-time pawns have the ability at their own risk to become a big-time queen and do as they like, to try and kill the king, but the structure, the norms of movement, always stays the same (pp.156-8).

mafias as localised groups. It is a hegemony that accepts the crimes that mafias commit, but also believe that politicians do far worse, and that committing crimes is just a fact of life: criminality is everywhere and politicians are crooks who only help someone when it is in their interests to do so. It is a hegemony that pacifies a population through apathy and the disbelief that a person can change the system as it is. The philosophy of a notable Camorra boss of the 1970s, Raffaele Cutolo, for example, was noted by Dickie (2013) as an ideology that was crudely nihilistic to its core. It seemed to give agency to young uneducated and troubled Neapolitans to escape their almost certain future in poverty, in favour of a life as a camorrista that was conceived as more glamorous. The only way to escape was to become a deviant in an unjust society:

“The day when the people of Campania understand that it is better to eat a slice of bread as a free man than to eat a steak as a slave is the day that Campania will win.” Cutolo also directly defines personal sovereignty. It emerges in the art of making do, and it culminates in a sort of self-making combustion: “The value of life doesn’t consist of its length but in the use made of it; often people live a long time without living very much. Consider this, my friends, as long as you are on this earth everything depends on your willpower, not on the number of years you have lived.” (Pine, 2012, p.51)

This is not a perspective that should be wholly rejected as propaganda, but something which should be considered when analysing the appeal or hegemonic pacification that the Camorra has. It demonstrates the extent to which Camorra clans have had an “ideology” *per se*, with their own value system which can be contrasted to broader society and development sought by the State. It is a lens through which its members interpret the world around them.

Through the Camorra and ‘o *sistema*, young Neapolitans that have relatively little agency are able to seize some. They start playing the same games as the corrupt politicians they see in the media, but on a smaller and more violent scale that only really reveals itself locally. They see those who have freed themselves from the conflicts that life naturally brings as denying parts of themselves, and as hypocritical – since they would be as violent and corrupt as them if they weren’t so safe (and bored) in their ivory towers. Conflict is a natural part of life, so why not seize that fruitful and exciting part of life? – by force if necessary. It is a reaction to a system that some young Neapolitans feel has failed them, and does not help reach all of those things they want in their life, and for their community and countrymen.

This works at its crudest for a prospective camorrista, but more subtly for the businessperson who wants to benefit from the position of the Camorra, and even more subtle still for the businessperson who pays the pizzo without denouncing because the

position of camorristi, criminality and dirty dealing is understood as a simple and unchangeable fact of life.

The appeal of *mafiosità* (mafia-ness) is an important cultural factor to consider, and is related to a hegemony that competes with the traditional State hegemony. On that which is Schmittian “political”⁹ in this context, it is worth recalling the notable case of a Camorra *capoclan* (boss) who purposely used his “lower class” regional Neapolitan language in a formal “Italian” setting of the courtroom, a social *faux-pas* in Italy, which should not be understood in purely classist terms:

While the judge has the distinction of wealth, status, influence, and family name, the same is true for the capoclan. From this perspective, the self-aggrandizing performance of ‘O capoclan rival those of the judge. The judge sees an undereducated man indulging in the arrogant excesses of *smania di protagonismo* (the neurotic need to be the centre of action). ‘O capoclan sees the judge, and by extension the magistrature, not as the adjudicator of a sovereign state but as a force that competes with his own personal sovereignty ... Both the camorrista and the judge see each other as pretenders to power. (Pine, 2012, p.32)

There is an allure to becoming a camorrista outside of a purely economic dimension that plays on the rejection of formalised power systems in favour of a more individualised one. In this example we see the competing localised power relations *contra* the intrusion of the Italian State. There are two competing cultural spheres with different value systems converging in the same geographical space. The values that generically defined “camorristi” contrast with those of the generically defined “judge”, “magistrature” and “State”, in the sense that they hold different cultural signs, norms and behaviours to be more attractive or appealing than others.

This may be interpreted through Bourdieu’s notions of Cultural Capital (1986). The latter refers to the types of education and socialisation that determine an individual’s progress in a society. In our case we have two broadly different spheres with two broadly different value systems for interpreting the value of an individual’s Cultural Capital. In this context, ‘o’

⁹ “The political must therefore rest on its own ultimate distinctions to which all action with a specifically political meaning can be traced. Let us assume that in the realm of morality the final distinctions are between good and evil, in aesthetics beautiful and ugly, in economics profitable and unprofitable. The question then is whether there is also a special distinction which can serve as a simple criterion of the political and of what it consists. The nature of such a political distinction is surely different from that of those others. It is independent of them and as such can speak clearly for itself.

The specific political distinction to which political actions and motives can be reduced is that between friend and enemy” [Italics added for emphasis] (Schmitt, 1929, p.26).

Capoclan” and the judge differ upon which behaviours and cultural signs they deem to be more attractive. In this geographical space we see the convergence and conflict between these two value systems. One claims to represent a type of “localness”, “Napoletanità” (Neapolitan-ness) and an authenticity to one’s true inner Hobbes, Machiavelli or Thucydides that characterises the manner in which to reclaim one’s individual agency. The other claims to represent that which is liberal, lawful, “cultured”, ordered and civilized in the normatively and societally determined meaning of each term. There is a profound difference between what the “criminal” or “mafia” sphere and the “State” or “Civil Society” sphere consider more valuable in cultural terms. Not only are the aspects of Cultural Capital profoundly different, but so too are the types of Cultural Capital. Bourdieu held that Cultural Capital can present itself in three forms: Embodied: such as skills, abilities and competences; Objectified: such as the functions of objects to demonstrate these skills and competences and; Institutionalized: such as university degrees which demonstrate such competences. For o’ capoclan and the judge the importance of each form and what each deems to be important within each form differs immensely.

Camorra clans in this sense are reliant on certain types of Cultural Capital to exist, as well as creating and then developing further types of dispositional Cultural Capital for aspects of the population which allow it to carry on existing. This explains the use of already existing cultural imagery and events, such as religious processions (*La Repubblica*, 8 June 2016; Sales, 2016), which enable an appropriation and then adoption of a certain cultural value which a community deems valuable for the benefit of changing a clan’s “image”. The rejection of State-related institutional Cultural Capital (such as degrees and institutional education) holds a different reasoning. Given that Camorra power in a poor and less educated community relies on its ability to attract those who are poor and less educated, adopting a mentality that is less about philosophy and knowledge and more about what is the case and situation at hand. Pine noted a similar rejection of institutional (embodied) Cultural Capital for members of the Camorra when he wrote that:

the camorrista’s authority rests not on “formal” education but on his know-how. Rather than the presumed impartial sovereignty of reason, it is his “embodied intelligence” and his awareness of the possibilities for action that render him supreme. The camorrista concerns himself less with ideas of “truth” or “justice” than with what Niccolò Machiavelli called the “effectual truth of things.” [*la verità effettuale*] (Pine, 2012, p.33)

This is the same for the society which they inhabit, and it is to the Camorra’s strength that they are able to focus on localness and those who are the “bread and butter” of an area to

justify their own existence as a pure product of the society they inhabit, and are a reaction to the (often) corrupt politicians and State. In the context of Civil Society, both as *societa civilis* and as represented through organisations and associations, conflicting (cultural) hegemonies are used by forces who wish to uproot mafia-type associations in a community, as well by these same associations to further entrench themselves in the same community.

In “criminal” appeals to a population, pro-crime “embodied” Cultural Capital becomes more valuable to individuals in a society than that which is anti-crime. The role of Civil Society regarding the fight against organized crime, then, to use Bourdieu’s notions of Cultural Capital as well as Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, is to change the nature of the *habitus* where the socio-cultural sphere of “Civil Society” meets the broadly and pejoratively termed “mafia” or “criminal” socio-culture sphere that now inhabits it.¹⁰ In communities which have become heavily influenced by these kinds of mafia/criminal socio-cultural spheres, the aim should be on the one hand to discredit these spheres whilst at the same time proposing/creating/developing a different spheres entirely to counter them. Following Gramsci, Civil Society that receives the support from *élites* becomes a mechanism to permeate the appropriate ideology in the form of cultural and behavioural norms. This has been achieved by development in a broadly targeted manner that fosters self-sufficiency and “resilience” (Duffield, 2014 [2001]; Evans and Reid, 2014; Singha, 2005) through selective developmental funding. This *élite* ideology then permeates the rest of society, co-opting private individuals and associations, thereby providing a foothold that ensures the survival of the status quo, whilst also developing society in a certain direction that ensures its easier governability within a certain demarcation of private freedoms. In this context, it is noteworthy that not all development is ‘good’ and worthy of promotion (Evans and Reid, 2014, p.84), and that Civil Society Organizations are funded and co-opted on the basis of their applicability to State policy. In focussing on Cultural Capital, Civil Society and the State *though* the disposition of a culture of legality, local socialisation processes are altered in a purposeful way, thereby affecting the manner in which individuals see the Camorra, legality and organized crime in general.

What we have not discussed yet however is the specific appeal that mafia-type associations provide to individuals in a population, and how the State and Civil Society are able to counter it. Alongside specific lucrative and economic factors, the attractiveness of a mafia-type

¹⁰ As noted in 1929 by John Landesco of criminal and “good citizen” spheres in Chicago: “the gangster is a product of his surroundings in the same way in which the good citizen is a product of his environment. The good citizen has grown up in an atmosphere of obedience to law and of respect for it. The gangster has lived his life in a region of law breaking, of graft, and of “fixing.” That is the reason why the good citizen and the gangster have never been able to understand each other. They have been reared in two different world” (1929, p.1057)

association has been achieved by the appropriation of specific cultural signs that align interests or beliefs of a population with the group. In the *mezzogiorno* region the alignment of certain local Church parishes with criminal clans has been an issue, whereby religious parades have purposely walked below balconies of local clan bosses to show respect, giving some symbolic weight to the clan from the Church. It should not be forgotten that camorristi and their supporters are very much a part of the society and therefore the culture in which they live. For example, it has been observed that camorristi have gesticulated towards Catholic symbols such as the crucifix before or after organized killings (Sales, 2016), with a view of making their act of killing somewhat redemptive or sacred. Other local cultural signs and indicators create some kind of symbiosis in this respect too. The use of regional languages and manners of speaking (Pine, 2012, p.32), normative values of honour and masculinity (Trevaglino et al., 2016), combined with symbolism, symbolic appropriation¹¹ and expressions of localness vis-à-vis the State¹² make normatively understood notions of criminal behaviours openly accepted by a society. A notable example elsewhere is the funding of community events, such as that described by Levitt and Dubner (2006, p.91-2) where an American OCG placed money aside to pay for social events to keep the locals favourable.

As Roy Godson explained with regard to drug cartels along the US-Mexican border, it is difficult to encourage a population, particularly young people, to oppose organized crime when popular media reinforce ideas about organized crime and trafficking through pro-drugs/machismo songs (2000, p.98). In the context of the Camorra in Naples, we need only look at the symbiosis of artists, agents and lyrics of the local *Neomelodici*¹³ music scene with Camorra clans and camorristi (Pine, 2012; Sanzone, 2014). Some of the lyrics, for example, speak of the honour and prestige that being a camorrista brings (see Sanzone 2014 in particular) promoting this choice in life. Whilst we should be cautious in splitting songs into a pro- and anti-crime camp, the songs represent at the very least the failure of the State/society to provide adequately for its citizens. It is important to note, as we have already done, that criminal groups are a part of the society in which they live – meaning that any appeal that they have is based on pre-existing notions. As Allum (2001) noted, notions of

¹¹ See for example the “Trademarks” section in: Gambetta (1993, p.127-158); the apparent mimicking of the Marlon Brando’s portrayal of the fictional “Don Corleone” from Francis Ford Coppola’s *The Godfather* (1972) by Cosa Nostra boss Luciano Leggio during a 1974 court appearance in Dickie (2004, p.184) that demonstrates the dual nature of symbolism, where art mimics life and life mimics art.

¹² An example of this is the accepted use of violence as a means of defending one’s honour in the culture of the American South as demonstrated in: Nisbett and Cohen (1996).

¹³ Neomelodici is referred to by Pine as “voicy Neapolitan-language lyrics, disco-pop tones and melodramatic (and ironic) melodies”. Famous Neomelodici songs such as “Nu Latitante”, “il mio amico camorrista” romanticise qualities of “camorristi”. The relationship between the Camorra and some of the music studios that produce this kind of music is available in. (2012).

family and friendship are closely related to honour in the South, which have been exploited by the Camorra. Individuals have joined the Camorra and have stayed loyal to it because of the bonds of friendship that the group provides them with. The appeal of normatively and socially defined norms of honour or prestige which an individual may receive by being a male “criminal” or “*latitante*” (fugitive/outlaw) for example, is based on pre-existing norms and cultures that the Camorra exploits for its own benefit (Saviano, 2007, p.144; Toros and Mavelli, 2013, p.80-2).

I interpret the diffusion of culture that enhances the attractiveness of becoming a camorrista to an individual (due to the search for prestige) through the lens of Bourdieusian Cultural Capital. The diffusion of apathy towards establishment political processes, of the normality of corruption in all levels of society, of individualism over community and the disbelief that one may change society and societal norms – all of which maintains the status quo can be read through the lens of what Foucault termed Docile Bodies. In the same manner that Foucault noted the disciplinary mechanisms (Foucault, 1977) of socialisation in Liberal democracies to make populations more easily governable, so too has the Camorra fostered the socialisation of docility amongst the society which they attempt to govern. Following Foucault, Agamben (2009) wrote of the mechanisms in post-industrial democracies that have led to the creation of the passive citizen, a so-called “Bloom”,¹⁴ who is productive with regard to the dominant economic system (neoliberalism) and social capital, but does not question the overriding narrative unless it is productive to the creation of more economic or social capital. We may apply the logic of the fostering of passivity put forward by the Tiquun collective (2000) and then Agamben (2009) to the Camorra’s presence in a community, and the creation of its own ideal citizen: its own “Bloom”. A citizen’s passivity to Camorra dominance and the Camorra’s collaboration with political and entrepreneurial classes serves to increase its dominance and entrenchment in society. Society becomes stuck in a vicious cycle. There is a belief that denouncing camorristi does not do anything, because law enforcement and the State either cannot or will not help – nothing will ever change, because the corruption of the *élite* and criminals will always happen. This unfortunately leads to the further development of these criminal and corrupt practices, thereby increasing apathy towards politics in general. In this sense, these passive citizens are their own worst enemy – their silence ensures that these behaviours and this culture continue unhindered. Gramsci and Foucault help us tread a line between those (sub)cultures in a *habitus* that is created naturally through hegemonic domination on the one hand and much more insidiously with an

¹⁴ Based on the character “Leopold Bloom” of James Joyce’s *Ulysses*, this “Bloom” exists entirely through the world’s structures around him, moulding and shaping his behaviour accordingly. See: Agamben, 2009; Tiquun, 2000.

the outward attempt to govern on the other. Both of these then determine what kinds of cultural capitals are attractive or appealing for different sections of society.

Despite the importance of culture within this, it is important to remember the pre-existing structural issues that characterise the area with which we are concerned. Widespread unemployment, particularly of young people, has been widely reported in the *mezzogiorno* region, as has been the level of corruption and general underdevelopment. It is necessary to tread a line which accounts for the “cultural” appeal of this life, the reasons for apathy amongst people who could resist it, as well as the plausibly understandable social and economic *necessities* for individuals. Indeed in the words of Franco Roberti, the head of the anti-mafia directorate in Rome:

Italian [m]afia groups have exploited the social inequalities between “strong” and “weak” citizens doing business with those among the former who feel they are above the law, and recruiting the latter as labourers. The latter delude themselves that only through lawlessness and mafia militancy can they achieve the economic and social progress they think would otherwise be unattainable. (2014, p.141)

This however somewhat misses the point. For people who live in these areas, this reality is not a delusion – it is a statement on the inequality and lack of opportunities in an area where the only (easy) way to achieve economic and social progress genuinely *is* through interaction and cooperation with these Camorra clans, one way or another. As Sales stated, the widespread use of extortion became an easy way for Camorra clans to put a large number of young people who were unable to find legal employment to work through the use of violence (1988, p.193) – increasing the influence and income of the clans in the communities that they inhabit by exploiting social problems such as underemployment, an abundance of unskilled labourers and general apathy to the status quo to their benefit. As Parini has convincingly stated, Italian mafias are not the *deus ex machina* which operates in an area free from resistance from perceivably passive southerners (2003, p.148). Rather they should be understood as a system of power which *attempts* to govern a population for its own goals which generally disregard the populace in that particular region. At the same time, they need to remain beneficial to individuals there in some way or another (or at least give the impression of doing so). The simple dichotomy that Roberti mentions is elaborated thus: the “strong” (business owners, the petite bourgeoisie, and the political elite - the pejoratively and generally described “rich”) are able to, if they so wish, cooperate and enter into the illegal economy through OCG contacts and middle-men (the middle-men themselves being part of the “strong” too) for their own benefit. Conversely the “weak” must choose between a relatively unskilled, sometimes dangerous but potentially lucrative income as part

of a clan, or a harder, generally difficult and low-paid position in the legal economy where, when we consider poor social mobility, it is often about “who you know”, rather than “what you know”. A person must choose between interacting with a mafia-type association and ‘o *sistema*, or not – knowing that either decision will not affect the existence of such a group; If I cooperate I may benefit from this system, if I do not, I will not benefit but the system continues to exist regardless without me. This then fuels greater apathy in the belief that this is the system as it is now, and will always be.

4: Methodology

The secretive and unlawful nature of organized crime in general makes researching the phenomenon a difficult task. On our organized crime continuum (Armao, 2003), the peculiarity of mafia-type associations, with their political influence and establishment of omertà in a community, add to this. Mafia-type associations affect the willingness of individuals in an area to denounce them (Di Gennaro, 2015). This is related to the general trust that individuals have in the law enforcement to challenge their activities where and when they present. There is an issue with the amount of data that a researcher can feasibly obtain through fieldwork (Gambetta, 1993, p.14) and also a consideration of the reliability of the data collected when the object of research is itself illegal and certain objects that we search for are invisible (Pizzini-Gambetta, 2008, p.349).. Despite these issues, reliable data collection on organized crime is not impossible.

The nature of the *pizzo* required a mixed methods approach. It required approaches that attempt to understand how widespread it is, how it functions, as well as the efforts and the manner in which law enforcement agencies and Civil Society reacted to it. Quantitatively I wanted to understand how many businesses pay, or have paid the *pizzo* in a given territory, but for the reasons mentioned above, this becomes a difficult task. Indeed as a 1993 Italian Parliamentary Report stated, despite the extent of organized criminality in Naples, only 82 instances of individuals denouncing extortion in were reported in the city in the previous year (Imposimato, 1993, p.33). For a metropolitan city of over 3,000,000 people and an estimated 100 or so criminal clans, many of whom have been demonstrated to have been involved in widespread and systematic extortion of businesses, such a small number of reported extortions is astounding. It is indicative of the unreliability of certain kinds of quantitative criminal data, particularly when this data is based upon a supposed relation of trust between the individual and the judicial system. Qualitatively, I wanted to know *how* and *why* the *pizzo* is paid, and what are the cultural norms and perceptions that surround its payment. This becomes more complicated when, as far as we understand it, the *pizzo* is the product of mistrust or lack of faith in the State and law enforcement agencies. This makes the amount of data we can access limited to the amount of people who have actually brought

themselves denounce it, or of criminals who have since spoken about the extent to which it was paid in an area. It is no surprise that much of the access to data regarding criminality, be that access to criminals who have become State witnesses (Gruppo Abele, 2005; Allum, 2006), interactions with criminals and their practices (Venkatesh, 2009; 2013; Pine, 2012; Thompson, 1966), interactions with people who have denounced criminals, and access to people in broadly termed “Civil Society” (Jamieson, 2000; Schneider and Schneider, 2003; Gunarsson, 2008) is dependent on some kind of cooperation and granting of access to a researcher. Despite obvious difficulties, fieldwork is invaluable to the study of social phenomena such as organized crime.

It was deemed prudent to study an area where a business community not only had a history of paying *pizzo* to a mafia-type association, but despite of this influence, managed to denounce the group to the point where its extortion racket was uprooted. In this way both of our hypotheses could be analysed whereby the particular nature of the *pizzo* as it was paid in a given community could be observed, alongside the reaction to it. The defeat of a mafia-type association in an area, so the logic went, would mean that businesspeople and law enforcement officials would be more willing to talk about their experiences. These experiences vary from when the mafia-type association had a significant influence on the community, to the time when this influence was eclipsed, whilst simultaneously providing us with a blueprint as to how this process flowed. In studying an area where a racket was defeated, and defeated in recent memory, it is possible to collect data where there necessarily is an abundance of criminal data – thereby identifying those factors that encouraged individuals to denounce when they were not able to before.

In this sense, I chose to study one Italian comune and how it was able to defeat organized crime. The aim of this method was to learn lessons from one detailed case study that could then be used as a benchmark for the mafia phenomenon elsewhere in Italy, and provide clues for an antidote. Whilst the choice of one comune inevitably diminishes the generalisability of the the study, the provision of *omertà* and the payment norms remain constant, making the study applicable elsewhere. In this regard and in agreement with Sanzone (2014), I stress that in order to truly understand organized crime and its effect on an area, we must move beyond a purely judicial, political, social and economic approach to also include culture. This is particularly pertinent when we consider the influence of social norms to be a crucial factor when referring to the power that mafia-type associations have over the *habitus*. The most effective way to do this is by going to the area and actually studying it face-to-face, and contrasting it with those other important factors. To account for the restrictiveness of studying organized crime at a distance, and to avoid a solely judicial and quantitative centric analysis of the phenomenon, a broad and holistic case study method

was selected as the most feasible approach that was likely to yield results. I made an active decision for “deep” research of one community, rather than “broad” research of the phenomenon in general – the assumption being that the experiences in one comune are likely to be similar to other comunes and communities throughout the *mezzogiorno* region.

The town of Ercolano in the province of Naples was chosen as the case study for three main reasons. Firstly, the extent to which it is referred to by the FAI and its related institutions as a “model” for the anti-mafia movement (Grasso, 2012). Secondly, its own anti-Camorra movement reached ascendancy in the last ten years, meaning that its key players (from the antiracket association, law enforcement, etc.) are approachable for comment. Thirdly, it is a community where I was able to obtain access to an anti-mafia association through a gatekeeper. At inception, I chose to split the town into three broad clusters which I observed in different ways: those who can be broadly termed as “the State” (law enforcement agencies, the judiciary, politicians), “Civil Society” (members of organizations and associations opposing organized crime both actively and passively), and the rest of the population which is being influenced by policies and initiatives of the other two groups. Using our two hypotheses, my interest rested on understanding how the pizzo functioned and how individuals in the town responded.

By interacting with each of these clusters in turn, using a purposely open ended and grounded approach to the topic, I wanted to slowly move up this ladder to observe how the anti-mafia movement presented itself, and how far reaching their activities were for people in the town. After gaining access through gatekeepers, I lived and worked for ten months (September 2014 - July 2015) in Ercolano in order to build a personal network and observe cultural norms regarding their relationship to (il)legality and the perception of organized crime. Data was compiled by adopting a mixed methods approach which relied on a ten month ethnographic research in the town, snowball sampling, questionnaires and interviews with members of the judiciary, local government, law enforcement, the business community and voluntary associations.

The first period was characterised by simply living and working in the area, and making no effort to approach any aspect of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano so as to build my own personal network independently of Civil Society Organizations. I moved to the neighbouring town of Portici, two minutes walk from Ercolano, and began working as an English teacher. I worked for a language association, as well as privately in the area for almost the entirety of my fieldwork.

The second period was devoted to approaching Civil Society Organizations and asking for access so as to carry out my project. In this, I identified four key players in the anti-Camorra movement, all of whom granted me access in one form or another. I attended meetings, interacted socially with members, befriending a number of them, and conducted interviews where possible. At the end of this period, I distributed questionnaires to members of the antiracket association, and conducted interviews with its constituent business owners when they consented.

The third and final period dealt with the State. This was purposely left until the end of the project so as to satisfy any concerns regarding their adversarial position against the Camorra. In this period, I continued my relationship with members of Civil Society, and organised interviews with representatives of the State. I was hosted at the Torre del Greco police station, where I interviewed three officers from the Carabinieri, one of whom was the personal link between the Carabinieri, the judiciary and the anti-racket association in Ercolano. Finally, I was hosted by the Intervestigating Magistrate for Ercolano at his office, with whom I conducted an interview.

The primary data that I collected is summarised in the following table:

Table one

Representatives	Groups	Data collection details
General population	Individuals met through ethnography	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participant observation. Working and living in the Naples metropolitan area for ten months.
Civil Society	Church & “Centro Pastorale Giovanile” Ercolano	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participant observation. Attendance of mass. Socialising with members. One interview with local priest
Civil Society	Youth Forum “Forum dei Giovani” Ercolano	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participant observation. Attendance of meetings. Socialising with members
Civil Society	Social cooperative “Radio Siani”, Ercolano	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Participant observation. Attendance of events. Socialising with members Interviews with two members
Civil Society	Antiracket association “Ercolano per la legalità”	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Socialising with members Interviews with nine shopkeepers Twenty-one completed questionnaires for members

State	Law enforcement agencies	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Visit to Carabinieri Caserma • One group interview with in-service Carabinieri officers with the rank of Captain and Lieutenant
State	Judiciary	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One interview with the-then serving investigating magistrate
State	Politicians	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • One interview with former Mayor who introduced anti-Camorra measures

The most obvious emphasis is the role of participant observation and ethnography. Living “in the field” and using snowballing sampling helped inform which Civil Society Organizations were relevant to this study. To do this, I adopted the Chicago School approach to urban sociology and ethnography through participant observation, combined with an ethnographic approach to snowball sampling and a holistic study of the area. Following sociologists, ethnographers and anthropologists who conducted research “in the field” in areas noted for the presence of organized crime, such as William Foote Whyte (1943),¹⁵ Sudhir Venkatesh (2009; 2013),¹⁶ Italo Pardo (1996)¹⁷ and Jason Pine (2012),¹⁸ this project sought to go directly to the location and actively interact with a specific community so as to get a unique look at society itself.

This method is not without its issues. As noted by E.H Carr in his ‘What is History?’ lectures, it must be remembered that “History cannot be written unless the historian can achieve some kind of contact with the mind of those whom he is writing” and that we “achieve our understanding of the past, only through the eyes of the present. The historian is of his own age, and is bound to it by the conditions of human existence” (1961, p.24). For the ethnographer the principles are the same. This works in a variety of ways when it comes to interactions between the researcher and a participant and can be seen in something banal

¹⁵ A young graduate who conducted a participant observation research project in an Italian slum in Chicago for three and a half years in the 1930s as part of a fellowship from Harvard University.

¹⁶ An Indian-American sociologist whose university study into the black urban poor turned into a decade of living alongside and studying the Black Kings gang in Chicago, interacting with and becoming friends with various players in the gang and community that they inhabited. He supplemented this with a study into the underground economy in New York, interacting with people as varied as socialites and cultured high-end escorts and drug dealers to see how they linked together in a social system.

¹⁷ A Neapolitan anthropologist who studied central urban quarters in Naples, living there for 20 months between 1984-86 studying the people who inhabited these areas and how they coped with life in these traditionally “chaotic” places.

¹⁸ An American Anthropologist who began researching the Neapolitan *Neomolodica* scene and the role that the Camorra had upon it. To do this, Pine got involved with the scene itself – making music videos and commercials on pirate television – all to build a portfolio and start his own recording studio.

such as appearance, likeability or similar interests, or even deeper aspects such as perceived trustworthiness, or with social distinctions such as age or class. Any of these could lead to the collection of different data by a different person, even if the research questions were the same. This leads to a greater scrutiny of “my” account of the social environment and events, which is welcomed as much as it is unavoidable. We must face the simple truth that everyone is biased, and people have the tendency to exaggerate, misremember details, deflect questions, and sometimes outright lie. We as social scientists must come to terms with the fact that this is simply the human condition, under which we must conduct and then analyse our data accordingly. It is universally claimed that we as researchers must try to be objective, which is true, though I firmly believe that objectivity in the field of society is unachievable. In this sense, the role of me as the researcher is incredibly important, and is an unavoidable variable of this research.

The table above refers to the socialising with members of Civil Society Organizations and the attendance of their meetings. Interaction in a formal capacity meant that I could explain my project, and ask for their assistance where necessary. Indeed, on visiting the Forum dei Giovani for the first time to speak to its organising committee, I was handed the results of a questionnaire that they had conducted on the perception of the Camorra by young people in Ercolano. Interaction on this face-to-face level provided the basis for understanding the activities that the individual associations conducted, how they were funded and/or structured, as well as paving the way for interviews where necessary. Interaction with their members in an informal capacity meant I was able to talk to the individuals who were part of these groups in a natural way, thereby facilitating further snowballing and interaction with new contacts, expanding my personal network and interacting with the community further. My position as an English teacher proved to be incredibly useful because many of the members of the associations wanted to practice their English with me, thereby providing me with even greater access to their members.

To correlate businesses that were members of the anti-racket and their reasons for joining, and their perception of the pizzo, I tailored a questionnaire that asked for general demographic data to see whether there was a general trend as to the archetypal member of the anti-racket, in addition to measuring how the individual gets their information and form their world view, measuring their trust in different individuals or institutions, finishing with a section on their experiences with the pizzo and the racket. This questionnaire can be seen in Appendix IV. A number of these questions were purposeful duplicates of a previous

questionnaire survey conducted in Palermo for Addiopizzo members by Carina Gunnarsson¹⁹ (2014) The participants chosen were solely the businesses that were signed up members of the antiracket available through the FAI website and document entitled “La guida per il consumatore critico antiracket 2014” (FAI, 2015). The completion of these questionnaires was followed by requests to interview the shopkeeper anonymously. Of the forty-five accessible businesses from this list, only twenty-three shopkeepers returned their questionnaire, of whom twenty-two completed it in full. This was a disappointing, though, wholly unsurprising result. Three businesspeople revealed in the questionnaire that they had paid pizzo in the past. Nine of the businesses consented to an interview, one of whom admitted to paying pizzo in the past, and detailed his experience of the process during the interview.

The primary data detailed here provide us with a unique dataset to study organized crime, mafia-type associations, and, more specifically, the ways in which they can be uprooted. In this thesis, primary data is classified as follows: interviews that I conducted are referenced in text first by a letter that indicates the type of person I interviewed (N= businessperson, CS = member of a Civil Society Organization, POL = politician, LE = law enforcement/judiciary) followed a number distinguishing individuals in the same category, which is then followed by the date the interview was conducted (i.e. 18032014 = 18th March 2014). The ethnographic data was recorded in a fieldwork log-book for the duration of my project, a selection of which is available in Appendix V. The following section details the secondary data used.

Due to the growing collaboration between the Italian Ministero dell'Interno and the FAI, portions of the most recent data on mafia extortion are available online and in print. During the process of this project, FAI released a number of highly relevant publications regarding the anti-racket movement in general towards the end of 2015, to celebrate its 25 years in existence, with some of the publications focussing in parts on our chosen community. Mariagrazia Gerina and Vincenzo Vasile's *I Processi dell'Antiracket: Una guerra civile mite* (The trials of the antiracket – a gentle civil war) (2015), systemically analysed trials throughout Italy where mafiosi were tried for the charge of extortion or attempted extortion. In this book alone, a whole chapter was dedicated to Ercolano, using excerpts from the trials and other data which has been used to further contextualise our project.

¹⁹ I thank Carina Gunnarsson for her kind assistance in sending me a copy of the questionnaire that was used in this article, and allowing me to pose some of the same questions to shopkeepers who had joined an anti-pizzo association

Gerina and Vasile's work was based on an analysis of data from another FAI project, "ZOOM Processi Penali",²⁰ that published extracts of judicial data online, organised by Italian regions, and then by comune. The access of data published for the purpose of transparency by the Italian State, the Ercolano administration, and the Zoom project relies on the trust that the data that was published was not edited or altered in any way, and was without omission. This research follows the assumption that the data for the purposes of transparency are complete and without omission, albeit with an inherent Statist bias. Information from the Zoom project, however, should be viewed more cautiously because the data available are not the minutes of the trials, but instead the highlights and relevant information from specific cases involving the extortion racket. Whilst there is a lot of data available without this editing, there is data missing that could be relevant, such as the full transcripts of the trials. 19 trials in Ercolano are detailed in the Zoom documents covering the period from 2000 until 2011.

As a more qualitative exercise, Filippo Conticello's *Storia del movimento antiracket 1990-2015* (The history of the anti-racket movement 1990-2015) (2015) also dedicated a whole chapter to Ercolano community. These publications were double-edged swords in that they inform much of the primary data that I collected before their publication and vice-versa, whilst unfortunately replicating some of the data such as the account of specific shopkeepers.

In addition to the publications linked to FAI, some of the associations that I studied produce their own material regarding organized crime and the role of the antimafia in Ercolano. The most obvious of these is Radio Siani, a free access webradio station. They publish programmes, updates, news articles and reports of events and initiatives that they conduct locally. Uniquely, they also conduct interviews with local and national anti-mafia activists, politicians and figures. Their analyses are simultaneously considered to be reporting the anti-mafia movement as well as facilitating its further development, in that their *raison d'être* is the openness and accessibility of information about Camorra and the anti-Camorra. These are all disseminated publically via Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and their webradio website, and privately via a private Facebook group for association members – which I was also kindly made a member. Their analyses in particular are viewed as indicative of the anti-mafia movement in general, but also particularized in a specific context – as much a product of their socio-cultural context as they are defining its development.

With regard to the relationship between Civil Society Organizations and the State, there is an abundance of data which informs data collected in the field and vice-versa, particularly when considering public-private partnerships and socio-economic development as a means of

²⁰ <http://www.antiracket.info/zoom-processi-penali>

preventing criminality. Due to the extent of political corruption that was uncovered in Italy for much of the post-war period, culminating in scandals surrounding the *Cassa del Mezzogiorno*, reconstruction money following the 1980 Irpinia earthquake (Behan, 2009; FBI, n.d) and then *Tangentopoli*, there was a significant drive for transparency and public accountability (OECD, 2000, pp.190-203). This has meant that a number of documents, accounts and governmental decisions have been placed online and accessible to the public. A number of these laws or decisions are useful to the study of the pizzo, the influence of organized crime upon an area, and the way in which local government has responded. With regard to local political decisions, the “Legge no.241/1990 articolo 3” mandated that every “every administrative measure, including those related to administrative organisation, the conduct of public works and staff must be justified”.²¹ Combined with a Decreto Legislativo (Legislative Decree) D.Lgs n.33 del 14/03/2013,²² which obligated administrations to make these documents free to access, both regarding requests by the public, as well as their publication online, we are able to access the reasons provided for the pursuit of certain communal policies. Individual comune account books are covered by this provision, and are often available online, whereby we are able to qualify where a comune spends its money year to year, and to whom it gives tax breaks. These account books are mostly dedicated to individual welfare provisions by which it shows the amount of money it gives, or it discounts from young people for school, or sick and elderly people due to illness – but a portion of it is also dedicated to money that is given to local social initiatives as a means of subsidising them without directly involving the comune. This is demonstrated most prominently with the money that is given to local churches annually as a form of charity, but can also come in the form of helping organisations such as the Red Cross, drug rehabilitation or more specific social or youth programmes. The combination of these provisions means that it is possible to analyse how specific communes have responded to organized crime, which in turn infers the manner in which they understand the phenomenon.

The final destination of assets and goods confiscated from mafia groups in any given comune is also interesting in this case, and is characterised by the same transparency. The process involves assets and goods being confiscated from a mafioso, transferred to the ownership of the State, then managed by a State-funded consortium until the relevant communal administration awards the assets or goods to an association that has applied to be its landlord. Much of this process is conducted openly, meaning that we are able to see to whom the comune entrusts a property, and its reasons why. Whilst much of this broad

²¹ <http://www.altalex.com/documents/codici-altalex/2014/12/09/legge-sul-procedimento-amministrativo#capol>

²² <http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2013/04/05/13G00076/sg>

macro-data is available online via the Libera association and the publications that they produce, individual Italian communes have much more specific data available on their comune website. Such data includes the details of the confiscation, the valuation of the assets, who the assets were given to and for what purpose – which are updated each year so as to detail any changes that have occurred to the property. Additionally, these documents often refer to particular *giunta* or communal decisions which decided to whom these assets were assigned and why. It is here where we are able to quantify and then analyse individual organizations or initiatives that have received these assets. In the area of our case study, the Campania region, the regional government created the Fondazione Pol.i.s., a non-profit foundation under its jurisdiction which adopted a regional strategy with regard to the confiscation and then re-use of these goods, as well as mitigation of distress of victims of organized crime. It does this through the publication information relating to transparency and those activities taken against corruption, in addition to the funding of research projects, documentation centres and publication regarding organized crime and the fight against it on a regional level. These are ready for analysis, and are incredibly useful with regard to following economic capital (and therefore financial support) from the State and its institutions to the associations and initiatives on the ground.

These secondary sources are further substantiated by an analysis of newspapers and their online archives when they have mentioned Ercolano and organized crime. I used the local newspapers/journals “*Metropolis*” and “*L’Unità*”, as well as national newspapers such as *La Repubblica* and *Corriere della Sera*. Conveniently, Rather conveniently, a book was published 2012 written by the former Mayor of Ercolano, Nino Daniele and the former lieutenant of the Carabinieri in Ercolano, Antonio Di Florio, and the honorary president of the FAI, Tano Grasso, entitled “*La Camorra e l’antiracket*” (the Camorra and the antiracket) detailing their experience in creating the antiracket. Di Florio’s chapter is particular useful in this sense where it is possible to cross-reference local history of the Camorra and the anti-mafia, because he dedicates several pages at the end of his chapter detailing the names of murders or attempted murders of camorristi in chronological order

5: Organisaton of study

This study is organised as follows: the first chapter provides a background to the case study. I introduce Ercolano’s history, demographics and political culture, before I outline the legal framework and powers that law enforcement agencies and the judiciary have when fighting mafia-type associations. Two sections on criminality then complete the chapter: one on the history of the Camorra in Ercolano, and a second that details criminality in the area more broadly. This provides the context on a local and a national level for the case study.

The second chapter, “Paying the pizzo”, focusses on the actual process of extortion by Camorra clans against businesses in Ercolano. It begins by presenting the judicial account of the local Camorra clans and the pizzo that they demand from businesses, before analysing the particulars of pizzo payment. I was interested in knowing; (1) the process by which businesses paid the pizzo; (2) how many businesses paid the pizzo before the growth of the anti-Camorra movement and; (3) what the the motivation for continuous pizzo payment was. The data in this chapter is based on interviews with the PM (Investigating Magistrate) for Ercolano, members of the Ercolano anti-racket association (who also completed a questionnaire about their reasons for joining) and an analysis of judicial minutes from relevant trials involving the extortion of businesses in Ercolano.

The third chapter, “The State’s response to the Camorra”, details the different approaches attempted by the State in the context of Ercolano. I start with the use of “hard policing” in the area, particularly through the use of cooperating witnesses and mass arrests, which I evidence through specific cases in the town. Next I analyse the use of regional, State and European funding, in addition to partnerships with third-sector organisations, all aimed at restructuring the economy so as to change the cultural and socio-economic context that allows mafia-type associations to thrive. This is followed by a section concerning the so-called *cultura della legalità*, the culture of legality, and the way that the State and its institutions have attempted to alter the cultural context and *habitus* in which citizens (particularly the young) live. I focussed here on the social programmes that the State funded as a means of making young people more active citizens, as well as the provision of facilities and tax exemption for associations that follow this broad discourse. I conclude the chapter by explaining the model that Law Enforcement, the judiciary, relevant Civil Society organizations and politicians have used to undermine local Camorra clans: the “Modello Ercolano”.

The final chapter, “Civil Society’s response to the Camorra” outlines varied responses to the Camorra by four different Civil Society Organizations. This chapter expands upon the discussions in the previous chapter, particularly with regard to culture and *habitus*, and the selective assistance given by the State. I introduce each of the organizations in turn, the activities they conduct, and their place within the broader anti-mafia movement.

ii. Ercolano: Demographics, crime and law enforcement

The Terrible beside the Beautiful, the Beautiful beside the Terrible, cancel one another out and produce a feeling of indifference. The Neapolitan would certainly be a different creature if he did not feel himself wedged between God and the Devil

Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, 1797

This chapter provides background information on the case study, Ercolano. It first introduces the town itself, its history, and its political culture. It then outlines the judicial and law enforcement framework against mafia-type associations and their contacts on a national level, before detailing the recent history of Camorra clans in and around Ercolano, concluding with a section on the local criminal landscape regarding informal work and petty crimes.

1: Ercolano

1:1 The town

Due to the historical significance and the oft celebrated beauty of the area in general, much has been written about Ercolano (formerly Resina, and Herculaneum) and its surrounding area including Pompeii and Vesuvius. Since the 1700s It has been described by foreigners who visited the area on the Grand Tour (Black, 2003), including Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, Lord Byron, Walter Scott, Mark Twain, and Alexandre Dumas, and continues to be visited by tourists today. In 1927 Resina had 30,000 inhabitants and was described as a thickly populated township consisting mostly of poor houses and dwellings, “ready to yield to social progresses” that the Italian State had planned for public health, with the provision of new housing for its citizens who lost their homes due to excavations at the Herculaneum archaeological site (Corti, 1940). Likewise, during the Allied invasion of Italy, Norman Lewis described the city as one of those “grimy, war-husked towns” (1978, p.23) trapped between Vesuvius and the Bay of Naples. The picture post-war became one of poor and sometimes illegal urban construction, which affected the overall architectural character of the area and left only the most vulnerable people in the *centro storico* of the city. Between 1951 and 1981 Ercolano was the site of a major population and construction “boom” alongside the nearby cities of Portici and San Giorgio, a process that has resulted in the significant extension of the Neapolitan urban area (Laino, 2008, p.396).

The parts of the city which could be considered *assets* or “pull factors” for visitors, such as the Herculaneum excavations (the remains of a Roman city destroyed in a volcanic eruption), access to Mount Vesuvius, villas from the Bourbon era and the city’s proximity to the sea, have been identified as areas of economic and social stagnation following financial,

edificial and political mismanagement over the past 50 years. The precarious location of Ercolano and the area surrounding Mount Vesuvius, a dormant volcano, in the face of the growing number of residential dwellings being built which further exacerbated risk to human life and property led to the passing of a law at the regional level for these at-risk “Zona Rossa” communities (Legge Regionale n.21 of 10 December 2003), forbidding the building of any new structures for residential purposes, as well as the expansion of already existing properties to prevent the increase in the number of possible inhabitants. Whilst there has been a number of illegally constructed buildings since (and a number of these have since been demolished), this law means that the inhabitants in the area had to either live in buildings that already existed (though as we have already seen, 80% of them in Ercolano have been hastily built since the 1960s) or move elsewhere. The “extraterritoriality” of the inhabitants in the *centro storico* is similar to that of the social context of the Neapolitan “bassi”²³ present in the centre of Naples in areas such as the *Quartieri Spagnoli* and *San Lorenzo* noted by Pine (2012) and Pardo (1996). The difference in Ercolano, however, is that whilst these older and decaying buildings are located in the centre of the city (similarly to Naples), they have been flanked on all sides and outnumbered by crude residential apartment blocks not too dissimilar from small “gated communities” often with a resident security guard and requiring a passcodes to enter. This keeps the graffiti draped *centro storico* and public life out. These gated apartment blocks are significantly more expensive than the bassi Ercolanesi, segregating the city into the generally poorer *centro storico* in the centre and the gated and non-gated apartment blocks slightly outside the centre and along some of the newer commercial areas.

The city is served by the tariffed Napoli-Reggio Calabria highway, three train stations and a suburban bus network. Two of the stations are on the *Circumvesuviana* line, a small network of narrow gauged lines that link the city of Naples with the ports of Torre Annunziata, Castellammare di Stabia and Sorrento, as well as other more difficult to reach communities on the opposite side of Vesuvius. Both of these stations are on the Napoli-Torre Annunziata-Sorrento line. The main Circumvesuviana station, “Ercolano Scavi” is situated in the centre of the city, and is a short walk from the Herculaneum archaeological site along the main street in Ercolano, Via VI Novembre. Due to the number of visitors to the site, every train stops at this station. The smaller station, “Miglio d'Oro”, is in the South East of the city at the periphery of Torre del Greco serving a residential area every 30 minutes. The city is served by the Trenitalia (the State railway) station “Portici-Ercolano”, at the periphery of

²³ This is the plural of “*basso*”, translated as “low”. It is also referred to as “*vascio*” in Neapolitan. It generally denotes a ground floor dwelling (Pine, 2012, p.3; Pardo 1996, p.7). An anthropological account of life within a Neapolitan *basso* in San Lorenzo is available in Pardo (1996)

neighbouring Portici, itself constructed by the Bourbons to link Naples and the Bourbon palace at Portici close to the sea. Nowadays it links Naples with Salerno on a railway line that follows the coast. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries Ercolano had another railway line, the *ferrovia vesuviana*, the Vesuvian railway, which linked the *centro storico* with communities overlooking the centre and a funicular railway ascending the volcano.²⁴ The Circumvesuviana is managed by a public-private partnership between the region of Campania and a limited liability company, Ente Autonomo Volturno (EAV), and is infamous for its delays and cancellations to its services. It is also notable for its dated and vandalised cars and the seeming uncaring non-checking of tickets which has led a large number of people to use the service regularly without a ticket. Its unreliable service between its termini is amplified by its limited services late evening, finishing as early as 10pm. This is also true for the less regular but equally premature services of the Trenitalia line – which has the extra hindrance of being a long walk from the centre of the city. Buses in the (sub)urban area of Naples are managed by Azienda Napoletana Mobilità (ANM), and like the Circumvesuviana, are notorious for their unreliability, ancient vehicles, regular strikes due to poor pay and working conditions, and lack of ticket inspection – further fuelling their underfunding and poor service. Partially due to these underdevelopments, travelling by car has become the preferred method of travel in the area for locals, and those who do not have cars are forced to choose between staying locally or waiting on unreliable and crowded public transport.

A published assessment of the town's geography, economy, assets and issues are available in Appendix VI.I.

1:2 Demographics

The population of Ercolano had been steadily growing since the official census began (1861 at around 12,000 inhabitants) until a sudden boom in the post-war period took its inhabitants from 30,000 in 1936 to 39,000 in 1951. This followed with year on year population increases to its peak in the 1991 census with 61,000 inhabitants (Tuttitalia, n.d), when the population began to fall to its current estimate at 53,972 at the end of 2015 (ISTAT, 2009a). The average age of the population is growing as the percentage of older people increases, and younger people move to other areas of Italy and Europe in search of work. The percentage of the population over 75 years old grew (in part due to the post-war baby boom) making up 2.9% of the population in 1991, 4.4% in 2001 and 6.4% in 2011 (ISTAT, 2011b). Simultaneously, the birth rate has been dropping from 12.3 per 1000 in 2002 compared to

²⁴ Due to various eruptions, most notably in 1906 and then 1944, which damaged the funicular railway, the project was eventually abandoned. Vesuvioinrete.it (n.d)
Today the volcano is accessible by road, and by a tourist bus

9.3 per 1000 in 2014 (Comuni Italiani, n.d), alongside the percentage of the population 6 years old and younger: 9.1% in 1991, 7.5% in 2001 and 6.5% in 2011 (ISTAT, 2011b).

Figure 1 is an elaboration of the 2011 census data (ISTAT 2011a) with Ercolano presented in 5 different areas. 0 is the area on the slope of Vesuvius making up part of the Parco Nazionale del Vesuvio, a large but sparsely populated area of the city that contains less than 0.19% of the population and so is largely ignored. 1 (in red) is the area leading towards the city of Torre del Greco and contains one of the Ercolano Circumvesuviana stations, partial access to the sea via the old *antico bagno Favorita* (a small bathing resort), apartment blocks, old Vesuvian villas converted into family dwellings, a football stadium and some smaller commercial nucleated areas. Area 2 (in blue) contains the main Circumvesuviana station (Ercolano Scavi) where the majority of tourists from Naples, Sorrento and the rest of the Amalfi Coast arrive into the city. The station leads onto the main street, Via IV Novembre, towards the entrance of the Herculaneum archaeological site, along a number of businesses aimed at drawing in tourists.²⁵ In the North-West of the area there is the Mercato di Pugliano (Pugliano market - a part of the *centro storico*) and in the South-East there are some more recently constructed buildings and apartment buildings which meet alongside and then North of Via IV Novembre to form the central commercial area of the city. Area 3 (in purple) is the rest of the *centro storico*, which feeds off the Western half of the Corso Resina towards Portici and Naples, the Agriculture Faculty of the Università Federico II di Napoli and the *Reggia* di Portici.²⁶ It is also the area that contains the entirety of the Herculaneum excavation site and the *Teatro Romano* (Roman Theatre). Both sides of the Corso Resina contain narrow alleyways (*vicoli*) which feed onto it and are made up of *bassì*, balconies and small businesses.

The North Western quarter of Area 1 which borders this area also contains a number of older housing complete with *vicoli* and *bassì*. Closer to the sea, there is past and present industrial land which has slowly been abandoned over the years, some of which has been replaced by newer apartment complexes. Even though the city is located along the sea, access is difficult due to man-made barriers. Area 4 (in green) is made up of more recently constructed buildings away from the central commercial area of the city primarily of residential housing, often in gated apartment blocks and stand-alone apartment buildings. The main road in the area goes along the South Western slope of Vesuvius and has a long string of businesses along it, though it is generally only reachable by car or by infrequent and unreliable local buses.

²⁵ One interesting attempt at this is a pizzeria that greets the tourists with a large and grammatically incorrect sign: "Welcome in Ercolano".

²⁶ A Bourbon palace and a former summer residence of the King of the Regno delle due sicilie.




Figure 1

Areas 0-4 elaborated in the Ercolano 2011 Census

(ISTAT, 2011)

Area 2 is overwhelmingly the most densely populated area of the city with a population density of 25,155.1 people per sq km,²⁷ with an actual population of 12,554 people, followed by Area 3 at 11,612.5 people per sq km. What is notable about these two areas is how similar they are to one another compared to the rest of the city. Both encompass the *centro storico*, and both are flanked at their peripheries by densely populated and recently built apartment blocks. They have the highest proportion of the population over 75 (7.7% and 7.5% respectively compared to 6.1% for Area 1 and 4.9% for Area 4) (ISTAT, 2011a), and the highest proportion of people aged above 65 and above who live alone (22.7% and 22.9% compared to 16.9% each for area 1 and area 4) (ISTAT, 2011a), where the number of widows greatly outnumbers widowers (Tuttitalia, 2016). Finally the proportion of dwellings that are owned compared to the number of dwellings that are occupied is lower (54.6% and 56.6% in these areas compared to 71.2% and 64.1% in the remaining two) (ISTAT, 2011a).

Area 2 has the lowest proportion of buildings that are deemed to be in a “good” state of conservation at 30.9% (compared to 70.5%, 67.3% and 79.4% respectively for Areas 1, 3 and 4) (ISTAT, 2011a). With regard to education, Areas 2 and 3 have the lowest percentage of 25-64 year olds with a high school diploma or degree (33.7% and 36.3% compared to 53.9% and 45.9%) (ISTAT, 2011a); the lowest percentage of 30-34 year olds with a university degree (11.7% and 14.3% compared to 24.9% and 17.1%) and the highest incidence of people aged 15-19 that do not study and do not work (33.8% and 30.4% compared to 21.3% and 24%) (ISTAT, 2011a). With regard to employment, they also have the lowest participation in the jobs market (35.7% and 35.6% compared to 41% and 41.1%), as well as highest rate of unemployment of those over 16 years old (33.7% and 35.6% compared to 21.9% and 25.1%) and the lowest rate of employment (23.7% and 24.7% compared to 32% and 30.8%), whilst Area 2 has the lowest rate of employment among 15-29 year olds (16.8% compared to 19.1% 19.5% and 19%) (ISTAT, 2011a.) Inhabitants in these areas are also less likely to have a job of medium-high level of specialization (25.2% and 24.6% compared to 38.7% and 32.8%),²⁸ but more likely to have a job with a low level of specialization (24.8% and 24.7% compared to 15.3% and 17.2%) (ISTAT, 2011a).²⁹ They are less likely to work or study outside of Ercolano (16.1% and 17.9% compared to 25.8% and 28.6%), and less likely to use their own form of transport (38.2% and 40.2% compared to 54.3% and 66.9%) (ISTAT, 2011a).³⁰

²⁷ To give an idea of how densely populated this is, a comparison with the most densely populated city (proper) in the world is useful; Mumbai has a population density of 29,650 per sq km. Area 2, however, is about half a kilometre square in size

²⁸ Legislator, entrepreneur, manager, intellectual, scientist, professional.

²⁹ Professions without qualifications.

³⁰ Car, scooter etc.

Other comparisons indicate a similarity in the percentage of people who use public transport (17.6%, 18.9% and 18.9% for areas 1, 2 and 3) with the exception of Area 4 (14.6%) likely due to the greater distance from the Circumvesuviana line, the inefficiency of bus transport, as well as the greater reliance on private transport (66.9%) (ISTAT, 2011a). Area 1 had the lowest incidence of households with children with employed and retired persons (with 7.5% compared to 14.9%, 11% and 11% for areas 2, 3 and 4),³¹ as well as the lowest percentage of families with six or more members (3.8% compared to 5.4%, 4.5% and 5.4%) (ISTAT, 2011a). For the areas in and around the *centro storico*, the picture that is painted is one of greater social and economic hardship – with the densely populated Areas 2 and 3 consistently performing worse than the rest of the city with regard to education, prospects for young people and employment, combined with a greater proportion of people over 75 and as well as a lower portion of householders who own their own home (ISTAT, 2011a). Between the two areas, Area 2 performs consistently worse. Area 2 is also the most readily associated area with the Camorra and criminality in general.

1:3 Politics

Like the rest of the Campania region, the post-war politics of Ercolano was dominated primarily by Christian democratic parties. That is to say, first by the centre-right Democrazia Cristiana³² (DC), then by coalitions of centre-left Christian parties that culminated in the Partito Democratico (PD). This is the case in Ercolano, save for a period in the mid-1970s when the council was dominated by the Partito Comunista Italiano (PCI). Indeed in Ercolano, results of over 70% for such coalitions have been a regular feature in local, regional and national elections for much of this period. After the Tangentopoli scandal in 1992 and before the inception of the PD, the winning lists were formed of former DC politicians alongside centre-leftists, whose national parties would later form the PD.

There are three notable local political earthquakes that are important to understanding the state of politics in the comune of Ercolano. Firstly is the assassination by one of the local Camorra clans of a leading DC politician, Antonio Buonaiuto in 1990, a former mayor and likely *future* mayor in the upcoming election. His murder preceded the dominance of the clan over the next administration with regard to public contracts, eventually resulting in the dissolution of the communal administration by Presidential decree. This period was followed by stewardship of the comune by the State until the next communal election could be held. The second earthquake was the 1995 election that resulted in the landslide victory for a

³¹ Identified as households with potential for economic hardship.

³² Christian Democratic party.

centre-left coalition on an anti-Camorra/corruption platform under Luisa Bossa, further cementing the Camorra as a prominent election issue.

After deciding to become a candidate for regional elections in 2005, a new candidate, Nino Daniele, was chosen for mayor under a similar coalition. Given the rise in violence between the two local clans, he stood on a stronger anti-Camorra platform and was elected promising to demolish illegally constructed buildings built by Camorra and their entrepreneurial associates. Daniele in particular was instrumental in establishing personal links between the administration, anti-Camorra associations, and the business community through an antiracket association and law enforcement agencies. Similarly, Daniele also successfully applied for developmental funding from the European Commission through the Campania regional government with a particular focus on structural adjustment, with an aim of making the city more accessible for tourists. He decided to stand down as candidate in 2010 to stand for the regional elections. In the following primaries he was succeeded by his vice-mayor, Vincenzo Strazzullo, formerly a member of the now defunct centrist Christian political party *La margherita*.

In a sign that the Camorra was continuing to influence local politics like in the early 1990s, a political scandal, '*Caso Ercolano*' was revealed at the end of 2014 whereby the number of members of the local PD surges from 300 to 1200 in a short space of time shortly before the names of candidates for the mayoral primaries were announced. The previous rules stated that in order for a candidate to participate in primaries, they had to gain 30% of the members' signatures from the previous year, but this was changed to be 30% of the members' signatures from the end of 2014. Under the previous rules, a candidate needed only 30% of 300 signatures, whereas now 30% of 1200 signatures were required, leaving a number of candidates apparently out of the running. In theory this was not an issue, but it became so when it was revealed that, a large portion of the 900 extra members were related to local Camorra clans. This meant that a number of PD candidates were to be left out of the running for the primaries because of potential Camorra entryism. In light of this, the local head of the PD, Antonio Liberti, gave the list of names to the Police and the *Autorità nazionale anticorruzione* (National Anti-Corruption Authority - ANAC) so that they could be investigated. (*La Repubblica*, 31 January 2015)

Further deepening the scandals with the PD, a number of in-office counsellors and administrators including Strazzullo and his Deputy Mayor, (both of whom were standing in the PD primaries), four other councillors, an entrepreneur and an engineer were implicated for bribery for the provision of public works, including the construction of a new police station. Given these two scandals, the provincial secretariat decided to cancel the primaries

and make Liberti the PD candidate for Mayor. In response to this, apparently worried about how this would look on a local level, the PD directorate in Roma intervened and overturned this ruling and made another candidate, Ciro Buonajuto, the sole candidate for Mayor. The young and charismatic Buonajuto was a vocal supporter of Matteo Renzi and was one of the candidates who would have been knocked out of the running due to the large influx of Camorra families to the PD list. He was also the nephew of Antonio Buonaiuto, the former Mayor who was murdered by the Ascione in 1990. Buonajuto was elected mayor of Ercolano in May 2015 on the first turn on an anti-Camorra, anti-corruption platform like Bossa and Daniele before him.

Whilst Buonajuto has been visibly present alongside local associations against the Camorra and corruption, his administration has been strongly criticised. In December 2016 a series of extra scandals including further investigations into PD corruption brought the Ercolano political system into disrepute. Alongside the scandals for the provision of public works under his predecessor, Vincenzo Strazzulo, other longstanding councillors have been accused of corruption: One councillor is suspected of transferring €10,000 of public works to another former councillor currently under investigation for vote trading. His administration is also being accused of not doing enough to help victims of criminality and their families, as demonstrated recently by an apparent “administrative error” that meant that the administration did not send any representatives in court to assist the family of a young man who was killed in 2009 in a case of mistaken identity. Not only does this undermine the work that the anti-mafia movement has done, but the local media have been drawing parallels between Buonajuto’s “error” and another error that lawyers in the suspected corrupted Strazzullo’s administration made when they “forgot” to file some paperwork to assist an antiracket maxi trial in 2011 that would demand damages from the clan. Indeed in worrying signs, Buonajuto has been accused of “forgetting the fight against the Camorra” (*Metropolis*, 12 December 2016). Under Buonajuto’s administration the city of Ercolano has sought to become the Italian City of Culture on numerous occasions, but has fallen short each time.

In 2016, Ercolano voted overwhelmingly against Renzi’s constitutional changes. Today the PD remains the largest party, but is slowly losing grass-root support to the populist Movimento Cinque Stelle.

The remainder of this chapter deals with the judicial and police powers, before localising the experience of the Camorra and other criminal activity in Ercolano.

2: Law enforcement and criminality

2:1 Judicial and police powers in Italy

Judicial repression against organized crime in Italy has a variety of different instruments, ranging from legislation that specifically targets the mafia phenomenon to general police activities. The adoption of Art. 416-bis in 1982 (Legge 13 Settembre, 1982 n.646) into the Italian Penal code is an example of this, where the definition of a mafia-type association was formally integrated into the judicial system. An issue was identified: the strength and influence of a particular organized crime group in the country, and the understanding that particular crimes conducted by an individual who is a member of this group are often acted in concert with other crimes conducted by a mafia-type association for the purpose of economic/social dominance, organised by *omertà*. This means that a crime is often part of a larger process which involves more law breaking. With the new law, individuals could be prosecuted for one crime (mafia association) that is then understood to contain a variety of other crimes which generally come alongside membership of a mafia-type association. Mere members of such an association would be punished for three to six years in prison, whereas those who promote, manage and organize such an association are punished for four to nine years in prison – all in addition to any other crimes they have committed as part of these associations. Art. 110 c.p. furthered this in tackling the so-called *area grigia* (grey zone), targeting individuals (politicians, lawyers, businesspeople, accountants, contractors etc.) who provide assistance to those committing crimes under 416-bis. The process of interaction between the licit and illicit has been identified in the new law as an issue, whereby a mafia-type association is noted to have been benefitting from access to the legal economy through intermediaries or “middle men”. The law criminalises the interaction of individuals in the legal economy with those who would be punished under 416-bis, effectively denying their access to the legal economy through the middlemen. This is similar to Art. 418 of the Italian penal code. However, rather than focussing on denying access to the legal economy, the new law focusses on the social interaction between mafia-type associations and a community. With a wide net, it punishes individuals who provide shelter, food, hospitality, means of transport, and means of communication to anyone who are members of organisations described in the aforementioned Art.416-bis, thus denying them access to a community and its citizens who could help facilitate their crimes.

Another particularly notable addition to the penal code is Art. 41-bis (Legge 7 Agosto 1992, n.35) which, if enacted by the head prosecutor, allows for the suspension of certain prison regulations for those “making use of conditions” or “in order to facilitate” the mafia-type association in relation to when there is evidence such as to “deem there to be an existence

of links with a criminal, terrorist or subversive”³³ individual. These measures range from: (1) prevention of contact with members of the criminal organisation they are a part / allied to; (2) the limitation of visits by outside individuals to once a month, and the further limitation that this person can only be a family member or other household members (except in extraordinary circumstances); (3) the limitation of goods received from outside the prison; (4) isolation from other prisoners; (5) the censorship of correspondence with the outside world; (6) the restriction of outdoor exercise, which itself cannot be conducted in groups of more than four people at a time. The role of certain individuals (the boss, for example) was identified as pivotal in the day-to-day organisation of a clan, where they were still able to conduct business despite being incarcerated. This law was an attempt to mitigate against this by limiting the communication between this individual and the outside-world, thus strangling the organisation itself. A notable effect of this has been the greater influence of the boss’s partner in the everyday running of the clan, given that they are generally the only individuals who are permitted to see the boss and can relay any messages for the clan onwards. The combination of these laws in particular serve the purpose of designating particular social groups as criminal; of criminalising individuals who assist them (though themselves not necessarily linked to the group); and the potential inability of an individual linked to mafia-type association to contact associates on the outside.

A much blunter instrument is the Legge 45/2001 (Legge 13 Febbraio 2001 n.45), which deals with cooperating witnesses (*collaboratori di giustizia* or *pentiti*) where a convicted individual and their family can be placed under witness protection and potentially have their sentence reduced when they collaborate fully with the law enforcement. A cooperating witness is described as

Whoever, having been part of a criminal association, decides to detach themselves from it cooperating with the authorities by giving information on the organisation and crimes committed.³⁴

This includes provisions for reducing punishment and giving special treatments during custody, the possibility of receiving benefits whilst in prison, in addition to receiving special protection for the cooperating witness and their family. This special protection may include: video surveillance and alarms by local police, relocation and financial support to socially

³³ The translation here is important, particularly with regards to the other elements of Art.41-bis. The original text says “far ritenere la sussistenza di collegamenti con un’associazione criminale, terroristica o eversiva”. The importance here is this instance is that this article is openly treating mafiosi in the same way as “terrorists” and “subversives”. The article is an addition to the 1975 law “legge 26 luglio 1975, n.354” which only dealt with terrorists and subversives, but such was the reaction after the murder of Judge Giovanni Falcone that the law was added to in order to include mafiosi in 1992.

³⁴ Deputy Prosecutor Gery Ferrara from the Procura della Repubblica in Palermo, April 2012.

reintegrate them, giving the person(s) new identities. All of this is available in return for consent to ongoing interrogations, not meeting other cooperating witnesses and identifying all assets owned so that they can be given to the judicial authorities. Whilst the law was originally designed to combat the *Brigate rosse* in the 1970s,³⁵ the measure has been widely used by the Italian State to combat mafia-type associations to understand the structure and activities of particular criminal groups, in addition to naming key individuals, alliances and so forth. Access to these collaborators of justice has also been made available to researchers by respective law enforcement officers, which have been used to try to understand the people who have participated in mafia-type associations, their personal histories, their reasons for joining and their general psychology – all of which can and does help inform government and police policy (Gruppo Abele, 2005). A number of other laws exist regarding organized crime, but we will not investigate these further, as the laws in themselves are not the focus of this research project. They are mentioned here only to demonstrate that the mafia phenomenon has been targeted directly in the Italian legal system, as a crime in and to itself.

In Italy the main policing body which deals with organized crime is the *L'arma dei Carabinieri* (henceforth referred to as the *Carabinieri*) and one of the four parts of the Italian armed forces. They collaborate with other police forces in Italy on a local level,³⁶ but data collection and policing strategy against organized crime is ultimately coordinated by the Carabinieri, who then pass this data on to the judiciary and the relevant investigating magistrate (*Pubblico Ministero* – PM) for whom they have officers directly dedicated. For “ordinary” criminal cases in Italy, the interception of communication is legally limited to individuals where there is already existing evidence of having committed a crime and where a judicial investigation has already started: namely where the aim is to collect greater data and prosecute more individuals and when approved by the relevant magistrate. However, as with terrorist and human trafficking investigations, organized crime is not classified as an “ordinary crime” (Galli, 2016, p.671-2), and investigators are instead permitted to monitor suspected individuals preventatively (i.e. before the crime has taken place). As noted by Galli, these expansions were introduced in relation to terrorist offences following the kidnapping of then-Prime Minister Aldo Moro in 1974 and then amended in 1982 to deal with organized crime offences. In order to prevent its abuse by the law enforcement and “allow for systematic scrutiny”, “the surveillance equipment to intercept the communication is physically located within the office of the *Pubblico Ministero*”, though the PM may authorize

³⁵ The Red Brigades, a Leftist revolutionary group which resorted to violence in order to destabilise the Italian State in the 1970s and 1980s.

³⁶ Polizia Municipale (Local communal police), Polizia di Stato (State police), Guardia di Finanza (Customs police dealing with borders, taxes etc.).

the installation of the instruments in other structures instead, where this scrutiny would not be present:

Operations can last for a maximum of 40 days, subject to the subsequent renewal of 20 days each, where the legal requirements still subsist (as underscored by the public prosecutor in his written application). Preventive interceptions must end once a criminal activity becomes manifest (*notitia criminis*). However the law does not limit the number of available renewals. (Galli, 2016, p.673)

The processes of data include, but are not limited to, stake-outs and surveillance of particular properties, data collected from surveillance devices connected to Carabinieri vehicles, undercover/plain clothed activities, surveillance of conversations between convicted criminal associates in prison and their visitors and, when approved by the appropriate judge, the wiretapping of certain phone lines. Whilst the approval for preventative wiretapping in a mafia-type case requires the approval of the relevant PM, this is somewhat of a blank cheque when considering Art. 416-bis, Art. 418 and Art. 110 c.c. This is particularly given their extensiveness in covering (1) those who are believed to be members of a mafia-type association, (2) those who are not members of the mafia-type association but are facilitating their access to the legal economy and (3) those who are not members of the mafia-type association, but provide them with some kind of assistance. It cannot be said that the Carabinieri monitor every suspected criminal's phone, given that there needs to be a suspicion of guilt that a crime is going to be committed, but any wide interpretation of these three laws allows for preventative communication interception in principle which must be approved by the PM. A notable limitation on police and judicial powers, however, is that information provided by security services and pentiti/police informers "cannot be used as investigative elements to ground an application for preventative wire-tapping" (Galli, 2016, p.673). Despite this, the extent to which they have collected data on Camorra clans is massive, as demonstrated by an analysis of wiretapped phones of the La Torre Camorra clan between October 1998 and April 1999 by Campana (2011), revealing 1824 pieces of contact between 202 actors in that period alone which, if viewed as a benchmark for the amount of data collected on specific clans, signals that law enforcement agencies are able to collect a vast amount of data.

As of yet, there is no specific legislation regarding the monitoring of WhatsApp or other popular Instant Messaging (IM) services in Italy. Applications such as WhatsApp, Facebook Messenger and (to a much lesser extent) Telegram are widely used in Italy as a means of communication. When installed on a phone, the app uses internet rather than phone lines to communicate between users, meaning that the information is only stored on the application

on the phones themselves, and on the WhatsApp servers in the United States. Traditional “wiretapping” involves a member of the law enforcement recording a phone call or intercepting a text message as the means of communication is conducted between the sender and the receiver. IM, on the other hand, cannot be intercepted in the same way. Access to these servers is possible through legal channels, though it would depend on the willingness of WhatsApp Inc., and Facebook, based in the United States, to cooperate with foreign magistrates. In 2016, WhatsApp announced “end-to-end encryption” for all of their products, meaning that data was no longer stored on, or accessible by, WhatsApp servers, effectively meaning that the only way to legally access data stored in the conversation logs is on the phones themselves (WhatsApp, 2016). It has been suggested by former security services employees turned whistle-blowers in the United States that it is possible to hack phones and then access this data *through* the phone itself, rather than through the app (BBC News of 5 October 2015) and that this happens on a large scale in the UK and the US, though there is no evidence of this being used in Italy. A more widely available means of access to the conversation logs would be through the physical phones themselves, which *could* be requested by law enforcement as part of the Legge 45/2001 pentiti law, though there is no evidence which suggests that this has happened as of yet. This demonstrates that with regard to surveillance, police tactics will always have to adapt to new technology, and, arguably, will never be enough.

Whilst these strict judicial measures are undoubtedly quantifiable in terms of number of arrests and amount of assets seized, the justice system here is mostly a reactionary actor, punishing individuals who are already involved in mafia-type associations, both directly and indirectly. The problem with this approach (and this approach alone) is that the majority of a clan can be arrested, but the reliance on the clan and the revenue it creates is unchanged through its associates, their families, power-brokers and middle-men. The aforementioned Articles 110 c.c. and 418 of the penal code go some way to criminalising the *area grigia* and prosecuting supporters, middle men and power-brokers. However, underlying reason as to why people partake in criminal activities: be that as an actual member of a group, an associate, a family member or a friend – is not dealt with (Allum, 2001). Corruption in the political, law enforcement and surveillance sphere also remains relatively untouched. The structural and personal influences that cause individuals to become a member or supporter of a clan or bend the rules are minimally affected. These laws are ultimately reactionary to crimes that have already been committed, even when they are designed to make the cost and chance of getting caught greater than the benefit of breaking the law. In short, if one takes the view that people turn to organized crime out of lack of opportunities, money, or simply because that is the socio-economic context that they are born into, the mass arrest of

clan associates simply makes their need greater: it makes the decision to turn to further criminality even more likely. The structure and socio-cultural sphere around them still exists. Mass arrests in this sense by themselves do not defeat or wholly uproot the organized crime phenomenon: they make individuals in more vulnerable situations more desperate, leaves poor families without a breadwinner and may also leave a power vacuum which another clan may move into. They also lends themselves to a framework which will, necessarily, always advocate more “powers” as a tool to overcome a defined insecurity, ultimately at the expense of liberty.

2:2 The Camorra in Ercolano

After World War Two the area around Ercolano was well-known for smuggling, particularly of cigarettes, centred round the area close to the Mercato di Pugliano, a vintage clothes market (in Area 2) which specialized in American army uniforms. One elderly contact during fieldwork recounted his experience as a young boy in the years following the Allied invasion, when he and his friends would obtain cigarettes and army uniforms and sell them in Pugliano and elsewhere in Naples. The relationship between the American army clothing and cigarettes is telling, given that the post-war Naples’ cigarette smuggling boom emanated from the influx of American cigarettes from the soldiers and the army bases. The smuggling networks that were created were to be eventually used by other more illicit drug smugglers, and finally used by Camorra clans (Paolo, 2004). The history of Camorra clans in the area as a whole is a confusing story, given the sheer number of clans, splinter groups from clans, and changing alliances and rivalries.

In 1977 hashish and heroin reached Naples thanks to a working relationship between the Sicilian Vernengo family and two different clans in the Naples area: the De Biase clan in the *Quartieri Spagnoli* in the centre of the city, and the Cozzolino clan in Ercolano. During the 1980s and the early 1990s Ercolano became one of the main centres for the sale of heroin in the area (Daniele, 2012, p.20). Following the downfall of Raffaele Cutolo and his Nuova Camorra Organizzata (NCO) in the late 1980s, Portici, Ercolano and Torre del Greco were left mostly under the influence of the Ascione clan and its allies the Vollarò (from Portici) who were on the winning side during the Camorra war. With this supply from the Sicilians, combined with a relationship with a number of other affiliates based around Europe, the Cozzolino clan was able to import large quantities of the drug to supply other clans in Ercolano. The dominant clan in Ercolano, the Ascione, took advantage of this relationship by working with the Cozzolino on a local level to outmanoeuvre rival clans (Di Florio, 2012, p101-2). They effectively wiped out another clan in the city, the Esposito, further extending

themselves into waste management and local politics, alongside the traditional activities such as racketeering and smuggling.

The murder of Buonaiuto outside his home in 1990 signalled a particularly radical shift in local Camorra activity. The murder by the Ascione appeared to have been motivated by Buonaiuto's future plans to change contracts regarding urban waste procurement, should he be elected to mayor or to the comune in general. The contracted company was later discovered to be controlled by an affiliate of the Ascione. The dominance of the Ascione was evident when, following an investigation by the *prefetto* (prefect) di Napoli in June 1993, the council that was elected in 1990 was dissolved due to the influence of organized crime, with the report citing the clan on numerous occasions:

To the President of the Republic,

The city council of Ercolano (Naples) re-elected in the elections of 6 May 1990 presents evidence of infiltration by organized crime that compromises the impartiality of the elected organ, the good performance of the administration and the operation of services.

[...]

In particular, in the time before and after the electoral campaign for the re-election of the aforementioned city council of 6 May 1990, the Ercolano area was the theatre for a violent clash between two Camorra clans, the Ascione and the Esposito, ending with the decimation of the latter and the resulting clear territorial domination of the former.

The murder of the lawyer, Antonio Buonaiuto, fits into this context who, in the comune of Ercolano, was the Mayor several times and, at the time of the attack, was an outgoing councillor as well as part of the management committee for local sanitation n.30 and the councillor for the administration of the Vesuvian aqueduct.

This aforementioned criminal episode is connected to the events surrounding the award of communal solid waste collection contracts, a sector in which the interests of organized crime tend to meet. (Discreto del Presidente della Repubblica del 14 giugno 1993)

In response to the indisputable influence of the Camorra on politics and the challenge that it presented to democracy in the city, as well as its citizens' wellbeing, the local church parishes in Ercolano staged a march. Complete with white banners and peace signs, a

10,000 person march against the Camorra and against degradation in the city went around the Mercato di Pugliano. One of these protesters was Luisa Bossa, a schoolteacher of Latin and Ancient Greek, who was elected two years later Mayor of the city with a landslide for a centre-left coalition. Her election victory, *o' miracolo*, the miracle, as it was called (*L'Unità*, 30 August 2003) was important in a number of ways. It signalled a split from normal politics in the city and the dissolution of its council two years previously, particularly given that Bossa was well educated, a local, inspired by the shame that the dissolution brought the city, outside the political establishment and, moreover, a woman. Her electoral campaign attracted particular attention of the voters simply because she stood on a platform pushing for "rebirth" of Ercolano, with a focus on legality. Her 61% of the vote does not tell the whole story. Not only did she gain that share of the vote, her party in her mayoral coalition won 3,000 more votes than the entirety of the second placed coalition, the centre-right, making her coalition unchallenged in local politics until the next electoral cycle. One of the first things that her administration did was to crack down on smaller elements of illegality throughout the city. Structures that were not conforming to building regulations, particularly in the area around Pugliano with only 5 out of 21 were found to be legally compliant. (*L'Unità*, 30 August 2003).

Further investigations into the growing power of the Ascione led to a "blitz" in 1996 against them and their affiliates in a Carabinieri operation titled "Nemesi", arresting 194 individuals (Di Florio, 2012; *La Repubblica*, 13 May 1997). Other than highlighting the huge numbers of camorristi that were present in the area, Nemesi resulted in a number of members becoming pentiti and denouncing other members. One notable pentito, Leonardo Zirpoli, alongside his brother, Salvatore, began to denounce their former partners but, under threats from other clan members, later retracted their statements. A few weeks later Leonardo's 16 year-old son, Ciro, was murdered in Portici, which had the opposite effect that the clan wanted and actually led to the Zirpoli brothers cooperating further with law enforcement (Centro di Documentazione regionale contro la Camorra, 2009).³⁷ Zirpoli's testimony, together with that of another pentito, Simone Cozzolino (the boss of the Cozzolino clan) revealed that there was a number of *Polizia di Stato* officers based in Portici-Ercolano and a number of the Naples-based drug enforcement that were on their payroll, so that action wouldn't be pursued against the Cozzolino and their affiliates: the Ascione and the Vollaro. They were bribed between two-five million Lira (€1000-2500) a month, as well as receiving gifts such as cars, specialist meats and cheeses to blame rival clans, and other innocent people for crimes committed, or to simply look the other way. Among the arrested was Sossio

³⁷ Zirpoli's continued cooperation with law enforcement led to Ciro's grave in Ercolano being desecrated: it was burned down and the marble gravestone slab destroyed with a hammer.

Costanzo, head of drug enforcement in Naples for over 10 years, alongside four of his colleagues and fourteen officers from the Portici-Ercolano police, however Costanzo was later declared innocent. One of the arrested officers, Innocenzo Treviglio, decided to turn State witness too, collaborating in bringing a number of other officers to justice too, effectively stopping the relationship between the law enforcement and the clans that had damaged public trust in them.

The decapitation of the Ascione and their affiliates, combined with the jailing of their boss, Raffaele Ascione in subsequent trials, led to the rise of the Iengo-Birra clan: a collaboration between bosses Tomasso Iengo, formerly of the Ascione, and Giovanni Birra, founded shortly after the end of the Camorra wars of the 1980s. In 1997, Iengo and his son were killed in an ambush, leading Birra to search for new partners in the Neapolitan hinterland to fill the vacuum. In the first months of 2001, they secured an alliance with the Iacomino family leading to the formation of the Iacomino-Birra clan. The growing strength of the Iacomino-Birra in exploiting pre-existing drug trafficking networks led them to move into areas infamous in Ercolano for drug dealing and drug smuggling, the so-called "Cuparella": a small enclosed area just off Corso Resina in Area 2 of the city, capitalising on the already established drug market (Di Florio, 2012).

In the early 2000s Ercolano and the surrounding area were effectively split into two groupings: on one side were the Ascione-Montella-Papale-Suarino-Nocerino clans and on the other were the Birra-Iacomino-Durantini-Savino (Di Florio, 2012, p.104), with the Birra occupying the half of the city closest to Portici and the Ascione occupying the half closest to Torre del Greco. The dividing line between the clans was on Via IV Novembre in our aforementioned Area 2, leading to the Herculaneum excavation site. Regarding their respective extortion rackets, the dividing line was also the main commercial area of the city, where it was common for businesses to pay *pizzo* to both clans.

This effective truce between the two groupings were broken in 2003 when the acting head of the Ascione, Mario Ascione and the head of the Montella, Ciro Montella were killed in an ambush (Di Florio, 2012, p.125). There followed years of conflict which, though costly for both sides, with sixty clan-related homicides (Conticello, 2015, p.150), eventually left the Birra as the most powerful clan in Ercolano. In 2004, in an effort to gain more money, the Ascione approached more shops for the *pizzo*, specifically in zones that were viewed to be under Birra control. One shopkeeper they approached denounced them immediately, going straight to the Carabinieri station (Daniele, 2012, p.46-7; Conticello 2015; Gerina and Vasile, 2015). The shopkeeper, Raffaella Ottaviano, was placed under 24/7 police protection for a year and a half. She testified in court in June 2005 against her would-be extorters, putting

them in prison for just under four years and they were also fined. In May of the same year, Nino Daniele, a candidate for the PD, was elected mayor of Ercolano on an anti-Camorra platform during a Camorra feud. His anti-Camorra rhetoric attracted the attention of Tano Grasso, the President of FAI, suggesting to the local lieutenant of the Carabinieri, Antonio di Florio, Nino Daniele and Raffaella Ottaviano to set up an anti-racket association “Ercolano per la legalità”. It took another year before the first person stepped forward to denounce attempted extortion, after being approached by the Birra. In an attempt to advertise the movement and gain supporters elsewhere, Daniele and Ottaviano gave various interviews on regional and national television and radio to tell the country their story.

In 2007, an operation titled “Reset” was orchestrated against the Birra by the Carabinieri, leading to fifty-four arrests and the confiscation of a number of apartments and material, all of which was used as “beni confiscati” to benefit the local community (Daniele, 2012; Di Florio, 2012). The individuals arrested were key: it included the entire directorate of the Birra clan, effectively decapitating them. To add insult to injury, the eventual trial from this operation was assisted by evidence from three pentiti.

On 2nd April 2009 a ledger detailing businesses who paid the pizzo to the Ascione was found in an arrested extortionist’s home, which was later decoded by a pentito, Fausto Scudo (Gerina and Vesile, 2015, p.208). One important fact revealed by the ledger was that while eighty businesses in one district of the city had been paying money to the Ascione, at that time only six of these businesses in the town had actually denounced the clan. The subsequent trial in November 2009 was a watershed moment for the anti-racket, as it involved forty-one defendants, and forty-two accusers who were supported by FAI, Ercolano per la legalità, Sos impresa³⁸ and the Comune of Ercolano in the courtroom. The key players of the extortion racket for the Ascione were thus removed from the picture. Shortly afterwards in December, the Carabinieri conducted an operation “Regalo di Natale” (Christmas present) which arrested twenty-one individuals of the Ascione and Birra clans going back to the 1980s. This operation was the result of businesspeople coming forward and denouncing their extorters (Gerina and Vasile, 2015).

After being extorted for years by various different clans in the area, Filippo Nocerino, a construction business owner, decided to take action into his own hands. He attached a hidden camera to his watch, and filmed extorters from various clans demanding pizzo from him. He gave this video to the Carabinieri, together with other pieces of evidence that he had collected over the previous fifteen years. He was placed under 24/7 police protection in

³⁸ A national anti-racket association which, amongst other things, encourages pizzo-paying shopkeepers to call them on their “hot-line” for advice.

November 2011, just before the start of Operation “Vento” which arrested twenty-eight people throughout the area. He later denounced these individuals in court in 2014, where he revealed that he had already previously denounced the Camorra in the 2000s for extorting his business, but due to inadequate protection by law enforcement, he was forced to drop the case and continue paying the clans. He now considered it to be safe to denounce the clans. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). As Conticello notes, everyone who arrives in Ercolano knows that everything has changed now. Where there was fear, *omertà* and ten homicides a year, the pizzo is not paid anymore: in Ercolano the Camorra has lost, and the antiracket has won. Now that almost no criminal activities conducted and there are no longer fearful businesspeople, the city’s redemption is studied in schools and has gained interest from abroad (2015, p.147).

2:3 The local criminal landscape

Beatrice (2009) contended that criminal groups in the area, commonly (and sometimes falsely) referred to as “Camorra”, exhibit a wide spectrum of peculiarities that determine their nature. These range from simple “thugs” that pester the district they live in or the middle classes to the point of exclusion from daily life; to small groups of acrimonious youths who move from their home district and harass people for their own gratification; to groups which we would traditionally associate with 416-bis. It is these 416-bis groups within the Campania region that this thesis is concerned, rather than those periphery/contracted groups below them. Whilst there have been large alliances of Camorra clans in the post-war period, clans are still mainly characterised by what an Italian Ministero dell’Interno (Ministry of the Interior) report on organized crime called “pulverizzazione” (1999, p.15): a pulverised and powder-like abundance of smaller clans in a larger interlinking network.

The illegal activities conducted by Camorra clans vary from traditionally dependable and constant money-making activities such as extortion of businesses (Di Gennaro, 2015) and usury (Di Gennaro and Elce, 2015) to more lucrative but riskier activities such as the trafficking of drugs (Roberti, 2008), weapons (Ministero dell’Interno, 1999), and cigarettes (Paoli, 2004; Guarino, 2011) as well as illegal waste disposal (Saviano, 2007; Martone, 2011) and the production of counterfeit goods such as clothes and DVDs (Gribaudo, 2009; Brancaccio, 2011). As these groups have grown and gained greater influence on the market, certain clans have outsourced the actual sale of illegal products in their territory to smaller criminal groups. This has complicated the borders between what we should term “Camorra” and that which is a smaller criminal group. For example, Camorra clans have been observed to pool their central supply of a drug and sell it to smaller (non-Camorra) groups for a profit,

sometimes selling to multiple groups who are only permitted to sell the drugs at certain times of the day. In this sense we can refer to a Camorra clan as having multiple “levels” whereby the first, central and integral part of the clan is contrasted to the outer peripheries of its operations, which are conducted by other separate, but affiliated, groups that do not necessarily have an organic relationship with the clan (Griboaudi, 2009, p.213-217). Similarly, certain clans, such as the Caselesì, have moved away from this lower level dealing towards more bourgeois and entrepreneurial crimes that blend the licit with the illicit such as money laundering and waste disposal (Saviano, 2007; Colletti, 2016), whilst still retaining the broad “Camorra” label due to their geographical positioning.

With regard to the so-called *area grigia*, mutual relationships between clans and businesspeople, politicians, civil servants and other individuals in positions of power have facilitated corruption and other crimes. These interlinking relationships are related to ‘o *sistema* in both a structural and cultural sense: they simultaneously represent the link between the licit and illicit economy, and a mentality that favours clientelism and contacts over due process (e.g: Train, 1912; Allum, 1973; Walston, 1988). This clientelism in Naples was noted, quite patronisingly, by Arthur Train to represent the culture of the Italians in general and of the *mezzogiorno* region in particular as one which has “never fully grasped the Anglo-Saxon idea that even the King is subject to the law” (1912, p.143). Rejecting this kind of Essentialism that pits an uncivilized (Southern) people against (Northern) European civilization is important because of its overgeneralisation, but also for its more discriminatory and oppressive politics. The worst of these is represented in the Positivist school of criminology advocated by Cesare Lombroso (Gibson, 2002) that linked the biological factors that decide one's appearance as indicative of one's propensity to criminal behaviour. In this vein, whilst caution should nonetheless be maintained for the amoral familism of Edward Banfield (1958) that treads the fine line between cultural Essentialism and the necessity of a civilizing process in the *mezzogiorno* region, the extent of reliance on patronage and favouritism that supersede due process in Neapolitan and Southern society should not be ignored. This cultural practice fuels *o' sistema*, using these pre-existing norms for overtly criminal purposes, thereby further refuelling those initial cultural norms and bringing them into contact with criminality. Borrowing from Blok (1974), Pine refers to the Camorra in this context as “not a circumscribable thing but a part of everything, the atmospheric state of things” (2012, p.15) where its existence is not only sensed and experienced, but also imagined and assumed in the areas they operate. It is based in the (often correct) belief that the Camorra operates in every aspect of life of certain districts, thereby influencing the character of relations within that same district.

The story of the Camorra in Campania is one of localised clans that have attempted to dominate the local market, situating themselves in the *area grigia*, reproducing themselves through the continued collaboration with third parties who benefit from their existence. Their imagined and actualised presence in different levels of society further exacerbates distrust in public processes, in the establishment and increasing apathy to the idea of process. In this regard, it is also important to clarify the obvious point that crime, petty and serious, exists externally to the Camorra that at times this external crime assists the clans, whilst also remembering Camorra and their associates offer opportunities for individuals on both a psychological and economic level where the State has fallen well short.

The socio-economic context is one of chronic underdevelopment and wealth inequality where the visible degradation of parts of the region has fuelled what has been called the "Broken Window Theory" (Kelling & Wilson, 1982) elsewhere. This is the process by which citizens in an area start to believe that authority does not exert any discipline and does not care, thus breaking the bonds of the social contract. The name stems from the idea that if a building has a smashed window that is remains unfixed for a long time, people who see the broken window frequently will start to believe that no-one cares about the area at all. The theory was tested by Phillip Zimbardo in 1969:

He arranged to have an automobile without license plates parked with its hood up on a street in the Bronx [a famously rundown area of New York City] and a comparable automobile on a street in Palo Alto, California [a famously affluent area] . The car in the Bronx was attacked by "vandals" within ten minutes of its "abandonment." The first to arrive were a family—father, mother, and young son—who removed the radiator and battery. Within twenty-four hours, virtually everything of value had been removed. Then random destruction began—windows were smashed, parts torn off, upholstery ripped. Children began to use the car as a playground. Most of the adult "vandals" were well-dressed, apparently clean-cut whites. The car in Palo Alto sat untouched for more than a week. Then Zimbardo smashed part of it with a sledgehammer. Soon, passersby were joining in. Within a few hours, the car had been turned upside down and utterly destroyed. Again, the "vandals" appeared to be primarily respectable whites.

Untended property becomes fair game for people out for fun or plunder and even for people who ordinarily would not dream of doing such things and who probably consider themselves law-abiding. Because of the nature of community life in the Bronx—its anonymity, the frequency with which cars are abandoned and things are stolen or broken, the past experience of "no one caring"—vandalism begins much

more quickly than it does in staid Palo Alto, where people have come to believe that private possessions are cared for, and that mischievous behavior is costly. But vandalism can occur anywhere once communal barriers—the sense of mutual regard and the obligations of civility—are lowered by actions that seem to signal that "no one cares." (Kelling & Wilson, 1982)

This is applicable to much of the *mezzogiorno* region and Naples in particular precisely because of the level of vandalism and seeming lack of caring that one sees on a daily basis. The most visual of these are the significant amount of graffiti in the streets and on public transport, some of which has been around for many years. Likewise, the infamous problem of rubbish collection that made news headlines around the world. Crimes associated with traffic and vehicle regulations are also common, but often unreported. Uninsured vehicles, riding scooters without a helmet or unsafely, speeding, disregard for traffic lights or pedestrian crossings, double (and triple) parking, illegal seizure of public parking spaces, illegal collection of parking fares, and other relatively low level crimes are widespread. Like every large city, there is also predatory petty crime ranging from pickpocketing to muggings, however there is little evidence officially linking these crimes to Camorra in any meaningful way.

Other widespread petty crimes include fare dodging – an indicator of the lack of consequences for non-payers and lack of investment in ticket machines and barriers, rather than the inability for the population to pay for the tickets. Indeed on the Circumvesuviana train system in particular, attempts by staff to inspect tickets have been met by abuse from some travellers, where the fear for their safety has dissuaded some of them from inspecting at all. Buses face a similar issue, but ticket inspection remains almost entirely unenforced where the bus driver has no part to play in the ticket inspection process, meaning that they rarely ensure that passengers have validated their pre-paid ticket on the vehicle. The result is that people rarely pay for their journey by bus.

There is a significant "black market" in the city ranging from undeclared irregular work, tax avoidance, sale of illegal goods, and everything in between involving private individuals, businesses and smaller criminal groups. The reasons for this are numerous. The inaccessibility and inflexibility of State bureaucracy dissuades individuals from declaring their income, but important too is the unlikelihood of being caught and of prosecution. The lack of contracted employment for unskilled workers is also an issue, whereby it is a greater incentive for a small business to pay someone "off the books", which a vying employee readily accepts. Landlords frequently rent properties in cash to tenants without contracts, sometimes giving tenants the option of a contract only if they pay extra money to cover for

the extra tax burden. Indeed, a noted practice has been of legal businesses offering to pay employees a certain percentage of their wage directly in untaxed cash, so as to reduce a business' and employee's tax liability, something that is beneficial to both parties. The unregulated and irregular nature of work in Naples in particular (see Pardo, 1996) favours undeclared cash transactions between individuals. Irregular and undeclared work comes in many different forms, ranging from casual employees for small businesses who are paid cash-in-hand, freelancers who work without declaring their income and workers (often migrants) working for organisations directly linked to stolen or counterfeit goods. The amount of cash transactions between individuals and businesses favours money laundering practices by Camorra and non-Camorra individuals alike. For young people who, like many young Italians, still live with their parents and thus do not have bills to pay, a large amount of their monetary transactions exist only in cash.

3: Concluding remarks

This chapter has introduced our case study and the essentials that pave the way for greater analysis in the following chapters. On a local level, I presented Ercolano's demographics, recent political history and the history of the Camorra clans operating in the area. Like many communities in the *mezzogiorno* region, Ercolano is a town characterised by high youth unemployment. Similar to many communities in Campania, and in the area around Naples in particular, it has also been characterised by the influence of Camorra clans that became involved in local politics alongside other activities such as trafficking and racketeering.

On a macro level, I analysed police and judicial powers in response to the Camorra, and provided a snapshot of the criminal landscape of the Neapolitan hinterland. In particular, I outlined the laws that provide the definition of and sentence for a "mafioso" (in our case, camorrista) and their connections outside of their association (those in the *area grigia*). I also outlined the legal use and limitation of the two main weapons at the disposal of the Carabinieri and the judiciary: that of the testimony of cooperating witnesses (pentiti) and that of surveillance (wiretapping specifically). As well as this judicial perspective, the size and character of the informal economy in the region is also an important factor to remember – particularly when considering relations between individuals in the area. The following chapters deal with the "meat" of the thesis.

iii. Businesses and the pizzo

Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the pizzo and how it has been paid in Ercolano. I draw upon the first-hand accounts of Ercolano-based businesspeople, court proceedings and practitioner accounts from the serving Investigating Magistrate as well as members of the local Carabinieri. The data is analysed as follows: I begin by introducing the judicial understanding of the term and how it is understood in Ercolano, and how Camorra clans have been observed to extract money from businesses. I then analyse this transaction from the perspective of the business people who used to pay the pizzo. This is followed by a discussion on how widespread the pizzo was in the community, concluding with a debate as to why certain businesses have paid, and others have not. In most, but not all cases, pseudonyms are used when I refer to businesspeople.

1: The Judicial perspective

In 2015 the then serving investigating magistrate for Ercolano, Pierpaolo Filippelli, described the pizzo as

basically extortion, a bribe. If we can put it thus, it is a “tax” that a clan claims from shopkeepers in order for them to be left alone. This is so that they can be left to work in peace without repercussions or the worry of being ambushed or attacked at their own place of work or home. Say that I am in charge of the clan: if you want to work without any hassle, you need to give me some money, or if you don’t want to give me money, you need to give me goods free of charge, or you have to hire one of the people that I tell you to hire. So, the pizzo is an abuse by a clan against an entrepreneur, against a shopkeeper and it is a criminal offence that is very damaging to their assets and their rights. However it is an offence that damages the whole economy because where there is an area where there is pizzo, where there is the Camorra, there isn’t any investment from other regions. If there were an entrepreneur from abroad, or Northern Italy that would like to invest in Ercolano or maybe another area of Italy, that finds out that here they pay the pizzo, they would rather invest more in another area instead. So this is a very damaging factor as it is a case of development that has been missed out in Ercolano.

We say that the pizzo is extortion and also harmful to a person’s liberty, to a person’s dignity, because a person who is forced to pay out of fear, it is clear that they are made to do something humiliating to go and pay a camorrista. To work and then have to pay a piece of their earnings to the camorrista. It is a person being robbed of their dignity, and so it is a very serious criminal offence. It is a serious criminal

offence that typically comes from Camorra clans, because extortion is important for a clan not only because it guarantees it money, but also because through the pizzo the clan truly shows its domination over a territory. It is like it were the State – it has command over a territory, and much like the State it wants you to pay taxes, and so here the clans want the shopkeepers and the entrepreneurs that operate in their territory to pay tax to the clan [...]

It could also happen that in some cases, alongside the payment of money, there would be a consignment of goods free of charge. So a shopkeeper of a shoe shop would give a pizzo of 100 euros but also five or six pairs of shoes for free – this is also a pizzo. There could also be a shopkeeper or entrepreneur who, instead of paying pizzo in money, is forced to hire a person chosen by the clan –that is also a form of extortion. Another form of extortion is that of changing cheques and money, some of it stolen, which forms a part of recycling laundered money for the clan. There are many forms of pizzo. The important thing for the clan is that everyone pays. At times the clan is willing to reduce the pizzo. In times of crisis, however, everyone pays. (LE 30062015)

Unsurprisingly, the image of the pizzo given here is not that of a voluntary payment for the receipt of a service, but instead an extraction of money or services from a business under duress or the threat of violence. Filippelli corroborates our comparison between tax and pizzo, noting that the payment is not about the money *per se*, rather it is the submission to payment which signifies Camorra power.

The pizzo identified here is more than a simple monetary transaction where money is given to the camorrista by a businessperson *metus causa factum* (Pezzuto, 2015, p.10), but also contains the provision of additional caveats which range from the forced hiring of staff (themselves likely linked to the clan in some way), the “rights of seizure” (Toros and Mavelli, 2013; Foucault 2008) of goods that are sold by the business, to assistance in Camorra money laundering schemes, namely transforming physical cash collected illegally elsewhere into legal custom once it enters a business. With regard to each of these, it is easy to see the possibility of a “creeping normality” or a “slippery slope” where an initial small allowance or adherence makes it difficult to refuse future requests that may grow in the amount that is demanded. The examples that Filippelli mention amount to a blank cheque in future visits (simple monetary payments, and the taking of goods), an undue influence over the business’ employment policy (with no assurances that the number of staff, their salary, will not increase), and the slow assimilation of the business into its criminal enterprise (particularly through money laundering). The provision of money laundering activities is particularly

duplicitous and ingenious since it requires a businessperson to have an active role in the crime on behalf of the clan. It requires a business to forge its account books, an illegal act, and therefore aligns the interests of the business with that of the clan – making business an active partner and, therefore, fostering omertà. This cooperation becomes more diffuse as it becomes more socially acceptable (Beatrice, 2009).

Each one of these types of *pizzo* denotes an assimilation of the business itself and a transformation in the culture and norms as to how individual businesses organise themselves. This is seen through the general “submission” side to the transaction and acceptance of Camorra power and/or its claim to legitimacy, but also through the changing of the business culture and conduct themselves. Encouraging a business to launder money, for example, involves a business putting money through the business as a legal transaction. It involves the hope that no prudent tax inspector checks that the amount of any particular “good” or “product” being sold is more than the amount you are able to provide.

I provide here a short example to explain how this functions: a beauty salon has only has a certain number of staff working at any time and, depending on the length of the work day, can only ever theoretically “sell” a certain number of products a day. It can, therefore, theoretically only make a certain amount of money every day based on the length of each transaction. It is more difficult to launder money through physical “products” for the simple reason that you have to buy and then sell the physical product to begin with. If the “product” you are selling, is not “physical”, such as a haircut, then it is relatively easy to launder money gradually through the business, as long as you have the existing tools or staff to run the business (hairdressers, scissors, chairs, etc.) and as long as you do not exceed the amount that you can theoretically make in a day compared to the amount of staff that are working on any given day. Once this money is in the business, it can be used in a variety of ways, such as buying products from other Camorra businesses so as to place “clean” money into the hands of the clan. With regard to the *pizzo*, dirty Camorra money is mixed with the clean money the business makes day-to-day. This forces the businessowner to be creative in their account books and then making clean and traceable transactions to Camorra related affiliates that act as a front for further money laundering elsewhere.

Certain Camorra clans in the area have engaged in property speculation based on the inflow and outflows of the business, the ownership of casinos abroad, and legal investment in the local tourist sector (Behan, 1996, p.127). Some members of the Ascione clan were arrested in 2008 in Florence on the charges of money laundering. They appeared to have been using contacts in other clans (the Casalesi and the Mazzarella) to purchase real estate (*La Repubblica*, 12 May 2009) in which a suspicious €1,000,000 deposit was flagged by a bank.

In subsequent investigations, €10,000,000 was confiscated in total (*Il Terreno*, 13 May 2009).

In this we can see how important certain businesses like these are to Camorra clans, in the sense that they are a means of cleaning dirty money, whilst, at the same time, fostering submission in businesses where the clan is based. Besides the illegality of this relationship, the business would have to pay tax on this extra non-existent income, and, if audited, to explain where this extra revenue has gone if not into the business itself. On being caught for faulty accounting, a businessperson can claim that they actually understated their real turnover elsewhere in order to avoid tax. This would lead to a fine for tax evasion, but would not disrupt the money laundering operation (which would entail greater fines and punishments). Indeed, as Behan noted, this may be why there are so many retail outlets in the *mezzogiorno* region: these inflows and outflows of cash are normal, difficult to trace and to monitor without massive resources (1996, pp.127-8).

The forced hiring of staff enables the Camorra to either (1) genuinely give one of their associates a legal job where the clan is able to “pay” them indirectly through the business they are extorting or (2) simply give them a job on paper, when the businessperson is paying a member of staff who never comes to work. The first of these means that the Camorra have influence and a means of checking the business and its activities, whereas the second of these is an ingenious way to pay Camorra associates with clean money. The strict monetary *pizzo* and the *pizzo* which entails the giving away of goods involves an alteration of a business plan and/or account books much like money laundering. If audited, a businessperson must be able to account for the loss of goods or money that has gone missing from the business. As noted by D’Alessandro (2009) and Beatrice (2009), the clan affects the relationship of a business to the law, making them complicit in the crimes. It becomes in both parties’ interest to keep the details of any kind of arrangement secret.

Filippelli detailed further cleavages in *pizzo* payment, stating that there is an inherent difference between two different types of businesspeople:

the *pizzo* paid by the shopkeepers – the ones that have shops (physical shops) – shoe shops, patisseries, the butcher – and the *pizzo* paid by entrepreneurs – who basically are at a place from time to time who have a work contract for a specific place. The entrepreneur in reality pays an amount in relation to the work that they are doing varying from between 3% and 5%. The shopkeeper is different – it is not as if they work every now and then – they can be found at the shop everyday. And these shopkeepers paid once a month or (something more common in Ercolano) three

times a year: Christmas, Easter and August. So every month, or during the most important festivals. (LE 30062015)

In many ways Filippelli corroborates what I have already discussed in the introduction with regard to the FAI and from Tano Grasso (2012). This is unsurprising given that his co-authors in *Camorra e l'antiracket* were public servants who worked in Ercolano, even though the “three times a year” payment has also been a feature in other communities in the *mezzogiorno* region (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). Filippelli stressed the difference between two different types of businesses: the business with a physical shop and regular opening and closing times in at least one set location, where a customer can freely walk in and buy products (which we henceforth referred to as “shopkeeper”); the businessperson who has a business without one set location, where they are contracted for a temporary period on a project (henceforth referred to as “entrepreneur”). This distinction was also corroborated in other interviews I conducted with members of the Carabinieri at the Police Station in Torre del Greco, who work with Filippelli: they quoted a 3% figure as a *pizzo* for entrepreneurs who have contracted works, such as apartment buildings and anything else involving concrete (LE 18042015).

The following section outlines these two different *pizzos* as they were experienced by businesspeople and the manner in which the Camorra have attempted to collect *pizzo*.

2: How does a business pay the *pizzo*?

In 2000 a building contractor named Filippo from Ercolano was approached for money by members of the Ascione clan. They wanted a percentage of his earnings in order to allow him to conduct his activities in their territory. Unwilling to pay them, Filippo decided to denounce his would-be extorters, leading to their arrest and eventual sentencing after he stood in court alone and denounced them. Despite this, the Ascione continued to demand money on new contracts that his business had received elsewhere. Filippo eventually decided to stop denouncing:

I did not feel comfortable. I was not safeguarded by anyone, not the doctor, not the judiciary, not the law enforcement. There weren't any associations to support me – no one. In fact, when I tried to speak to the law enforcement or to anyone, I found *omertà* ... perhaps it was not the right climate. [...] The threats just continued. I couldn't stand it anymore, so I left to work in Genova alone instead. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.225)

Six years later Filippo returned to his hometown to try and work nearby. Despite conducting all of his activities behind a hard metal shutter in private, it only took twenty days before he was approached by another clan, whose emissary told him that in order to continue to conduct business, he would need to “conform to the rules”. “I was prepared, I was waiting for him”, Filippo said in a court appearance a few years later. “Did you not denounce the aggression?”, asked the investigating magistrate. “No, I had already suffered too much”.

Often when his business was contracted in the area, he would be approached at his work place by members of a clan, requesting a percentage of the money. At times, he was approached by more than one clan separately, with the result that he had to pay the costs of his as well as a percentage of his earnings to multiple clans. For Filippo, this first began at contracted works in Ercolano, then in Naples, followed by the surrounding area of San Giovanni a Teduccio, San Cristoforo and San Giovannello: it must be stressed that this is not a phenomenon affecting Ercolano but the *mezzogiorno* region in general (Gerina and Vasile, 2015; Conticello, 2015). At one point he was contracted alongside his brothers to restructure an apartment building in the Mercato quarter of Naples and was called to go and negotiate with their client on some extra work that they required:

We knew that there was the Camorra and we explained to our clients that we wanted absolutely nothing to do with these gentlemen. At this time I was staying in Genova, coming back every fifteen days just because I have a family, and I only went to visit this building site once. I happened to be on this site on this particular day by chance. They needed some more work done on the building, and had requested a meeting with me just to understand what I would quote them. For this I brought along my brother Biagio, to this meeting along with our other brother Mariano, just for support. At a certain point without warning the client interrupted and started yelling at us, we were all at fists. They started to leave whilst talking amongst themselves about what had happened, when four people suddenly arrived. Then for some reason, they began to beat me, and only me, I suffered for half an hour. My brother Mariano tried to intervene so they turned to beat him too, then at a certain point they turned to my brother Biagio who was sat and they broke his finger. After half an hour of being beaten, they opened the door, and the corridor was full of people. Out of this crowd of people came Roberto, this Roberto was Roberto Mazzarella [a member of the Mazzarrella clan, from Torre del Greco] (Tribunale di Napoli, Procedimento penale n.1244/2013 cited in Gerina and Vasile, 2015, pp.226-7)

As noted by Gerina and Vasile, to that which was being sought was a “bribe” of varying amounts, all payable on religious holidays – but the extra problem for Filippo was that this

amount grew each time he met with the Mazzarella.³⁹ Every now and then, Filippo would be summoned by the Mazzarella clan: sometimes in a bar, sometimes on the building site or even at the grandmother's house of a worker that he was forced to hire. With every new meeting came a new clan, and more money to pay (2015, p.228). This was made even more outrageous when, in 2007, Filippo received a new summoning by someone he did not recognize: he was to follow a car up to a building, follow people up to the third floor where he was met in an apartment by people who told him that they were from the Rinaldi clan. The Rinaldi clan and the Mazzarella clan were rivals, had fought one another during the Camorra wars of the 1970s and 1980s, where the Mazzarella were part of La Nuova Famiglia and the Rinaldi were part of the NCO and Raffaele Cutolo. The Rinaldi had called this meeting with Filippo to know how much he had paid the Mazzarella. The reality of the situation was even more complicated, however, as Filippo was paying both the Mazzarella, and another clan which was historically linked to the Rinaldi: the Formicola clan. On hearing this name, the Rinaldi began a long discussion, forcing Filippo to wait outside on the balcony. When he was called back in, he was quoted a figure of €17,000 which he agreed to pay, given the circumstances. As well as this pizzo of €17,000, Filippo was "almost forced" to buy certain shares in a consortium which was working on the port to develop tourism in Ercolano and Portici. Following this, he was told to allow the clan to be a part of this venture, by making one of the camorristi a member of the consortium (pp.228-9).

In 2009, Filippo decided to do something about his situation. He reported that "since it was very difficult to be able to identify people, as many people look like one another, it was impossible to describe everyone [...] I decided to film them in order to leave a trace of that which happened" (p.234). Working with the Carabinieri, he filmed his interactions with the clan and then gave them the tape as evidence. From 12 October 2011 onwards, every interaction with clan members was filmed by a camera hidden in Filippo's wristwatch. The first thing filmed was extortion by the Mazzarella and the Formicola clans, with a payment of €4,000 (3% of a €130,000 contract) that they came and took directly from the site: "It was all in 500 euro notes" (p.235). In December 2011, the Carabinieri started arresting the people in these videos in "Operazione Vento", arresting 28 people from five different clans. One of these videos was subsequently released online, and shows the meeting between Filippo and his extorters.⁴⁰ The video shows how, on the work of renovating the "Albergo dei Poveri" for which he was getting €450,000, he was approached by the clan for a pizzo payment of €22,000. On hearing the amount, Filippo responded "It's not possible, how am I able to do

³⁹ For a detailed insight into the Mazzarella clan see Gribaudo, 2011, which mentions Roberto specifically.

⁴⁰ The video and some of the excerpt are available at: Il Fatto Quotidiano, 30 January 2012: <http://www.ilfattoquotidiano.it/2012/01/30/filma-camorristi-chiedono-pizzo/187916/>

this?”, at which the camorrista’s response was simply :“I don’t give a fuck” (*Il Fatto Quotidiano*, 30 January 2012).

Regarding the main points on this particular type of pizzo payment, Filippo’s account gives us much to ponder. Firstly, that of Camorra territoriality: the borders of different clans appear very fluid in the sense that various clans are operating and extorting entrepreneurs in one another’s areas. As we can see, this leads to entrepreneurs regularly paying a portion of the contracted money to multiple clans in the same area. The same laws that allow for accountability on public funding in the face of endemic corruption also allow the details of construction contracts to be available to the public. The information regarding entrepreneurs who receive public contracts in a territory is available in the public sphere, often published by local administrations, making an accurate demand for a specific figure much easier to accomplish by clans. Indeed the local Carabinieri noted that: “the Camorra finds out that there is a project of 200,000 euros, for example, and so, goes to the site and asks [...] So there isn’t a fixed amount” (LE 18042015).

Private contracts are more difficult, as the attainment of a figure is only available through certain channels such as contacts inside the construction industry. However, ongoing works in an area make it easier to approach specific entrepreneurs. Secondly, the pizzo payment for the entrepreneur comes in various forms: the most obvious are a percentage of the contracted money for the project and alongside imposed workers. There is also the imposed purchase of materials or shares or the forced signatures of contracts sponsorships allowing camorristi an incursion into the entrepreneur’s business or sector on a local level, further assimilating free businesses. This has a knock-on effect and enables a Camorra clan to influence, if not dictate, local construction policies, laundering money through unfinished (and sometimes illegal) construction works.

Another Ercolano entrepreneur in the area, D.L.R.⁴¹ had a slightly different experience, whereby in November 2007 he was relayed a message by one of his workers from two individuals who had arrived at his construction site:

Tell the boss that he needs to come *fuori al ponte*.

D.L.R. asked his staff where this place was exactly, at which his staff informed him that it was an area of the city which is known for the presence of Camorra in our Area 3. He decided not to go there. Close to Christmas, the individuals came back, asking

Why hasn’t anyone come? Tell the boss that he needs to come *fuori al ponte*.

⁴¹ As named in the Zoom document “ERCOLANO 19, 2007-8”.

He decided not to respond this time either, particularly because it was close to Christmas time and he was suspending work for the holidays. The two individuals did not take kindly to the indifference shown by D.L.R. and decided to be much more explicit in their next visit in March 2008:

Do we have to be ambassadors for you again? If that's what you want ... don't you want to be left in peace? Say to him [D.L.R.] that that he needs to come to the *Moquette*.

The word *Moquette* literally means “carpet” or “rug”, but here it was the Ascione clan's euphemism for “extortion racket”, as well as the place where a businessperson had to go in order to pay the pizzo. If you are ordered to go to the *Moquette*, it means that you have to go to a specific place to pay. In the case of the Ascione it refers to an apartment in a residential block located on a street close to the centre of Ercolano, Via Panoramica, (see figure 1) where the stairs that the shopkeeper climbs to get to the apartment are covered in a red carpet (Daniele, 2012, pp.21-2):

This is the third time that we have come here ... do you not know that you are in Ercolano? What are you waiting for? For us to raise our hands against you?

Under these conditions, and after some thought, D.L.R. and his employee decided to denounce these individuals to the Carabinieri rather than pay. D.L.R. announced his intention to the Carabinieri to go to the *Moquette* and meet these individuals. On arriving at the *Moquette*, he was met by a single person, “D.P.P”:

You know who we are, and you know why you are here. We want to be friends with everyone.

D.P.P requested a sum of money that would be “something adequate” because “things aren't going so well” and “we are in need”. That same day, D.P.P was arrested by the Carabinieri (Procedimento Penale n.18204/08 R.G.N.R. 9341/08 R.G. TRIB). Much like with Filippo, the *modus operandi* of the clans involved an approach by camorristi, followed by an invitation to an apartment owned by the Camorra where an amount is formally arranged. The “regularity” of payment as identified by Grasso and Filippelli does not apply to entrepreneurs because their businesses do not have one set “project” and the business necessarily moves around the area, meaning that it is expedient for a clan to resort to extortive tactics on each individual project rather than a regular collection of money. There is a difference between paying once a month over the course of a single project, and paying once a month indefinitely, something which for this type of entrepreneur is not attainable.

The manner in which payment was conducted with the Ascione has been described by various other businesspeople who paid the pizzo. This is the account of another businessperson:

I took the money to the Moquette. Sometimes I would take it there and they would say “Fuori al ponte”, which is the front of the Ercolano Post Office, where there is a road called Vico Moscardino, and I went to take it there... I entered onto the street, there was a house on the left, and I went there and brought this money ... Sometimes I brought it there and to ... where there is the Enel [an electric and gas company] written on the buildings ... zi’ Luigi, where zi’ Luigi lives. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.209)




Figure 1

Aerial map of Ercolano

(Googlemaps)

There are two different locations being described here. The first is in an apartment building, which is where “zi’ Luigi” lives (the road Via Panoramica is located on the map by a red circle which is in our Area 1 of the city mentioned in a previous section). “Fuori al ponte”⁴² or “For ‘o ponte”, as described elsewhere in Neapolitan, is Vico Moscardino (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.) (indicated on the map by a yellow circle in our Area 2 of the town).

Zi’ Luigi is Luigi Nocerino, who was the acting boss of the Ascione whilst the real boss, Raffaele Ascione was in prison. One of the more striking things about the “ponte” is its location in the heart of Ercolano. It is within short walking distance from the main street in

⁴² Tr. Outside of the bridge

Ercolano and the Herculaneum archaeological site (located in figure 1 with a pink square). On one side it is facing a famous Bourbon Villas, Villa Campolieto, designed by one of the most famous architects in Naples, Luigi Vanvitelli. At times the businesspeople would be told to go into Luigi Nocerino's home, as described by another building contractor in court:

Witness: We entered immediately into the lounge and it was there where we sat.

Lawyer: So, the entrance enters immediately into the lounge?

Witness: Yeah. As you enter, like so, on the right, there is an armchair and a table in the centre, and we sat. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.210)

So here we are able to visualise the ease at which a businessperson paid. They would go to Via Panoramica, call the appropriate apartment and then either go up and pay in person, or be ordered to go to the stronghold of the Ascione in Vico Moscardino, much closer to the economic heart of Ercolano, walk down a narrow alley leading to the courtyard and leave the payment of money there. The image of a single armchair at a table, with presumably other smaller seats around it in Nocerino's apartment, or a businessperson being ordered from place to place to give away money is a potent one, giving us an idea of the strict hierarchical power dynamics that the boss and his clan were trying to evoke. The use of specific language or catchphrases has been disseminated in the wider community by the Ascione, where they attempted to create a norm, or at least a specific understanding of what those linguistic signs meant.

While the Ascione had the Moquette and the "ponte", the Birra instead had the "Cuparella", referring specifically to two streets, "Via Pace" and Via Cuparella, both close to the market area of Ercolano in Area 2, where a representative of the clan would approach the shopkeepers and then take them to a nearby apartment to receive the money. Further evidence of the phenomena of a first meeting where the clan establishes contact, and then a second where they take payment, is exemplified by a baker in the market quarter of the city:

It was at the end of October 2009 when an individual came in and ordered me to talk to someone with who he was affiliated, who, according to him, was in charge of Ercolano. I said "commander..." because, I mean, if he says he's in charge of Ercolano, I guess that's what I should call him— I bake bread, I'm a baker, I didn't know. He just said, "Yeah you need to come to this place", and for the first few days it didn't really sink in.

That was until he came here again, but this time he didn't come alone, but instead with another two or three people, ordering me to go outside with them, all of this in front of everyone in the bakery. This was annoying because the other customers were scared to leave - people weren't coming into the bakery anymore. (N5 18032014)

In this situation, a member of the Birra clan approached a business person, and ushers them into contact with a second individual, in this case the "commander", who tells the businessperson what they are to do. If the shopkeeper did not obey, other members of the Birra would come to the business and harass the businesspeople and customers of the business. In this meeting one of the Birra associates, Ciro Savino, addressed the baker thus:

Oh, so you didn't understand the ambassador from yesterday? That you had to come to the Cuparella [...] You have to help us out because we are having a few problems. As everyone else is paying, you have to pay us too. You've gotta give us 5,000 euros now, then 300 euros every month. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.212)

The process itself involves the initial contact with the clan through the ambassador who requests a meeting, the meeting establishes power dynamics and the demand of tribute, which, if not followed and adhered to, will result in intimidation in the business itself. The baker did not pay this amount, resulting in further threats involving having a gun pointed at her and her staff, and then a small bomb placed outside the business. The bomb destroyed the shop shutters, but fortunately did not lead to any casualties. Like the Ascione clan, we observe similarity between the modes of escalation adopted by the Birra clan to the steps of escalation that follow a request for *pizzo* that Henner Hess described in Sicily (1973, p.103). Indeed in June 2009 a building contractor from Ercolano was murdered by the Ascione clan, apparently for not paying *pizzo*. From what has been reconstructed by Ascione pentiti, the contractor had already paid his *pizzo* to an individual from the clan by doing some work in his home for free, but the clan wanted money too. It seems that he refused, leading to his murder by being shot, his body being burned, and then left in a landfill on a road on Mount Vesuvius (*NapoliToday*, 10 March 2009).

The manner in which the *pizzo* has been experienced is varied. Giuseppe is an owner of a shop and inherited the *pizzo* from his father, who in turn had inherited it from his father. Giuseppe's grandfather had paid the *pizzo* ever since the Ascione had shot at the shop shutters back in the 1970s, and they paid every festivity until it was changed to monthly payments of 200 euros a month. They paid the Ascione until 2006, when the Birra clan expanded in the area and forced Giuseppe to pay 250 euros on festivities to them too (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.213; Daniele, 2012, p.22-3). The *pizzo* paid to the Ascione

carried a hereditary element to it, in that when the business was handed down to the new owners, *pizzo* paying was a pre-existing and normal part of the business plan. This is an ingenious side to the *pizzo*, given that the disposition for paying *pizzo* is already established (in this case for two generations), making it *abnormal* to not pay it, even if it is resented.

Ciro owns what Filippelli would refer to as a “physical shop” in Ercolano and is now a member of the antiracket. For years he paid the *pizzo* to the Ascione clan in Ercolano. He was approached every festivity by a member of the clan and told to give him a “present for the prisoners”. I asked him about the relationship that he had with the men who came to his shop, curious about any kind of dynamics that were involved between these two individuals, at which he said there was no relationship at all: the camorrista would arrive every now and then, close to the aforementioned festivities, give a reminder that the prisoners need presents, and would then leave. Ciro inherited the business from his father, and unlike Giuseppe, he gave no indication that his father paid too. The “present” that was asked for (between 3% and 5% of takings) would be rounded off for an easy payable figure (N3 15042015). During the subsequent trial he said that the extortionist would come to the business and say “I come in the name of the *Moquette*, you need to give me 500 euros for the prisoners” (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.211). Similarly, in June 2004 a pizzeria in Ascione territory was approached by three young guys who threatened the owner, asking for a sum of money: “We are doing the rounds of the area from top to bottom, we are getting the salaries for our friends in prison”.

On refusal, one of them became even more threatening, saying that the owner obviously did not understand who they were, and what was going to happen to him. After they left, the owner went to the Carabinieri, where he identified the individuals (Procedimento Penale n.30025/04 R.G. – 10723/04 RG.Trib). This appeal to “prisoners” is, if correct, an interesting revelation and corroborates research conducted by Alessandro Colletti in an analysis of judicial accounts of the Casalesi Camorra clans (2016), whereby money collected from businesses was purposefully set aside for the salaries of those camorristi in prison and a kind of social welfare for their families. Declarations from other pentiti in Ercolano have also indicated the use of a system similar to social welfare for clan associates and their families (*Camorriste*, 2016), indicating that the claim is at least partially true.

Further demonstrating the extent of the extortive attempts, a prominent businesswoman in the area, Raffaella Ottaviano⁴³ was approached by members of the Ascione in 2004,

⁴³ I use Raffaella’s real name, as compared to aliases that I have used for other shopkeepers simply because she is such a vocal part of the anti-racket movement. Her name is already in the public domain, having being interviewed by the BBC, Radio Tedesca and other European broadcasters, in addition to being given an award

reporting it to the Carabinieri. To contextualise her case, she owns three businesses on the same street in Ercolano – all located on the main street which is understood to be the boundary between Ascione and Birra territory. She became a minor celebrity after she denounced the Camorra, allowing herself to be interviewed by various people throughout the media and becoming the honorary President of the local antiracket association “Ercolano per la legalità”. Here is a lengthy account of her experiences, which are pieced together from various interviews, meetings and judicial accounts:

Interviewer: The first thing to start, what is your name?

Raffaella: My name is Raffaella Ottaviano, I’m a shopkeeper, and the first woman to be liberated from the Camorra in Ercolano – the first person.

Interviewer: How did this idea [to denounce] occur to you? This first courageous step.

Raffaella: It’s not that it “occurred” to me. I just didn’t accept it. I was very angry, and I just went and denounced. Here in doing this I took the [first] step [...] I left, went to the Carabinieri station for Ercolano, and denounced.

[...]

Interviewer: But what was it like beforehand? Did you pay too?

Raffaella: Never. They never came to me. [Their visit in 2004] was the first time. The first time they came I didn’t even understand what they wanted from me. The first time they came I said “Ah okay I understand, you’ve mixed me up with someone else” and I said “go away immediately”. They also wanted to tell me a price, he said “there are three shops, what should we do?” I said, “It doesn’t matter, because I’m not interested in your product”, this is what I said. Then he shows me courtesy, and goes outside. Another two of them I faced in court *alone* ... (N 18032014)

According to her own judicial account, the interaction with the Ascione went thus: on the 15th March 2004 around 11am, two individuals rode up to one of her shops on a scooter. One stayed outside on the bike, whilst the second went inside:

Extorter: Io Zio [the uncle] sent me.

Raffaella: Who is Io Zio?

for services to the Italian Republic from the Presidente della Repubblica. I know from personal experience that she would much prefer me to use her own name, rather than a pseudonym.

Extorter Zio Giannino.

Raffaela asks twice who Giannino was

Extorter: I ask the questions here, not you.

Raffaela: I'm the one who'll be paying, so I want to know who it is who I have to pay.

Extorter: Don't you want to pay?

At the negative response from Raffaela, A.G. ["Extorter"] replies in a threatening tone.

Extorter: Alright then, until next time.

The next day, a different man turns up at the shop:

Extorter 2: Lo Zio sent me ... Signora, you already know what you need to do, it is what you want to do - you want to pay us.

Raffaela again refuses to pay, at which he replies:

Extorter 2: Until next time then... until next time

Shortly afterwards, Raffaela crossed paths with the two men from the day before who were returning from another business on the main street in Ercolano. They looked at her and remarked "infamona", "infamous one". The infamy associated with a criminal who turns away from the criminal system, yet it was less an insult than an instruction of what will happen to her if she does not "play ball". (Procedimento Penale n.1170/05 RG. Trib. – 15676/04 R.G.P.M). It was at this point that Raffaela decided that she needed to denounce, and so she went to the local Carabinieri. She recounted what happened next on the Italian talk-show "Beati Voi" on the Catholic TV network TV2000:

Host: So when they left you ran [to the Carabinieri station] immediately?

Raffaela: Immediately, right away, as soon as I could. I went to the local Carabinieri caserma looking for the lieutenant there. The lieutenant wasn't there, but I said, "no you have to call him again, because if I leave I will never come back – I need to denounce". The person there said "But Signora, to whom are you referring?" "The Camorra!" I said "extortion! So I need to denounce immediately!" The lieutenant immediately came down, and invited me up. He said to me "Right away before you tell me what happened, show me the surveillance photos, because otherwise they might escape" "Right now?" "Yes, right now" [...].

Host: So they were arrested – the same day?

Raffaella: [She nods] Right away, because I went there immediately. (Tv2000it, 2015)

The Lieutenant, a Venetian, sat with Ottaviano personally to get her account. There is no accessible judicial data on “Extorter 2” from the second day, leaving us to assume that he was not identified, and therefore was not tried. Both in court and from the victim in interviews, there are a number of questions regarding the timeline. From the judicial accounts we see that this happened over two days (15 and 16 March 2004), whereas from her personal account where the impression is given that all of the interactions occurred on the same day leading her to “leave immediately” for the Carabinieri.

In addition to payments in cash, the clans also forced shopkeepers to buy specific products, presumably related to businesses under their control or influence in some way. One example of this was the forced purchase of a particular coloured ornamental star at Christmas time which was to adorn their shops. The Birra first imposed the purchase of white stars to pizzo payers, which the Ascione followed up by imposing the purchase of red stars (Daniele, 2012, p.22), so as to make it easily visible who was paying, and to whom, whilst also demonstrating to other shopkeepers in the wider community that the influence of these clans on their local businesses was generally a normal and accepted thing in the city. To an outsider these stars mean nothing, but to someone who is already paying the pizzo and is thinking about denouncing their extorters, they are demonstrative of the grasp that the clans have upon the businesses. This is not unique to Ercolano. A similar situation was noted in a trial in 2004 in the area of Afragola where the Moccia clan charged businesses to “rent” Christmas stars over the Christmas period (Confesercenti Napoli, 2012). Similarly, during the Easter period some businesses were encouraged to deliver Easter themed ornaments and gifts (wine, Easter eggs, ornamental doves, panettone) to social gatherings related to the clan, whereby the leftovers would then be resold by the clan to other businesses (Daniele, Di Florio, Grasso, 2012).

This type of pizzo functions in two ways: firstly in a pure economic way whereby a business “buys” a product for more than it is worth (giving the clans clean money, since it can be written off in business account book as “decoration” or “advertising”), and secondly in a more symbolic manner, whereby camorristi can show the extent of their power over a community. Similarly to this was the forced purchase of bread: kilos and kilos of bread (Daniele, 2012, p.21-2), seemingly produced by a clan-related business, were likely to go towards a money laundering operation. The following is an account by a butcher based in Ercolano of an exchange he had with a member of the Birra:

“How is it that you are getting bread from someone else, Zi’ Pietro said that you had to get bread from us. We’re not looking for any trouble, but you’ve gotta do the same as us...”

“I’ve already got plenty of bread”.

“You don’t get it, if you don’t take the bread from us, where does that leave us? Look, don’t make Zi’ Pietro mad, because otherwise you’ll have problems”. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.207)

The butcher was told to buy “10 kilos a day from Giovanni and 10 from Giuseppe”, but the forced purchase was not all beneficial, simply because the costs he had to pay were above market value: on the market normally it would cost 80 cents a kilo, but he had to pay 1.30 euros for bread he did not want, the majority of which he would have to throw away at the end of the day:

“If I took 10 or 15 pieces of bread from one clan, I also needed to take 10 or 15 pieces from the other clan” explained the butcher who, after years of paying his dues to the Birra-Iacomino, started also paying the Ascione-Papale. He tried to tell them: “No, I don’t need any bread”, but he was just silenced all the same: “I have brought you bread, so you either can sell it, or you can just pay me all the same”, explained the new debt collector who introduced himself as “Zi’ Pietro”. (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, pp.207-8)

In this example there is a clear initiative to collect clean money at the expense of the butcher who is forced to ignore local free-market logic and instead buy that which is more expensive. This forces him to abandon his initial supplier of bread and provide money to local clans for their services, thereby giving local Camorra-owned (and legal) produce providers clean money at the expense of those genuine local suppliers, and therefore harming the local economy and giving clean money for clans to invest elsewhere.

Another shopkeeper simply identified as “G.D” had an experience where the pizzo he paid went beyond cash payment or the forced purchase of goods:

G.D. paid three times a year, from 2006 to 2009: at times in cash (200-300 euros), other times through shop merchandise (IT products).

The collector or collectors presented themselves in the name of “Zio Luigi”, a person known by the victim as a member of one of the local organized crime groups [the Ascione]: “he said that lo Zio had sent him. We understood because rightly, partly

from the newspapers and partly by the character that we know of our town, of fear ... we have to give them this little gift, so they say”.

Once again one of the accused, S.V came up to the victim's shop and asked for a mobile phone valued at 200 euros, payable in instalments.

G.D. refused initially, but he could not get away with giving the accused nothing at all “... he asked me if I could just give him a phone. In the end, he ordered me to give him a phone and he wanted to pay for just a couple of instalments. But I told him “It's not possible, I don't want to give it to you. You need to pay in full”, at which he says “Don't you recognize who I am? ... So I will give you a call so that you can see who I am”. He showed up a few days later and, in fact, I saw his insistence, in that he was always coming back. So then I inquired as to who this person was because from the papers I found out that he was a person who had recently been released from prison. I gave him the phone and I gave him what he wanted, because when these people came into my shop I tried to make them leave immediately to avoid scaring the other customers”.

After some time, the victim received a deposit of €50-100 euros for the sold phone, but the subsequent instalments, of course, were never paid. (Procedimento Penale n.45282/10 R.G.N.R. – 17778/10 R.G. Dib)

This example seems to indicate a kind of independent extension of the pizzo, whereby S.V. tried to use his position as a member of the Ascione to gain extra tribute from G.D. than he was initially entitled to “officially” by the clan. This may be a purposeful tactic by the clan or an over-step of the clan's authority by S.V. In the Zoom document it is suggested that he is one of the clan's foot-soldiers – expendable and trying to use his group's influence where he can for his own benefit. Indeed, the knowledge of what these groups can do (G.D. mentions the local news and the fear of the clans in the town) influences the character of these interactions and leaves the possibility of an open-ended tribute to the clans. It seems as if G.D. called the camorrista's bluff in lieu of the deposit for the phone, but still had to cover the following instalments as well as the pizzo he was already paying to the Ascione.

This “logical” assimilation of the local economy is one side to this, but the (mis)use of Camorra power for the benefit of lower level camorristi is another. Likewise, a businessperson who dealt with marble recounted the time when he was approached by Ciro Savino (the baker's would-be extorter) for a pizzo of €1000, replying that he could not pay it because he was very ill from heart disease – he was left alone. This was until he was approached two weeks later by some other extorters from the Birra clan, who requested that

instead of paying the pizzo, the businessman was to do some marble work in Savino's house instead. The businessperson calculated that this would cost €5000-6000 euros instead – far greater than the original pizzo quoted to him before. This was never paid, however due to arrests (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R.G. Trib.). In this example, we see the original official pizzo amount in cash rejected, then later the camorrista tries to benefit as much as he can from the situation. These are not isolated incidents. In December 2008 an owner of a bar, G.R., was approached by a man he knew to be a member of the Papale (linked to the Ascione), M.S., who asked to speak to him "Int' o' Vico" (Neapolitan for "in the alleyway") because he wanted to talk to him about something. Asking for him to clarify what he meant, M.S. said:

You need to give us €450 for the prisoners

G.R. said that it might be difficult to pay

If you don't pay, I'll blow up the bar. I'll close the bar. You won't open anymore.

After Christmas, M.S. came back to the bar every now and then and would occasionally order drinks without paying for them. When he was asked for payment, M.S. responded with "put it on my tab, don't worry about it". After this point, whenever G.R. asked him to pay there and then, he would respond with a "I'll make you close the bar, I'll blow it up...". This continued for a while until he came with his wife, who was also related to the Papale, where they would pay for their drinks. The next time M.S. came into the bar alone for drinks, he was asked again to pay his tab, at which point he exploded at G.R.:

Cornuto, you turd, I'll kill you, your wife and your kids if you report me

It was only at this point that G.R. reported M.S. to the Carabinieri (Procedimento Penale n.20156/11 R.G.N.R. – 19223/11 R.G. DIB.). The use of the Southern expletive *cornuto* is particularly interesting in this case. The word means "cuckold", namely a husband whose wife is unfaithful to him. In the context of the *mezzogiorno* region it is generally associated with a man without "honour" in that he is unable to satisfy his wife sexually. In this context, the camorrista (perhaps accidentally) inverts the meaning when he refers to the shopkeeper as a *cornuto* precisely *because* he is resisting this, and therefore, Camorra influence into his affairs, logically meaning that the acceptance of payment (i.e. the metaphorical acceptance of their extra-marital relations with his wife) prevents him from being a *cornuto*, and therefore dishonourable. In not accepting Camorra dominance, the shopkeeper is, according to the clan, dishonourable. The camorrista, M.S., is quoting the line that other pizzo collectors for the Ascione use when they approach a business regarding prisoners, but instead of actually

pursing the €450, he treats the business as if it were his own, taking a drink without paying every now and then, and gets annoyed when the owner asks for the money. M.S had overplayed his hand, presumably because he thought he could rely on the fearful reputation of the Papale to get him free drinks, and did not expect the business to actually report him even when the initial demand for a substantial pizzo sum had fallen through.

A similarly minded individual to M.S approached the owner of a restaurant, an enoteca and a bed and breakfast in 2007, his opening gambit being “You need to go to the Moquette, because we need to talk with you”. The following is an extract from the Zoom document, which is worth quoting at length:

Though terrified by the invitation, in the sense that it was well-known that it was at the “Moquette” that one meets the representatives of the Camorra clan hegemony in the area ... he responded that he wasn’t able to go anywhere because he had to work.

Later, having not accepted the first “invitation”, the defendant “P.M”, a leading figure in the criminal world of Ercolano, directly intervened against the victim.

According to the victim, in the second half of September 2007 an armoured dark coloured Lancia Thema approached his place with P.M at the wheel. After reminding him that he had “called him a couple of times”, he invited him again “for a walk”. When he refused the defendant dismissed him with a sarcastic “vabbuò” [Neapolitan for “okay”]

About a month after that episode another emissary of the Ascione-Papale showed up at the victim’s restaurant aboard a high-powered motorbike, warning an employee “tell [the businessman] that he is starting to annoy us! If he doesn’t talk with us then we are through”.

Despite fears for his and his family’s safety, the victim resisted the implicit and explicit threats intended to force him to go to the “Moquette” to “go straight” by paying “pizzo”.

The pressure of the “invitations” and “warnings” culminated in a serious incident that occurred on the 7th July 2007 [sic], in which the accused “P.M”, explicitly expressed his intention to extort the victim, and of his origin from the Camorra clan hegemon, as well as knowledge of all the properties and economic activity of the victim, including those recently purchased.

It is incredibly interesting to look at this episode: the victim had just come out of the enoteca that he runs when he saw the accused aboard a scooter who said:

“Don’t you like us? We have come here a load of times to call you and you never came! Don’t you understand that you too have to pay as well, just like everyone else? You are scrounging off all of Resina [the old name for Ercolano], you are scrounging ... because this restaurant isn’t yours. Because this house isn’t yours. Because this enoteca isn’t yours”.

The victim’s resistance even at this latest threat provoked the violent reaction of the accused who first slapped him in the face and then threatened him by pointing a gun to his legs:

“Now if you want to denounce me, do it. I’ll be going to jail all the same! However, in the garden there [referring to a house that had just been bought by the victim] you won’t be doing anything”

The defendant’s conduct is significant as he is not afraid to act like this in a public place, enough that the intimidating power of the clans he represents would be an effective deterrent to anyone who witnessed the incident. Moreover, it evokes a total and comprehensive control of the territory and of the economic activities carried out by criminal organisations in the area, demonstrative of the penetrating ability of infiltration in the economic and social fabric of Ercolano.

The threat was not carried out because the victim reported the extortion to which he had been subjected to, leading to the arrest of the extortionist. (Procedimento Penale n.55571/07 R.G.N.R. mod.21 – 37974/08 R.G. G.I.P.)⁴⁴

The claim to economic, territorial and therefore political dominance is incredibly striking here, where we see the violence that the Camorra evokes in a very meaningful way, as well as the punishment for not at least passively adhering to this Camorra hegemony. Similarly to the previous businessperson who was called a “cornuto”, the concept of “going straight” and paying one’s dues, namely the pizzo, is portrayed as something honourable or at least duty-bound for a business to pay. This works as a message to the businessperson themselves,

⁴⁴ In this document the events are dated “From the month of September 2007 until 07/11/2007 in Ercolano”. However, as noted by the insertion of “[sic]” the author of the document has incorrectly written “7th July 2007”, outside the date range. Given a number of other references (Antonio Di Florio, pp.116-7; *Metropolisweb*, 13 January 2008) that recount a similar confrontation in the street between a shopkeeper and a member of the Ascione, the date is assumed instead to be in the days before 13 January 2008 when two leading figures of the Ascione were arrested (Michele De Crescenzo and Mario Papale). It is assumed that PM is “Mario Papale”, though cannot be verified.

but also against any by-standers who watch what is happening. Fortunately, in this example the violence went no further and the businessperson reported the incident to the Carabinieri. These are a number of accounts of actual extortion or extortive attempts by local criminal clans on local businesses. Returning to Filippelli the reasons for these actions is clear with regard to territorial dominance, and goes some way to understanding the economic and political influence that the clans have over an area. However, there are some unanswered questions which we shall analyse here.

The amount of 3 to 5% of revenues for the *pizzo* was a common theme for many of the businesses, where we are left with the conclusion that this is an acceptable Goldilocks number: something that is not too small for the Camorra, but also not too large as to bleed a business dry. The question is how the amount has been calculated: the amount that the business gains in revenue, at least in theory, is unknowable exactly at the point at which a business is approached by the Camorra. Therefore, unless the Camorra have the ability of knowing this figure due to inside information (e.g. contacts in the local administration or business), monitoring the business or by overtly *asking* them, then the amount suggested by the camorristi is a “rough” figure based on what they predict the revenue of a business of that size in that area to be. This leads to an intriguing situation whereby the Camorra could have underestimated the business’s earnings, and therefore the percentage paid by the business would be lower, meaning that a shopkeeper could be paying a relatively small amount compared to other similar businesses. On the other hand, however, the earnings could be overestimated by the Camorra, meaning that the percentage paid could be too large a figure to reasonably pay: in such a case the Camorra may rethink the figure, in return for knowing the actual revenue of the business, and demanding an appropriate figure, further solidifying control over the shopkeeper by knowing the financial details of the business. This would require an element of negotiation about the amount depending on the finances of the business, something verified in interviews with the local Carabinieri:

The criminal says [to the shopkeeper], “look – I’ve got to do my rounds in the area – give me 3000 euros every festivity”. If they say that they have lower earnings, then 1000 euros every festivity instead. (LE 18042015)

So therefore we can note that there indeed *is* an element of negotiation regarding the *pizzo*, and that the amount of money that is being negotiated is not the issue. The issue is, rather, for the business to pay in the first place. This leaves us with more questions however, because, based on the evidence available to us, the *pizzo* was not as widespread as previously suspected.

3: How many businesses paid the pizzo?

It was noted by the representatives from the State, the Carabinieri and Ercolano per la legalità that the extortion racket(s) in Ercolano were powerful enough that everyone, or almost everyone, paid the pizzo before November 2009, when both clans' extortion rackets in Ercolano were "decapitated", and that a few years after this time, no-one or almost no-one paid. This was elaborated particularly by Angela Nocerino, the daughter of Filippo Nocerino (the building contractor), but also the coordinator of the anti-racket association in Ercolano, 'Ercolano per la legalità':

All of them paid, oh God, the Carabinieri cannot say that all of them paid, but a large number of them did pay. People who moved their shops to Ercolano paid. Everyone in the area paid. Likewise, my father paid. We say that... The idea of having shop... we say that it's a rooted idea with their associates. The first "favour" you do is talk to them, and give them this first "tax". It then opens the door for further "honours". It was a completely normal thing to do. This way, you feel absolutely safe with your shop. If you pay, everything remains absolutely peaceful. (CS2 18032014)

And in 2014:

We can say that no-one pays the pizzo – if someone does pay, it is a very rare case. There is not a justification to pay it as the shopkeepers aren't scared. We have the Carabinieri who work with us – they always pass along the streets, pop into the stores, and just generally drive around the town – but not in an invasive way. We can say that no-one pays the pizzo –but if anyone does happen to... come to us! Because it really is a rare case – there just isn't the justification to do so. (CS2 18032014)

Likewise Nino Daniele also highlighted that:

In Ercolano everyone paid. Everybody paid the pizzo. But at the same time, no one would say that they pay the pizzo. The pizzo was paid by everyone. Often it happened that you would pay both clans – clan Ascione and clan Birra. So, everyone paid, but often people paid twice. (POL 18032014)

And in 2014 there is no doubt on his part whatsoever:

The Camorra is beaten. It's not comparable to the organisation like before, when we lived under their dominion – sure, there are some that exist. And it is their wish to carry on and reorganize themselves, but they are beaten. When you are beaten you begin to collaborate, as many have done with the authorities, and have started to talk

[...] In three years, a city that was considered a city of the Camorra, has become a city of the anti-Camorra. (POL 18032014)

Likewise, pentiti themselves spoke of the extensiveness of pizzo paying. S.F. was a member of the Birra clan between 2001-2002 working particularly in drug trafficking. In 2003 (when he was 17 years old) he joined the Ascione working for the extortion racket where his role was to interact with the victims. Whereas building contractors and other entrepreneurs would go to the “Moquette” and pay “Zio Luigi”, S.F. dealt with shopkeepers who paid around the three festivities, always accompanied by a number of his associates:

S.F. specified that it was not necessary to resort to threats because “most of them already knew... they would even have the envelope [of money] ready ... they would pay immediately without discussion”, stating that the activity was spread throughout the area: “Everyone paid ... there wasn’t anyone who didn’t pay”. (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.)

This leaves us in a troubling quagmire: according to representatives of the antiracket who worked with businesses and a member of the Ascione from 2003 until his arrest in 2008 who actually collected the pizzo, *everybody paid*, in complete contrasts with the judicial data and the accounts from businesspeople which detail a large number of individuals who paid the pizzo, but with a sufficient number of them who say that they denounced the pizzo upon being asked for the first time. Here we must choose between two equally disconcerting options: (1) that businesspeople have actively misled the Carabinieri and the judiciary about the extensiveness of the pizzo so as to cover themselves or; (2) that the Carabinieri, the judiciary, the antiracket and camorristi have overplayed the extensiveness of pizzo payment.

To help answer us here, it is worth drawing on those businesses that are members of the antiracket, but say that they had never been approached for pizzo. This is an account from a “physical” shop close to the centre of the city:

Has your shop ever had an experience with the racket?

Shopkeeper: Never never never. But I don’t know why. It’s strange because I’m not so special. People here believe that everybody pays, because in their opinion it is something obvious. It is true enough that we had a robbery where some people took [quotes amount stolen]. There was a guy outside with his friends who were watching for a while and then they came inside. According to others, those who pay [the pizzo] would not have been touched, and wouldn’t have had a problem with this kind of thing ... it’s not because I didn’t pay that

they broke in. In 13 years, it is an ugly reality of being a part of the Neapolitan metropolis – because Ercolano is part of this great metropolis of Naples, because in all we have 3.5 million inhabitants, and it is something normal that in 13 years there would be a break-in of [amount omitted], because we are, as they say, a shop very much in view of the Camorra. (N1 11042015)

To contextualise the business, it is located in the main financial area of the city, the area where it is generally understood that lots of businesses paid to both the Ascione and the Birra. It is also an open shop, in the sense that customers can walk in and out as they please. From the interview, the businessperson said that the shop has been present in the general area of Ercolano for around 13 years (i.e. since 2001/2), moving to its current location 10 or so years ago.

Another interview conducted revealed an interaction, but no payment:

Have you ever had an experience with the racket?

Shopkeeper: An experience in which they came here and wanted something, no. They asked in a veiled way, but I didn't ever "lower my head" [submit to it]. I didn't report it to the Carabinieri, instead I reported it to the [State] police. But the Camorra never did come back. We didn't have any problems, my husband however, last year, his shop had a bomb inside which destroyed the shop completely. So we have been affected by it. The bomb was placed because they didn't "lower their heads", what's more, my husband is in politics and had denounced the vote-exchange phenomenon. Immediately after this denouncement, they left this bomb, and destroyed the shop completely.

Why do you think that the Camorra didn't come here?

Shopkeeper: Because they understood that we won't submit to them. Because fear is their strength. It is not that I am not scared, the fear made me understand that I need to be cautious – fear made me understand that I need to turn to the law. But, if I were to be scared, and do nothing, they are much stronger. And it is always like this. (N2 14042015)

To place these different accounts in context, it is important to note that whereas the first business is an "open" business, this business is a "closed" one, in that you have to be let into the place of business, generally by appointment. The shopkeeper in this instance demonstrates an awareness of the clans around her, both with her own brief experience which she reported, and through her husband. Similarly to the previous account, it is difficult

to reconcile the view that the pizzo was paid *en-masse* in Ercolano with a shopkeeper voluntarily giving an interview stating otherwise, particularly when they say that they had in fact reported an approach by a camorrista in the past.

We have to consider a number of factors here regarding the reliability of these sources. As mentioned in the methodology, I obtained interviews by distributing questionnaires to businesses who were members of the antiracket. The questionnaires were anonymous and were used to get an idea of the demographics of the people who joined the antiracket, as well as to gain an understanding of the general experience that people in Ercolano had with the racket. The interviews were anonymous, and were done one-on-one. We have two broad options to consider here: either these shopkeepers were being untruthful and had paid the pizzo and/or had been intimidated by the clans in the past or they genuinely had no experience with the clans whatsoever, and the only criminality experienced was one of robbery rather than extortion. If we consider the first option to be true, a question remains as to what reasons these shopkeepers have to be untruthful whilst also consenting to the questionnaire, and then to an interview in which they could be “exposed”. Other than to overtly deny any possible embarrassment of paying, or for any other personal reason, these individuals had no fathomable reason to (1) consent to an interview and then (2) be untruthful. There were other instances throughout the interview process of participants when the question of pizzo paying and their experiences were dodged entirely (N7 18042015).

I judge that these shopkeepers’ account should be considered to be accurate, particularly when the first shopkeeper is thoughtful to our conundrum as to why that shop was skipped. It is for this reason that in many ways the shopkeepers who turned down the opportunity to be interviewed or to complete the questionnaire are viewed as the most interesting, but due to ethical considerations were necessarily left alone. Since this project is specific to a time and place, with numerous interactions with the protagonists as well as access to other documented data, we are able to build a detailed picture of how some of these interactions between shopkeepers and members of local Camorra clans happened.

Additionally, the data collected from questionnaires given to signed-up members of ‘Ercolano per la legalità’ revealed that only three of the twenty-one shopkeepers who consented to this research project admitted to paying pizzo beforehand (see Table 1 below). In this data we can also see that five shopkeepers claimed to have denounced extortion upon being approached. This can lead us to believe that either they are not willing to admit that they had paid it previously, or, that these businesses had genuinely never paid it. It was noted too in Palermo that the majority of joiners of Addiopizzo claimed to have never actually paid pizzo

beforehand and that they have joined because they were invited by friends or colleagues, or a sense of moral imperative to do so.⁴⁵

Which of these phrases most describes your experience?

I have never paid the pizzo and I have never experienced intimidation of an extortive nature	10
I have never paid the pizzo and I have always denounced extortion attempts	5
I paid the pizzo up until ***, and subsequently I denounced the extortion	3
I paid the pizzo up until ****	0
I don't want to/ I am unable to respond	2
Left blank	1

Table 1

Questionnaire results from shopkeepers

A number of antiracket businesses did not take part in the questionnaires, with some of them saying that they did not know that they were members, and others politely excusing themselves one way or another. Of those businesses that did not know they were members, one interaction was particularly interesting. In each of the previous *guida per il consumatore critico antiracket* (FAI, 2015), a number of businesses seemed to always be present. One of these businesses on the main street was run by an older gentleman. On approaching the man I told him the purpose of my project and asked if he would be willing to participate. He said he was, and so I agreed to return in several days to collect his questionnaire. When I returned, I asked him if I could collect the questionnaire, at which he told me that he was very confused: he had never been a signed up member of the antiracket, and therefore could not complete the questionnaire. I double checked later in each of the guides to cross reference this, and he was definitely present in each.

Another example was that of a business a bit further away from the centre, where I was told to come back another day as the owner was not present. On the windows of the business was one of the Consumo Critico stickers, which advertise to the outside world that this is a

⁴⁵ I thank Carina Gunnarson for this observation.

business that has said “no” to the pizzo, so things felt promising. I came back, and the owner explained to me that the business itself changed hands a year or so ago, and that they were not members of the antiracket, but made it abundantly clear that just because they are not members, it does not mean that they are paying pizzo. I asked if they had received any word whatsoever from FAI or the antiracket, on which they told me that they had not. Here was a business that was *freeriding* on the “brand” of the anti-racket and the anti-mafia movement in general, but was not subject to any checks by FAI or the local anti-racket. They are able to benefit from any ethical consumerism aspect to the anti-racket, the central aspect to the Consumo Critico campaign whereby people buy from mafia-free businesses, despite not being “part” of the anti-racket. In addition, it seems unlikely that they would be approached by an extorter from a local clan because it would be assumed that they would denounce the attempt immediately.

These two notable interactions demonstrative of an antiracket association that is either overstating its numbers (be that purposely or passively), or does not keep its publicised records up to date, or a mixture of the two. These factors, combined with a low completion rate, made it incredibly difficult to access our specific data set and to analyse the area with certainty. To further this point, as shown in the introduction, investigations by the Carabinieri revealed the existence of a substantial piece of evidence concerning the extortion racket. In March 2009 Gennaro Dantese, a member of the Ascione clan, had his home searched by the Police, and in one of his kitchen cupboards a three page list was found. Organised by street and/or zone, and then placed in columns indicating name or nickname, the type of business, amount, and when, this seemed to list the businesses paying pizzo to the Ascione clan in the extortionist’s own handwriting.

A member of the Ascione arrested a few weeks later, Fausto Scudo, decided to turn pentito and confirmed that this was indeed a list of the extorted businesses by the Ascione (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.208). The list contained around 80 or so names (at that time in 2009, only 6 businesses had actually denounced their extorters) (Gerina and Vasile, 2015, p.216). These businesses are ones that would fit the differentiation between businesses that we have made as “shopkeepers”, the ones that have a set location and have money collected from them on a regular basis. The number of these types of businesses in the whole of Ercolano, however, is over 700. If we limit our number of businesses to the “centre” of the city, ignoring businesses which require driving rather than walking to reach we could narrow it to around 600. If we went further and simply chose the two main streets we are left with a very generous 200 businesses. Even if we assume that the extorted businesses in Ercolano were equally spread throughout the city between the two clans (i.e. the Ascione and the Birra extorted the same number apiece), which we can assume that they were not, the case

that “all businesses in Ercolano paid the pizzo” is a spurious one, even when we know of one clan’s collection rota. Unfortunately it was not possible to access the data in full, so we cannot say with certainty whether the businesses listed in the three page ledger were located close to the busier financial centre, clustered in “pockets” or spread out throughout the whole city, or whether other ledgers existed.

Whilst unfortunately there is no “Birra ledger”, there are some indications as to how large their extortion racket was. The aftermath of the bomb that was detonated outside the bakery in October 2009 by the Birra led to widespread arrests, and of these arrests came the collaboration of Birra pentiti (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.), who were able to shed light on the Birra’s extortion racket in the absence of a “ledger”, with details of extorted businesses. The importance of their testimony, in addition to other pentiti, was elaborated by local maresciallo (Marshal) of the Carabinieri “D.C”:

The information contained in these manuscripts [from the pentiti] identified 23 business owners who admitted to have been subjected to extortion, and of 60 businesses that were heard [for evidence] only 10 denied having received extortive requests. (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.)

If we take the numbers here as a general estimate of the size of the Birra’s extortion racket, given the number of pizzo-paying businesses already identified through the Ascione ledger, and with the lack of other evidence saying otherwise, 50 or so businesses paying the pizzo are a significant number but is by no means *all* of the businesses in the territory. Comparatively we could say that the Ascione’s extortion racket is bigger than the Birra’s, and that the Birra received less of their revenue through the pizzo than the Ascione – although the emphasis the Birra placed on the drugs market due to its high profitability could explain this.

It is important to reiterate the history of the clans in the area, given that the Birra only really became a major force in Ercolano after mass arrests of major members of the Ascione in Operazione Nemesi (1996) (Di Florio, 2012, p.102; *La Repubblica*, 13 May 1997) where they took control of the area around the Cuparella through well-placed partners in the drugs market. Later, the same clan secured an alliance with a number of other groups (notably the Iacomino in 2001) (Di Florio, p.103), assassinating the bosses of both the Ascione and the Montella clans (from the neighbouring Torre del Greco) in one ambush in 2003 (Di Florio, 2012, p.125; *La Repubblica*, 12 March 2003) to start a war. Though it is not certain what the reasons for the war were, one major factor gradually affecting the revenues of both clans was the transforming drug market, moving away from Ercolano in favour of Torre Annunziata to the South and Secondigliano in the North. This, according to testimony by pentiti, was a

reason why there was greater emphasis on extortion around this time, something both clans already practiced in the territory (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.). Information gained from victims and pentiti helps us chart the shift towards extortion from 2003/4 onwards in the area where there were a number of businesses who were (according to the businesspeople) approached for the first time.

This made the territory itself and the money gained from extortion much more important than in the past, when it served solely as a form of revenue to pay salaries of the associations' members. The clans shifted focus to the growth of the extortion racket in order to compensate for the reduced revenues elsewhere (namely, drugs and construction). This goes some way towards explaining, at least from an economic perspective, why there were a number of businesses who had seemingly been approached for the first time in the 2000s. To summarise, even when the Ascione were in their heyday throughout the 1990s, judicial data and individual testimony from shopkeepers indicate that the extortion racket did not cover the whole of the territory. Indeed, the first time a number of businesses were approached for pizzo, despite existing throughout the 1990s, was in the months and years following the outbreak of conflict between the two clans. Towards the end of 2003 there were a number of new approaches to businesses, and the Ascione had two instances of being refused on first request in 2004, whereas both clans had somewhat of a spike in first requests from 2005-2007. Both of these times are around times of conflict, so we can infer that the reasons for these demands for pizzo from different businesses was due to military necessity, rather than territorial/hegemonic expansion.

It was perhaps to both clans' detriment that they did not expand the extortion racket in times of relative stability when they would have been better placed to punish non-payers without large media/community attention, rather than at a time when they actually required the extra income from businesses in order to conduct their war. From 2003 there is on-off conflict between the clans as they both compete for the territory through violence: bringing greater attention to their activities through violence in the streets and making the number of killings difficult to ignore. Major operations by the Carabinieri eventually decapitated both clans, notably in 2007 against the Birra in Operazione Reset (Daniele, 2012, p.50-1; Di Florio, 2012, p.113; Radio Siani, 2003), and from 2009 onwards against the Ascione with the discovery of the extortion ledger (Gerina and Vasile, 2012, p.208) through operations "Regalo di Natale", "Cento Vetrine", "Free Shop" and "Andate in Pace" 2009-2010 (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R G. Trib.), though both clans still exist in much weaker forms today.

4: Why do businesses pay the pizzo?

In some ways the answer to this question is obvious. Regarding Filippelli as well as the insinuation or outright use of violence by camorristi upon businesspeople to force them to do as they say, we must point to fear. The reason why businesses pay the pizzo in its various forms to camorristi when they request it is because of the *metus causa factum*. Whilst the questionnaire was largely inconclusive due to a small number of respondents and other issues,⁴⁶ we are able to say that the most chosen answer to the question “Why do you think people pay the pizzo” was “because people are scared” (10 businesses), followed by “because there is not enough support from the government” (9 businesses). Other responses were “Because there is not enough collaboration between businesses” (4 businesses), “Out of habit” (3 businesses), “because there is not enough support from law enforcement” (2 businesses) and “Other” where one business claimed “Some businesses pay it due to tradition”, with the option “because paying the pizzo provides cheap and reliable protection” receiving no responses.

Given the nature of the Camorra in Ercolano and organized crime in the *mezzogiorno* region in general, this is hardly a revelation, and demonstrates the manner in which pizzo payment is due to the *metus causa factum* where the consequences for not paying (violence) appears to be the main factor, alongside the perception that the government is not doing enough to protect you from this. The question was kept purposely vague – it asked why people *in general* pay the pizzo, rather than asking for their own experiences. This was instead asked in the interviews where applicable.

There is more to the data than meets the eye, given that the only businesses in the questionnaire that admitted to paying the pizzo (3 businesses), 2 of them answered that the reason they did so was “out of habit”, pointing to that “creeping normality” that we have identified elsewhere. It is important to stress that the threat of violence *is* real, and has been demonstrated through individual acts of violence against shopkeepers as well as the murder of other businesspeople. Despite this, judicial accounts of what we have seen in Ercolano reveal that the insinuation of violence was only ever used during the first meeting that businesspeople had with the camorristi in their safe house and then actual violence were only used if a business refused to pay, whereas the monthly or festivity reminders never seemed to meet with the same threats.

⁴⁶ One respondent answered the question “Why do you think people pay the pizzo?” with “Other: I don’t think people pay the pizzo anymore”, whilst another ignored the question and the section of the questionnaire concerning the antiracket entirely.

Why is this? The amount asked for is often relatively small. In a simple cost-gain analysis of pizzo payment a businessperson contrasts the amount that they are asked to pay (which we have noted to be around 3-5% of revenues, though sometimes different) over the course of a year with the threat of violence and perhaps death. A comparable phenomenon in the centre of Naples and elsewhere in the *mezzogiorno* is that of *parcheggiatori abusivi*, individuals who request money from drivers so that they are able to park their car or motorbike in an area. Everyone knows that these individuals are not State employees, nor from any private company that owns the right to charge drivers for a parking space, yet everybody prefers to pay them regardless because paying one or two euros for the peace of mind that your vehicle will not be damaged is a price worth paying. The logic of pizzo payment when the amount requested is small (particularly in the form of free drinks, etc.) is the same. This is how camorristi have been able to get free phones, build drink tabs without payment and so forth. It can be better to submit to a minor request than live without hindrance.

This is plausible for small amounts, but what about larger amounts such as hundreds or thousands of euros? I point to the reasons why businesses pay taxes in general: precisely because it is a norm to do so, and as time goes along, this norm becomes further entrenched. From the perspective of a pragmatic business owner, we observe a business bringing pizzo payment into their rational economic calculations and projections of their business as if other taxes or payments that they are required to pay to the State had increased. If there is an attitude towards the pizzo that is the same as that which exists towards tax (that it is a norm that one must conform to and pay), then every single pizzo payment becomes easier to pay – particularly if it is already taken into account in the planning of the business. It is notable that it was mostly “new” businesses who were approached for the first time who denounced their extorters without encouragement, rather than frequent payers where the norm of payment had already been established. This is precisely the ideal “Leopold Bloom” (Agamben 2009) citizen that the Camorra fosters in their interactions with them – a pizzo payer who pays their dues as a matter of course, and passes this responsibility down to their successor and so on. This individual has been created by the structures around him, and the perception of what is common sense in this context is founded on these influences (Gramsci, 1999).

The first step is to demonstrate the extent to which the Camorra is to be feared (measurable by insinuation of violence against the businessperson, the extensiveness of their influence throughout the area through those “affective-aesthetic effects”, such as white and red stars in shop windows, visibility in the media and so on) or at least worthy of submission. The second step was for the businessperson to accept this as normal. This step is when paying pizzo becomes a norm and when the payment of the pizzo enters into the financial

calculations of the business in general. It is just another business cost: albeit one that is payable in cash. This second step demonstrates the true power of the Camorra whereby the idea of revolting against the Camorra becomes *unthinkable*: revealing the ideology that it disseminates and fosters in the population in the *habitus* that the clans share – without the clans actually doing much at all (Pine, 2012). After the point where the norm has been established, it becomes a social *faux-pas* not to pay this amount, later solidified by the niceties between camorristi and businesspeople when they meet at the Moquette.

A question worth asking here is how aware the businesspeople were during this process of normalisation. We can demonstrate the steps the camorristi take in order to garner passivity in the individuals they wish to make money off of, but it would be rash and perhaps even patronising to take the businesspeople for individuals for such fools here. They understood the process that was happening, yet they paid regardless. In an inversion of Marx's conception of the commodification and what he called the "fetishism" of goods, and the manner in which a greater value has been placed on them beyond their inherent economic value, "they [the population] do this without being aware of it" (Marx, 1867, p.166-7), Slavoj Žižek, echoing Peter Sloterdijk, applied this to ideology and the (un)acceptance of certain truths. This states that "they know very well what they are doing, but still, they are doing it" (2008, p.25), pushing it further to become "They know very well how things really are, but they are still doing it as if they did not know" (2008, p.30). This second inversion presented by Žižek is perhaps a more apt explanation of a businessperson's reaction to extortion. Individuals know very well that they are socialised in a certain direction away from their "natural state" (i.e. without subjugation and conditioning), but instead prefer to live their life as if their new socialised reality is natural. This goes some way toward understanding the "political" power and influence that the Camorra has over those people who join their ranks, their supporters, those people they extract money from, and individuals in society in general.

5: Conclusion

This chapter introduced the *pizzo* and protection money as it is experienced in Ercolano. Based on the response of the relevant investigating magistrate, I distinguished between the protection money that is paid by entrepreneurs who go from contract to contract and another that is paid by shopkeepers in one or more set location. From the experiences of shopkeepers in Ercolano I was able to analyse the extensiveness and the frequency of the *pizzo* by two different clans, concluding that unless we discount the testimony of some key members of the Ercolano antiracket, the *pizzo* did not reach full coverage in the area – particularly in areas where we would expect the *pizzo* to be collected more.

The *pizzo* was identified as more than simply a “cash” payment, but something that ranged from the forced purchase of goods (red and white stars, kilos of bread), forceful admittance of Camorra contacts onto building consortiums, and the giving away of certain products to Camorra associates. In the last of these I noted a possible cleavage between that which is the “official” Camorra clan *pizzo*, and that extra part that is taken by *camorristi* (free drinks, a free phone), hypothesising the nature of this and questioning whether this is a purposeful strategy, or merely an abuse of power which the main bosses turn a blind eye to. A comparison between the accounts of different businesspeople revealed similarity in the actual action of *pizzo* payment between *pizzo* payers: each involved being approached by a *camorrista* who tells you to go somewhere to talk with them (in the street, in the alley), who then tells you to go to one of their strongholds (the *Moquette* or *fuori al ponte* for the Ascione, the *Cuparella* for the Birra) where they outline the manner in which you are obliged to pay the *pizzo*. A member of the clan then comes along every month, or every festivity to either collect the *pizzo* money, or to remind you to take it to their stronghold. Based on the remarks by businesspeople, with an exception of partial negotiation when business was not going very well, this was the extent of their relationship with their extortioners.

I contextualised the number of businesses that paid *pizzo* in the area before November 2009, concluding that the declaration by the former Mayor and the antiracket association that all, or almost all, of the businesses paid the *pizzo* was an exaggeration. The number of businesses that paid the *pizzo* was significant, but without disregarding the accounts of key businesspeople we are unable to claim with good judgement that the *pizzo* was universal or near universal in the area. Here I reasoned why the extortion racket(s) did not cover the whole of Ercolano, concluding that the clans (foolishly) placed a greater emphasis on the erratic (and lucrative) drugs market, rather than reliable (but less lucrative) sources of income such as the *pizzo* that also guarantee territorial supremacy.

On the basis of the data on the businesspeople collected in Ercolano as well as the judicial data, I concluded that *pizzo* payment involved similar mechanisms as taxation, whereby it is the normality and acceptance of the system in place over time that allows for the continuation of payment, rather than the overt fear of violence. The fear of violence is present, undoubtedly, however it is less of a factor as time goes along. The power of the Camorra in this context is one that does not *need* to use violence to compel individuals to pay *pizzo* over time, given that its influence over the community has already been accepted by the *pizzo* payer. This is extortion, but not an extortion that can be stopped by simply arresting the extortionist, rather it is intrinsically linked to the payer’s perception of the Camorra and its place in the community it inhabits.

iv. The State's response to the Camorra

Introduction

This chapter is devoted to the State response against organized crime and the pizzo in Ercolano. Its particular focus is the combination of judicial repression and the development of specific cultural spheres and norms in the community that make the conduct of judicial repression easier. I note that the *powers that be* have chosen to adopt a dual strategy against organized crime that has incorporated a socio-cultural approach into its already existing judicial framework. This is a response to the pervasiveness of the Camorra and those socio-cultural norms that sustain the Camorra in society.

I begin by analysing the type of repression that has been used against Camorra in Ercolano by law enforcement agencies. In particular I discuss methods that have been used, and specific examples of camorristi turned cooperating witnesses. This is followed by the role of funding and support for cultural organisations and voluntary associations as a means of challenging the Camorra. This leads to a section on the role of culture in reorienting individuals in society towards legality and “following the rules”. I then devote the final section to explain the “Modello Ercolano” (the Ercolano model), that is, the purposeful strategy that has been taken by law enforcement agencies, politicians and the judiciary in Ercolano as a means of rebuilding trust between citizens and the State.

1: Judicial repression in Ercolano

Since 1996 and Operation “Nemesi” that arrested 194 associates of the Ascione clan, there has been a partial reliance on Camorra pentiti to bring other camorristi to trial. The interlinking ties between surveillance and the collaboration of pentiti and the individuals they denounced are elaborated in this first section as a means of demonstrating the utility of such strategies.

The first main pentiti were the brothers Leonardo and Salvatore Zirpoli who were arrested in this operation. Their decision to collaborate with the police in return for reduced sentences led to the murder of Leonardo’s 16 year-old son, Ciro, as well as the attempted murder of their half-sister Giuseppina Brisciano. Another member of the Brisciano family, Gennaro Brisciano later turned pentito against the Ascione and gave evidence about other members of his clan. He was eventually murdered in 2003 in an ambush organized by the acting boss of the Birra, Enrichetta Cordua, the wife of imprisoned boss Giovanni Birra (*Il Mattino*, 14 September 2003). There is no clear reason as to why Brisciano was murdered, given that he was a former member of the Ascione, though parts of the local media speculated that he could have been a spy (*Lo Strillone*, 16 March 2015). Cordua was later arrested in 2007 in Operation “Reset” under 416-bis, which was later upgraded to murder when the testimonies

of other Birra pentiti indicated that it was her who organized the hit. She later became a pentita (female cooperating witness), giving the Carabinieri and the judiciary greater understanding of the everyday organisation of the clan and their relationship with other clans – providing other leads for the Carabinieri (*Il Mattino*, 10 February 2016). The Ascione had similar parts of their organisation revealed, discussed most prominently in the 2016 documentary series “*Camorriste*” (2016), featuring an episode about the boss-turned pentita Antonella Madonna. The episode featured interviews with Pierpaolo Filippelli and other members of the local Carabinieri, as well as a long account from the pentita herself. It recounted quite succinctly how she was married to a man born into a Camorra family (the Suarino family), Gennaro Dantese, who rose up the ranks of the Ascione. Dantese initially gained prominence after the murder of the acting boss of the Ascione, Mario Ascione, in 2003 when he became involved in the organisation of the clan. After a number of lower ranking members of the Ascione became pentiti and incriminated the bosses above him, Dantese became the boss of the Ascione. During this time, Dantese controlled the actions of the clan, whilst Madonna controlled the economic side of the clan: paying lawyers, the salaries of the foot-soldiers and the social welfare of those families who had relatives in prison. This is not dissimilar to the social welfare provided to camorristi and their associates by other Camorra clans as observed elsewhere by Sciarrone (2011) and Colletti (2016). Dantese was arrested in 2010, and later became incriminated himself for the murder of Carlo Borrelli, an Ercolano-based entrepreneur who was shot, had his body burned and was abandoned on a road on Mount Vesuvius for not paying pizzo (*NapoliToday*, 10 March 2009).

Madonna took over as boss of the clan, and began an affair with a sailor based in Torre del Greco. Dantese’s family discovered her infidelity and began threatening the pair of them, as well as Madonna’s family. Carabinieri surveillance through wiretaps meant that they understood most of this situation, knowing that they needed to arrest Madonna and encourage her to become a pentita before she was murdered by the rest of the Ascione clan. She was arrested in December 2012, and became a pentita – denouncing the Ascione and their affiliates in return for the opportunity to raise her children, which she was permitted to do outside of Ercolano with protection from the State. Further collaboration from Madonna and between fourteen other pentiti led to another mass blitz against the Ascione in July 2016 and the revelation of corruption between a member of the law enforcement and the clan (*Cronache della Campania*, 11 July 2016). From research on the Ascione and the Birra clans since the 1990s, there is evidence of collaborations between the Carabinieri and at least twenty-five different pentiti, giving the Carabinieri a remarkable knowledge about the

everyday organisation of the clans, their networks, their activities, their respective salaries, and the various characters within them.

Together with the data collected from pentiti, other methods employed locally to collect evidence include surveillance, amounting to the covert placement of recording devices in visiting hours for known camorristi in prison, “stake outs” of known camorristi’s homes, undercover Carabinieri cars, plain-clothed officers, Carabinieri vehicles fitted with recording devices as well as traditional wiretapping techniques. All of this led to arrests, generally based on 416-bis alongside another crime, and the possibility of more pentiti, who, in turn, led to more arrests.

We are left with some issues here. Whilst these types of techniques are undoubtedly successful with regard to the number of individuals arrested, the socio-economic and cultural conditions that influenced these crimes to start with are not addressed. Whilst it is important to apprehend those criminals who are already active, that is a limiting factor of traditional police work itself – it is an attempt of curing the symptom of a problem, rather than the cause of it. Exemplary of this approach is the aforementioned Operation Nemesis: an operation based on traditional police work that led to the arrest of 194 individuals of the Ascione (a number of whom were released after appeals). The arrests led to the rise of the Birra clan who partially filled the vacuum that was left by employing a number of contacts in the drugs business that had not been apprehended. The “pulverised” (Ministero dell’Interno, 1999) nature of Camorra clans in the area makes it difficult to uproot the Camorra phenomenon in general, where the decline of one clan leads to the rise of another in its place. Such was the scale of the operation that the Ascione were conducting in Ercolano, that they had become an integral part of the local market, with a large amount of money available to individuals in the area who had very little job opportunities.

Inevitably, the supply-and-demand cycle in the drugs market was filled by another supplier. Ercolano was later left in a situation in the early 2000s of two Camorra clans fighting for control of the same market, which had been previously controlled by one of the clans. Given the number of Camorra clans in Naples and the surrounding area, only a region-wide effort would push Camorra clans back enough so that individual clans will not benefit from the demise of their adversaries. There have been signs that municipalities are willing to pool their efforts against organized crime and criminality in general, such as the “Protocollo d’intesa per la sicurezza urbana integrata” (2007), which provided a joint framework between the Prefettura di Napoli, the Regione di Campania, the Provincia di Napoli alongside the bordering towns of Ercolano, Portici and San Giorgio a Cremano aimed at partially solving this issue.

This quick vacuum filling also happens within the clans themselves, whereby one head of the clan is arrested, and one particular organisational culture comes to an end, only for another to take over in their place. The Ascione was founded by Raffaele Ascione, who conducted the clan's activities alongside a criminal clan from Catania in Sicily, the Papale, with another criminal group who had a number of drug contacts, the Cozzolino. Raffaele was arrested, and interacted with the clan from prison through his wife until his death in 2004. In his absence his brother, Mario Ascione, was given control of the clan until his murder in 2003. The boss of the clan continued to change arrest after arrest due to pentiti revelations, culminating in the leadership of Natale Dantese and then his wife, Antonella Madonna. At this point leadership returned to members of the Suarino family to which Dantese was related, and then eventually to Raffaele Ascione's widow, Immacolata Adamo, who was arrested in July 2016 in "Operazione Freedom". It transpired that earlier in 2016 Adamo was approached by members of the Birra clan to disband the Ascione for a payment of €25,000 so that they could control the whole of Ercolano, an offer which she dismissed as too low, leading to the planning of her murder and her eventual arrest by the Carabinieri following confessions by Birra pentito Gerardo Sannino as well as surveillance (*L'Orta Vesuviana*, 13 July 2016). In this case, the weakening of one clan is followed by the increase in power of another. The Camorra see-saw in Ercolano since the 1990s has consistently gone back and forth. The number of competing alliances between various clans in the area in different ventures means that it is incredibly difficult to avoid the mass arrest of one clan culminating in the rise of another.

It is precisely this phenomenon that Tom Behan described when he wrote of the Camorra hydra: each chopped off head results in two heads replacing it (2009, p.161). Each defeated clan leaves a vacuum to be filled by others. Using these judicial and police methods alone, it is only possible to uproot the Camorra clans in an area if every element of the Camorra's operation is destroyed. It is not enough to arrest the boss, the lieutenants, the accountants and the foot-soldiers since the clan can be recreated by them once they leave prison. It is also prudent to consider the relatives who relied financially on the clan (who now have a gap in their income) who may welcome another clan that is rooted in a similar social, economic and cultural context. The rate of unemployment in particular is important to invoke, wherein employment may be found using similar middle-men and contacts to before to find work. What is a young man who dropped out of school, for example, to do when the most obvious work opportunities are related to a clan in one way or another?

The manner in which the State is able to respond to these issues is an open-ended question. Judicial repression has expanded by criminalizing those elements of society which are seen to be benefitting organized crime groups themselves by giving the better access to the licit

economy (political corruption in general, lawyers, contractors) in the *area grigia*, and arguably, will continue to expand to the detriment of liberty and privacy. If we move beyond this reactionary approach to crime, we have to address precisely how it is we believe that organized crime (1) develops and then (2) is able to flourish in a community and (3) how we are feasibly able to actively change the rules and boundaries of the *habitus* within which they operate. The question is not only whether we place greater emphasis on social, economic, or cultural factors regarding the organized crime phenomenon and its interaction with the rest of society, but also in what manner we should respond to these factors to prevent its development. Inevitably, this is an incredibly complex question: we must address simultaneously how the State has understood this conundrum and how they have *actually* addressed these issues. The following section outlines the manner in which the local, regional and national governments in collaboration with the European Commission and other funding organizations have approached the issues of changing the social, economic and cultural context in Ercolano that we can overtly designate as structural adjustment towards a more neoliberal economy, that is, one that is economically self-sufficient and requires minimal State intervention by creating generations of financially independent and innovative citizens. To do this we place particular focus on those programmes which have identified structural changes in the area itself as a way of combatting criminality.

2: Structural adjustment through funding

There are several examples of funding and grants that have attempted to address structural issues. I shall first introduce them before analysing them in more detail. Of particular focus in Ercolano was the conservation and optimal utilisation of historical, cultural and environmental assets that set the territory apart from other places in the world. Here we refer to the Herculaneum archaeological site, Vesuvian villas built by the Bourbons, Mount Vesuvius and its proximity to both Naples and the Amalfi Coast (Città di Ercolano, 2008). These have been identified as assets whose utility should be maximized, which would then lead to an increase in the amount of tourist money coming to the area. It is hoped that this increase in tourist money will help the area to prosper, removing various economic motives that encourage people to work with or alongside Camorra clans.

The opportunity to exploit the cultural and historical assets in the territory as a means of improving the area was not missed by locals who wished to lure outside donors. After many years of neglect by the Italian Ministero della Cultura, which “failed to commit the kind of routine funding that the care of this and other UNESCO World Heritage-listed archaeological sites of the Sopratendenza Archeologica di Pompei” (Thompson, 2007, p.192), a

“Memorandum of understanding” was reached with the Hewlett Packard Foundation, an American philanthropic organization, thanks to whom in 2001 a conservation framework was created for the Herculaneum site. In this, there was to be a partnership between the public and private sectors, helped financially by the Hewlett Packard Foundation where they would work together to improve the conservation of the area and develop the cultural identity and experience of the site and its related bodies. This was later expanded in 2004 to include the British School in Rome who was selected in order to give extra weight to the heritage aspect of the project. Alongside this, the private-public partnership has sought to create and develop certain Civil Society groups, comprised of local and international experts who would engage in the study of local history and culture *through* the site and disseminate information *about* the site, maximizing the utility of the sites in the area through talks and open-days for local schools. The purposeful interaction between the site and local schools (culminating in school projects and trips to the site) and the local administration and other Civil Society groups through the creation of the role of a Community Officer is also important here⁴⁷ as aimed at making the Herculaneum site more than simply a heritage and economic asset, turning it into a social unit which can benefit the local community through participation.

Furthering the benefits of the Herculaneum site to the territory, from 2003-2009, the “Urban Herculaneum” project used €40,700,000 from National, Regional, Municipal and Private bodies for urban development of the city, focussing on five main areas:

- The urban and environmental regeneration through the creation of multidimensional infrastructure, rehabilitation of squares and streets, restoration of the town centre, improvement of the transport system
- The promotion of cultural resources (e.g. construction of cultural centres and a School of Archaeology)
- The improvement of socio-economic conditions through incentives for crafts and businesses
- The improvement of sustainable tourism opportunities
- The improvement of security. (European Urban Knowledge Network, 2010)

On the ground, this came in the form of: restructuring and re-planning of one of the central squares (Piazza Pugliano), the creation of a foundation to organize the enhancement of the cultural experience of tourists (CIVES: Centro Integrato per la valorizzazione di Ercolano e

⁴⁷ Interestingly, the current holder of this post is an active member of Radio Siani. In addition, when I contacted the Herculaneum Conservation Project asking about their interaction with the local community, they directed me towards Radio Siani too.

degli Scavi⁴⁸), renovation of some of the tourist transport, the foundation of a school for young archaeologists, and the “Resina Tipica” operational centre which is focussed on supporting local business (European Urban Knowledge Network, 2010). In 2008, CIVES inaugurated the opening of MAV, a virtual museum about the Plinian Eruption which destroyed the Roman cities of Herculaneum and Pompeii. This was located on the main street in Ercolano between the train station where the tourists arrive and the archaeological site itself. It is easy to see that the focal point of the development is the shifting of the economy to be more dependent on tourism. The tourist assets of the area (in the form of the Herculaneum site and Mount Vesuvius) have been identified as an area of development, bringing outside money and investment to the area for the benefit of local people through jobs. The inclusion of the “Resina Tipica” brand encourages products to be locally made, then developing the local economy through tourist money.

The results of this funding were mixed. Despite the money spent on the MAV and the quality of the final product, it had limited impact on the international tourist for the simple reason that the virtual material is only available in Italian. Such an implemental oversight is difficult to understand, particularly given the number of English and German speaking tourists who arrive into the area with money to spend. Two reasons for this could be the poor quality of English in the area (there are no language schools in Ercolano, for example, and my own experience rates the quality of English taught in schools to be rather low) and a lack of money or organisation to make the MAV accessible. Whatever the reason, inaccessibility for non-Italian speakers is ultimately a huge hindrance for the area and the centre itself, undermining attempts of making the area more and more reliant on international tourists. Piazza Pugliano was still undergoing restructuring work in 2015 (throughout the early 2000s it was the site of several Camorra murders). Furthermore, despite the amount of money being spent on it, the piazza is rarely visited by tourists who only go to visit Ercolano to visit the Herculaneum site. Despite the high hopes of the “Resina Tipica” brand, its products are incredibly difficult to find – particularly for tourists, who only tend to walk along the main street towards the Herculaneum site before leaving again.

Later in 2007 European Commission funding came to Ercolano through the Più Europa programme (Città di Ercolano, 2008) by way of the region of Campania for the purpose of improving

- Sustainability of decisions, obtained through the participation of citizens and Civil Society so as to enhance the legitimacy and the effectiveness of the actions through forums and participatory planning workshops

⁴⁸ Integrated centre for the enhancement of Ercolano and the excavations.

- The pursuit of a high quality of life, by applying the principles of environmental, social and eco-compatible sustainability
- The strengthening of public and public-private partnerships
- The optimisation of expenditure in terms of quantity and quality. (Ecosfera, 2010, p.10)

This involved the structural adjustment of medium-sized cities in Campania away from a welfare-based and participatory State model, in favour of a participatory society and private businesses, involving the State only when the private and “third” sector are unable to address structural issues through the free-market or social and environmental awareness. This included, amongst other things, the assistance to local entrepreneurs, identification and targeted use of historic and cultural assets in the territory and the restructuring of urban spaces for the benefit of the community in general.

This adjustment towards economic sustainability makes use of mass youth unemployment in the area, and attempts to gear citizens in the territory to create their own individual economic and social enterprises for the benefit of the community in general in competition with other medium-sized cities in the area. The program outlined a number of problems in Ercolano, which are viewed to be a barrier to further development:

In an urban sense, the city has been characterised by an irrational and systemic growth. Furthermore, there is a substantial shortage of adequate infrastructure and services such as public transport, leading to urban congestion from traffic.

In the social sense, the city exhibits a significant lack of services and infrastructure for the community for what is required – particularly those for children, but also in public spaces and places for social gatherings for both old and young. This then emphasises the presence of social inclusion problems and pronounced housing problems, resulting in increase in the crime rate. (Ecosfera, 2010, p.88)

Here criminality and the crime rate in general are understood, admittedly rather broadly, partially as a result of social exclusion and housing problems. These issues were to be solved through an approach that addressed the perceived misuse or inefficiency of the city’s historical and cultural assets, and at the same time provided zones of socialisation that foster productive Social Capital for the further development of the area through associationalism and trust. Social exclusion in this context is perceived to be due to a lack of social gathering places in the public sphere where individuals can interact in a (albeit normatively defined) socially, economically and culturally productive way.

As noted previously, the Camorra has social power in a community and is a genuine alternative for young Neapolitans who would otherwise remain underemployed or unemployed, ultimately providing an arena for individuals otherwise excluded from progression in their community (culturally, socially, economically) to interact with other likeminded individuals in that community and feel included. Obviously, *this type* of social inclusion is not that which is being encouraged. Indeed “social inclusion” is defined here not just as the manner in which an individual feels part of a community, rather it is the manner in which an individual feels part of a specific community – that community which is the driving force of the social, economic and cultural development, all within the logic of a broadly (neo)liberal framework. The funding here is not for the purpose of encouraging people to be more interactive with one another in general, rather it is to encourage people to be more interactive with one another in a specific way that makes the community more resilient and sustainable, all without the need for the State. It is difficult to avoid understanding this type of development as a purposeful means of improving governability and resilience in the face of globalization.

How did the Più Europa programme approach the underdevelopment it identified? In Ercolano the developmental money from the programme was earmarked for a number of things to target this, including: restructuring some of the streets around the archaeological area, linking the main Herculaneum site with the Roman Theatre nearby, creating a new access to the Herculaneum site, restructuring the streets outside a school, restoration of communal buildings for the future Carabinieri station which was based in Torre del Greco, the linking of two outdoor parks by creating a tunnel to take vehicles away from them, the creation of a historical/cultural centre for one of the Bourbon villas (Villa Maiuri) complete with equipment and furnishings, regeneration of one of the main streets, the creation of a cultural centre (ATENA) for young people in a disused royal stable which will also be renovated, the creation of an urban park on one of the main streets, regeneration of two of the main piazzas in the centre of the city, regeneration of one of the main streets close to the coast and maintenance work in several streets (Città di Ercolano, 2008). All of this added up to a total of €33,133,469, of which a majority was spent on restructuring and the renovation of streets, with less than €10,000,000 being spent on what we could define as directly addressing the social problems acknowledged above (Ecosfera, 2010, p.92-3).

Concerning the social sphere influenced by the Camorra, we can seriously criticise the use of much of this funding for merely cosmetic changes – making the city look nicer, but not actually addressing any of the deeper structural problems – particularly when it is in some of these piazzas that young adults first interact with camorristi (*Camorriste*, 2016). This is a charge that has also been levied against the political establishment in general – particularly

with regard to the phenomenon of naming streets, piazzas and adding plaques in the name of notable figures in the anti-mafia movement, or innocent victims of the Camorra. The discrepancy between the symbolisation and martyrisation of these individuals compared to the actual actions of the ruling junta was widely scorned in the media in 2016 when the Comune of Ercolano paid for the plaque of an innocent victim of the Camorra in 2009, Salvatore Barbaro, but then forgot to provide the correct paperwork that would have allowed the comune to be represented in the trial so as to support the victim's family:

They remembered with a marble slab and a solemn march a few weeks ago in via Mare, the place where the innocent man was killed by Camorra hitmen. They remembered with a mass and with a string of fine words immortalised in video and photography (all posted on social media of course). But when it came to get serious, they “forgot” - leaving only friends and relatives in the trial to face the man who killed him with 11 gunshots (*Metropolisweb*, 9 December 2016)

This discrepancy between words and actions is common, which leaves the comune open to charges of talking the talk but not walking the walk. There are many parts of the city and streets named in the Più Europa report that were *still* undergoing building work during fieldwork, some of which was there for the duration of my stay, even beyond the summer of 2015 (despite this particular Più Europa funding being destined for the 2007-2013 period). Indeed the royal stables, *le scuderie*, opened for the first time in the summer of 2015 (€250,000 was spent on the cultural centre and the purchase of equipment, and €1,466,566 on the refurbishment of the building). Whilst certainly hosting regular cultural events and showcasing local businesses, the clientele seemed to be what we could best define as the middle class, rather than the disadvantaged socially excluded youngsters that it was arguably supposed to help. Likewise the Urban park on the Miglio d'Oro has its issues too (See figures 1-3). Its opening times - Monday to Friday from 9am to 6pm and weekends and bank holidays 8.30am to 12.30pm are inconvenient for the young people for whom it is intended. In addition to this, it is forbidden to play football, a well-known pastime for young Neapolitans – who instead opt to play in the street and in the areas which are commonly associated with camorristi. Despite containing a playground (some of its equipment is broken), and some park benches with some inspirational quotes on them, this project to give disadvantaged children something to do in public. The park cost €1,430,000, and receives very few visitors.



Figures 1-3

Photos of the Urban park of Ercolano

To somewhat hammer the points of security and legality, Più Europa provided another €1,880,000 which went towards: raising awareness and making better use of resources in the territory for the benefit of the population (but there were no details how this was done, costing €500,000); the installation of an integrated security system including burglar alarms, video surveillance in municipal buildings, public schools and the street, the creation of a citizen and tourist oriented web portal dedicated to warnings and recommendations made by the citizenry (all under the “Ercolano Città Sicura” program, costing €935,000); new surveillance equipment for operation centres and vehicles (working alongside the Polizia locale, costing €50,000); the building of raised pedestrian crossings (€320,000); and video surveillance for the city’s roads aimed at drivers (€75,000) (Ecosfera, 2010, p.221-2). These should be viewed as complementary to the already existing strategy for judicial repression, emphasising deterrence and the protection of comune assets.

This is not to overtly say that this funding has been misused, rather, it is to note that despite the awareness that criminality in the city has been caused by a number of (societal) structural issues, the vast majority of the funding from Urban Herculaneum and Più Europa have been spent on making the city more appealing to tourists, and therefore encourage them to spend money there – creating jobs. Despite the amount of money that has gone towards these efforts, the truth is that where Più Europa pointed to the issue of social exclusion and housing problems, the investment into expensive road restructuring, the opening of outside spaces which are rarely used and fall into a state of disrepair, minimal efforts to boost local entrepreneurs and the expanding of cultural initiatives to disadvantaged young people through both programmes have fallen well short of their objectives. The projects appear to benefit private interests rather than alleviating the societal problems that have been identified. It seems that a route has been chosen that focusses on private interests and an increased securitization of the area.

On the other hand, the conservation efforts by the Hewlett Packard Foundation and its partnership with State structures have largely been positive. Even though its main focus has been cultural and historical conservation, its partnership with the State and interaction with local associations has meant that its work goes far beyond the conservation effort itself. The site encourages access to local children through open days, bringing young people into contact with positive cultural capital, whilst the site is entirely free to access once a month, bringing other locals to the area who wish to visit it. The Urban Herculaneum and Più Europa programmes were, in many ways, freeriding off the increasing viability of the Herculaneum site, seeking to maximise the impact of the site itself. In some senses this is an understandable strategy. By focusing on the cosmetics of the city and its “image”, the city would be better placed to attract outside (private) investment, shifting the cost of developing

the city away from public institutions to the private sector instead and providing employment to locals. In this vein, the city tried twice to become the Italian city of culture, unfortunately falling short both times. Whilst there is certainly some merit to changing the economy of the city and gearing it towards tourism, it is unlikely to succeed in the short term given the astonishingly limited places for tourists to stay, as well as things to do for tourists *other than* the MAV and the Herculaneum site, all of which are worsened by the low proficiency of English and other international languages by locals. There is, for example, one small tourist info-point in the city (which opened for the first time in 2015), which is manned by volunteers with varying levels of language proficiency and is only open sporadically in the summer months. Local politicians have been grappling with how to encourage tourists to stay longer in Ercolano and enjoy the other parts of the city other than the Herculaneum site itself.

This general funding strategy for Ercolano has economic development through sustainability and maximum utility of assets at its heart, whereby the end-game is a community that is economically self-sufficient. There is a general understanding here that the alleviation of economic underdevelopment is achieved through a more neoliberal approach to the economy and the creation of a community in which security and development go hand in hand (Duffield, 2014) in which previous underdevelopment is conceptualised as having led to danger and insecurity. Underdevelopment leads to criminality and vice-versa. This general approach to the economy and a purposeful pursuit of development should not be separated from the fight against organized crime and the manner in which the State approaches the issue. This is for the simple reason that whilst judicial repression is reactionary, these kinds of developmental agenda attempt to address those same structural factors in the long term that are understood to create economic insecurity in general, and, therefore, to address and remove some of the reasons for an individual to become involved in organized crime in the first place.

The manner in which this funding has approached the issue of economic underdevelopment and social exclusion leaves much to be desired. There is very little effort to address social exclusion of those individuals who would otherwise be at risk of interactions with the Camorra and criminality in general, despite the acknowledgement in the Più Europa programme that this is one of the main causes of underdevelopment in the area. If the aim is to expand the number of local businesses in the service economy for the purpose of sustainability and supplying the product that tourists in the area demand (in the form of bars, shops, accommodation, tourist merchandise) and for the purpose of lowering unemployment and utilising assets, then a question worth asking is how it is possible to form such a local economy without giving Camorra clans access to money from the licit economy *whilst at the same time* not socially excluding those local people who do not have the relevant skills or

forms of capital that make them worth hiring in this service economy, namely, those same people who would be more at risk of interacting with the Camorra. For an individual who is born into a community such as the *centro storico* of Ercolano, to what extent are the options in life, and then the influences to make certain decisions over others, genuinely different? When these development programmes present the possibility of more options for such an individual with regard to work, the factors that influence whether these options are attractive or worthwhile compared to others remain relatively unaltered. At the same time, the types of Cultural Capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that some of these jobs may demand may be different to the ones that this individual has grown up with.

As a further example, the expansion and redevelopment of already existing piazzas does very little to address these social exclusion problems, and is perhaps counterintuitive when one considers the influence that camorristi have over these social spaces as a means of disseminating their specific Cultural Capital. From the accounts of Antonella Madonna, who eventually became the boss of the Ascione, it is in these piazzas where she first met and became involved with her future husband, and therefore his network of Camorra contacts. As she herself noted:

We were all very much surrounded by the business of the Camorra. Via Canalone, Cuparella, Piazza Pugliano. It's there where you can meet all the boys and girls. Amongst all my friends I felt superior to everyone else, which was a part of my character. I wanted to command even when I was there! [...] I met my husband [in these piazzas] when I was only 11 or 12 years old. As a young man he was very captivating. He already was a young man who everyone feared, and was a young man who was above everyone else around him. (*Camorriste*, 2016)

It is precisely this captivation that is not addressed by these projects undertaken in the city, and that must be approached in a socio-cultural manner. The area itself can become more cosmetically attractive, and bring in more money from outside of the territory, but the appeal of the camorristi who live in these areas remains relatively untouched. It is not enough to say that social spaces in general need to be regenerated and improved, because some of these spaces are also influenced and/or dominated by the Camorra and their social networks, as long as an element of the local population still regards with some positivity those qualities and specific Cultural Capital that camorristi represent and foster (See Appendix VI.II).

In this manner, it is difficult to see many of the funding opportunities here as a definite approach at which to undermine criminality entirely, without also focussing on the social element to Camorra power: be that their appeal to locals in the services and financial opportunities that they offer, or the culture of *omertà* that they have fostered amongst

businesses and the general population to prevent denouncing their activities to the law enforcement. In very blunt terms, by addressing the economic underdevelopment of the area, its historical and cultural assets, transport links, redevelopment of social meeting spaces and supporting some local businesses without addressing the relationship that organized criminality and *area grigia* middle-men have with the rest of society, economic development here risks assimilation into the licit economy by the Camorra, and their further entrenchment into the economic life of the territory.

3: Cultures of Legality

Judicial repression and a re-gearing of the economy to address social issues are two ways in which the State has attempted to combat organized crime (and the structural issues that cause it), but they only tackle some of the issue. Judicial repression deals with those individuals who already are criminals and provides disincentive for those who may commit crimes in future. Economic structural adjustment attempts to deal with those issues that create poverty and unproductivity in the first place, whilst also attempting to give other economic alternatives to would-be criminals. The cultural sphere and the manner in which it affects behaviour are also important, affecting and (re)creating those norms and perceptions in society that make certain life-styles and decisions more appealing or less desirable than others to individuals within specific (sub)cultures.

It is useful at this point to engage with ideas proposed by Kelling and Wilson (1982), and enacted in New York City by the Republican Giuliani administration in the 1990s (Levitt and Dubner, 2006). It is notable that reactions to the so-called “Broken Window Theory” (Kelling and Coles, 1997) have not been tried in Naples to date. The theory posits that the feeling that “no-one cares” about what happens in a community, signalled by uncleared graffiti, unrepaired broken windows, and even disinterest in upholding rules in society “leads to a breakdown of community controls” (Kelling and Wilson, 1982). These “untended” behaviours increase the likelihood that individuals will commit crimes, generally disrespect others and abuse their community. For various reasons Naples and its metropolitan area are notorious for the level of low high incidence rule breaking. As we have already noted, this varies from the level of informal employment, informal/non-existent contracts between individuals, non-payment for public transport, graffiti, littering, double parking cars in streets riding motorcycles without helmets, lack of insurance on vehicles and queue jumping. This coincides with the perceived lack of response from the institution or individuals in society to punish these behaviours – be that through penalties from the State or the use of shame by individuals to indicate to the perpetrators when they act in such a way. This creates a vicious

cycle which serves to further entrench apathy and the belief that “no one cares”, and that it is not in a person’s personal interest to obey the rules because of a lack of consequences. This represents the ebbing away of social cohesion and trust in State institutions.

Rather than following this route, the Italian State, the region of Campania, and the comune of Ercolano have pursued general strategies that have attempted to change the nature of the *habitus* by influencing those socio-cultural factors that determine individual behaviour, also in symbolic ways. It is notable, for example, that in the early months of 2017 the Mayor of Ercolano announced his intention to remove pro-Camorra graffiti that has been present in the area for years. It is tempting to interpret this as an institutional response to Broken Window Theory, but was much more about symbolism. As the Mayor, Ciro Buonajuto attested:

We have been removing other pieces of graffiti over the last few months, and we will continue in this manner. In the fight against illegality, symbols are also important. It is in this way that we can develop a culture of legality [*cultura della legalità*]. Whenever we report such incidents, we will try to intervene as soon as possible (*Metropolisweb*, 5 March 2017).

The reason for wanting to remove graffiti was less about the breakdown of community of controls that influences individual behaviour and petty crime, as it was about symbolism vis-à-vis the Camorra. Rather than removing graffiti because having a cleaner public space is a desirable end *ipso facto*, the focus has been on the symbolism of particular types of messages in a public space. The focus has been individual behaviour, rather than the changing of the external and structural factors that *cause* some of these behaviours.⁴⁹ An example of this elsewhere may be found with Roy Godson’s notion of the Culture of Lawfulness (2000) which we refer to in the Italian as the *cultura della legalità*. This exists on a spectrum: the adherence to the law in general at one end, and the active denouncement of illegality at the other. In the “Protocollo d’intesa per la sicurezza urbana integrata” (2007), the municipalities of Ercolano, Portici and San Giorgio a Cremano adopted a joint strategy on building this *cultura* whereby they would actively pool their resources into rebuilding the relationship and “social trust” [*fiducia sociale*] between the citizen and the State. In order to do this it would require a joint inter-communal effort, with the additional impact of Civil Society Organizations, in the area of “deviance”, “bullying” and “illegality” in a concrete

⁴⁹ It should be added that one of the most eye-catching pieces of graffiti on one of the main streets that I noticed the first time I visited the city in 2014, “BIRRA MERDA” (insulting the Birra clan, though it is unclear whether it was tagged by an opposing clan member or someone else), is still sprayed on the wall as of September 2017. There is still a piece of graffiti referring to the “Cuparella” on Via Pace, the street where some businesspeople paid the pizzo to the Birra clan.

manner. In this context, social trust that the State is working for the benefit of the citizen and society at large as understood as vital for the successful conduct of State policies. In this context the citizen is hoped to be a willing partner.

In Ercolano, this effect had a number of different results, given that this *cultura* does not merely encourage adherence to the law, but also active citizenship: denouncing unfairness and oppression where it exists with a general impetus on the improvement of the community, albeit within an already existing legal apparatus. Every year during the “Settimana della legalità” (Week of legality), a series of marches, events and activities are organised sponsored and conducted by various *comunes*, associations, schools, law enforcement, and aspects of the State apparatus. They all culminate in one large national demonstration in a designated city which changes every year of and which I was fortunate to attend alongside one of the partner Civil Society Organizations in Ercolano, Radio Siani, in Bologna in 2015. Ercolano celebrated this on the local level with its own event, “la Marcia della legalità” (the march of legality), a march starting from the central piazza and through the main street, finishing at one of the municipal squares where the marchers listened to speeches from various local people such as leading Carabinieri officers, association heads and school teachers – all talking about the topic of legality and what they can do to make their city a better place (see appendix 18 March 2015). The march itself was attended by different members of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano, including: the then Mayor and his colleagues, prominent local councillors, former Mayors and politicians, other associations including “Let’s do it Italy!”, representatives from Libera, Radio Siani, soldiers from the Carabinieri, and, most pertinently, all the children from the local primary, middle and high schools.

The march in Ercolano was a product of an inter-school project by the *comune* of Ercolano called the “a scuola di... sicurezza, legalità, ambiente” (school of... security, legality, environment), which sought to expose young people to the concept of legality in class and in the street. What is important to emphasise is that the purposeful inclusion of schools and schoolteachers alongside members of Civil Society Organizations and Civil Servants in this march was not the whole story. Part of this programme was the inclusion of issues of legality in the school curriculum. For the days and weeks beforehand, students from all of the local schools were asked to research and do school work based on the march, including the designing of placards and the discussion of ideas surrounding legality, organized crime and the community in class. Between speeches by members of Civil Society Organizations, politicians and Carabinieri officers, the microphone was passed to select students who would read out a quote about organized crime and legality that they had composed themselves, or from famous figures. Many of the quotes advocated active citizenship through a *Societas*

civilis, in line with post-Marxist emphasis on improving the state of affairs in a community. Here is a selection of quotes from the march:

“The hard hands of our future will bring back legality”

“He who fights risks losing, he who does not fight has already lost”

“[Through] legality you find peace. No to the Camorra. No more injustice. We need to be free to talk about how to beat the Camorra – long live peace and legality – the earth will die from hate and will be reborn with peace”

“Legality betters our world”

“Legality is synonymous with a better future”

“Legality cleans the world of the mafia and brings children on the right path, because we are the future of a better world. With legality there is the respect for the laws, and we can change our community. We choose legality because it is man who decides what happens to everyone in a clean, healthy and peaceful world”

“The world is a dangerous place to live in, not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it” [Albert Einstein]

“Even today Ercolano goes towards a broken society where the Camorra causes fear, a society in which the fear of conscience and some businesspeople prefer l'omertà to denouncing. Legality means waking up in the morning and clothing yourself in courage. The acceptance of defeat to every type of injustice and not knowing what to do despite what one believes [is Right] does not make the city more powerful. Legality is everything that renders cohabiting alongside others possible. It is not healthy to be lone wolves, isolated, but without sharing things together. Legality has made this cohabitation together possible”

“Legality is respecting the rules. Not only the rules that we impose on one another, but the rules that we live day to day. The rules allow us to live a life together in a community in a way we can best define as ‘human’”. (Appendix V, 18 March)

At the very least, these quotes are demonstrative of the kind of legality that is being discussed in schools, though it would be misjudged to assume that they account for the children's understanding of legality in its entirety, rather they are an expression of the idealistic side to this *cultura*. Several of these indicate the need to follow the rules for the bettering of society, others are more nuanced in pressing for an active citizenship for the

benefit of all. One thing that they all have in common, however, is that the person who is responsible for this change is necessarily the individual: the citizen. The citizen must alter their behaviour and follow the rules for the benefit of all. One main issue, if we are permitted to be critical of quotes by schoolchildren, is that the existence of current rules and laws which some may regard as immoral, wrong, or damaging to society, is not brought into question. Put simply, any structural issues within the current *status quo* that may exist are not addressed. There is a risk here that the legality that is being pushed is that of adherence to the rules *no matter what* rather than adopting a more critical view. To make this even more troubling, it is worth noting that one of the speakers, the then Mayor, Vincenzo Strazzullo, as well as other councillors in the PD were implicated on corruption charges several weeks later for crimes of the provision of public works contracts (*Metropolisweb*, 12 October 2016).

In connection with this project, one of the local schools, for example, took a cultural position, citing a “distorted knowledge of legality” (A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.7) as one of the main emerging problems affecting the area in its formative educational plan. It further stated that

The strengthening of research and intervention on the issue of legality is necessary in order to cope with the messages of Camorra subculture, which imposes paradoxical behaviour codes through the logic of oppression and violence and the subtle conditioning and recruitment of younger age groups.

The school achieves this through education on legality and health through normal “schooling”, educating children, providing them with the knowledge to move in the contemporary world, informing their conduct, developing attitudes towards sociability, interculturality, tolerance and cooperation, making their lifestyles through the achievement of the equilibrium of the mental and the physical through textbooks, books, film, artistic and sporting activities and games. (A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.14)

This addresses precisely those elements which developmental funding did not: that of (re)defining the nature of the *habitus* to the detriment of “Camorra (sub)cultural” sphere. Through the school’s commitment to the “a scuola di...” project, the school identified a need for a “promotion of culture, security and legality as a moment indistinguishable from the educative-social formation of the pupil” (A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.50). Its objectives were overtly stated as:



Figure 4

Giorno della legalità in Bologna, March 2015.

In this photo that I took, you can see four individuals who are part of Radio Siani's organising committee. The woman in the centre has a tablet from which she is individually reading out the names of each innocent victim of organized crime in Italy. At each reading of the name, the marchers chant a particular slogan where the victim's first name changes each time:

"GIANCARLO SIANI"

"Giancarlo è vivo e lotta insieme a noi! Le nostre idee non moriranno mai!"

(Giancarlo is alive and struggles alongside us. Our ideas will never die!)

Giancarlo Siani was a Neapolitan journalist for the *Il Mattino* newspaper who was killed by the Camorra in 1985

See Appendix V, 24 March



Figure 5

The Marcia della legalità in Ercolano, March 2015.

In this picture from the Radio Siani website you can see members of Radio Siani's organising committee who are leading from the front, schoolchildren and schoolteachers who have been given the day off in order to take part in this march, the community coordinator for the Herculaneum site, various members of the communal administration including the Mayor, members of the Carabinieri and various members of other Civil Society groups in Ercolano.

www.rudiosiani.com

- To know, recover and affirm the value of the culture of legality
- The training of legality as a means of fighting the mafia, omertà, bullying and oppression
- The education of solidarity, interculturality, tolerance, diversity and friendship
- To make people aware of the work of institutions

(A. De Curtis – G. Ungaretti, 2014, p.50)

Other aspects of this project went even further, such as a direct interaction and cooperation between law enforcement officers and members of the emergency services. There is an annual event at the Ercolano football stadium where children from local schools do activities such as assault courses and learning about the daily procedures of these officials. In one of these, the children were shown how dogs sniff out drugs through a demonstration of a bag of cocaine being placed in a suitcase alongside other suitcases – all of which was cheered on by parents and teachers in the stadium's stands. By interacting with law enforcement officers, young people are able to see the "other side" of criminality from the perspective of the Carabinieri - giving members of these institutions a personal face (Radio Siani, 2014). Here we see the already normative conception of legality/justice placed within a *status quo* Statist discourse where the adherence to legality becomes a means of facilitating State actions elsewhere (represented here by assisting law enforcement).

Following Evans and Giroux (2015), we note education to be a form of political intervention by its very definition. Rather than being a critique, this is an acknowledgment that the manner in which the State disseminates a version of *cultura* is never really objective. In favouring a broadly Marxist and Gramscian interpretation of the function of social norms over functionalist ones, I point here to the role that these discourses serve in reproducing and upholding the *status quo*. One of the speakers, a teacher from a local school, elaborated the "legalità" camp in these words:

Like all of you, I also have a smartphone. I used it to understand the word "legalità" and what it referred to by our dearly loved resources. There was a thing that struck me. Legalità becomes adherence to the rules that protects the weak from the oppression of the strong. I know this because it has been referred to directly from my smartphone ... this today is a thing we need to underline – we are not weak. We need to protect the weak – we need to give a hand to protect them. Here everyone today, you are not simply the citizens of tomorrow, you are the citizens of today. This is always better. We are not given a beautiful picture today of our society: corruption, problems, people disinterested in politics, people with nothing to look forward to in the future. But we need to carry on with the day.

These things that you have, because you all have them... Use them! Don't just use them to go on Facebook or other such like. Teach yourself and memorize the numbers of the Carabinieri, the Mayor, the Guardia di Finanza, the State police. It's not enough to say that you are here – it is better to denounce. It is the courage to say “this happened in this moment”. Because the other side will say that what they are doing is not wrong.

[...]

The thing that you need to understand is that this morning the schools of Ercolano are here, the institution is here, the law enforcement is here [...] Legalità is not simply obeying the law, because we need to pay our dues, or because we need to denounce others, instead legality is everything in our lives. We are legalità. We need to be lawful. We have to face various points of view – the one we face today is that of the law enforcement. And today I want to thank the Carabinieri, the Guardia di Finanza, the State police, and the local police, who are always close to us.
(Unnamed Ercolano Schoolteacher, March 2015)

Given that this behavioural change is one-directional (in that it is the populace who are encouraged to change their behaviour to the State and Law enforcement, and not the other way around) and the State remains unaltered, insofar that the State is placed as the centre of the entire endeavour, *Societas civilis* is instead used as a *weapon* to assure the cooperation between State and society, rather than the end goal.

The promotion of a culture of legality is one side to this cultural State-led (or promoted) approach to criminality. In Ercolano, the purposeful use of confiscated goods and assets (as allowed for with the legge n.109/96, which I discuss in the following chapter) has also become an essential part of this process. The various networks and relationships created through the broad “anti-mafia” fight on the local level has encouraged the continued fight against the Camorra through social and urban development. Examples of this include 18 properties that have been confiscated and put to reuse in Ercolano up until 2015 (Città di Ercolano, 2015). The confiscated properties varied from apartments, farming ground, vineyards, cellars, and so had a varied number of uses. The recipients of these properties/assets were: the antiracket association “Ercolano per la legalità” (1 apartment); a local voluntary association⁵⁰ “Arcipelago della Solidarietà” (2 apartments); a metropolitan-level development consortium “Consorzio S.O.L.E.” (10 properties of which 8 are

⁵⁰ As prescribed to in law “legge 11 agosto 1991 n.266”.

administered jointly by two other social cooperatives); a social cooperative⁵¹ “Arci zona rossa” (2 apartments); the Comune of Ercolano (one 80-square-metre cellar), whilst two more properties are under consideration. The details of the recipients are important in turn to investigate in order to better analyse what legge n.109/96 (Libera, 1996) looks like on the ground.

The apartment given to “Ercolano per la legalità” in 2013 was a property previously owned by a Pietro Scognamiglio (Nota n.10905 del 07.03.2014), associated with the Birra clan in the early-mid 2000s. The 120.5 square metre property, along with all of its furnishing, was given to the association so that it could become the headquarters of the antiracket, of which the sitting president at the time was Nino Daniele (Città di Ercolano, 2015). The two apartments given to “Arcipelago della Solidarietà”, a voluntary association, were transformed into “Casa Nelson Mandela” in 2009, which gave refugees a place to live. The association itself “intends to practice and promote volunteer activities in solidarity with and support for vulnerable individuals; promote a culture of solidarity as the concrete affirmation of rights; contribute to the development of a pluralistic community; push for the end of marginalization and underdevelopment; contribute to the development of participation as an affirmation of citizenship rights; and encourage the process of democratization of public facilities for equal participation” (n.d). With the support of the Italian Ministero dell'Interno and the Comune di Ercolano, Arcipelago della solidarietà was selected to administer this property, with places for 15 individuals (Nota n.10905 del 07.03.2014). Whilst the properties are administered by the association, this administration is based in a joint Comunale/Ministerial project which is to be renewed annually.

“Consorzio S.O.L.E” and its intertwined organisations are somewhat more complicated to explain. S.O.L.E (Sviluppo Occupazione Legalità Economica - Development, Occupation, Legality, Economy) is an initiative of the Provincia di Napoli which seeks to streamline the process of giving the stewardship of a confiscated property from the State or Municipality to a suitable voluntary association or social cooperative. In collaboration with the national agency which administers “beni sequestrati” (seized goods) and “beni confiscati” (confiscated goods), S.O.L.E is tasked with removing obstacles which can slow down this process (such as mortgages) on a local level. S.O.L.E itself is a project by the Direzione Politiche (Political Directorate) of Naples, itself under the jurisdiction of the Città di Napoli, which, under a Presidential Decree must offer its services and personnel for free for S.O.L.E activities (Città Metropolitana di Napoli, n.d.). In short, S.O.L.E is interwoven into the regional and metropolitan administrations, and, therefore, also with the Italian State.

⁵¹ As prescribed to in law “legge 8 novembre 1991 n.381”.

The entirety of one apartment and 89% of another in the same building were given to the comune of Ercolano (the other 11% is occupied by another resident) in 2010, but after a *giunta comunale* decision in 2012, the apartments were eventually entrusted to S.O.L.E because they were deemed uninhabitable (Nota n.10905 del 07.03.2014). The last 8 plots of land surrounding this building, were entrusted to S.O.L.E, who then entrusted them jointly to “Cooperativa Tom” (based in Portici) and “Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani” (Città Metropolitana di Napoli, n.d.[a]), a social cooperative associated with the aforementioned association Arci zona rossa. These cooperatives use these plots of land to create a “social farm” growing mafia-free produce in addition to conducting educational and social programmes with the participation of “disadvantaged individuals” (Città Metropolitana di Napoli, n.d.[a]). In addition to this, from 2013 both of these cooperatives were granted at least 10 years of use of these plots free of charge.

Arci zona rossa received two apartments that were confiscated from the Birra clan in 2008 in operation “Reset”. Over the course of a few months, this association transformed itself into “Radio Siani”, the pro-legality radio station. It must be emphasised that the names “Radio Siani”, “Arci zona rossa” and “Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani” have often been and are used interchangeably: Arci zona rossa is the initial association founded to receive the property, which then created Radio Siani (indeed, Radio Siani is legally recognized as Arci zona rossa) whereas the Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani⁵² is a social cooperative and the social activist and voluntary wing of this associational network. We will discuss the specific social activities that Radio Siani and its related association conducts in the following chapter, but for now it is prudent to see *how* Radio Siani has been used by the local administration to promote a specific culture. In this sense, Radio Siani alters the *habitus* through their social activities using education and socialisation, whilst at the same time, the purposeful re-use of confiscated criminal assets denotes a very literal replacement of physical criminal assets (apartments) in a community.

In the apartment itself, the Carabinieri found a radio transmitter, which upon investigation was found to transmit a popular radio station. Over the past decade or so, this radio station had various different names: originally “Radio Ercolano Stereo”, then “Ercolano Centro” and then “Nuovo Ercolano”, though each of them were more commonly called “Radio Camorra” or “radio clan”. From this apartment, the radio DJs were transmitting pro-Camorra and coded messages to associates on the outside – telling drug smugglers and drug dealers where to pick up supplies and communicating via easily accessible radio. Arci zona rossa was approved to be the benefactor of this property wherein they changed its *modus operandi*,

⁵² Also “Cooperativa Sociale Giancarlo Siani”

becoming a webradio of legality: they turn the house of a former boss and the site of Camorra propaganda and coded messages via the radio station into a site of the anti-Camorra (Radio Siani, 2013) The president of the association, Giuseppe Scognamiglio explained:

Here, there was a decision to found Radio Siani. Why? Because this apartment was one of the first to be confiscated here from the Camorra, it is a symbolic place: it was the house of the boss – where the boss had orchestrated this war in Ercolano. For this motive, we didn't have to simply have a place to meet, a social centre, but instead a place from which to send a different message – a much more important one. When we were deciding what to do with ourselves, a radio in this apartment was also confiscated and closed down. This was one of the most famous radios in Ercolano: Nuovo Ercolano. From the subsequent investigations by magistrates and attorneys, that this was "Radio Camorra", "Radio carcere" [prison radio] – because it was a real communication channel that the Camorra used to communicate information through various songs, dedications, phrases in codes for camorristi in prison, and other colleagues in the territory. There were people on the loose, checkpoints, "pay attention there is Carabinieri", how to get the drugs, where a homicide was committed.

[...] We basically want to respond to and investigate this phenomenon and this radio of the Camorra. We decided to make a radio of the "anti-Camorra" in this "bene confiscato" that was the home to the boss. We responded in this way. And we decided to follow the teaching of Peppino Impastato [a Sicilian activist who was murdered in 1977 by the Cosa Nostra] with his "RADIO AUT" and bring it to life. We then decided to name it after Giancarlo Siani, because he was from Campania, and the only victim of the Camorra who was a communicator, a journalist, the only victim who comes close to what we are doing now and what we are doing. He was a very young journalist, and so we decided to name the radio after him. We say that he is the tutor of the activists who come to the radio. (CS2 18032014)

The radio station does this in a variety of ways. It is purposely a web-radio, meaning that anyone with computer access can listen to its content, rather than needing a conventional radio. The content itself is varied too, with a blend of popular music, classic rock, punk, Neapolitan/Italian music, in addition to different conversation segments where they discuss local issues, Italian politics, world politics and so on.

The radio station's main purpose is to talk about illegality, but it also provides entertainment to its listeners, doing its best not to be a single-issue radio station. The

symbolism of the location was not missed by the Fondazione Pol.i.s., a non-profit foundation under the jurisdiction of the Campania regional government, who selected the Radio Station as a *bene confiscato* of “symbolic importance” (Fondazione Pol.i.s., 2013), effectively earmarking it for further funding opportunities such as the project “Radio della Legalità”, which sought to “join and give a voice to small associations, editorials and webtv; to promote the issue of legality; to support and contribute to the training of young people in Campania” (Fondazione Pol.i.s., 2013, p.11). All of this is alongside promotions and interviews for heads of community groups, authors, anti-mafia activists, priests, judges, politicians on both the national and local level.

The radio station itself is made up entirely of volunteers, who do what they can in their spare time alongside whatever job or studies they also have. Some of the more prominent interviews pertinent to our research are those focussing on the interactions between the radio station and local/regional judges, politicians and law enforcement officials, wherein different journalists for Radio Siani have conducted or broadcasted interviews with people such as Pierpaolo Filippelli, Giorgio Napolitano (the former President of the Italian Republic), Nino Daniele, Claudio Fava (Politician, screenwriter and anti-mafia activist) (see Appendix VII.II for example). These interactions have benefits which are two-fold: firstly the interview themselves, and secondly the possible creation and facilitation of anti-mafia “networks” and communication. The interaction between the grass-roots groups such as Radio Siani and these high profile practitioners and activists goes some way to narrowing the gap between general citizenry and policy makers – lending a voice and a human face to the anti-mafia movement and State policies that target criminality in general. We could theorise this in terms of a process that increases vertical trust between the populace and the policy makers. Radio Siani’s website is an example of this, where volunteers, activists and local politicians write articles about their activities, or react to a local issue. Like the interaction between Carabinieri officers and shopkeepers, whether purposefully or not, the willingness of people such as Filippelli to be subject to an interview by the local anti-Camorra radio station goes some way to building the anti-Camorra brand in Ercolano that appears to demonstrate the breaking down of boundaries, and the increased fluidity between the State and non-State anti-mafia, and therefore increasing social trust in the area.

Particularly in the years following the election of Nino Daniele in 2005 to mayor on an anti-Camorra platform, the local comune and its administration also pursued their own policies which were purposely aimed at combatting cultures of criminality in the area. One simple way in which Daniele approached this was to try to “reward” or “incentivise” legality in the form of tax exemptions. A prominent example of this was when Daniele’s administration encouraged membership of the antiracket association and the denunciation of the clans

through economic benefits in the form of tax exemption, and the payment of legal fees in racketeering trials. From 2008-2010, it was recorded that Raffaella Ottaviano's three clothing stores, in addition to another shopkeeper's business were exempt from paying waste disposal taxes to the communal administration "X LEGALITÀ" ("For legality"), in 2011 this was expanded to another shopkeeper.⁵³ The only other entities that were granted to such exemptions were select voluntary associations who were considered to be valuable social assets in the community – an incredibly symbolic message to the antiracket. For a period, Daniele and his administration also allowed the antiracket association to be based in the MAV building, alongside support from the Commissione parlamentare antimafia⁵⁴ (Conticello, 2015, p.150), giving the antiracket the space to conduct its activities, whilst also giving it clear institutional support. Daniele built on this, saying:

in that moment [during the Camorra feud in Ercolano] we did many things – one of the most symbolic things, something very strong, was against the illegal construction of buildings. At this time, we demolished 30 or 40 illegally built buildings – houses/structures built without a permit simply to say "you need to obey the rules of the State". I remember another thing we did that was very symbolic in the eyes of the citizens was to seize motorini [scooters], because in Ercolano, no-one wears a helmet on their scooters. Why? Because in general when there is a hit, the killer normally arrives by car or by scooters – if you arrive with the helmet, no one will know who you are. And so the clan pushed a disposition upon the territory that no-one needs to wear their helmet on their scooters. And so, the State police, the Guardia di Finanza and the Carabinieri would create road blocks in order to stop anyone who wasn't wearing their helmet, as there is a law requiring people to wear a helmet. If they are not, the motorino is seized. It was to show to the people that in this place you obey the law of the State, not the rules of the clan. It was a very symbolic thing. When someone is stopped at this checkpoint they see that the State controls this area. This then sends a message that people are able to free themselves from the clans.

For example, the use of the "beni confiscati". We took assets from the boss and the clan and used them for a social activity – and this also paints a strong picture for them. Showing that the State is being serious – so here we are creating a climate of trust from where we can find the courage to free ourselves. (POL 18032014)

⁵³ All available at <http://www.comune.ercolano.na.it/>

⁵⁴ Parliamentary antimafia commission. The antiracket at the MAV was inaugurated by Francesco Forgione, the then President of the commission.

This points to a dual process in gaining sufficient trust among the people in Ercolano that encourages denunciations against Camorra clans and their activities. On the one hand, Camorra norms are purposefully questioned within a community, whereas on the other the State makes it clear that they are actually present in the area. Daniele's top-down changes point to the latter in the form of increasing institutional trust whereby the aim was to change the perception of the State through visible action against petty crimes which in turn have been helping the "disposition" of the clans. The laws against not wearing helmets whilst riding a scooter or a motorbike already existed, as did laws against the illegal building of structures, but the issue was that the law was being ignored and law enforcement did very little to combat it. The illegal construction of buildings in Ercolano is particularly pressing, as the laws relate to the precariousness of the community on the slopes of Mount Vesuvius. In 2003 a regional law was passed for the designated "Zona Rossa" (red zone) communities around the volcano (that is, the communities that would be most affected by any inevitable eruption) so as to mitigate the cost of the eruption. The law (Legge Regionale N.21 del 10 dicembre 2003) made it absolutely forbidden to construct new buildings for residential purposes, given that the number of individuals already at risk from the volcano due to their proximity was already incredibly high, making already complex evacuation plans more difficult.

By overseeing the demolition of these buildings, Daniele's administration was sending a message that the law must be obeyed, and that it is the State who is legitimate, not the Camorra and not criminal businesspeople. In theoretical terms, to borrow from Robert Putnam (1993) and Carina Gunnarsson (2014), the "game" now has penalties for cheaters – illegally constructed buildings will be demolished. Analysing these measures by the State, it is interesting to consider these actions as what Walter Benjamin called *rechtsetzend Gewalt* (law-making violence) or *rechtserhaltende Gewalt* (law-preserving violence) (Benjamin, 1921): whether this is affirming or re-affirming the strength of the State *through* violence/the law, and then what this means when we try to understand the clans themselves. If we consider the State to be doing the former, then we can conceive actions and violence by the clan to maintain their order of things to be "law preserving" in their own context. If we consider the State to be doing the latter, then we must ask why the laws had not been being preserved in the first place.

This comparison and theoretical discourse between clans and the State was made clear somewhat accidentally in one of the interviews I conducted with Daniele, who in one interview begins by saying what we have pondered above, but quickly rewords his sentence, seemingly because of how unfavourably it paints the State and its institutions *vis-à-vis* the Camorra clans:

The State needs to retake control of the territory. And say “the Camorra doesn’t command this territory, instead it is the State that commands... [pause] commands? Here there is the need to *respect* the rules of the democratic State. There is a need to retake... [pause] *reoccupy* with rules, the territory. And this is what we have been trying to do. (POL1 18032014)

By accident, Daniele seems to highlight the legal/illegal legitimate/illegitimate dichotomy between the State and organized crime groups in general – best personified in St Augustine’s “Pirate and Emperor” tale.⁵⁵ Additionally, he points to the necessity of demonstrating to the population that space (both physical and metaphorical) has been (re)taken from the clans. Despite the fact that the laws already existed regarding construction and helmet wearing, we inevitably must refer to the actions of the State here as the former (law-making violence) given that it is pushing a new disposition *upon* the populace here – the State is making the law where beforehand it was ignored almost entirely. Perhaps without realising it, Daniele’s administration was pursuing a line which partially adhered to the policies advocated in Kelling and Wilson’s “Broken Window Theory” (1982), whereby relatively trivial infractions of the law were punished. This was used as a means of demonstrating that the State is present, and does care about the law, and will react to those who break it.

This was used as a weapon against the Camorra clans, their associates, and the *area grigia*. If citizens sufficiently trusted the institution and law enforcement to react to law breaking, the theory was that they would report crimes to the police when they actually occur. Echoing the language of Liberal proponents of Social Capital such as Putnam, regular players are able to denounce the cheaters of the game whatever shape and size they are, knowing that a referee will punish them. In a very simple way, by merely increasing the presence of the State and police in public life, and being less lax against criminality, Daniele’s administration was able to alter citizens’ perception of the State in their community compared to before, demonstrating that if they were to denounce cheaters, the cheaters would be punished. Whilst it would not be true to suggest that there is absolute trust for the institution and law enforcement now, we can at least note a definite increase in trust by shopkeepers for the law

⁵⁵ The story recounts the exchange between an unnamed pirate and Alexander the Great, with the Emperor lampooning the pirate asking him what he is doing “infesting the sea”. The pirate’s response was “The same as you do when you infest the whole world; but because I do it with a little ship, I am called a robber, and because you do it with a great fleet, you are an emperor” (Augustine of Hippo, 1998, p.147-8). This is a comparison that is used by various theorists on the terrorist/freedom fighter debate within terrorism studies, including Noam Chomsky who quoted it in the opening to his book on the subject, aptly named “Pirates and Emperors” (2003).

enforcement compared to before, which has encouraged more people to join the antiracket association. The following section will discuss how this phenomenon has been approached by the Carabinieri.

4: The Modello Ercolano

Linked to this process is that of the changing perception of the local law enforcement. It is at this point that we introduce the “Modello Ercolano” (the Ercolano model), a term which has been coined by varying politicians, members of the law enforcement, the judiciary and civil society activists in Ercolano both past and present to describe the anti-Camorra movement that uprooted the racket. We start with a lengthy extract of an interview with a three Carabinieri servicemen responsible for Ercolano to best explain it, which for clarity we shall analyse piece by piece:

What is the Modello Ercolano exactly?

Officer 1: It is a fusion of various elements. That is, a chain starting with the judiciary, ending up at the shopkeeper.

Officer 2: There are links between these made both of trust and brotherhood where everyone wanted the same thing. Beforehand no-one went out at all because despite the gears and chain [connecting everyone together] we were missing a vital rawlplug⁵⁶ [see figure 6]: the judiciary, the Carabinieri, Civil Society. Instead, today starting with the judiciary, there is the Carabinieri then Civil Society that have all understood that they have to do this work together. If there is Civil Society that wants to do something, and there is the Carabinieri nearby that understands what their problems are...

There are the Carabinieri that want to help with whatever they can, but if Civil Society does not collaborate, the judiciary cannot do anything. It was the case that during the 90s, when there was a large number of Camorra, that neither the judiciary nor the Carabinieri did their duties, leaving Civil Society as lone victims of the Camorra. So everyone needed to go forward and reverse these

⁵⁶ The word used by the officer was “tasello principale”, also translated to “wall plug”, “screw anchor”, or “dowel”.

This sentence was particularly difficult to translate due to the multiple double meanings and imageries in English and Italian of “chain” and “gears”. In the physical sense, gears and chains have nothing to do with rawlplugs, and, for clarity’s sake, we must state that Officer 2 is alluding to a metaphorical rawlplug which relies on our comprehension of how such an object works (see figure 6), whilst simultaneously referring to a “chain” and “gear” in the sense of things connected together – rather than the actual physical thing.

mistakes. Today everything is inversed: now there are these three entities; Civil Society, the Carabinieri and the judiciary who continue working and want the same thing, and so the Modello Ercolano will keep going forward.

There will be, like there has been for the last 10 years, us Carabinieri preparing ourselves here, likewise the judiciary even when the PM Fillipelli eventually leaves, there will be another, one hopes, to follow that which has been done over the last ten years by Dr. Fillipelli. We hope that we will also remain here, but no matter what, we hope that whoever comes tomorrow has the intelligence to understand the people in this area: shopkeepers and their needs. Unfortunately it was the case in the past that if I, as a shopkeeper, received a visit from an extortionist and went to the Carabinieri, the Carabinieri took the threat too lightly. For too many years there was a lot of ignorance on our part.

Officer 1: At times, it happened that people were only doing their professional duty.

Officer 2: When this problem has been shown to these people who made a mistake, they didn't understand that here in this area when there is a poor guy who goes to denounce, that person is entering into a system that ... just to make you understand ... it is not that a person can only speak to their brother about their fear. So you need to go and break the omertà that so touches fear. The omertà is the fear that walks alongside, in symbiosis – you know? They are the same thing when it comes to the Camorra. If you listen to the person who wants to denounce the camorrista, and then don't abandon them afterwards – it is here you touch the mentality of the shopkeepers, and this is what we have been doing for the last ten years.

Here, we have done some psychological work, because when the shopkeepers came here it is not that they sat down and I spoke nothing but good, especially when we are talking about the boss of the clan, every last turd – no one would have wanted to denounce. We stay talking for hours: 1, 2, 3, hours – also at night – for days. So it is this: we are the way out [for the shopkeepers] to break the “wall of indifference”⁵⁷ that for thirty years no one had the will or the want to go and combat – neither from the part of the judiciary, nor from the part of the Carabinieri. (LE 18042015)

⁵⁷ He used the phrase “Muro di gomma”, literally, the rubber wall

There are two distinct imageries presented here which we can use to visualise the Modello Ercolano: that of a rawlplug and that of gears. A rawlplug is a small plastic or metal insert that is placed into a drilled hole to better hold a screw, using more of the screw's potential energy and more of the structural integrity of the wall without damaging it. To ensure greater structural integrity and ensuring that a screw does not bend, a rawlplug is added to a drilled hole, ensuring greater accuracy whilst drilling, as well as protecting the wall from unnecessary damage after a weight is added to the nail on the outside of the wall. In the metaphor alluded to by Officer 2, we visualise the judiciary as the screw, and the accuracy and direction with which the screw goes into the wall without damaging it as representing their ability to prosecute camorristi.

If there is no rawlplug a screw can often end up at an irregular angle, with the result that the wall could be damaged and the screw could be unfit for purpose. To visualise this metaphor further, if the population does not sufficiently trust the Carabinieri to report crimes, then there is no rawlplug in the wall: the judiciary is lacking information and witnesses to prosecute criminals – the screw is screwed in crooked. If there is a less than favourable working relationship between the Carabinieri and the Judiciary, this is also the case. The rawlplug, then, represents the ability that the judiciary has to prosecute criminals.




Figure 6:

How a rawlplug works




Figure 7

The anti-mafia gears of Civil Society, Carabinieri and the Judiciary working together in unison

The gears and chain allude to the continuous flow of these three elements and the ongoing relationship between these. This is explained further in the following exchange:

Is there a difference in strategy in Ercolano, Portici, Torre del Greco in fighting the Camorra? [All of which are under the jurisdiction of this unit of the Carabinieri]

Officer 1: Very often the Modello Ercolano is singled out alongside the anti-racket association that was founded in Ercolano and has led to the defeat of organized crime in the area. But this is reductive, as I said before, to specify only the anti-racket association, because other communes in the area like Torre del Greco and Portici have had antiracket associations. But, using the case of Torre del Greco for example, the antiracket association didn't work: it died, and then a bit later it was born again. The initial incarnation didn't have the chain between the antiracket, law enforcement and the judiciary – because they didn't have the same course. If a piece is missing, or there is an incomplete gear even just by a millimetre, it doesn't work very well. If this happens, the situation would return to what it was like before, even if not as serious. The Modello Ercolano is a model of a system of investigations which is done with the help of civil society. [See figure 7]

- Officer 2: That, in Italy, unfortunately doesn't exist – it doesn't exist! It's absurd, but it doesn't exist.
- Officer 1: In Italy and in this area we have this situation with criminals. But I believe that elsewhere in the world the *Modello Ercolano* does not exist, because there are not the conditions because they come from Ercolano. In America, it is another thing, but there are organized criminal families which were imported from Italy – there is extortion there too where people pay a lot. The Camorra, the Mafia, 'Ndrangheta also exist there – but they haven't created an association which can defeat these criminal cartels. It is for this reason that I say it is reductive to say that the "*Modello Ercolano*" indicates only the Carabinieri, only the antiracket, rather, it is all of this together.
- Officer 3: Like they have created an association of delinquents, in this we have created an association between civil society, law enforcement and the judiciary
- Officer 1: We need to combat illegality. With legality we make people understand what legality is. (LE 18042015)

The gears and chains here represent each individual actor in the fight against organized crime. The judiciary is one gear, the Carabinieri another, Civil Society the other. If one gear is missing, then the whole system fails. If the Civil Society [*societas civilis*] gear is unable, or unwilling to report crimes, then the Carabinieri cannot investigate and arrest criminals. If the Carabinieri is unable or unwilling to listen to Civil Society and give them sufficient protection the system fails. If the Carabinieri and the Judiciary do not have a good enough working relationship, then the system fails. Each element may be rotating independently, but if individual cogs are broken, if the gears are not aligned properly or if the gears are rotating in opposing directions, the system fails.

Using the metaphor represented in Figure 6, combined with the system presented in Figure 7, the *Modello Ercolano* is imagined as a contraption which, using these three gears, aligns a rawlplug into place. If a gear is rotating in a different direction, or a single cog is missing, the contraption does not align the rawlplug properly – meaning that when the screw is screwed into place, it is not as energy efficient as it could be. The emphasis then moves to the links between each of the gears, as well as the initial push to denounce in the first place – rotating the first gear. The officers described the rotation of the gears between the Carabinieri and Civil Society, where the mixture of public and private lives, the formal and informal, becomes a notable aspect of the relationship between the Carabinieri and the extorted shopkeepers in Ercolano:

I saw when I was doing some interviews with them that their relationship with the police was rather... informal. It's as if you were friends

Officer 2: We're friends with every one of them. You think that, you've gone around and talked with lots of shopkeepers – and I think that they only spoke nicely about us? Right?

It's true – yeah

Officer 2: Why is it like this? Because in the moment that they denounced, we arrested the camorristi. We didn't abandon the shopkeepers – we continued to listen to them, we stayed at their disposal. For any problem that they have, from the smallest up to the largest, we are available to them. We have gone to their houses in the middle of the night because they heard a noise ... we go and see them and make them feel safe. And we have said to them above all – look at all the people who have been arrested – all of them will be sentenced – that is a promise. And they saw that effectively all of these camorristi in Ercolano have been arrested and then sentenced. All of them are serving time in prison.

Officer 3: Here there is a thing that I have never seen before. I'm originally from [omitted: outside of Campania], and there they don't have the need to do the kind of things they do here. Another thing I've never seen: that is the following of trials. At times it is done informatively, another time the person is delivered there, and then it is finished. A thing I have never seen in the other places where I have worked, a thing that is done here in particular is the following of the trend of the informative phase of the trial. ... Officer 2 [name omitted] only finishes his work when the arrested becomes condemned, and this is the same for us. This is a thing not comparable to other police forces: first they arrest the person, do the informative stage of the trial, advise the judges, follow the trial (i.e. the condemnation of the arrested). It was to break this wall too – there is no longer a superior and inferior level of policing and the judiciary – there is no longer dependence – this is a very unique thing. It's all done together. The PM calls his referent officer, Officer 2, who organises all of us. He calls him entirely informally without the need to have all the formality. We are at the trials only to support the PM in his battle – but also to see what's going on. We're all there.

When there was a trial where a shopkeeper is giving their testimony we are right behind them in the courtroom. (LE 18042015)

The importance of trust that the shopkeeper has for the law enforcement becomes an essential factor here, particularly regarding the antiracket association. After several years of meetings, the breakthrough appeared to be the bomb placed in the bakery in October 2009, when the antiracket association reacted by staging a march through the city alongside the Carabinieri. The subsequent “maxi trial” in November, and then other trials that followed brought with them a front of solidarity that did not exist beforehand for Filippo in 2000 and then Ottaviano in her trial in 2005. In attendance were members of the antiracket, uniformed members of the Carabinieri, representatives of the comune di Ercolano as well as other organisations who came to the trials to lend some psychological support to shopkeepers who were denouncing. As Tano Grasso put it:

With the participation of the antiracket association there is a significant change in the atmosphere within the law court. What is a mafia trial in the land of the mafia? It is certainly not like any other trial, however importantly, there is something that you don't find in the sentence nor in the transcription of the hearings: there is a *climate* that weighs down upon it and at times weighs down strongly enough to become a decisive factor in the proceedings. Unfortunately, like it or not, a mafia trial is not conducted just between those which are institutionally provided: judges, prosecutor, accused, defence, witnesses; there is always an “x” variable and it is from its value that one gets the atmospheric context inside the courtroom. (Grasso, 2014, p.10)

By having supporters from the antiracket, the Carabinieri and others inside the courtroom, the “x” is influenced in a completely different way, encouraging the shopkeepers to denounce, encouraging other shopkeepers to denounce too. This “x” appears to be something which members of FAI and the Carabinieri have identified when dealing with shopkeepers, as Roberta Rispoli from the legal office of FAI in Naples explained:

There is always special attention paid in the listening to victims of extortion. The witness, in absolute innocence, can alter the reality of the facts. One example: there is a shopkeeper that is called to testify after ten people before them; if they are asked whether they are scared, they would deny it; on one hand they need to prove that they are as strong as the others that preceded them, on the other it could be that they really weren't scared. The point is that they *were* scared, they were at the moment of extortion; though now, after a few months, this sensation is being relived, though absorbed. At present (during the testimony) they aren't scared, instead they

only have the moment where the crime was committed. And it is this which must be held on to until the end of the sentencing. (Grasso, 2014, p.19)

In essence, rightly or wrongly, there is an element of external social pressure inside the court room that other witnesses provide. It is not a “negative” social pressure encouraging deceit or something else similar, rather it is one that encourages a shopkeeper to “do the right thing” and give their account of the crime. This new “atmosphere” or “climate” of the antiracket replaces the old “x” variable that mafiosi created in the courtroom in the past, and is achieved through simple and unquantifiable actions of communication amongst shopkeepers about their problems, and then their relationship with the Carabinieri, then later the judiciary.

As mentioned previously, Tano Grasso encouraged Nino Daniele, Lieutenant Antonio Di Florio and Raffaella Ottaviano to found the anti-racket association “Ercolano per la legalità” in 2006 with Ottaviano as the President. A large inauguration took place in one of the Vesuvian villas in Ercolano in November 2006, and had a large attendance of shopkeepers, Carabinieri and politicians (Di Florio, 2012, p.115). The actual first meeting of the association in private was described by Di Florio as something a bit different:

The first meeting with the shopkeepers happened in a clandestine manner, in a classroom of a primary school. There was me, Raffaella and three shopkeeper friends of hers. It was so that, with an initially broken voice from emotion, I started to speak - to display and explain my intentions. I talked and talked with all the enthusiasm of my ideas but in their gazes I saw a shadow of distrust that stuck to me for the whole of the evening.

During our farewells at the end of the evening the carpenter of the town, an older man in his sixties, took me aside and said to me that if I wanted to be heard I needed to demonstrate my commitment with facts. “Lieutenant, do you know what’s wrong? People aren’t very trusting, least of all the shopkeepers. These armed people go around the city and do what they like, and then you come along and say that you want to change things... but when? We want facts Commander! You need to earn the trust of these people... you need to convince them that it is better to denounce than pay. Facts, commander... facts and results!”

For months I continued to organise these meetings. No-one denounced, but the number of participants increased meeting after meeting. Raffaella worked hard, she was the echo chamber of the activity of the Carabinieri [explaining to the shopkeepers how they had helped her]. The back-and-forth between her and the

shopkeepers spread, finally they began to understand that someone wanted to listen to them without the obligation of denouncing. (Di Florio, 2012, p.115)

These initial shopkeepers were those who were immediately close to Ottaviano, and she was the main driving force of these beginnings. The difficulty was not only in encouraging people who didn't already know Ottaviano to join the antiracket, but also to actually denounce their extorters, particularly when the previous years (2004-2006) had seen an increase in first-time pizzo demands (Di Florio, 2012, p.115) apparently due to the growing need for revenue by the clans. Up until 2009 there was on-off violence between the clans, leading to a number of murders in the streets of Ercolano and Torre del Greco. In June 2007, the Carabinieri's operation "Reset" arrested the entire directorate of the Birra clan, which was followed by a year and a half of hits against the Birra by the Ascione, seemingly to signal the absolute disarray that this decapitation had left them. The new dominance of the Ascione was only temporary due to the discovery of their accounts ledger in April 2009, followed by a mass trial in November. It was during this period (from 2006 to November 2009 with the end of the mass trial that the Carabinieri worked particularly hard at winning the "hearts and minds" of the shopkeepers, demonstrating that they could be trusted and would react when approached by a shopkeeper. Following the foundation of the anti-racket in 2006, Lieutenant Di Florio visited various businesspeople in the area and asked whether they wanted to join, reassuring them face-to-face that the Carabinieri would be there for them.

Here are some extracts of some interviews with shopkeepers who were visited in 2006 by the Carabinieri:

The racket is a plague in this territory. When a lieutenant of the Carabinieri, Antonio di Florio came into our stores to talk with us, and asked if we wanted to speak out against the racket and so on we said yes, gladly. And so, the first contact was with Antonio di Florio. At the same time, there was the national director of FAI who alongside di Florio and the Mayor, Nino Daniele, asked to have some kind of meeting with shopkeepers and entrepreneurs to hear their ideas.

[...]

We have never paid [the pizzo]. You hear things, it was not understood as one payment after the other after the other – it was to be paid at Christmas, Easter. And we knew that they were around, but they never came here. (N6 17042015)

And another business from the same time:

Basically, I've always had this opinion of not playing ball with the Camorra. A Lieutenant from the Carabinieri came here and invited me [to denounce]. Having this opinion to combat the Camorra, and this invitation, we founded the antiracket. (N2 14042015)

It took another year (2007) before the first new business joined the antiracket after denouncing the Birra (Di Florio, 2012, p.115), and then it was not until the spectacle of a well-known businessman threatened in the street by the Papale (related to the Ascione) at the beginning of 2008 that more joined. After hearing about the incident, Di Florio personally approached the businessman, and convinced him to join the antiracket. Though the businessman could not bring himself to actually denounce the individual who threatened him, he took the Lieutenant's phone number. Later that evening, Di Florio received a call from the businessperson saying that they had reconsidered, and that they would denounce after all (Di Florio, 2012, p.116-7; *Metropolisweb*, 13 January 2008). Following the discovery of the Ascione ledger in 2009, other Carabinieri officers visited businesspeople that were discovered to be paying the pizzo, asking them whether they would like to join the antiracket too and reassuring them that the Carabinieri are there for them whenever they need.

Here we see that the Carabinieri made a purposeful effort at fostering the development of the antiracket once the seed had been planted, whilst also creating some kind of relationship between businesses at risk from Camorra interference and the Carabinieri themselves. Indeed from the questionnaire data collected from members of the antiracket, the number of businesses increases significantly after 2007 where there appeared to be greater trust for the Carabinieri to actually help them:

Year Joined	Number of businesses
2006	4
2007	0
2008	2
2009	3
2010	4
2011	2
Left blank	6

Table 1

Elaboration of questionnaire data showing the years that "Ercolano per la legalità" members joined the association

Reason for joining	Number of businesses
A member of family asked me to	0
A friend asked me to	0
A colleague in Ercolano asked me to	3
A colleague (in general) asked me to	0
An acquaintance asked me to	0
A member of the antiracket asked me to	0
No-one asked me to, I approached the antiracket myself	10
Other (generic)	5
Other (Approached by Carabinieri)	2
Left blank	1

Table 2

Elaboration of questionnaire data showing “Ercolano per la legalità” members’ reasons for joining

Businesses were asked what year they joined the antiracket – where seven of them said either 2009 or 2010, that is, the period following the discovery of the Ascione ledger. Of those seven, two stated that they had been encouraged to join by the Carabinieri, two approached the antiracket independently, and the final three were approached by other members of the antiracket. Of those who approached the antiracket themselves, four of them joined before the mass trials (in 2009), three of them joined after 2009, and three of them left the space blank. Of the two businesses who were approached by the Carabinieri one joined the antiracket in 2009, but did not want to/could not respond to the question as to whether they had paid the pizzo, and the other paid the pizzo until 2009.

One way that this trust in law enforcement was created and then fostered was to encourage the shopkeepers to contact them personally if there was ever a problem, or they felt threatened in any way. This came in the form of their work phone number, or even their personal phone number. This meant that if there was ever a problem, they could refer to “their” police officer, “their” contact in the police. As time has gone along, a number of these shopkeepers and Carabinieri have become friends: the Carabinieri pass by their shops every now and then whilst on and off duty, but also communicate with one another in their spare time on social media platforms such as Facebook, and occasionally even on the phone via WhatsApp. This could be about anti-racket matters, but, more often than not, about anything

else: football, the family, local news, the weather, and so on. In this context the public and private lives of these officers *vis-à-vis* shopkeepers and entrepreneurs have become blurred, leading to a move towards *particularized trust*,⁵⁸ rather than *generalized trust*⁵⁹, or *vertical trust*⁶⁰ among these individuals. A brief search on Facebook reveals the levels of this connectivity whereby individual Carabinieri officers are “friends” with and are “tagged” in pictures with a large swathe of local businesspeople from the anti-racket, civil society activists and politicians – all complete with smiling faces.⁶¹ In this we can see an increase of vertical trust (by shopkeepers for law enforcement) *through* particularized trust:

Officer 2: If you return to the time I was recounting earlier with the fact that in Ercolano there had never been trust in the law enforcement because the law enforcement didn’t understand how to gain trust from the citizens. What happened was that in 2004, two members of the Ascione clan went to extort Raffaella Ottaviano, a clothes seller, and for the first time ever, someone denounced an extortion.⁶² Raffaella Ottaviano went to address the lieutenant of the Carabinieri, Antonio di Florio, who used to command the Carabinieri in Ercolano. From then, the Lieutenant together with the local institution, above all with the mayor Nino Daniele, because he was the mayor at the time, asked Raffaella Ottaviano with support from FAI if she would like to be the president of the antiracket association. They wanted to create something unheard of – exploit this problem – this request for money. These two subjects who made this request were arrested and from here was born, with many problems because as I was saying, in 2004 the Camorra in Ercolano was strong – having these immediate arrests. So Ottaviano says “yes” to being available, and so began the association antiracket which at the start consisted of only two or three members who had not yet denounced. Unfortunately what happened for the next few years was that the antiracket association didn’t grow because the Camorra was still too strong.

⁵⁸ Defined here with reference to Carina Gunnarson’s work on Addiopizzo as “the trust we feel towards those known personally from daily interactions, often people we define as close friends, family, neighbours, and relatives” (Gunnarson, 2014, p.48).

⁵⁹ Defined as “the trust people have in others that they do not know” (Gunnarson, 2014, p.48).

⁶⁰ Defined as “trust towards the political system and its institutions”, which is commonly regarded as fairly low in Italy due to various political scandals on the national and local level. (Gunnarson, 2014, p.48).

⁶¹ Due to the commitment to anonymity in this project, this will not be demonstrated concretely on paper. It must be considered, instead, as personal “anecdotal” evidence.

⁶² It is important to remember the denunciations of Filippo discussed in the previous chapter, several years previous to Ottaviano’s denunciation.

Notwithstanding these foundations, this voluntary action by Raffaella Ottaviano at the Carabinieri station created the antiracket association. However for many years, it remained only a small entity because the Camorra was still strong. It didn't start with an event from the prosecutor Filippelli, nor from us Carabinieri in the area (both that of Torre del Greco and Ercolano) – it didn't start with something done differently.

What did it consist of? We asked all of the shopkeepers that we knew paid the pizzo – because this came out in investigations [referring to the Ascione ledger and testimonies from pentiti] – we addressed them alongside the anti-mafia that 99% of Ercolano was paying the pizzo and called them to join us in this police station. We would talk once, twice, three times, even ten times, that is until in 2009 when this wall of indifference, of which I have already spoken, began to crumble. Why? Because they understood that maybe the moment to trust the Carabinieri had come.

Officer 1: They understood that we are right and just people.

Officer 2: To understand them and get them to come out with us we had to get closer to them, and make them understand that we weren't joking. To give them options. (LE 18042015)

The view that trust in the Carabinieri increased over time is supported by the questionnaire data from shopkeepers. One question asked the shopkeepers to rate the law enforcement institutions in Ercolano in the year 2000 compared to the law enforcement in 2015 (rated 1-10 where 1 is worst, and 10 is the best). Even with our limited sample, we can say that shopkeepers assessed law enforcement in Ercolano to be better in 2015 than in 2000. Another question asked the shopkeepers to indicate the levels of trust that they have for different institutions (the Church, the press, the judiciary, the EU etc.); here the most trusted institutions were the "Carabinieri" and "anti-Camorra associations". Alongside the building of particularized trust between the Carabinieri and shopkeepers, the Carabinieri and other institutions wanted to make themselves seen in the area, and so they organised various marches through the city as a sign of solidarity, described by the then Mayor Nino Daniele thus:

The famous walk started with thirty Carabinieri in the streets and in the alleyways to show the clans that we are strong. The State is present – and here we are, basically. To give trust to the shopkeepers – and encourage them to denounce, it wasn't enough to say – "you need to trust us" – you need to demonstrate this with actions

with which we got a good response. It's a thing that they were encouraged to do, without fear – without feeling abandoned. (POL 18032014)

Combined with the personal connection between a number of the shopkeepers and their Carabinieri officer friends, this show of strength goes a way towards demonstrating that the law enforcement is present. This is a long way from the situation in 2001 after a number of shootings in the city when the previous Mayor, Luisa Bossa, alongside the Carabinieri declared that the State simply did not exist in Ercolano. By their own admission, before the implementation of the Modello Ercolano, the Carabinieri were lax when it came to businesspeople who reported harassment by cammoristi. A prominent example of this is the aforementioned entrepreneur Filippo who reported attempted extortion in the early 2000s, eventually going to trial, but dropped the case simply due to the lack of trust in the law enforcement to protect him and his family (Gerina and Vasile, 2015). Likewise, the scandal in Portici and Naples in the late 1990s regarding the successful bribery of State Police as well as leading drugs officials would ultimately be a part of this – undermining trust for law enforcement in general.

The Modello Ercolano is the building of trust and working relationships between three integral parts: Civil Society, the Carabinieri and the Judiciary which, when working in tandem, are able to prosecute people who have committed crimes in this area relating to Article 416-bis and other laws. The model as explained in this section is incredibly simple. The population needs to have sufficient trust in the Law Enforcement that the Law enforcement will not simply abandon them (like they seemingly did Filippo) when they report an interaction with a mafia-type association. (see Appendix VII.II) The population needs to believe that the Carabinieri are *actually doing their jobs* and not collecting bribes from those same mafia-type associations. In this way, criminal proceedings and investigations can begin. As investigations begin, the relationship between the Carabinieri and the Judiciary becomes important, one without rivalries and without competition between agencies. This is personified in this case through PM Filippelli and his “referent” in Officer 2, whose personal relationship and rapport become an important aspect in the progression of investigations. Civil Society and the population rotate their gear, which rotates the Carabinieri’s gear, which then rotates the Judiciary’s gear, hopefully leading to the development of trials and the eventual imprisonment of an accused individual. This then demonstrates that trust in the legal institutions and the law enforcement is to be merited, meaning that individuals are more likely to report a crime when one happens due to the belief that it will be pursued by law enforcement.

Despite this progress some issues still remain, particularly with regard to the perception of corruption in the political establishment and law enforcement. As acknowledged by the Carabinieri officers that were interviewed, the Carabinieri did not do enough to support businesspeople and denouncers of the Camorra in the period before 2006. Revelations by pentiti in 1996-1997 revealed the collaboration between officers in the State Police and affiliates of the Ascione (*Corriere della Sera*, 31 January 1997), which were seemingly dealt with by subsequent investigations. Issues of trust surrounding the political establishment are common in Italy due to a number of scandals, and Ercolano is no different. The dissolution of the communal administration in 1993, the suspected involvement of former Mayors and councillors in the provision of public work contracts for money in the 2010-2015 period and then the 2015 “Caso Ercolano” scandal ultimately affected the public trust. The same occurred with the outright negligence, or convenient forgetfulness of lawyers, in Strazzullo’s administration to push for damages from the clans in a 2011 maxi trial, much like Buonajuto’s administration forgetting to provide the correct paperwork to be presented in the trial for the murder of Salvatore Barbaro. Additionally, more recent revelations of collusion between individual Carabinieri officers and Camorra clans have further complicated matters, where pentiti spoke of occasions of officers kneeling and asking for forgiveness after arrests elsewhere (*Cronache della Campania*, 11 July 2016), ultimately undermining the whole process of (re)building trust. There is a danger that the Cultura della legalità and the Modello Ercolano are being focussed on the population in general as a means of altering behaviour, but without law enforcement and the political establishment being influenced in any meaningful way.

5: Conclusion

This chapter addressed the manner in which the State has responded and has been proactive against the organized crime phenomenon and criminality in general in Ercolano. Increasing surveillance of 416-bis criminals, and the increasing use of pentiti cooperating witnesses, led to greater understanding of particular clan structures, their association and their networks which we exemplified with an account of judicial repression in Ercolano between the early 1990s and 2016 for the Ascione and Birra clans. Though noting their undeniable extensiveness and importance, limits of judicial repression were identified, where we brought the study of organized crime back to sociology with particular regard to conflicting cultural spheres and how they interact in our chosen *habitus* in Ercolano. I analysed different developmental agendas that had influenced social activities in the city, particularly noting their focus on creating an economically sustainable community along broadly conceived neoliberal economic lines. Here I questioned the viability of such a

direction given the influence that Camorra social criminal spheres already has upon the community, and what the results of such developmental agendas could bring young Ercolanese.

Following this, I introduced the *cultura della legalità* and how the State has attempted to develop these broad socio-cultural norms in Ercolano. From marches, interviews, and accounts of local pedagogy, I analysed how a top-down approach to developing this *cultura* required the cooperation from certain Civil Society Organizations such as Radio Siani and local schools, particularly in involving young people in order to encourage a real generational change in cultures and norms towards lawfulness in general. Expanding this, I analysed the literal physical replacement of Camorra/criminal space with “legalità” space with regard to the re-use of confiscated criminal assets and the role of Radio Siani. I then introduced the role of the local comune and the Mayor Nino Daniele in asserting its control and power as part of this process, where citizens could be shown in a symbolic way that reactions against (micro)criminality were not just “talking the talk” but genuinely “walking the walk”.

Lastly we introduced the “Modello Ercolano”, the general response to the Camorra in Ercolano and the acceptance by local authorities that judicial repression alone is not enough to defeat the local clans. This section was the result of in-depth interviews I conducted with local Carabinieri officers, who outwardly spoke of the need of rebuilding the link between Civil Society (which we read as the Aristotelean *Societas Civilis*, rather than “Civil Society Organizations”) and law enforcement institutions with regard to trust. Based on the accounts from these officers here and shopkeepers that I was fortunate enough to interview, I noted that their relationship was something more than simple “institutional” “vertical” trust, but instead was “friendly” particularized trust, whereby the Carabinieri actively sought to go beyond their duties as officers to make themselves available to individuals when they were needed, and actively encouraging the active membership of the local antiracket association. This was particularly important during subsequent trials, when businesspeople were able to get past that indescribable psychological phenomenon that Tano Grasso referred to as “x”, helping them denounce their extorters.

I have focussed here on emphasising those “social” and “cultural” factors that allow for the continued existence and prevalence of organized crime groups in the *mezzogiorno*, unrepentantly remarking that these factors are as important to the reduction of this phenomenon as judicial repression. In this case study, the judiciary, the Carabinieri, local government officials, and members of anti-Camorra Civil Society organizations agree with this assertion, noting in no uncertain terms that where the State and the law enforcement have neglected the social power of the Camorra in the past – at times becoming involved in

corruption itself, the State needs to undertake policies and cooperate with Civil Society Organizations in order to “win back” the trust of the public.

The following chapter analyses this phenomenon further with regard to Civil Society Organizations, where we particularly note the specific developmental direction that the State has taken in this regard: supporting certain organizations over others despite a broad “anti-mafia” appeal.

v. Civil Society's response to the Camorra

Introduction

In the same manner that actions against organized crime by the State have been realised through development, judicial repression and culture, actions by Civil Society Organizations that are not necessarily acting in accordance with State action also influences the *habitus* that mafia, criminal and a criminal “culture” spheres have occupied. This chapter is devoted to those organisations that have engaged with the issue of criminality in Ercolano, contributing their own cultural sphere that competes for hegemony over the *habitus*, often in contrast with other cultural poles or focal points from other sides of Civil Society. In particular I emphasise the complexity of the modern anti-mafia movement with varying support from the State, wider society and one another. I note the prominent points of difference between elements of it where the present strategy, specific modes of socialisation and future trajectory of the anti-mafia movement are in dispute. There is not one anti-mafia movement, but several – all of which are competing for the dominance of the strategy and socialisation that they see as the most effective.

First I introduce the role of Civil Society Organizations in Italy against organized crime with particular focus on the association “Libera” and the use of culture to fight organized crime in Italy in general. This informs the rest of the chapter, in which I focus in greater detail on four different sections of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano, namely ‘Ercolano per la legalità’, ‘Radio Siani’, the ‘forum dei giovani’ and the associated actors of the ‘Parrocchia Santa Maria del Pilar’ church parish.

1: Civil Society and Organized Crime in Italy

The Italian NGO ‘Libera’ is a poignant example of a rival sphere whose development was a purposeful attempt to conquer the ruling *habitus*. Libera was founded in 1995 by a Turin-based priest, Don Luigi Ciotti, and was the product of personalities from the broad anti-mafia movement itself who had become frustrated with the one-pronged response to organized crime from the Italian State (Dalla Chiesa, 2014). Shortly after its foundation as an association, Libera started a petition concerning the management and destination of seized and confiscated assets from mafia-type associations, requesting that they be put towards a social use (FLARE, n.d, p.39). This petition acquired over a million signatures, and led to the adoption of the law “legge n.109/96” (Libera, 1996) which facilitates the transfer of the ownership of confiscated goods from organized crime that would normally go to the State, to the local administration of the area in which they were confiscated, where they are to be used for “the purpose of justice, public order and civil protection”. The local comune may administer these properties directly, or it may hand over administration to an already defined

“voluntary organisation”,⁶³ “social cooperative”,⁶⁴ or a centre that deals with the “cure and rehabilitation” of drug addicts,⁶⁵ The only limits to the transfer of trusteeship of these confiscated goods/properties are that they should not be used for the management of other confiscated property; must not be used to hire any of the relatives/partners/cohabitants of the recipient of the seizure and; must not be sold for a price less than that determined by the competent Ministero delle finanze office in the territory have requested it if there is greater utility in the public interest for its use instead. Specific assets in Ercolano were mentioned in the previous chapter.

Physical and monetary assets (including sold assets) are to be used to fund: the renovation of deprived urban areas; prevention and recovery of areas affected by hardship and marginalization; action in schools regarding educative courses on legality; and promotion of an entrepreneurial culture and entrepreneurial activities for unemployed young people. It must be emphasised that despite the actions of the recipient NGOs and associations, the targeted approval and decision as to whom receives individual properties and assets lies with the State and its relevant institutions, and therefore *should* be considered part of the State’s efforts against organized crime and underdevelopment, albeit through an approved third-party. As an umbrella organisation, Libera members set up smaller associations throughout Italy so as to be able to receive some of these assets, and conduct other activities in order to use former mafia property and assets against organized crime itself. This means that the literal physical structures that previously helped foster criminal social and cultural capital are being used to develop the social and cultural capital against it. Here the facilitation and development of a certain type of culture alter the nature of social relations in an area, and therefore challenge the norms that characterise it. In his analysis of ‘Libera Sport’, one of the five sectors of the Libera, Cayli addressed precisely this, noting that

Libera Sport endeavours to renew the society through crafting new social, political and cultural identities. In doing so, the social bond between the individual and society is established to ward off the [m]afiosi. (2013b, p.437)

In this sense, sport and participation in sports in general as a means of tackling (organized) crime can be understood in terms of socialisation, where “competitive team and popular sports help increasing a positive socialisation, discarding former undesired behavior [sic] patterns and reflexes, developing the attitude of respect for the rival, defying egoism and gaining the values that outweigh losing a game with dignity rather than winning it without

⁶³ Referred to in law “legge 11 agosto 1991 n.266”.

⁶⁴ Referred to in law “legge 8 novembre 1991 n.381”.

⁶⁵ Referred to in Presidential decree “decreto del Presidente della Repubblica 9 ottobre 1990 n.309”.

dignity” (2013b, p.448). It must be noted that there was a greater emphasis on “team” sports such as football or basketball, rather than “individual” sports such as surfing, shooting and golf – that is unless individual sport increases “collectivity and a sense of social integrity of [helps] their community and to develop positive socialization” (2013b, p.448) *through* sport but also *through* Libera as an organisation itself.

In this context, it is important to recall Gramsci’s Cultural Hegemony in the sense that we observe a process whereby a culture emanating from above permeates downwards for the purpose of smoothing governance. The (sub)culture which suffers most is that which enables the continuation of criminal governance: that which we have already termed the “criminal” or “mafia” cultural sphere. In this manner, State-sponsored or approved Civil Society Organizations are able to roll back the influence of organized crime by directing and guiding the nature of social interactions between individuals, favouring positive socialisation, and altering the appeal of OCGs and the criminal cultural sphere. It is precisely here where a “new” sphere centred round Libera is created through its redefining and altering of the already existing *habitus* – changing and altering behavioural norms for sections of the population.

The work of Addiopizzo in Sicily also represents a challenge to mafia territorial power through the shaping and moulding of cultural habits and practices (Gunnarson, 2014, p.42) whereby it focusses on changing the shopkeepers’ norms *vis-à-vis* the Cosa Nostra and the pizzo. Where it differs from the activities of Libera, however, is that it focusses purely on the businesspeople where pizzo paying has become the norm and local consumers, rather than socialisation. The organisation was started by seven university post-graduates who wanted to open a pub in Palermo, where one of their friends advised that they consider the cost of the protection money to the local mafia in their cost calculations for the business. They began considering the reality of racketeering in their area, and what they would do if they were approached for “protection”. As they were already politically active individuals, they decided to publicise some kind of public message against the Mafia and against the norm of paying pizzo, culminating in the plastering of the centre of Palermo with stickers reading “A whole population that pays the pizzo is a population without dignity” (Gunnarson, 2014, p.41-3). This is particularly innovative, given that it uses symbols of “honour”, a trademark and image of the mafia (Gambetta, 1993, pp.127-158; Trevaglino et al., 2016), against the mafia itself. The organisation that these individuals founded was meant to be some kind of mobilisation point to enable businesses to speak out outwardly against the Mafia by placing Addiopizzo stickers in their shop windows, and allowing Addiopizzo to advertise their membership in public forums. In return, Addiopizzo would conduct campaigns in order to appeal to ethical consumers – encouraging consumers to buy from the clear non-pizzo

payers, therefore making it economically viable to join the organisation, as well as attempting to break the taboo around talking about the pizzo. They wrote:

Have we ever thought that while doing our daily shopping we give money also to the [M]afia? Of course not, yet it is so. If the bakeries, the clothes shops, tobacconists, bars, butchers, office supply stores, fishmongers, libraries, ice-cream parlours, cinemas, florists, toy shops, funeral directors and so on and so forth are forced to pay protection money, they do so with the money that we spend at all of these businesses. (Partridge, 2012, p.347)

This is an attempt at transforming the relationship that individuals have with businesses, as well as the relationship that businesses have with organized crime. In addition to the purely social awareness aspect of the organisation, Addiopizzo set up its own legal office, and now collaborates with many law enforcement, educational and business institutions (Gunnarson, 2014, pp.43-4; Partridge, 2012), streamlining the process by which businesses may oppose the pizzo, and bringing them into contact with the institutional fight against organized crime. The use of Civil Society Organizations as a means of undermining organized crime goes much further than influencing public attitudes to certain issues and raising awareness as some have claimed (Ralchev, 2004). Instead, if properly directed, Civil Society Organizations can go some way to changing the manner in which individuals interact with the society of which they are a part. Similarly to Libera, this involves a reshaping of culture emanating from Civil Society but ultimately guided and assisted by the State, albeit in a more focussed and specific manner.

A blunter instrument and another “cultural pole”, to borrow Cayli’s (2013b, p.438) terminology that converges on the *habitus* is that of Roy Godson’s so-called “Culture of Lawfulness” (2000), enabling law enforcement and regulatory systems to function more effectively. In facilitating the development of a “sympathetic culture” to law enforcement, a culture of lawfulness is one where the average person “believes that legal norms either are a fundamental part of justice or provide the gateway to attain justice and that such a system enhances the quality of life of individuals and society as a whole” (2000, p.93) Here we see the concept of *Societas civilis* in action, which, combined with regulatory practices as described by Godson,⁶⁶ becomes a tool for the State to foster a certain cultural pole of “lawfulness” for the easier enacting of State law and order policies for the benefit of the society as a whole. It is here where the conditioning of structures in society by mafia-type associations is undermined. (Orlando, 2000, p.8)

⁶⁶ Which Godson notes as: Civic and School-based education, centers [sic] of moral authority, and media and popular culture

This way of thinking should be viewed with suspicion. On the one hand, the State can justifiably be accused of fostering consent through the purposeful development of a favourable *dispositif* (Foucault, 2008; Agamben, 2008), such as Hegemony, *Habitus* or ideology so as to condition the population to be more governable. That is to say, the social structures that supported mafia-type associations are replaced by ones that foster the *powers that be* instead. On the other, the facilitation of these types of socialisation can be viewed as a good *ipso facto* – creating a fairer society through the selective conditioning of the population at the expense of undermining already existing, and similarly functioning organized crime structures. The former Mayor of Palermo, Leoluca Orlando, followed the latter perspective in describing the anti-mafia process as

a cart with two wheels: one the wheel of social, cultural and political reform, the other the wheel of police and judicial repression. Only if both move in unison does the cart go forward; if one wheel moves while the other stands still, the cart spins in a circle without advancing. (Schneider and Schneider, 2003, p.160)

Broadly speaking this much is obvious, particularly when we use a sociological lens to analyse the phenomena of mafia-type associations in general. There is an understanding that the repressive “wheel” needs to function properly so as to discipline those who have transgressed societal norms, and the other “wheel” that alters the socio-cultural context in which crimes come to be committed in the first place. What is missing, however, is a broadly agreed definition as to what “social, cultural and political reform” looks like. If reform amounts to altering the manner in which individuals perceive Law Enforcement agencies, the judiciary and the State in general, without addressing any perceived deeper structural causes of crime, then it is worth asking who is to benefit from the Culture of Legality, and how effective it alone can be. Again, this is not to say that the establishment of such a culture is a bad thing, but it is only to question its adoption in the broader framework of the (neo)liberal economy that does not attempt to address any other underlying causes of (organized) crime, except for where it is productive in terms of social or economic capital. It is difficult to not play devils advocate, in that the Culture of Legality does not seem to imagine there to be very real grievances as to why individuals may not trust Law Enforcement agencies or the political system in general to represent their interests within the *status quo*. Like the quotations about legalità by schoolchildren in the previous chapter, there is a risk of popularising a culture that is less critical of those in power, ignoring instances of corruption and inequality that often characterise areas where mafia-type associations are prevalent.

These discussions will now be contextualised as we turn our attention to the experience of Civil Society and culture against mafia-type associations in Ercolano.

2:1: Ercolano per la legalità

As noted previously, the antiracket was an idea proposed by Tano Grasso, the honorary president of FAI, who heard about Raffaella Ottaviano and her spontaneous denouncement of her extorters, and her decision to represent herself in court alone (Daniele, 2012; Di Florio, 2012). He proposed to the Mayor Nino Daniele, Lieutenant Antonio Di Florio of the Carabinieri and Ottaviano to form an antiracket association that would give local businesses an association to voice their concerns about the Camorra, and encourage communication between them and the Carabinieri. The underlying idea was that arrests alone were not and are not enough to defeat the Camorra in this context, given the influence that the Camorras have over the area. The issue was not that the Carabinieri were lacking in strength, rather it was that the Carabinieri and politicians in the area were not sufficiently trusted in reacting to businesspeople's concerns (See Appendix VII.II). This was the barrier that needed to be broken by encouraging businesspeople not only to join the antiracket association, but also to denounce their extorters to the Carabinieri when approached for pizzo. We have already dedicated an entire chapter to the manner in which pizzo was collected in Ercolano, and have already detailed the manner in which the antiracket came to be founded. What is missing, however, is what the antiracket does, how it has expanded its membership, and an understanding its underlying purpose and direction.

Up until the multiple breakthroughs in the second half of 2009, the continued existence of the antiracket was measured by the enthusiasm of its individual members, among whom Ottaviano stands out, as explained by a shopkeeper and member of the antiracket:

Before Raffaelina, other people had denounced the pizzo [referring to Filippo], but in the end it was her who created the association; it was her idea, her tenacity, her anger, for this association in Ercolano. If it were not for the grit that she has had, the association would not be what it is now. There would be the pain as the people from the clan destroy the association. In Naples we have a saying: "il paese è del paesano" [the country is that of the countryman] in the sense that there are people who inhabit there, live here and know everyone. This is the strong point of the antiracket, because the shopkeepers know everyone, those who were the first shopkeepers knew everyone. This was the strong starting point of the antiracket. (N7 18042015)

As we know, it was actually Grasso's idea to create the antiracket association; however, the point still holds. Ottaviano helped mould the antiracket as it is today through her own contacts – and encouraged other businesses in the city to join. Being the owner of three businesses on the same street was a good starting point with regard to her presence in the

local business community but another one was that her continued enthusiasm for the antiracket as it grew and grew. In Conticello's words, Ottaviano's denunciation and then decision to stand in court alone against her extorters changed the DNA of the city (2015, p.152). One initial reason for this is deeply personal and involves agency. From conversations with Ottaviano, I can attest that she is incredibly stubborn. The businessperson spoke of this tenacity - with a very strict sense of what is right and what is wrong – so much so that there was no chance that she would have (1) let the Camorra extort any money out of her, or her three clothing stores and (2) let them get away for trying to do so. Her long-standing position in the business community as not only a businesswoman with three shops on the main commercial area, but also as having family and friends who are businesspeople in the immediate vicinity meant that she had some early supporters for the antiracket association, and an opportunity to meet more businesspeople (See Appendix V, 10 February 2015). Between 2006 and 2009 there were slowly more and more people who came to the semi-regular antiracket meetings. The meetings were a mixture of formal and informal – where formal discussions by businesspeople alongside Lieutenant Di Florio and Nino Daniele became more informal after the meeting had finished, and with the result that a number of them became friends. A decision in 2008 to further advertise the activities of the antiracket and the stories of those businesspeople who had denounced encouraged further members to join. Indeed in May 2008 a businessperson decided to denounce the Ascione after seeing an interview with Ottaviano on RAI (the Italian State news channel), saying that seeing the interview had given him the courage to denounce, leading to the arrest of a camorrista, Domenico Pugliese, for attempted extortion (Di Florio, 2012, p.119).

Based on the data collected in interviews with the shopkeepers, the reasons that they gave for joining the antiracket were varied. The answers to the question “what was your reason for joining the antiracket” are shown here by different shopkeepers:

It wasn't really a decision. It was something completely natural even though I have never received any type of extortive request. I joined to show solidarity with the shopkeepers. (N1 11042015)

Because this was a comune where almost all the shopkeepers paid the racket. And all of us got rid of it, now all of us are together against this abuse. (N3 15042015)

“Defend what is yours” if we can put it like that. I defended myself, my business, my family, myself as a person and my dignity. (N5 17042015)

I joined because Raffaella Ottaviano is one of my customers. She said that she was the President and that we should join the association. She is always the uniting factor of the association. (N7 18042015)

The declaration that they wanted to show solidarity is a particularly important, whereby the shopkeepers seemed to have identified that the greater number of antiracket members, the safer that they and their community would be from Camorra reprisals, and that therefore there is “safety in numbers”. As we can see, some of these answers are rather vague. There are reasons linked to pride and what is “right” and other more immediate reasons such as being encouraged by the police, and even Ottaviano herself. Whilst it has been noted in other interviews with businesspeople and the Carabinieri that a number of the current members of the antiracket joined the association after being visited by officers of the Carabinieri after the discovery of the Ascione ledger, a significant number declared that they joined of their own accord or because a colleague asked them to do so.

The actual activities of the antiracket vary between social activities organised by the constituent businesses and the campaigns and the work of putting prospective new members into contact with other members and the Carabinieri, organised by the directorate. In many ways, the antiracket functions merely as a meeting place for concerned individuals to speak freely with individuals who may be or may have been in a similar situation, where they are explained the process of denouncing their extorters by individuals who have experienced it previously. In working within FAI guidelines, the directorate organises campaigns to recruit new members and compiles a list of its members to be submitted to the FAI regional office for the purpose of encouraging ethical consumerism. They also produce unique Ercolano “io non pago” (I do not pay) stickers for display on shop windows or on shop doors. The stickers are distributed in antiracket marches through the city by other antiracket members, politicians, judges and officers of the Carabinieri that take place on a designated day every year in December. The appeal to ethical consumerism is reminiscent of, and arguably influenced by, the activities of Addiopizzo in Sicily, where the idea that buying goods from pizzo-paying businesses is indirectly funding organized crime is placed into the mind of the consumer (Patridge, 2012, p.347), thereby affecting their decision making. The placement of the “io non pago” stickers, also used by Addiopizzo, serve not only to say to the consumer “this business does not pay the pizzo”, but also to imply that businesses that do not have the stickers *must* pay the pizzo, which is not necessarily the case. A notable reaction to these stickers from the Camorra has been to avoid approaching them, as Ascione pentito Fausto Scudo mused with regard to a business that placed a sticker on their window

[the business] does not pay because the businessperson, in clearly posting an antiracket symbol outside their commercial property, has clearly declared their intention to denounce pizzo requests. It is this statement of intent that us from the clan Ascione have taken under consideration, and with this symbol [in the window] we skip the business entirely. (Conticello, 2015, p.152)

In effect, trying to collect pizzo from an antiracket member was deemed too much trouble given the more likely propensity to denounce.



Figures 1 and 2

Two examples of anti-racket stickers found in shop windows in Ercolano

“I don’t pay the pizzo, and I denounce whoever asks for it” with the phone number of the anti-racket listed below

The role of the antiracket association itself was to convince businesses who, as Tano Grasso observed in his own experiences of businesses in the formation of an antiracket association in Capo d’Orlando, kept themselves to themselves and paid pizzo in silence. They aim to break the barrier of isolation: the disposition and culture of *mafiosità* (mafia-ness) has been pushed on businesses, making them feel alone against their extorters, and has been realised for them as indifference and individualism, which hinder opposition to mafia (Grasso, 1992, p.19). More specifically, this culture of *mafiosità* can be broadly defined as somewhere between a type of Cutolian nihilistic individualism, and a conservative traditionalist preservation of the *status quo*. It is one that pushes the acceptance of isolation and powerlessness in the face of the Camorra sovereign as the normal state of things, as well as a view that one should be thankful that the pizzo payment is not higher. These shopkeepers become those Foucauldian *corps dociles* (Foucault, 1975; 2008) and

Agambian-*cum*-Joycean Leopold Blooms (Agamben, 2009, p.22-3; Tiqqun, 2000) that the Camorra has purposely fostered so as to be able to govern their territory and their activities more effectively. This acceptance and docility are precisely what La Boétie called *servitude volontaire* (La Boétie, 1553). The question as to why more businesses did not revolt against their extorters before 2004 can be answered by the process of socialisation, conditioning and ideological hegemony that their extorters and their clans facilitated directly through interaction. Like William Reich's conundrum as to why so few people who are starving actually steal, we should not ask what brought individuals such as Filippo or Raffaella to denounce. We we should ask instead why so many shopkeepers did not denounce at all until encouraged to do so (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p.38).

Alongside the threat of violence, this is further solidified indirectly through affective-aesthetic effects (Pine, 2012, p.14) in the community in general where the perception of the natural order of things is further materialized in Ercolano through anti-police graffiti on walls, abandoned buildings, shouting in the streets, scooters in alleyways, red and white stars adorning buildings, fireworks at certain points in the day as a message to drug peddlers that new products have arrived or that a camorrista has been released from prison, stories of violence and criminality in the local news. All of this serves to reaffirm the already held view of the inherent powerlessness of the businessperson and the futility of resistance, whilst also denoting the betterment of a businessperson's situation as possible only through cooperation with the clan. This is further facilitated through the belief that the existence of organized crime and political corruption *in general* is the normal state of affairs in the world, and exists throughout the world as much as it does in the *mezzogiorno*. Indeed during my time in Naples, I was asked on various occasions what the mafias in the UK were like, at which my denial of their existence was met with derision (see for example Appendix V, 10 January 2015).

It is precisely this feeling of isolation for businesses that needed to be addressed by the antiracket: this disposition of isolation amongst a vast number of businesses in a community must be re-examined and imagined instead as something that can be overcome. The amount of fear that mafia/Camorra extorters evoke for each individual business must be reimagined in order for it to be shared amongst the business community as a whole, thereby making resistance easier. What the antiracket association sought to do was simultaneously to demonstrate that shopkeepers are not alone in their isolation and that they are genuinely in a position to oppose and then undermine this criminal phenomenon, but also that an individualistic mentality in the face of this type of systematic oppression will only serve to continue it.

However, one must still overcome the Prisoner's Dilemma. It is accepted that, in order to uproot this phenomenon, shopkeepers need to denounce their extorters with the support from others (be that other shopkeepers, the antiracket association, or the Carabinieri). The issue, however, is moving beyond the conviction that paying a small tithe to the Camorra in isolation is a small price to pay for the risk of denouncing and not being supported. A shopkeeper needs to be convinced that they will be supported otherwise this small tithe truly is a very small price to pay for avoiding violence or emotional distress. The process of moving from this extorter-influenced attitude and logic that separates and isolates individual businesses, making it easy for them to pay in silence, towards an understanding that a business is able to say no and denounce this *metus causa factum* payment, is understandably difficult, but is nonetheless the key to the uprooting of the Camorra in this context. There is an element of embarrassment, if not shame, to have paid and have been subjected to threats of violence (subtle, insinuated or otherwise), which can be mitigated through a kind of group therapy between current and former payers. This is precisely why regular meetings have been important for the businesses in the antiracket association, because the meetings facilitate those trust bonds between individuals and demonstrate to those isolated businesses that they are not alone, and that they be able to denounce their extorters with the support of friends and colleagues and the assistance of the authorities. They are supported by the Carabinieri and the rest of the antiracket association in the process of denouncing when they step into the courtroom – removing the “x” environmental value that can weigh down on a businessperson in court (Grasso, 2014, p.10), and after the trial.

The antiracket serves to redefine the link between individual businesses and the rest of the business community and between the business community and the Carabinieri, therefore restoring faith in the judicial system in general. As an organisation, it emphasises that the influence that the Camorra has over a business is largely due to a business's reluctance to trust the law enforcement in supporting them because of the ingrained isolationism that has been pushed by their extorters. Therefore, from the perspective of the Carabinieri it has been important to demonstrate that they are genuinely serious about wanting to support the businesses, which is the cornerstone of the Modello Ercolano itself.

2:2: Radio Siani

As mentioned in the previous chapter, Radio Siani began as the social cooperative “Arci Zona Rossa” in 2009. It had registered as an official association a month or so previously, but had existed for a while as a young group of friends who met occasionally, talking about

the problems that faced their community and what they could do about it. What they lacked was a physical space to do this that they could call their own, instead of meeting in bars, cafes or piazzas. Upon hearing that a property had been confiscated from the Birra clan, and knowing that this would be given to a local registered association for the purpose of providing a social/cultural good for the community, they decided to register themselves as an association officially, so as to be able to apply to become the benefactors of this property. The then Mayor, Nino Daniele, originally wanted this property to become the site of the anti-racket association, but due to its relatively small size, this was rejected by the association. Here is a description of Radio Siani's first steps:

After the first few months of logistical difficulty to start things due to structural problems in one of the rooms, the apartment started to be frequented by the young people of Ercolano in November 2009. On 21st November there was the first big step. In a few days they organized an anti-Camorra march for that evening starting from [the Radio at] Corso Resina 62. You could see was not only the faces of the young people from the new radio, but also adults, seniors, schoolchildren, institutional figures who came together to parade through the main streets of the city. The same streets that were the main links for men of the clans. (Radio Siani, 2013)



Figure 3

AntiCamorra march, November 2009

(*Corriere del Mezzogiorno*, 23 November 2009)



Figure 4

Radio Siani poster November 2009

www.radiosiani.com

The timing of this march was crucial. In the month before the march on the 21st November there had been the bomb detonated at the bakery, a Carabinieri march through the city as a show of force, and the murder of a young local Neomelodico singer, Salvatore Barbaro, in a case of mistaken identity by the Ascione. All these events on the back of years of Camorra violence formed the backbone of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano. Figure 3 shows a the sign reading “Ideas do not stop with fear”, being held up by a number of individuals who are now active in various other Civil Society Organizations throughout Ercolano such as the Forum dei Giovani, and in local media. The point was that, while there was a general social “anti-Camorra” movement and mood that formed around this march organised by Radio Siani, the different organisations and associations now approach the issue in different ways. The sign is now displayed in Radio Siani’s headquarters and is occasionally brought to other marches they take part in.

Radio Siani, in particular, is a difficult group to place and categorise for the simple reason that it grew organically and separate from the State, to have a close interaction with the local administration only later through its symbolism as a movement against organized crime, as

clarified by its president, Giuseppe Scognamiglio during another interview at the radio station:

I believe it was 2009 which was a very important year, because it was in this year that the antiracket association was born, that Radio Siani was born, and so they met the shopkeepers and organized a walk with the association and, above all, the law enforcement that we have to thank in this story. But they were all together – the Carabinieri who met with the activists who were working in this apartment and making Radio Siani. And so it was this union of force together, and with a hand from the administration and its Mayor, Nino Daniele, who like us had put himself on the line, with contributions as the Mayor. We weren't paying any taxes like rubbish collection for two years – much like the businesses who denounced the racket. This union together had created an important turn in terms of the investigations, the arrests, the dismantling of the clans in their territory which has had a very long history in Ercolano. (CS2 18032014)

It is not that they are “part” of the State, rather it is that the State recognised that this was a Civil Society Organizations that could be a conduit for its own social policies. This could then be supported with partial funding, thereby giving institutional backing to programmes. It is noteworthy here that, given the different manner in which different Civil Society Organizations are supported by the State, we can identify *teloses* and methodologies that develop simultaneously in the same space. In this context we can see Radio Siani conducting policies in the area with State support in a kind of Post-Marxist discourse which places an emphasis on the freedom of information and the necessity of democratization and cooperation across society *within* a neoliberal model and approach to Civil Society in order to hold politics to account. Hammering the point in an article that celebrated the success of the anti-mafia in Ercolano, Giuseppe Scognamiglio wrote:

Civil society: the honest and decent. We continue to be bullied, with oppression and violence without liberating ourselves. This is no longer possible.

The Modello Ercolano is precisely the product of this organisation made by Civil Society, young people, shopkeepers, entrepreneurs and people from the institutions. Here in Ercolano the honest and good parts of the city have been able to organise themselves, to share a common objective, deciding which sides to take, against injustices, the mafias and illegality for a better community, for a different future.

We don't have any other secrets; it's just that we trust one another, walking together on a common path. Unsurprisingly, marches signify much more than a symbolic action.

Something important must be added however. This has all been made possible thanks to PM Pierpaolo Filippelli and his men, his staff, his Carabinieri, those at the Torre del Greco caserma, and their representatives in Ercolano, and the other law enforcement agencies that have been collaborating with one another. They have been able to wipe out the common mentality in the area that perceived the Carabinieri as the bad guys and the Camorra as the good guys who they can rely on where necessary. Unfortunately in Ercolano, the roles of the State and the anti-State had been inverted for decades, thanks also to a conniving politics, all too often complicit [with the Camorra], like its own family-based Civil Society that has been known to have been wedged between the Hammer and the Sickle, between the altar and the dining room, between pleasures and investment, between offences, abuse and a couple of holidays in Mondello [a famous beach in Sicily], giving life to the [in]famous "*zona grigia*", that continues to do so much harm to Italy and in many cases reigns supreme in the "new" socio-economic system.

Fortunately for the tourist town without tourists, for Vesuvius without footpaths, and for the sea without areas to bathe, all of these true men, with humility and determination have been able to restore everything to normal, producing mind-boggling numbers, decapitating the clans, decimating [criminal] families, eliminating the criminal organizations, with hundreds and hundreds of arrests, convictions and harsh penalties for all, without exception, from the least to the most important in their hierarchy. (Radio Siani, 2015)

There are some problems here particularly regarding hyperbole. The "good" Carabinieri/Civil Society and "bad" Camorra, the "us vs. them" discourse is hinted at here, and should be rejected as oversimplified and reductive. Similarly the rhetorical combination of masculinity and the anti-Camorra movement should be rejected, exemplified here with the allusion to the "true men" that fight against the clans. This said, however, this rhetorical posturing does betray a subtle redefinition of local culture, world view and norms, whereby the traditional masculine image of the honourable mafioso is inverted, making it honourable instead to be *against* this criminal cultural sphere – itself part of the cultural hegemonic contest for the *habitus*. Despite my respectful philosophical apprehension to this particular type of rhetorical flourish, this redirection of deep rooted cultural norms is undoubtedly ingenious. A word, a phrase or an idea such as "honour", that had previously been associated with criminal/mafia

culture and the protection of “their” culture and close-knit way of life away from the perceivably corrupt and oppressive State that interferes in local affairs, is purposely inverted, using that same drive and cultural norm to want to be “honourable” and redirecting honour to the fight against the corrupt and oppressive camorristi that interfere in local affairs. This is an example of the political character of Radio Siani, without overtly involving politics.

Criminal influence on the local mentality, that we refer to as indicative of a criminal/Camorra cultural hegemony, has been identified as an obstacle to defeating organized crime in the area. As well as regular citizens, years of corruption and collusion between local politics and Camorra clans led to years of relatively uninterrupted Camorra activity that created a society which, according to Scognamiglio, was more disposed to turning to the *zona grigia* and criminality than the State and legal means. This can be changed through cooperation and the dissemination/freedom of information through a legality discourse, where Radio Siani can be a major player:

We sought to create an anti-mafia radio which communicated all these things through different forms of art. So the world is outside this venture: we want to provide the truth and aesthetic information, that is, without manipulation in order to give the people the possibility to decide for themselves. Without taking them away from this. Above all, the rooms in this radio are an open canvas, and give people the opportunity to speak through the microphone to show people different realities. Like other associations, how different people do different things with other “beni confiscati”. We want them to tell the story and communicate their initiatives and seminars on legality, the anti-Camorra, anti-mafia. But at the same time we try to maintain the characteristic of a radio-comune.⁶⁷ There is always space, but at the same time it is important to have a mixture of other lighter topics – ironic, funny, good music alongside those more serious topics. We include other things such as book presentations, small conferences, meetings with students at school, people in the street. (CS2 18032014)

Taken literally, it is questionable whether their openness extends so far as to allow Camorra supporters to have a slot on the radio to speak, but this notwithstanding, it is clear that they want to host as many different viewpoints as possible: how best to approach problems in society, with a broad focus on the Camorra and criminality in general. This is particularly visible with claims from their members that they are an apolitical association, though these

⁶⁷ This is broadly understood as an approach with origins in anarchist/anti-Statist movements, when activists tended occupy buildings and then use pirate radio stations to broadcast their message. The difference here, of course, is that this is not based in an occupied building and the activists do not live on site. See Behan (2007).

are countered by claims to the contrary by other individuals I met and interviewed in the city, who noted the politicised and activist character to the organisation (N6 17042015). I also strongly reject the notion of apoliticality itself, particularly with regard to such political issues. One can attempt to be as unbiased as possible, but the notion of being apolitical in such a context is ludicrous. This is a common element throughout the non-State anti-mafia activist movement in the *mezzogiorno* region personified through various Leftist *martyrs* such as Giuseppe Impastato (whose Radio AUT they have emulated).⁶⁸ Radio Siani is a very typical “anti-mafia” Civil Society Organization in this sense; most Italian anti-mafia Civil Society Organizations claim to be apolitical, are run through voluntary participation, and have no age requirements whilst primarily focusing on young members (Cayli, 2013, p.84). Grass-roots and bottom-up activism are identified as the manner in which the cultural and social problems in society can best be targeted. Scognamiglio spoke of the importance of a kind of “cultural” war against the Camorra and criminality:

The final message is absolutely this: in the sense that we met inside this apartment really is to give out this message. At the end of the day, this radio in this place is to give a message to the people that haven't yet overcome the fear of the Camorra that unfortunately for a long time has been present in our territory and in our heads that is today difficult to unhinge and change. But to enter into this place, where before it was impossible. Because below this apartment, where you would stop to enter the building, there was the chariot of the Madonna where there was a religious ceremony where, if you wanted to pass, you had to enter with your head bowed. It was a place of power, where one could not confront, where you couldn't be against the boss in this place. To enter into this apartment is to give a message that we “look, we are all together”. On a walk together: this is a common struggle. We can do it through a strength in numbers –we are a city of 60,000 inhabitants – how many Camorra could there be? 600? 700? 1000? But there are always 56,000/ 57,000 good and honest people in this city. It is a message that we all together. We are people of the same mentality, to free ourselves from this evil. We can do it. We can do it through a cultural route, a cultural message created from our consciousness. Critique the phenomenon. Here, we work a lot with schools and through this you help the antiracket associations because the antiracket association became the voice of denunciation. The shopkeepers denounced together with the association antiracket

⁶⁸ In 2007 a webradio was founded in San Giovanni a Teduccio (between Ercolano and Naples) named after one of Giuseppe Impastato's Radio AUT most prominent anti-mafia segments, “Radio Onda Pazzo”, the radio broadcasts political segments, with an aim of highlighting local and national political issues to young people. Because of the close vicinity of this webradio and Arci Zona Rossa, “Radio Siani” was the name chosen instead of Radio Onda Pazzo. We can say that Radio Siani more closely represents the discourse of Impastato rather than Siani.

and therefore they are now all together, there is no longer need for any shopkeeper to be ordered about, and threatened. (CS2 18032014)

Subtle examples of this are shown simply through their expanded membership and reliance on volunteers in the local community who are willing to dedicate a bit of their own time to the organisation – then coming into contact with other like-minded young people who help (re)define their own perceptions of cultural capital around them. Where the radio is a product of voluntary associationalism, its members have been recruited through already existing friendship ties, as exemplified not only by its foundational origins as a product of four friends, but also the manner in which it expanded. Here is how one of its members and broadcasters explains it:

Radio Siani gave me this opportunity, like they gave the opportunity to young people before me. Having a good time, meeting new people – and through them I was able to meet new artists and other heads of social movements. Radio Siani has been a world where I have been able to better myself for the last two years. The last year has been fundamental because it has helped me understand whether my future is to be here with the Radio, or elsewhere. I found myself [in Ercolano] to be a big fish in a small pond, and also more open. And this is the same thing for Radio Siani.

[...]

I was invited to join the Radio, though I should give you some background before saying any more. It all began with an acquaintance with one of the guys from the Radio in 2013, who after a few months invited me to come to the radio, and invited me to be a part of it, where he and I began broadcasting in October 2013 (because they start broadcasting every year in October). My friend began to host me there monthly, as a cover for another political pundit. All of this was as an amateur, because no one at the radio is a professional, it's just when anyone is available I mean. Thanks to one of the organisers, after a couple of months I had a fixed slot. (CS 19062015)

Pre-existing friendship ties separate to the radio have been utilised to recruit members, who then come into contact with the Radio Siani social network which includes friends and acquaintances made through the activities that they conduct. Here is a brief example as to how widespread this network is: through my own private English teaching that I was doing during my fieldwork, I came into contact with the “British Community Naples”, an association that held weekly social events in pubs and film showings in hand with the British Council in Naples to get locals speaking English with native speakers. The Neapolitan organisers of the

British Community not only knew members of Radio Siani through shared journalistic circles, but had actually been invited to Ercolano to visit the radio a year previously. Both Radio Siani and the British Community have members and organisers who are active in more than one organisation, who are then able to meet one another when their organizations interact with one another (See Appendix V, 18 March 2015). Indeed Radio Siani has fused, through the dissemination of information and discussions according to the broadcasted interests of their members general culture (music, talks), their fight against illegality and criminality, and as a result they have been able to meet other like-minded organisations and associations who are active in the social sphere such as the British Community.

Alongside the radio broadcasting itself, the promoters and managers of the group conduct other activities through the “Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani”, founded in March 2012 and based in the same location. As a “tipo b”⁶⁹ cooperative in Italian law, this cooperative aimed to “offer opportunities for social reintegration of disadvantaged individuals, or those who are already on the path to recovery”. The cooperative has four main focuses: communication, management and re-use of assets confiscated from the mafia, social activities (including social and health) and cultural tourism,⁷⁰ all of which are covered in turn by different parts of the Arci Zona Rossa, Radio Siani and Cooperativa Giancarlo Siani legal entities, using many of the same activists in all of them. Their communication focus includes the cultural activities of Radio Siani itself through its broadcasts, but also the granting of advertisement slots to other social movements, the renting of radio equipment, the promotion of events, and researching the community that they inhabit. Notable activities in this area include the administration of the Ercolano per la legalità website, the advertising of local socio-cultural events such as those run by the *Scuderie* and local entrepreneurship through ethical consumerism. Cultural events, public meetings and marches in Ercolano such as the *Marcia della legalità*, “Agricoltura locale: possibile sviluppo” (Local agriculture: possible development) which bring together individuals from NGOs, politicians and locals, are often sponsored, advertised and attended by members of the cooperative.

In a broader sense, the cooperative also manages land confiscated from the Camorra, upon which it cultivates produce on a “social farm”. They produce a specific tomato species “pizzino vesuviano”, and honey in a beehive that they manage with the cooperation from the local Agricultural faculty of the Università degli studi di Federico II di Napoli. These products are cultivated by members of the cooperative alongside young volunteers from the local community. There have been occasions where local schools have included school projects

⁶⁹ Type B: involved in the management of activities aimed at providing employment for disadvantaged persons in the industry, trade, service and agricultural sectors

⁷⁰ <http://www.radiosiani.com/chi-siamo/cooperativa.html>

relating to these confiscated sites as part of their curriculum. Indeed two classes in a school close to the Radio Siani headquarters had to undertake such projects for two hours a week everyday afterschool for a week where they were supervised by two of the Cooperative's volunteers (*Il Gazzettino Vesuviano*, 6 February 2014) which has been repeated every year since 2013. The use of children is easy to criticise, however Scognamiglio pre-empted this;

We are excited to kick off this activity which is crucial to us all in the recovery and support for kids in the neighbourhood ... although it may seem controversial [to use children in this sense] what really matters is the cultural aspect – particularly in a neighbourhood and a city that do not offer many other ideas. (*Il Gazzettino Vesuviano*, 6 February 2014)

Whilst the cultivation of ethical produce is important in this context, particularly as a means of re-using assets *against* the Camorra and encouraging individuals throughout Italy to buy more ethically, the money gained from the produce that goes back into the farm is not the focus here. The focus is, as Scognamiglio declares, changing the culture and giving young people other opportunities and experiences that they would not have had otherwise. This is also the case with the cooperative providing vocational training for young people in the area, such as organising classes that both support the local tourist economy (teaching English, teaching local history and culture in hand with the Herculaneum site) and encourage socialisation in other contexts.

An essential side to this whole strategy, however, is that of the willingness of communal and regional politicians to siphon money into these types of projects in the first place, which we mentioned in the previous chapter. Most visible here through the initial granting of the apartment where Radio Siani is now based to Arci Zona Rossa (specifically Scognamiglio as its president, to whom it is entrusted for the duration of 10 years), and the farmhouse and its surrounding land to Cooperativa Sociale Giancarlo Siani (alongside another social cooperative) as well as direct and purposeful funding for their projects (all of which are awarded through the S.O.L.E Consortium, part of the Città Metropolitana di Napoli framework). A 2014 declaration, for example, granted €199,575 to Arci Zona Rossa to assist its activities under the National Government department “Dipartimento della gioventù” which gave €11,678,448.45 to the Campania region in order to promote entrepreneurship, social youth employment, self-sustainable management of properties that the groups occupy with already existing State owned assets – all aimed at young people up to the age of thirty-five (Dipartimento della Gioventù e del servizio civile nazionale, 2014).

Likewise, a 2016 declaration, awarded the sum of €27,000 to the Cooperativa Sociale Giancarlo Siani for their continued social work with local young people on the farmland, in

return for declaring that the project is due to funding from S.O.L.E. and placing their logo on the outside of the premises (Consorzio S.O.L.E., 2016). Overall, Radio Siani relies on the willingness of some of their members to work voluntarily and contribute to their activities when they can, on State funding, and on the continued permission to use confiscated assets.

2:3: Forum dei Giovani

An interesting contrast to Radio Siani in the area is that of the Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano which from 2009 onwards has offered an area where young people can meet and organize activities. In line with a 2003 Council of Europe policy document entitled “Revised European Charter on the Participation of Young People in Local and Regional Life” (Council of Europe, 2003). The regional government in Campania created a scheme whereby they would fund youth forums following a set of predetermined guidelines established in a 2008 procedural format for the creation of youth forums (Decreto Dirigenziale del 15 dicembre 2008 n.67). This led to the creation of a one-standard format for youth forums across the region, of which the Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano is but a one piece, whereby each comune has standard model for a youth forum. Through a set electoral framework, the Forum votes for a President as well as members of its own council so that it can organise events and meetings as a youth group, in addition to lobbying and communicating ideas to the ruling comune and acting as an official representation of a comune’s young people. In this sense, each youth forum is a democratically elected interest group for young people, facilitated by the elected comune. In May 2009 the Forum was officially created in Ercolano, meeting regularly and talking about problems affecting the city and discussing what to do about them, in addition to organizing social and cultural events to give young people something to do. Examples are that of cleaning specific public areas, hosting local politicians, showing informative films, gathering petitions and promoting awareness locally of certain issues and, in order to support local businesses, a discount card “Carta Amicizia” for young people with an Ercolano postcode.

In 2011, the comune decided to give two rooms in one of their public buildings to the forum as a permanent meeting place for young people, as well as a space in which they can do their school, college or university work. This was further developed by book donations from a number of people in the city to create a small library in this space, and regular opening times, making the Forum often frequented in exam season. The Forum benefits young people by providing a place where they can do school work away from home, as well as a space in which they can meet new people of similar ages, working and learning together.

The Forum provides a platform for young people in Ercolano to advertise themselves and the activities that they are doing, whether it is teaching a foreign language, writing articles, photography, website design, dance, music either with or through the Forum. Much like Radio Siani, the Forum advertises much of the activities that they do and other notices online, with a presence on Facebook, Twitter and their own website. Through the media, they publicise news articles and blog posts written by members of the Forum.

The Forum has pushed for a number of local causes and conducted its own voluntary activities such as the cleaning of the local areas where individuals have littered or purposely dumped waste, collecting charitable donations and used book sales for the poor, or helping victims of natural disasters such as the August 2016 Italian earthquake. All of these are decided democratically by a Forum vote and are conducted with the direct participation of young people in the Forum, sometimes in collaboration with other organisations, fostering greater interaction and cooperation between the members of these organisations before, during and after the participation (see Appendix V, 12 February 2015; 3 March 2015)

There are a number of noteworthy events and activities that they have held and collaborated with since 2009. The most interesting from our perspective was a 2014 project titled “Questionario #NOCAMORRA” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014), conducted in collaboration with a researcher of the Università degli studi di Napoli Federico II, Dr. Ciro De Falco and the Ercolano administration. The project focussed on young people in Ercolano and how they perceived the Camorra phenomenon. Questionnaire data was collected from a local school in Ercolano with 432 students between the ages of 13 and 21. The questionnaire was multiple choice, had several questions that asked the participant to rank certain values and had a few open questions that required the participant to write a few lines of elaboration of their answer. What is important to highlight is that the questionnaire was conducted upon local students *by* other local students in order to understand how young people in the community perceive their local area and its relationship to criminality. The fact that the questionnaire was proposed and then conducted in the first place, in addition to having its results elaborated in presentation *for* local young people is itself demonstrative of the activist nature of the Forum, as well as the fact that they seek to understand the phenomenon itself based on data. The Forum has purposefully made this data available online and accessible for anyone – leading me to contact them.




Table 1

Elaborations of the answer to the question “Which of these definitions best describes the Camorra? (Indicate one response only)” from the #NoCamorra questionnaire. (<http://forumgiovaniiercolano.it/>)

On perceptions, the results of the questionnaire showed that 44.3% of the participants considered camorristi to be “criminals”,⁷¹ whereas only 5.4% viewed them positively. In this sense we can note the definite negative perception of the Camorra and camorristi in general, whilst also noting (with the options of “men of honour” and “hero”) that the results display the perception that being a criminal in this context is negative. This is contrasted to a 2012 questionnaire in Naples conducted with over 2000 children from 10 different schools aged between 12 and 14, where 10% were found to view the Camorra favourably and 16% believed that the Camorra guaranteed wealth, power and the resolving of the financial crisis (*Metropolisweb*, May 2012).

On the phenomenon in general, when the participants were asked where they got their information on the Camorra, the majority of individuals indicated the media in general (TV, Newspapers, Internet, Books, Radio) rather than people or institutions (Church, School, Family, Friends), referred to in the document as “agencies of socialisation”.⁷² It must be noted, however, that the amount of faith they placed in each of these as well as the amount that each affects their view is not pursued here – so one piece of information about the

⁷¹ “Which of these definitions best describes the Camorra? (Indicate one response only)”

In addition to the 44.3% who considered them to be “criminals”, 17.2% considered them to be “murderers”, 4.5% “businesspeople”, 0.2% “heroes”, 7.3% “thieves”, 13.4% “politicians”, 5.4% “men of honour”, 7.8% “other”. (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.9)

⁷² “Where have you heard talk about the Camorra? (it is possible to indicate more than one response)”

“TV” (94%), “At the local parish Church” (29.4%), “Family” (54.2%), “School” (70.1%), “Newspapers” (70.4%), “Friends” (49.5%), “Books” (27.8%), “Radio” (32.6%) and “Other” (2.3%).

(Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.6)

Camorra from the TV will be weighed as equal to various interactions with the Church about the Camorra. There is a question as to how influential different interactions are compared to others. Indeed, the presentation document states, “School is the first social institutions outside of the family home with which an individual begins the process of secondary socialisation” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.7). At the very least the data here is a good indication of how much these media and agencies disseminate information about the Camorra and how widespread its impact is.⁷³ Further indicative of this is that only 47% of the participants had heard of Giancarlo Siani, Radio Siani’s namesake.⁷⁴

The participants were asked to indicate the importance of certain factors that lead to the Camorra phenomenon, all between 0-10. The highest indicated was “corruption” averaging at 8.9, followed by “ignorance” at 8.4 and “bad politics”⁷⁵ at 8.2⁷⁶. The coverage of national political scandals is ultimately a factor here, whereby revelations such as those in Tangentopoli have likely harmed the public trust in public institutions. This is also the case on a local level, demonstrated by the 1993 dissolution of the local administration due to Camorra infiltration, other corruption scandals in Ercolano such as that in 2014, and other collusion between the *zona grigia* and the provision of public work. The participants were also asked to value the work of Law enforcement, the local comune, the national government and local associations. In this, the Italian State was consistently criticised in that it had a 63.2% negative rating and a 16.6% positive rating. The local administration was more mixed with a 35.8% negative rating and a 32.2% positive rating. Law enforcement was more positive with a 36.7% positive rating and a 29.7% negative rating. Local associations were even more positive, with 40.8% positive rating and a 30.1% negative rating.⁷⁷ Regarding the Law enforcement more specifically, the participants were asked to rate their level of trust in its institutions, again between 0-10. In this, the Carabinieri were rated highest

⁷³ An interesting project for the future would be a questionnaire which goes into more detail about a local community and where people receive information about the Camorra. An example of this could be a comparison between different Civil Society organizations and specific media organizations. One could analyse how many of the participants follow Radio Siani / Forum dei Giovani on Facebook, how many of them have heard of different local organizations, are members of the local political parties, and of other voluntary associations etc. I did this in a much more limited way with my questionnaire for members of the local anti-racket, but given the limited numbers available, many of the results were inconclusive.

⁷⁴ Other individuals’ fame that was questioned were Giovanni Falcone (Murdered Sicilian Judge, 81%) Totò Riina (Former Cosa Nostra boss, 77.1%), Roberto Saviano (journalist and writer of *Gomorra*, 63%), Carmine Schiavone (former member of the Casalesi, 50.5%), Raffaele Cutolo (former boss of the NCO, 48.1%) and Bettino Craxi (former Italian Prime Minister, 14.8%) (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.7-8)

⁷⁵ The original Italian is “Cattiva Politica”, where “cattiva” can be translated as “(morally) bad” or “naughty”.

⁷⁶ “In your opinion, from 0-10, how much have the following been involved in the formation of the Camorra?” Followed by “Unemployment” at 7.3, “Social hardship” at 7.2, “Urban degradation” at 6.9, “marginalisation” at 5.7 and “for career reasons” at 5.6 (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.10).

⁷⁷ “How do you rate the following organizations against organized crime?”

The options available were “very bad”, “bad” “bad enough”, “acceptable”, “good enough”, “good”, very good” and “Don’t know” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.13).

(5.8) followed by the Guardia di Finanza (5.4), the State Police (5.3) and the much lower Municipal Police (3.7),⁷⁸ which coincides with the data collected in my questionnaires with the anti-racket members.

On their own activism and their own opinion of “what is to be done?” the participants were asked which sectors should be intervened in in order to defeat the Camorra, the vast majority indicated Corruption (53%), Security (50.9%) and Education (50.5%).⁷⁹ Corruption, again, was understood to be the main issue which is damaging their society, which perhaps demonstrates the frustration that the participants feel towards corrupt individuals’ influence upon the whole socio-economic system, and indeed explains why some people are persuaded by microcriminality when those at the top are as criminal as those low level camorristi. Parts of this discourse posit that without the grey zone between some elected officials, civil servants, businesspeople and the Camorra, the Camorra would not be as influential as it is. If you remove this ability to influence politics and the licit economy, then the Camorra would not be as powerful. The security discourse covers varying elements from law enforcement, State power and even the private and personal sphere: the Camorra are powerful and have an influence over society because law enforcement has been lacking in some way – be that in the form of not protecting shopkeepers, or simply not catching/punishing people for their crimes when they are committed. We could also take the perspective of private security: the Camorra are in a position where they are able to exploit local people, and so therefore their security (shopkeepers through shop shutters, CCTV, or private security) is viewed as important to resisting the Camorra. The education discourse is equally varied: it is as much about educating the current and future camorristi on the harm their activities inflict on others as it is about educating people to report crimes and wrongdoings to the proper authorities when they see them. At the same time, it is education in a civic, cultural, entrepreneurial, psychological, social and political sense as the participant understood it.

In terms of their own activism, the participants were asked whether they participate in initiatives against the Camorra to which 41.2% responded “yes”. It is unclear exactly what this might entail, but in Ercolano we can say that it could be anything from ethical consumerism against the Camorra promoted by the anti-racket businesses, participating or being a member of any anti-mafia group such as Radio Siani or Libera, to taking part in

⁷⁸ “From 0 to 10, how much trust do you have in the following bodies of the Law enforcement?” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.14).

⁷⁹ “If you were to suggest something to the institution, which of these sectors would you intervene in to defeat criminality?”

With much less emphasis placed on “Work” (40.3%), “Environmental Protection” (23.1%), “Immigration” (7.9%) and “Free time” (7.6%) (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.22).

projects against the Camorra through the Forum dei Giovani, the Church, the scouts, or any other social movement. Additional exposure to these types of organisations through la Marcia della legalità and its related activities must also be considered here. They were further asked how they would judge these kinds of initiatives against the Camorra: 5.4% judged them to be useless, 75.1% to be useful, and 19.4% to be essential.⁸⁰ Crucially, when the participants were asked whether the Camorra could be beaten, 46.8% said “yes”, 16.7% said “no” and 36.6% said that they did not know.⁸¹

On the immediate issue of their place within this system, the participants were asked whether they knew anyone involved with the Camorra, and 59.4% answered “no”, 30% answered “yes” and 10.6% answered “prefer not to say”.⁸² On their future in Ercolano and the local area the participant were asked whether they would leave their home city in the future: 48.5% responded “yes”, only 13.3% responded “no” and 38.2% responded “I don’t know”. Following this, the participants were asked what the causes and/or motives people had for wanting to leave: 25% responded that it was due to reasons of work, 24% for the “future in general”, 17.6% citing a distaste for the city, 17.2% a distaste for Italy, 8.8% for easier living, 6.4% for varied reasons and only 1% was because of the Camorra.⁸³

To reiterate, a major aspect of this project is that it was conducted by young people in the local community. Indeed as the Forum stated:

The research was useful, because on the one hand it drove young people to stop and reflect on a particularly important issue in our region and our future as embodied in the fight against the Camorra, and on the other hand because it gives a clear picture of the thoughts of young people in the area.⁸⁴

There was a significant element of collaboration in all the phases of the project that made it possible, namely from the process of proposing the idea in the Forum, communicating with local schools and teachers to realise it, to the eventual presentation of the results to the participants and their peers. In its design the project sought to enable discussion on these

⁸⁰ “Do you think that this type of demonstration [social initiatives against the Camorra] is.. (Indicate one response only)” This was broken down into “Useless, given the vastness of the phenomenon” (5.4%), “Useful, to understand other people who are against the Camorra” (4.4%), “Useful, to send a message to the criminals” (10.3%), “Useful, to spread the culture of legality” (25.8%), “Useful, if the institutions execute concrete acts too” (34.6%) and “Invaluable to combat the phenomenon” (19.4%) (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.20).

⁸¹ “Do you think that the Camorra and organized crime in general can be defeated?” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.20).

⁸² “Have you ever known anyone involved with the Camorra?” (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.13)

⁸³ “Do you intend on leaving your city to live in another place?” “If yes, why”? (Forum dei Giovani di Ercolano, 2014, p.19).

⁸⁴ <http://www.forumgiovanihercolano.it/iniziativa/questionario-noCamorra>

issues for the participants and their peers, with the collection and presentation of the data forming part of the Forum dei Giovani's activism against organized crime.

Similarly to Radio Siani, this project can be seen as underpinned by a post-Marxist perspective of Civil Society through participation and activism, within the framework of an institutionally based youth forum. Members of the Forum also pointed to its general stance as apolitical, which, again, I reject. The group may try to exert its attempts to stay outside the realms of party politics, but it is difficult, if not impossible, to not politicise the issues it deals with.

The main difference between the Forum and Radio Siani, however, is that the Forum stays afloat due to the voluntary assistance of their members to continue conducting their activities, as well as the continued support from the communal administration. The Forum's legal status, for example, is predicated on support from the comune, which, for partisan reasons or ineptitude, may choose to reallocate the resources enjoyed by the Forum to other areas of communal administration. An area that should be pursued is the relationship between the communal administration (in this case, overwhelmingly by the PD), the local youth wing of the party in power and the Forum. This could provide us with some interesting comparisons as to how a party may exert its influence on supposedly apolitical organisations such as the Forum.

2:4: The Church

Neoliberal approaches at addressing social issues in communities are rooted in a strategy that involves the third sector, often outsourced from and (partially) funded by the State. This should be understood in the context of the outsourcing of the public sector. In the case of areas characterised by economic underdevelopment and the influence of mafia-type associations, it would be prudent to compare the activities of associations that have received support from the State and those who have not. An idealist could imagine different elements of the anti-Camorra movement working together in tandem for the sake of the overall goal of bettering society and defeating the Camorra. But the reality is a lot more complicated. This was highlighted quite clearly by a local priest, Padre Pasquale Incoronato, in one of his pastoral youth meetings that I was fortunate to attend. The topic of this particular evening was "giustizia" (justice) and "legalità", which, on the basis of various readings from the gospels, and a particularly focussed attention on me and my research, Incoronato considered not to be the same thing. We can view this as the split between the Hegelian/Marxist concept of the *Bürgerliche Gesellschaft* combined with the Church's perceived authority on ethical matters and a more liberal and utilitarian approach to ethics

and morality that has been transformed into public law. What has been decided by the State and the laws as legal and illegal is not necessarily the same as what is deemed (by the Church or God) to be right and wrong. This appears to be a simple point, but demonstrates a particularly deep fissure between two prominent camps of the anti-mafia movement: the State-endorsed and supported camp has a focus on legality, compared to the Church's focus on justice and what they believe to be Right. (See Appendix V, 3 March 2015)

An aspect that was covered in the questionnaire with the Forum was the existence of “agencies of socialisation”, of which Civil Society Organizations are undoubtedly a part. Despite the trend of a decreasing number of churchgoers, the Church remains a significant part of the socialisation process outside of the family and outside of school. At the same time as this process, some of the local parishes in Ercolano have been rather active in trying to undermine the Camorra and the attraction that the Camorra has on individuals in the community, tying together socialisation, the Church and what it is to be against various injustices in society (some of it represented locally by criminality). From historically accessible data in newspaper archives, the first example of a Church-based anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano happened during the time when the communal administration was dissolved due to Camorra infiltration. As mentioned previously, in June 1993 the communal administration⁸⁵ was dissolved by Presidential decree due to links with the Ascione clan, which meant that there was no locally elected government until November 1995. During these 18 months, the Church became particularly vocal in its criticism of local corruption and Camorra, calling for greater State presence to protect people, as well as itself organizing marches through the city in the public areas most associated with organized crime. In one letter to Oscar Luigi Scalfaro, then President of the Republic, one local priest, Don Raffaele Falco called for the army to come and help a struggling community: who was experiencing more and more violence. He called for the army because “deterrence is the only remedy for the wave of delinquency” and “we need everyone to mobilize themselves, but this can't happen unless the people trust the [re]actions of the State” (*L'Unità*, 21 August 1993). In response, the regional government assigned more Carabinieri to the city, arresting a number of individuals, a temporary measure which had minimal results. The Church began organizing marches through the city to show its opposition to the clans: one of these marches numbered around 10,000 people, and is seen to have sparked some life into an anti-mafia movement, given that a number of the people involved in this march were to become elected with an unprecedented landslide victory in November 1995 on an anti-mafia platform (*L'Unità*, 30 August 2003). This movement still existed in Ercolano in 2001, but still

⁸⁵ This administration was elected in 1990: an election marred by the murder of a former Mayor, Antonio Buonaiuto, a prominent critic of organized criminality in Ercolano.

without sufficient State support, with the then Mayor Luisa Bossa declaring that the State simply does not exist in Ercolano. Since the Church alone was unable to defeat the Camorra, it sought to alter the social conditions in which it was able to flourish; by appealing to the clans' families. We can interpret this desire to change the social conditions as wanting to change the nature of the *habitus* that existed in Ercolano, replacing it by Church-influenced cultural values that focuses on what is Right. Such was the path that Don Falco chose to pursue appealing to people who surround the clans instead: asking women to turn in their Camorra men (*L'Unità*, 14 July 2001).

The Church in Ercolano has been proactive against criminality and delinquency, though generally without the assistance or cooperation of the local administration and using its own devices and agency instead. One of the main focuses of Incoronato and his parish has been on children at risk in the community, and how to reincorporate those who are, or have been involved in organized criminality back into the community. In 1999, the parish had an opportunity to expand its reach from the church building itself to hold stewardship of a former pub, to be transformed it into a kind of community centre. The pub had a troubled history, being formerly managed by camorristi, with its former landlord being killed. In the newly founded "La Locanda di Emmaus" the parish would only pay the comune for electricity, heating, water and so on as long as the building remains a social asset for the community. The parish now had a canteen and space for children to learn and do school work under the supervision and guidance of local parents and volunteers, as well as older children who are brought in to help. Outside of summer time, the Locanda is also the meeting place of the Centro Pastorale Giovanile, the parish youth centre, which shares a number of members with the Forum dei Giovani – demonstrating part of the networked nature of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano.

The main impetus behind this was the desire to protect children at risk, to keep them off the street and prevent them from going down the route of criminality, by giving them a space to interact with the church, its volunteers, and other local children. Another asset used by this parrocchia is the so-called "La Tenda" (the tent), comprising an auditorium (Oratorio San Domenico Savio), a covered makeshift classroom block as well as a small artificial football field. Incoronato described the area before it was taken over by the parish as a "Camorra cemetery": it was a commonly known area for drug dealing and taking, where two corpses were found. As for La Locanda, the land itself is owned by the comune, but in this case the parish has to pay rent to the comune of Ercolano (CS1 19062015). The idea behind this structure, in contrast to the educational La Locanda, was to provide a recreational area for the same children, alongside others in the community.

One particularly notable aspect of these two structures that Padre Pasquale had founded and their *modus operandi*, was that a number of the children in attendance were the children of cammoristi who were the most likely to be at risk of becoming cammoristi in future. One has to remember that whilst some people do turn to crime due to a general pursuit of action, excitement, pride or reputation, others do so out of necessity, all of which are simply due to the socio-economic system that they find themselves in. Of the parents of the children who these spaces there are people on the sidelines who feel the collateral damage caused by the presence of these groups in the community, as well as the effect of reprisals caused by the police. There are the people directly connected to the Camorra through family, namely those children and wives who have been reliant on the money gained from criminality, who, upon the arrest or the killing of the breadwinner, now are left looking for other sources of income and support. As noted previously, it has been suggested that money collected from businesses goes directly towards “the prisoners” and looking after their families, making sure that the families remain tied to the Camorra. Whilst the arresting of criminals is an undoubtedly important aspect of the fight against organized crime, the social and economic effect that the removing of an (often male) family member or partner has upon a household is somewhat self-defeating in the fight against organized crime in the long-term, given that the systemic issues regarding the propensity towards joining a criminal clan and committing crimes have not been addressed. Indeed, by increasing arrests whilst not addressing these issues a society risks creating a vicious cycle whereby each arrested individual could leave a family further reliant on the Camorra, whose offspring then grow up, join the Camorra and repeat the process again.

During the summer holidays, the local churches conduct various summer camps using their two centres: using socialisation between different children in a community and Church context to try and keep them off the streets and trying to break away from this vicious cycle. This is done through the access to various sporting and cultural activities: playing football on the field refereed by other children or young adults from the church or association, dance classes and recitals, art classes and cinema. In practical terms, what the activities of Incoronato’s parrocchia do is to try and move these families away from their previous networks of support, toward the Church and other community support networks. The ultimate aim is to try and uproot criminality on a local societal level. It means that a child whose family has been affected by crime (directly or indirectly), or the socio-economic reality that created and fosters it, has an opportunity to leave this cycle. Through the Church, La Tenda and La Locanda, Incoronato sought to socialise the children of camorristi and individuals affected by the Camorra back into the community *through* the Church itself.

According to Incoronato, the creation and renovation of “culture” are an essential part of this. He emphatically declared that “the less culture there is, the more the Camorra wins” (CS1 19062015). We can interpret this “culture” in a few different ways. In one sense he is referring to those cultural activities that young people do in this context, such as doing sport, dance, learning together, and so on. In another much more broader sense, we can view the culture that is needed as the Church’s version of the *cultura della legalità*, though with a greater emphasis on what is (in)justice and the distinction between right and wrong in a more moralistic sense as the Church sees it, rather than in a purely legal sense. The culture that Incoronato seeks to expand consists of those Catholic values which they view as necessary to expand into the community in order to prevent individuals from turning to sinful lives through criminality, amongst other things. Here we see another cultural pole and cultural sphere that attempt hegemony over the *habitus* using a combination of religious and activity-based socialisation to influence the norms and behaviours of the members. This happens in the combination of sports and fun activities in a Church or religious based context, facilitated by Incoronato and other local Church leaders. Here new cultural identities are forged in a similar manner to Libera Sport articulated by Cayli (2013b). In this context, the Church purposely conducts a combination of fun activities alongside educational programmes so as to place the Church, its values, and their importance for the bettering of society into view for those individuals who take part. This is facilitated as much by the knowledge and cultural capital gained from these activities, as it is by the friendship and comradery gained with the other young people around them in the activities that are conducted.

What is important to emphasise in this Church-based context is that whilst the anti-mafia/anti-Camorra movements in Ercolano are all on the same “side” against criminality *per se*, they all have different approaches as to how to defeat them. This could in part explain why, despite the efforts made by this particular parish to try to mitigate the effects of organized crime, and its attempts to change elements of society in the process, the support in terms of money, assets and exemption from particular taxes has been few and far between. What constitutes development, much like beauty, is in the eye of the beholder. Indeed as Evans and Reid quite poignantly remark, “[d]evelopment has always been politically qualified. Not all development is ‘good’ and worthy of promotion” (Evans and Reid, 2014, p.84), and here it is difficult to disagree. Whilst the local Churches have been able to create social centres outside of the church buildings themselves, it has come at significant economic cost in comparison to other associations: where Incoronato has to rent La Tenda from the comune (CS1 19062015), other associations have received properties and assets free of charge, in addition to funding. It is important to note that neither of the two properties

(La Locanda and La Tenda) were ever owned by the Camorra, and so would not have been earmarked for confiscation and stewardship as social assets. La Locanda was a pub which was merely managed by a Camorra associated individual(s), though it is unclear as to who the “landlord” was.⁸⁶ The fact that it is the comune who asked the parish to restructure their expenses and to pay for the utility bills leads us to assume that it is currently owned by the comune. Whilst we note that the comune has acknowledged the work that the parish has done, and is able to do, there has been little support otherwise. La Tenda, however, has always been a communal asset and thus simply receives payment from the comune, though with parts of the site (the football field) entrusted to them. Aside from longstanding annual monetary contributions to the different churches in Ercolano by the comune, a common practice across Italy, there appears to be no other financial support given to the parish and the Church that assist the activities they conduct outside of the actual church structure.

Despite the role that the Church in Ercolano has had in highlighting the issue of corruption and Camorra, and then facing it in practical terms from 1993 onwards, it remains very much separate to the rest of the anti-Camorra movement. This is visible in terms of the amount of tax exemption, payment, support and assets that have generally been passed over to other elements of the anti-Camorra movement but not to the church, at worst indicating a purposeful decision and at best indicating an oversight, on the behalf of the State, Region and Comune who have thus favoured certain proponents of the anti-Camorra movement over others. This becomes problematic when the Strategic Planning (2007-2013) aims and objectives of the Più Europa programme cited the need for educational workshops through the:

carrying out territorial educational activities to offer: meeting and socialisation spaces for a positive use of leisure time, fun recreational activities in the streets, educational courses and workshops to stem marginalization processes and exclusion. In particular, moments of socialisation, both during the school timetable and during the summer holidays are to be consolidated in order to improve the relational opportunities of minors. (Ecosfera, 2010, p.68)

⁸⁶ Unfortunately, whilst increased transparency into communal legal documents and assets has meant data is more easily accessible for citizens and researchers, I have been unable to ascertain exactly who owned the property, given that transparency records for the Comune di Ercolano tend to only go back to 2002. The landlord is assumed to be the comune, though no records have been able to substantiate this claim. If the property had been “owned” by a camorrista, and had been confiscated after 1996, we would expect to see it as a confiscated asset designated for social use under legge n.109/96, but this is not the case. This means that this property has either; (1) been owned by the comune but then managed for a time by camorristi; (2) owned by camorristi but then aken under comune control *before* 1996 or (3) owned by a private landlord, rented to camorristi, then repossessed by the comune after the pub closed.

Socialisation has been noted several times in the previous section of this chapter as an important aspect with regard to development. The summer camps at La Tenda and the afterschool clubs and meeting at La Locanda, for example, undoubtedly represent a kind of socialisation, “educational course” and “workshop”, which are deemed worthy of development, even though these are all through the Church. Indeed there was a purposeful strategy within the Church to create a space for greater socialisation. From 2000 onwards the parish tried a new strategy in their educational development by purposely pairing up children from poorer families with less poor families, which was intended to have an effect on the socialisation of the young children and expand their own individual networks, for the purpose of bettering the community as the parish and Incoronato saw it:

These are the families that we helped with their homework, to cloth them, to educate them, and to eat together. Two times a week, they come here to eat. The children of clan members arrive here, and the intention was that once they are grown up, they wouldn't have waged war like they would have done otherwise [without our intervention]. (CS1 19062015)

Not only were these children clothed and fed where applicable, alleviating the stress on parents, but there was a very specific socialisation process that was encouraged involving the pairing up of poor and less poor, children of Camorra with other children, all mixed together at regular meals and helping one another with school work. The socialisation process here can be generalised as children interacting with one another and with adults in a relatively controlled environment, but also particularised as a place where children can better understand traits such as empathy and justice, all under the guidance of the parish. In a more specific manner, the socialisation in such an environment encourages children to see the world from perspectives other than their own.

Despite this, the Church appears to have been overlooked by the Strategic Planning funding, leaving us to wonder what kind of socialisation is to be encouraged instead. As seen previously, much of this funding went towards other developments and redevelopments for already existing assets (such as the Vesuvian villas) and to improve tourism in the area, alongside the re-use of criminal assets. Here we can see the different “sides” or “aspects” of the anti-Camorra in Ercolano and their varying levels of institutional support, demonstrative of the phenomenon in the rest of Italy too. From the perspective of investment and funding it can lead us to infer that economic development in the form of increasing tourism, cosmetic social development, and improving the *cultura della legalità* has taken preference over social development in general. Only those elements of society which fall in line with the overarching Cultural Hegemony determined by the overarching social-economic system are

fostered, that is unless they can be co-opted for the prospect of economic gain or self-sufficient social capital. Additionally, as announced on Incoronato's Facebook page in early 2017, his parish is actually in danger of losing custodianship of la tenda altogether due to funding issues. By this, it is meant that the assets that are available in the region for economic and social use (be that roads, public transport, aspects of the culture and history such as the Vesuvian villas and the Herculaneum Scavi) have been designated as worthy of development by the region in order to increase the amount of economic capital entering and then remaining in Ercolano, therefore enabling the development of socialisation and educational programmes in the city. For the groups and associations that already conduct these kinds of activities, such as the Church, the opposite is true: you start by building the culture and the socialisation of people within a community – giving them an element of agency within their own community, which will then lead to greater social and economic development in the city in a moralistic way.

3: Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the role of certain Civil Society Organizations in Ercolano in combatting organized crime, noting the varying institutional support that they have received, as well as the variety of discourses that each group has deployed to approach the issue of criminality in their community. What is clear is that each group has emphasised the necessity of addressing the predominant “culture” that allowed organized crime groups and its supporters to flourish despite setbacks from judicial repression. It is the manner in which this “culture” has been conceived, the way it is to be addressed, and their desired *telos* that is the point of difference and dispute between these groups, whereby we have visualised this struggle as a struggle for cultural hegemonic dominance *within* the broad anti-mafia movement itself.

I began by contextualizing Civil Society Organizations in Italy that focus on combatting mafia-type associations, noting particularly their strategies regarding “culture” to do so. Then we focussed in greater detail on the experiences of the anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano.

I started with Ercolano per la legalità, noting individual characters and personalities who fostered its initial development, and the way in which it focussed on changing the inbuilt individualistic and isolated norms of accepting Camorra dominance. By providing a social space and forum where businesspeople were able to talk about their experiences and issues regarding (in)security, this antiracket association was able to build horizontal relationships between businesspeople, which were expanded to include members of the Carabinieri, something which facilitated the drive to actually denounce their extorters. This was an

exercise that was purposely aimed at (re)building the trust of businesspeople for the judicial system, all within the realms of the *cultura della legalità*, the Modello Ercolano, at the expense of the Camorra, their criminal sphere, and the behavioural dispositions and habits that had been pushed onto their pizzo-paying victims. Similarly, Radio Siani and their activities were characterised by a very purposeful and overt call to change the character of the culture in Ercolano. Supported by the State through confiscated assets and the funding of projects, the ensemble of voluntary associations and cooperatives that make up Radio Siani geared themselves to play an active role in local media, the organisation of events or collaboration with organizers of events that could and can get locals involved with activities that provide opportunities outside of Camorra influence. Throughout this process the *cultura della legalità* was emphasised, whereby individuals could be socialised in a manner that removes the appeal of the Camorra and, when present, provided with other options, thereby facilitating the (re)definition of Cultural Capital in the *habitus* away from the Camorra criminal sphere. I found their activities to be a conduit for the enacting of State social policy in general, whereby funded programmes were realised by the association alongside its other voluntary activities which serve to complement government action (World Bank, 2013) whilst also increasing the levels of trust for the State.

The Forum dei Giovani on the other hand emerged from my analysis as an organisation that got young locals interested in their community through direct action, albeit in a wholly voluntary and comune-determined context. The Forum emphasises the importance of action over pessimism, and whilst it can be accused of naïveté and wishful thinking, their activities encourage youth participation in their community that amounts to a response to Camorra/criminal influence (such as the cleaning up of illegal waste), and the facilitation of discussions about these issues – all of which strengthen the accountability of the communal administration. The Forum is also self-critical, as elaborated by the #NOCAMORRA project, where its assistance in the research methodology and then its own subjecting itself to scrutiny afterwards encouraged the discussions of these previously taboo topics. This represents the alteration and self-realisation of certain Cultural Capitals that become embedded in the local consciousness.

The Church represented the most troubling part of the anti-mafia movement in Ercolano, as we see a section of Civil Society that is actively and outwardly fighting mafia-type associations through the changing and adaption of Culture in which they thrive – attempting to sap the appeal of organized crime – but that receives little support from the State in this regard. In this sense, I identify that from the perspective of the State the Church is tackling organized crime in the right way, namely through socialisation and the changing of “Culture”, but with a different end-game or *telos* with a focus on what it deems to be “Right”.

Whilst each of these groups has a different notion of what constitutes “Culture”, and therefore on what Cultural plane the *habitus* is to be moulded (and for whom), what each of them share is the acceptance that the way to undermine the Camorra in this context is to influence the behaviour and norms of the community through Cultural Hegemonic dominance. Each of these segments are fighting for dominance in the social sphere, together with a multitude of other socio-cultural influences and factors. Each of these influences the norms of individuals, their perceptions, choices and actions. In this sense, we should talk of anti-mafia movements, rather than one anti-mafia movement.

vi. Conclusion

“Why have grand jury investigations and police forces failed time after time to crush organized crime? What is the reason why gang rule has successfully defied every attempt to suppress it?”

John Landesco, 1929

“Every effort will be in vain if preventative means are not effectively adopted at the same time in which you try to eradicate evil with repressive means. I will never tire of this: whilst the present state of things lasts, the Camorra is the natural and necessary form of society I have described. For every thousand times eradicated, it will be reborn another thousand”

Pasquale Villari, 1885

Every reactionary effort against the Camorra must necessarily be conducted alongside preventative measures. Not only must actions be taken against *current* criminal associates, but also against *future* ones. The growing influence of organized crime in Chicago in the 1920s led Landesco to ask the question above, but in our case study and elsewhere, these questions still remain pertinent. Despite seeing the entire directorate of the Ascione clan arrested in 1996, not only did the Ascione continue its operations in the years that followed, another clan was able to gain power. The norms that facilitated passivity to the Camorra, the networks and assistance provided by third-party *area grigia*, and the socio-economic reality of the area where the clans provide economic alternatives to lawful employment to locals remain unchanged. Villari refers here to what Tom Behan 120 years later called the Camorra hydra (2009), that mythical Lernaean monster that regrows new heads as soon as one was cut off. The Italian Ministero dell'Interno referred to this phenomenon through the “pulverised” and “atomised” (1999) nature of the clans. Judicial repression against Camorra clans in Ercolano up until the early 2000s faced the same problem – investigations using judicial tools, surveillance and arrests help undermine, if not destroy individual clans, but do not stop new heads growing in their place.

Using judicial tools alone is like trying to cure a symptom of an illness rather than the cause – the root causes of a problem are not addressed, and the symptoms remain. In Ercolano, as elsewhere, the answer to underlying questions as to what *causes* crime, whether it is possible to eliminate it and what to do are still open. The Camorra, like other organized crime *species* and *subspecies* (Armao, 2003) exist simultaneously as a product and determinant of the society that they themselves inhabit (Jamieson, 2000), consequently, any

attempt at defeating a deeply rooted group must use judicial repression *alongside* other social, cultural, economic measures to alter the structure and behaviour of individuals in society, given these species' influence on such structures and behaviours. The development of a particular phenomenon in any given area, such as organized crime, must not be observed in a vacuum but instead as a by-product of its environment and its relationship to individual agency – itself determined by specific socialisation, culture, socio-economic factors, norms and psychology of individuals in their own contexts. Just as seemingly unrelated factors in a given *habitus* are able to influence individual agency and behaviour (e.g. Donohue and Levitt, 2001), we should be cautious not to place criminality, criminals and (in)actions by law enforcement and politicians into a bubble that are only affected by one another. This confuses correlation and causation, whilst ignoring other social, economic, demographic and cultural factors.

This thesis has highlighted the importance of non-judicial tools in a response to organized crime, particularly the role of culture and socialised norms in a *habitus*. It did this through the research of one very specific case study, demonstrating that the results would be applicable to other similar cases. Focussing deep on one case study was my preferred method to collecting less data on many case studies. I analysed the nature of the Camorra *pizzo*, how and why businesses paid it, and how the ensemble of the comune of Ercolano and the modern anti-Camorra movement has responded to it and mafia-type associations in general. In our case study, we saw how society responded to these gaps that help sustain organized criminal clans in sometimes conflicting ways with varying rates of success.

Two broad questions were asked in this regard: (1) *what is theizzo?* and (2) *how important is the social-cultural sphere to the anti-mafia movement?* Where the payment of *pizzo* is a point of direct contact and acceptance of clan dominance by the local business community, perceptions of the *pizzo* vis-à-vis the anti-Camorra movement in general were crucial. These issues were addressed in the three main chapters on the theme where one detailed how and why the *pizzo* is paid in our case study by businesses, and the other two on the institutional and Civil Society responses to the *pizzo* and the Camorra in general.

Drawing on the accounts of Ercolano's businesspeople, court proceedings, judicial reports and accounts from Carabinieri officers, "Paying the *pizzo*" outlined the process in which businesspeople were demanded (sometimes unsuccessfully) to pay the *pizzo* by clans in Ercolano. In line with our understandings of the *pizzo* as explained in the Introduction (Grasso, 2006; D'Alessandro, 2009), I concluded that the *pizzo* is not simply a cash payment, but comes in various forms that are paid differently by different types of businesses. The *pizzo* paid by an entrepreneur is different to that paid by a shopkeeper

given the contractual nature of the entrepreneur's activities compared to the continuous and set geographical space in which the shopkeeper conducts their activities. Whilst these pizzos differ in the manner that they are paid (a percentage of a job for the entrepreneur, and three times a year or monthly for the shopkeeper), the reasoning behind any specific cash payment is best articulated through the Sicilian dictum "not too much to ruin the business, but just enough to get the beak wet" (Zaffuto, 2012), where the amount requested was approximately 3-5% of the job/revenue. The non-cash pizzo outside of this percentage was multiplicitous, and amounted to other payments, extractions or services that benefitted the clan or individual camorristi in one way or another. This was through the forced purchase of expensive ornamental Christmas stars to adorn a business (which collected cash revenue and demonstrated the territoriality of the clan), overpriced products (such as bread that gave Camorra-related businesses "clean" money, and reduced the reliance on genuinely clean suppliers), the acceptance of Camorra businesses into business consortiums, the forced hiring of Camorra associates (where a business would pay their salary) and even unofficial luxuries that individual camorristi deemed themselves entitled to (free drinks, cheaper phones, free contracted works).

The actual process of paying the pizzo was also elaborated in this chapter and elsewhere, where I noted the importance of euphemisms and specific phrases to indicate payment, and where to pay – notably through the Ascione *Moquette* and the Birra *Cuparella* and the process of making payment something honourable and even "normal" to do. This was particularly relevant for businesses that refused to pay their dues, where the extorter insinuated and outright spoke of them as dishonourable, disreputable and deviants. Violence was an important factor here, but not as much as the *fear of unknown reactions*, whereby a combination of cryptic phrases and "affective-aesthetic effects" (Pine, 2012) sought to symbolically strangle possible resistance in its cradle.

The disposition of passive acceptance and the normalization of this relationship as *de facto* is part of this process, where I draw comparisons with Étienne de La Boétie's *servitude volontaire* (1553) as well as the concept of the purposeful fostering of an easily manageable, governable and docile businessperson-*cum*-Bloom (Agamben, 2008; Dean, 2009; Tiqqun, 2000). This ideal citizen would not only pay their share of the pizzo, but would actually do so because they have been disposed into believing that corruption (in one way or another) is the way of the world – sapping support away for legality and denouncing. From the perspective of the businessperson, however, I indicated that this passivity is lived in ignorance of the potential results. Following Žižek (2008) I hold that the businesspeople know very well that they are being moulded to become this ideal citizen, but when interacting with the camorristi they act as if they do not know. The perceived lack of other

options due to a presupposed corrupt and careless State politics, police and judiciary, further facilitated the vicious cycle of pizzo payment.

The pizzo was analysed as a specific mechanism used by the Camorra, whose value transcended the economic benefit it held, and instead provided the clans with an effective tool for controlling a territory, and influencing the cultural, economic, psychological and social character of business life there. As Beatrice (2009) noted, Camorra clans have affected business relations in an area for their own benefit, which we have come to understand through the businessperson's choice between docility and collaboration. As we saw, this influence may come in the form of forced purchases (of bread, for example) which benefits "clean" businesses related to the Camorra. However, to state that it was simply a means of demonstrating territoriality would be an oversimplification: it is a tool that provided the clans with a means of proving their dominance, but also to try and convince the shopkeepers that dominance (one way or another) is the natural order of things. Whether that is through the State, a kingdom, a feudal lord or the Camorra, someone is dominating this arena. Shopkeepers are made to feel as if they should be happy that this particular oppressor is not so greedy – like the perceivably hypocritical corrupt politicians elsewhere in the community. The disposition pushed here is one that encourages the acceptance of this relatively minor tithe and an uncaring, inefficient and corrupted State and its Law Enforcement as an unfortunate fact of life. This is its true political power, and the way in which the Camorra it is able to, as Jason Pine wrote, accomplish a lot without actually doing anything (2012, p.14). The use of violence by the Camorra in this context is demonstrative of this political power that has been undermined.

The following chapter dealt with the State's response to the Camorra, where we saw the limits of judicial repression without some form of cooperation with or investment (financial or otherwise) in an area. I detailed Carabinieri operations in Ercolano, and the use of surveillance and *pentiti* to understand the inner workings of the clan, concluding that whilst judicial repression is important to apprehend camorristi and their associates who have already committed crimes, it is a strategy that requires cutting the head off of every single Camorra hydra head at the same time – which itself does not look at the causes of the Camorra itself.

The answer to questions such "what causes crime?" and "what causes individuals to be co-opted by criminal groups?" is contested, but the answer provided by the State in this context is one that involves the pursuit of policies that encourage cooperation and association in the public sphere between public and private actors. In short, it is the pursuit of policies that encourage the entrenchment of neoliberal socio-economic policies that encourage economic

resilience and efficiency by making the most use of the assets that exist in a community and co-opting citizens. Following the discourse of writers such as De Tocqueville (1988) and Putnam (1993), these policies are understood to be one which improve trust in institutions, create interlinking networks between State and the third sector, giving areas characterised by economic underdevelopment the opportunity to overcome problems they face without the need for continuous State intervention (in the form of a participatory welfare State model, for example). From the perspective of neoliberalism, it is this underdevelopment that is perceived to be the root cause of the Camorra and criminality in general. This strategy of development was deemed inseparable from broader strategies of defeating mafia-type associations in Italy. The State encourages the development of arenas where private actors may interact with one another, thereby conducting State policies along associational lines without directly involving the State. Within the context of regional and national funding, the comune of Ercolano received money that aimed at achieving this kind of structural adjustment, maximizing assets and access to them in the territory that would best attract private investment and money (namely through its tourist assets) that would indirectly lead to jobs as well as social and cultural benefits. My analysis has shown that developmental efforts here can be justifiably deemed cosmetic – and not addressing deeper rooted issues such as housing, social exclusion and lack of areas for locals to gather socially in an arena (Ecosfera, 2010, p.88) that (1) does not involve the pursuit of profit and (2) does not involve the influence of the Camorra. Indeed the end-game of these policies may actually lead to further social exclusion and the beautification of those free social spaces (piazzas) where camorristi come into contact with other members of the community, without addressing the underlying cultural, economic, psychological and social appeal that being part of the Camorra/criminal cultural sphere involves.

This was addressed in part through policies pursued under the expansion of the *Cultura della legalità* and the *Modello Ercolano*. The first of these had a disposition that involved a mixture of pedagogical activities in schools and other associations involving young people, as well as vocal institutional support for denouncers of organized crime – all for the purpose of affecting behaviour and (re)building social trust that the citizenry has for the State. It is hoped that the improvement of social trust in this context would encourage individuals to reject the Camorra/criminal cultural sphere in favour of a “good citizen” sphere and Cultural Capital (Bourdieu, 1986) that at one extreme accepts passivity to the law as *is*, and at another encourages democratic discourses that hold those in power to account (in the form of collaboration and discussions in the public sphere). The denunciation of criminals formed part of this discourse, whereby the citizenry (with a focus on the younger generation) was encouraged to reject passivity and tacit acceptance of the Camorra in favour of that which

assists the State's effort to undermine it. This is linked to, but separate from, the *Modello Ercolano*, which focusses on those social connections between Civil Society (*Societas Civilis*), the Carabinieri and the Judiciary that facilitate the process by which a businessperson denounces their Camorra extorter. Similarly to the *Cultura della legalità*, the *Modello Ercolano* was focussed on (re)building social trust – particularly in a community that deemed denouncing the Camorra as useless. Since the Carabinieri were viewed to be unable (or unwilling) to do anything about extortion attempts – as demonstrated by the extensiveness of pizzo payment as revealed through investigations, as well as their abject failure to support businesspeople such as Filippo in their time of need in the early 2000s – the *Modello Ercolano* was focussed at winning the “hearts and minds” of the shopkeepers, and therefore the populace in general.

The role of Civil Society Organizations in both of these processes was analysed in the following chapter, where I noted purposeful cooperation between some Civil Society Organizations and the State for the purpose of (re)building this trust alongside (re)defining of types of Cultural Capital at the expense of the Camorra and its ability to thrive in a community. This was conducted through the antiracket association, where businesspeople needed to be convinced that paying the Camorra *is not normal*, rather, it is an imposition, and that they are able to denounce their extorters in safety with support from the antiracket and Carabinieri officers. This links to our general perception of the pizzo as something that had been accepted by the shopkeepers. The norm of payment that had become regularized and habitualised to the point where subjugation was deemed as an inescapable facet of an unfair, brutish and Hobbesian world needed to be traversed to the point where any future extortion attempts would be reported to the relevant authorities. The initial push for this required a businessperson to have sufficient trust in the Law Enforcement to take the first step, then have a Law Enforcement institution willing to support them during the denunciation process – thereby creating the initial contact between businesses and the Carabinieri which would provide the evidence that the unthinkable *can* be done - used later to entice other businesses.

Radio Siani, the Forum dei Giovani and the local church parishes sought to undermine the conditions under which the Camorra thrives in other ways. They attempted to divert those young people “at risk” who may engage in criminal activity in the future towards activities that brought them into contact with their own socio-cultural sphere. For Radio Siani, this involved purposeful interaction with individuals and organizations in their own Civil Society network, engaging in a process of promoting social and cultural projects that benefitted the territory – often sanctioned and sponsored by the State. These activities spread the message of the *cultura della legalità* through the radio station itself, but also pedagogically through the

participation of locals (notably children). This serves to provide other options to Camorra influence, whilst also giving young people other options through these associations and the social benefit that they provide. The Forum provides an area for discussion for the young people in Ercolano, encouraging participation in political discourses regarding the comune as well as direct action for any other issues they felt needed addressing (such as cleaning where waste had been illegally dumped). In addition to these democratically decided inclusionary activities, the Forum provided a space where young people are able to socialise, read and do their school/university work away from home, alongside general social activities before, during and afterwards – interacting with socio-cultural spheres that are separate to the Camorra one. The importance is placed on doing this in a socialised manner, rather than an individualised.

This social sphere that the Forum provides is one where young people can talk about the issues in their community, including but not limited to the Camorra, critiquing one another and encouraging interaction with politics in general. Outside of these general State-sponsored discourses is the Church, whose cultural hegemonic discourses with regard to what it views as “Right” are at odds with what the *Cultura della legalità* views as “legal”, leading to a disunited fight against social exclusion, organized crime and criminality in general. Whilst the Church is part of the broad “anti-mafia” movement in Ercolano, its activities are deemed not to warrant State support outside funds normally provided to non-profit associations – this is despite its activities directly focus on those families and those children who have been linked to the Camorra and its socio-cultural sphere. In this context, the Church appears to be enticing these families and children away from the Camorra in the right way (socialisation), but replacing their Camorra-influenced socio-cultural sphere with something unprofitable and inefficient in economic and in Social Capital terms – thereby not worthy of fostering and support by the State.

In the same manner that the Camorra influences businesspeople (in the fostering of pizzo-paying norms), young people (in the attractiveness of mafiosità) and the population in general (through employment opportunities) so too has the ensemble of the antimafia movement responded to (re)occupy the *habitus* and influence the power of these norms. In this sense, “the political”, as Schmitt (1929) calls it, is the means by which social and power relations are organised and influenced, I contend that the antimafia movement has responded along a similarly opposing route – attempting to influence those same social and power relations so as to undermine and defeat the clans. What follows this defeat is the point of contention between different elements of the antimafia movement – whether that be the State, or different Civil Society Organizations. As Ernesto Laclau puts it:

A political dimension becomes constitutive of *all* social identity, and this leads to a further blurring of the line of demarcation [S]tate/ civil society: It is precisely this further blurring that we find in contemporary society in a more accentuated way than in Gramsci's time. The globalization of the economy, the reduction of the functions and powers of nation-[S]tates, the proliferation of international quasi-[S]tate organizations - everything points in the direction of complex processes of decision-making which could be approached in terms of hegemonic logics, but certainly not on the basis of any simple distinction public/private. (Laclau 2000, p.53)

In the context of the antimafia, this is achieved through the co-option of certain elements of Civil Society. Alongside a general restructuring of the economy away from public ownership and towards associationalism (De Tocqueville, 1988) sponsored by State and private funding, that we can refer to as neoliberal economics, the State has sought to develop social trust enough that citizens report illegality when it happens. Businesspeople have been given personal assurances by the law enforcement and members of the antiracket, the State has funded associations for the purpose of improving social trust and young people have been given access to associations that promote cooperation and personal (or moral) development. Despite this, important questions remain – particularly when we observe this new antimafia/State Cultural Hegemony as only supporting associations insofar as they are beneficial in economic and social terms as the State/private organisations understand it. To put it in another way, it is possible that some of the underlying causes of organized crime and criminality that should arguably be regarded as a goal to defeat *ipso facto* (i.e. poverty, alienation), are not solved with this strategy in a meaningful way when they are not useful for economic gain or Social Capital. In this sense, whilst the transformation of criminal cultures of illegality to Statist cultures of legality is a desirable *telos*, when culture takes preference over the improvement of socio-economic factors for those most vulnerable, we risk the State socialising its population not to question the law. In this, we should refer to the “antimafias”, plural, rather than “antimafia”, singular since the groups are competing for the same space in the *habitus*. Using the singular implies that there is one movement with one end goal, which is susceptible to co-option in the pursuit of a different end goal.

There is a troubling and duplicitous nature to the State and the antimafia in this regard – particularly when we analyse the *pizzo* itself. I hypothesised that *the pizzo is understood as a systemic tax*, and indeed when we look at the different actors involved, the perceptions of the *pizzo* by the different actors involved appears to be remarkably similar to what we would call “tax”. As for the clans themselves, the money collected from businesses has been demonstrated to contribute (at least in part, if not entirely) towards the salaries or “welfare” of camorristi and/or their families (Camorriste, 2016; Colletti, 2016). A relatively small amount is

involuntarily given to a collector, which then goes towards the central administration, to then be redistributed accordingly as directed by the clan's administrators. Similarly to taxation by the State, not only is this payment involuntary in the sense that a business is required to pay it, but at a certain point this payment has become accepted (at least passively) and even habitualised. In the same way that the State has been able to habitualise businesses to pay their required taxes with relatively little resistance, so too has the Camorra attempted to foster this kind of disposition upon individuals in its territory.

In case someone from outside this culture asks why the shopkeepers did not simply denounce when they were approached – so as to rise up against a system that, unlike State taxes, simply exists for the benefit of (criminal) others, it is important to note the genealogy of taxation itself. The question was asked by Étienne de La Boétie of peasants under the French feudalism in the 1500s: why

so many men, so many villages, so many cities, so many nations, sometimes suffer under a single tyrant who has no power other than the power they give him; who is able to harm them only to the extent to which they have the willingness to bear with him; who could do them absolutely no injury unless they preferred to put up with him rather than contradict him. (1553, p.42)

The answer for us is the same: it is because they have been conditioned to do so, based on habit, and a flawed conception that subjugation to such power structures is the normal state of affairs. The fear of reprisals certainly exists, but this is only part of the story. Here we draw purposeful similarity between precursors to modern States, feudal kingdoms and criminal groups precisely because of their ability to influence “the political”. In the same disconcerting manner to La Boétie, Wilhelm Reich noted that the astonishing thing about people in general is

not that some people steal or that others occasionally go out on strike, but rather that all those who are starving do not steal as a regular practice, and all those who are exploited are not continually out on strike: after centuries of exploitation, why do people still tolerate being humiliated and enslaved, to such a point, indeed, that they actually want humiliation and slavery not only for others but for themselves? (Deleuze and Guattari, 1972, p.38)

We can ask ourselves the same question: the main issue is not why businesses denounce the pizzo, but rather why so many businesses continue to pay it? Here we point to the effects that the Camorra's influence in localised social, cultural, economic matters in daily life

that their biopolitical power represents. This ultimately has the side-effect of posing the questions of our own culture and *habitus* and the manner in which we are socialised too.

On first glance this seems “radical”, or even facetious, but I claim that in the same manner that the mechanisms that facilitate the normality of regular tax payment are a more sophisticated and institutionalised version of the pizzo, the facilitation of pizzo payment mechanisms by a criminal group work in the same way. In this sense, what makes a tax a tax is its involuntariness of payment alongside some kind of regularity of payments, rather than who decides what it is to be spent on. In the same vein, where we have demonstrated the pizzo to not only be “involuntary”, but also have some “regularity”, the only remaining difference between tax and pizzo appears to be that the contributions gained from the pizzo are out of sync with what the State understands to be the “public good”. This becomes a particularly poignant consideration when contributions gained from the pizzo go towards the “wages” or “salary” of clan members and/or their families, and are, one could argue, going towards a “good” for a community, albeit a much more closed and clandestine community (Levitt and Venkatesh, 2000; Colletti, 2016). These kind of contributions distributed from the pizzo simply go towards a “good” that is out of sync with what the State would consider a “public good”; both the State and the clan are doing what they deem to be best and right for their respective communities in their own circumstances. The only difference is the strata of people they are trying to benefit - one has a broader community than the other. If we are to understand this kind of regularised and involuntary payment to the Camorra as extortive, State taxation must also suffer the same judgement.

In this I am actively drawing a definite line of similarity between a social movement that rejects organized crime and the pizzo with examples of tax resistance against the State. On the one hand the pizzo is rejected because it only benefits those who are part of the criminal group itself, and does not serve the payers other than the *metus causa factum*, whereas on the other its “illegitimacy” *per se* is decided by that institution which, by all accounts, began in a similar way and evolved to a point at which this tax that had already come to be seen as a socially, culturally and habitually normal thing, came to be more accountable to the people from whom it was extracting money. Simply put, much like tax resistance involves altering the socio-cultural sphere and through the changing of norms, the resistance against the pizzo must do the same.

It was also hypothesized that *the process of changing attitudes towards mafias has become the focus for anti-mafia movements*, which we can categorically affirm, though with additional caveats that place this cultural war against the Camorra alongside and complementary to judicial repression. In this vein, I identify the cultural side of the antimafia movement (through

the *Cultura della legalità* and the *Modello Ercolano*) as a purposeful strategy – redefining notions of Cultural Capital in the area, and thereby altering the *habitus*. In our context, these notions are redefined as those which foster active citizenship, entrepreneurship and sustainability – where it is hoped will attract outside capital to the area, encourage local activism and alleviate poverty through greater employment opportunities. The rejection of the pizzo and *mafiosità* by shopkeepers is part of this process (assisted by the antiracket and law enforcement), as is the rejection of criminal/Camorra culture in general (assisted by activism and targeted socialisation).

The Sicilian writer Gesuldo Bufalino famously wrote that “La mafia sarà vinta da un esercito di maestri elementari” (the Mafia will be beaten by an army of primary school teachers), which is only partly true. Socialisation is important, but what Bufalino omits is the content of the curriculum that those school teachers teach to the new generations – socialisation must be away from Camorra influence and towards something else. In the case of Ercolano, I am concerned as to whether this “something else” that is being pursued actually addresses the deeper inequalities and issues that characterise the territory and create the environment where criminality may flourish.

An extended excerpt of a January 2017 news article for *Metropolisweb* about the Camorra and anti-Camorra in Ercolano is a fitting conclusion to this thesis, concerned as it is that new criminal hydra heads will sprout from below:

In the six years since the last deadly ambush in the *città degli scavi*, numbers are no longer written with blood, but instead with pride. The numbers do not represent the number of corpses, but rather the number of life sentences. These numbers do not tell of the merciless fury of the clans, but instead of their inexorable decline.

...

2016, in this sense, has been the *annus horribilis* for the bosses, murderers and chieftains. Godfathers, soldiers, extortionists, supporters. Pushers, runners, drug dealers and camorristi in skirts.

It has been the year in which the Camorra, under Vesuvius, has had to swallow bitterly, adding up to thousands of years in prison. The female bosses, the last die-hards were arrested. Godfathers who had orchestrated one of the bloodiest and most violent feuds in the history of the underworld were buried under a flood of life sentences.

THE NUMBERS. The figures put together by the work of Antimafia magistrates and the police who risked their lives in the shadows speak for themselves. The Carabinieri in Torre del Greco and Ercolano, along with the DDA [anti-mafia directorate], arrested a good five hundred camorristi between 2009 and today. An army that ruled the roost for twenty years by imposing the racket upon the entire city and killed in silence. The year that has just ended was above all a year of squeeze for the killers in the war between the Birra-Iacomino and Ascione-Papale clans. The two clans – along with their allies – have been involved in thirty-eight investigations over the last five years – all put up by former antimafia PM Pierpaolo Filippelli – which revealed thirty-eight of the sixty mafia killings. Crimes for which – in various levels of courts – were handed forty-four life sentences, twenty of which have already become final by Supreme Court judgements. The record-holder and boss of the Birra, Stefano Zeno, had ten of them (including two final judgements). In all, one hundred and twenty of the killers and bosses were arrested thanks to the words of forty pentiti – making Ercolano the “home” of those who have been sentenced for life and collaborators of justice. Additionally, there is a blow to any type of future reorganisation, with twenty bosses sentenced to maximum security imprisonment.

...

YEAR ZERO. The numbers say that the Camorra is almost gone from Ercolano. But the crisis and absence of work – especially in those forgotten alleyways – have led to the emergence of micro-bands of cocaine and marijuana dealers that often use children as runners. Inequalities which “strengthen” the remnants of the underworld because by themselves, the arrests and the work of a few associations are not enough. 2017 is Year Zero for the Camorra. But it is also a challenge for Ercolano. The city without bosses where the numbers no longer count the number of murder victims, but instead the number of prisoners. (*Metropolisweb*, 2 January 2017)

viii. Appendix

I: Notes on the methodology

English-language research on the antiracket movement in Italy has largely been focussed on the Sicilian context. The cultural fascination with “the mafia” partly explains this, but also the attention that many of the anti-mafia movements have attracted. The first antiracket association in Italy was formed in 1990 in the small city of Capo d’Orlando, close to Messina (Grasso, 1990), and there has been a significant focus on Palermo (Gunnarson, 2008; 2014; Orlando, 2000; Schneider & Schneider, 2003) where momentous assassinations of judges, shopkeepers and activists were met by what has been referred to as the Palermo Spring. The outcry after the murder of Giovanni Falcone and Paolo Borsellino in particular lent itself to this, where reaction over the following years led to the creation of Libera, the expansion of the Federazione antiracket Italiana as well as Addiopizzo. Thus, Palermo is a city that has been placed under the microscope and has become a potent symbol of the fight against mafia in Italy, but has its own history of the mafia and its own social history of the antimafia. The city of Naples – the latter capital of the *regno delle due Sicilie*, its province characterised by brigantry post-unification, and the first Italian city that first rebelled against Nazi occupation in 1944, has largely been ignored on an international level with regard to the anti-mafia movement. It came into the spotlight with the publication of Roberto Saviano’s *Gomorrah* in English, and has the unfavourable image abroad of a city covered in discarded rubbish – all linked to its own local mafias, the Camorra. Naples has a different experience of mafia to Sicily, but has nonetheless its own anti-mafia stories to tell. As we have seen, like in Sicily, there is an anti-mafia movement, and there are anti-racket associations that have, alongside law enforcement agencies and other parts of Civil Society, uprooted their local clans and their extortion rackets.

My initial fascination with the topic came from the Sicilian context, which I was fortunate to study during my undergraduate degree. In 2013/4 this project was originally envisioned with Palermo and Addiopizzo in mind, though the presence of other researchers working in the same area at the time (see Gunnarson, 2014) meant that I had a choice between drawing upon the same data as others, or conducting the project elsewhere. During this time I was fortunate enough to meet a relevant gatekeeper from Radio Siani via a mutual friend, who encouraged me to conduct my research project in Ercolano instead.

Initial interviews were conducted in March 2014 with the help of my gatekeeper, and a visiting German radiobroadcaster, Jan-Christoph Kitzler, who was in Ercolano to write a story about the anti-racket association.⁸⁷ This particularly day was the *giorno della legalità*,

⁸⁷ I am incredibly indebted to Jan-Christoph here and my gatekeeper. I was only expecting to visit Radio Siani and be shown around the town, however, my gatekeeper had planned a full morning of interviews with the former mayor of the town, shopkeepers from the antiracket and the president of Radio Siani that were much

the day of legality, when leading members of the institution, antiracket association and other actors in the anti-mafia community organised events, marches and interviews which highlighted the necessity to resist organized crime in the area. These interviews and meetings gave me the basis through which to plan further fieldwork, which was conducted between November 2014 and August 2015. I returned to Naples at the beginning of 2017, and have been living here ever since.

In the first few months of my research, I purposely avoided contacts that I had made through my gatekeeper six months before. By diversifying the people I was interacting with, I hoped to get a broader picture of the area which I could then contrast with one another. In order to interact with individuals in the area, I rented a room in a shared apartment, and began work as an English teacher. I obtained a job for a language association close to Ercolano which provided native English speakers to primary schools as teaching assistants. In the evenings, this language association organised afterschool English lessons for people in the area where I was a teacher for children, young people and adults. Additionally, I organised my own private English lessons in the area which I did for the duration of my fieldwork. As I noted in the methodology, I split my research into three distinct periods, though there is an element of overlap. These first few months before interacting with my “contacts” in the anti-mafia movement could best be described as “covert” in that my underlying reasons for living in the area, other than teaching, were revealed only when asked.

To my surprise most people were satisfied with my reasons for being in the area without any further questions, whereas the ones who pried for further explanation as to “why here and why not elsewhere?”, were incredibly helpful and did their best to put me in contact with politicians and members of local Civil Society Organizations that they knew. It is in these instances I relied on snowball sampling whereby one contact leads me to another, and then another, and so on. During this time I broadened my personal network by interacting with social and cultural associations in the Naples area: I regularly attended social events aimed at improving local’s language skills such as the “British Community Naples”, an association which organised weekly events that encourage young people to meet and practice their English. This community was particularly useful as it placed me in contact with individuals from the Naples area who wanted to improve their English, whether that was through

more far reaching than I could have ever dreamed of. Whilst Kitzler came to Ercolano with a fully functional and expensive microphone, I instead was going to rely on a rudimentary Dictaphone app available on my phone. He kindly offered to ask questions on my behalf during these interviews in addition to his own questions, and then even more kindly sent me these audio files in the following days, as well as giving me the permission to use them in this thesis. He wrote an article based on these interviews and interactions available in German at: http://www.deutschlandfunk.de/kampf-gegen-die-Camorra-die-mutigen-buerger-von-ercolano.724.de.html?dram:article_id=296721

lessons and/or meeting socially, as well as individuals who were interested in my research project, and wanted to put me in contact with relevant organizations and individuals that they thought could assist me.

From the second period onwards (January) I began approaching local Civil Society Organizations involved in the anti-mafia movement so as to identify the extent to which individuals in the area interacted with, and were influenced by socio-cultural anti-mafia spheres and vice-versa. In the Ercolano anti-mafia movement two of these spheres were already identified: the antiracket association (Ercolano per la legalità) and Radio Siani. I later noticed that the administration-based Youth Forum (Forum dei Giovani) were involved in social and cultural initiatives against the Camorra. The same can be said for the local Church parishes, though the only activities I noted at first was them lending space for town meetings discussing the illegal dumping of toxic waste by Camorra and rogue entrepreneurs. My access to the Santa Maria del Pilar parish church and their related associations came through one of the guys from the Forum dei Giovani, who introduced me to Padre Incoronato. I continued to meet with members from both of these associations for the remainder of my time in Ercolano.

By chance, I met another member of Radio Siani outside of the radio station itself and we became friends. Since my original gatekeeper had moved away from Ercolano for work in the United States, this guaranteed continued access. Indeed it was through this new gatekeeper that was I kept up to date on their activities, arranged further visits to the association and was invited to join a coach full of association members for the Libera national demonstration in March in Bologna as part of the “*settimana della legalità*”, week of legality, a week of events throughout Italy that highlight the issues of organized crime in Italy.

In April I began approaching businesses in the anti-racket association to distribute the questionnaires. Since I had met Raffaella Ottaviano a year beforehand, and she knew I was coming back, I decided to meet her again to remind her that I was around, and of the research that I was conducting. Further information about the questionnaires can be found in Appendix IV.

The final period of the fieldwork involved interviewing members of the Carabinieri and the PM Pierpaolo Filippelli. Interactions and interviews with the Carabinieri and the judiciary was purposely left until the end of my fieldwork so as to mitigate against influence that speaking to law enforcement institutions may have upon the shopkeepers that I interviewed.

An obvious omission from the entire project is that of the camorrista. No effort was made to gain data directly from camorristi outside of judicial reports and accounts from Camorra due

to a mixture of feasibility and concerns for safety of myself, as well as those who I had been interacting with throughout the project. The inclusion of testimony from *pentiti* of Ercolano-based clans as mentioned in the Zoom documents and elsewhere partially compensate for this (Procedimento Penale n.5030/2012 R. G. Trib.; Conticello, 2015; Gerina and Vasile, 2015; *Camorriste*, 2016)

II: Challenges to primary data collection

In presentations of this project to conferences taken place before and after fieldwork, a common question asked was “*why would shopkeepers want speak about their experiences with the racket with an outside such as yourself?*” which I will answer directly here. Even when I speak Italian (as I did when I conducted this research), I am clearly an outsider to the *mezzogiorno* region – my mannerisms, my accent, my appearance, the way I dress, and my general sense of presenting myself are ultimately from a different culture and environment to that of the participants in this project. Whilst it has been suggested that this is a limitation on this project due to the general perception that there is a distrust for outsiders (which there is), I instead reject this as a limitation, and argue that precisely because I am a foreigner, and I am an outsider, I am able to extract data that would be otherwise unavailable to a project conducted by a local. Indeed, it is precisely because I am so clearly an outsider that shopkeepers would be more willing to trust that I am not a *camorrista incognito*.⁸⁸ I welcome similar research projects conducted by locals, Italians, Southerners, and female researchers to account for these variables.

Select omission of certain pieces of information should also be considered during the interviews of shopkeepers. As noted in the introduction there is a possibility that these business people paid the *pizzo*, or had some kind of mutual beneficial relationship with the Camorra (Alessandro, 2009). The payment of money to an OCG is a criminal offence, and any account of their experiences with local *camorristi* would have to corroborate any details that they may have given in court. This is particularly true if a shopkeeper wishes to overplay their resistance to the *pizzo* due to some notion of honour, or a fear of embarrassment.

One particular challenge came in the interviews conducted with the baker.⁸⁹ two things became clear: she believed that “Everyone paid it” (the *pizzo*), and that “this was a land ravaged by the *pizzo*” (N5 18032014); she denied that she had ever experienced interactions with the Camorra *before* the incidents mentioned in the “*Businesses and the*

⁸⁸ I am indebted to Carina Gunnarson for this suggestion.

⁸⁹ There were two: one with Jan-Christoph Kitzler in 2014, and another in April the following year to double-check information. (N5 18032014; N5 17042015)

pizzo” chapter (N5 17042015). This leaves us with two options: either we take her claims as merely a perception of the extent of *pizzo* payment in Ercolano *minus* her (i.e. she instead should have said “Everyone paid *pizzo*... apart from me”; “this was a land ravaged by the *pizzo*... except for me”), or it was a subtle way of saying that she had paid it beforehand too, which she then denied in a later interview. If she *had* paid before, this would lead us to infer that they had likely paid *pizzo* to the other clan (the Ascione, the historic clan of the area) before this interaction with the Birra clan, and that these interactions with the Birra were simply a step too far for a business already paying *pizzo*, *or* it was merely an extra extension of the payments already being made to the Birra. The timing of the interaction would also fit, particularly given the decline of the Ascione in light of a war they were losing against the Birra clan, and presumably, the Birra clan’s expansion into new territory through the collection of *pizzo*. Though it must be stressed that there is no evidence to suggest that the *pizzo* had ever been paid by the bakery, the placement of these factors in the wider context of the widespread payment of *pizzo* is difficult to ignore.

III: Ethical considerations

The safety of the researcher is an important factor. There are enough accounts and studies on Camorra clans to demonstrate their violent nature to provide at least an element of apprehension for research *in the field* about them and their interaction with a community. Research in the field always has its risks, highlighted most recently in December 2015 by the horrific political murder of an Italian PhD student, Giulio Regeni, from the University of Cambridge during his field research in Egypt.

The projects that researchers conduct are important, though there is an inherent trade-off between the safety of the researcher and some of the data, particularly when it is on a delicate or sensitive topic, and absolute safety cannot be guaranteed. Given that this project was conducted in an area where the Camorra was substantially weakened, and that the topic itself was the “anti-Camorra” rather than the Camorra, the risks for this project however, were minimal. Like many large cities, Naples is well-known for its level of petty crime. Throughout my fieldwork, I only had a few examples where I felt anything close to being in any immediate danger, and even then, they were all fairly insubstantial.

Given that this project involved constant interaction in the field with real people, the ethical considerations are huge. Similarly to the ethical dilemma that William Foote Whyte (1969) and Joseph T Howell (1972) had regarding the eventual publication of their work, I knew I was going to write about the people I met, and some of them might even get around to reading this (though, as Whyte noted, not many of his contacts did). Any ethical consideration on the part of the people I met in this time can be only be countered by strict anonymity. Unless the name of the individual is known or printed elsewhere, in what I can normatively describe as “in the public eye” (e.g. politician, heads of organizations etc.), all names of people I identify have been changed. One main ethical consideration on the ethnographic method was whether individuals I met through my overt research (i.e. people who knew about my research) were to meet individuals I met during my first couple of months (i.e. people who didn’t know about my research), but no such problem ever occurred – the two groups remained entirely distinct from one another.

I also need to emphasise the considerations taken with regard to Civil Society Organizations: in particular those who are members of the anti-racket and other anti-Camorra organizations. The questionnaires that I distributed, and the interviews I conducted with shopkeepers were anonymous. Given that a number of the shopkeepers were likely to have been threatened by camorristi in the past, the line of questioning progressed so that if there was any hint of emotional difficulty for the interviewee, I would not press forward any further questioning.

Likewise, when discussing payment of pizzo money, if a question was answered ambiguously, and seemingly purposely so, I did not pursue it either.

In the interviews with law enforcement there is a mixture of anonymity and openness. One of the officers was an undercover officer, obviously without question they are to remain anonymous. On the more public figures: heads of organizations, politicians, journalists – there is no anonymity unless requested. Indeed, it is often that these individuals want to be seen and want to be heard so that they can get their message out. Interactions with Radio Siani, Raffaella Ottaviano and Nino Daniele, for example, are a testament to this.

I originally considered changing the name of the *comune* that I was studying, so that I could attempt to write in complete anonymity, but the more I observed and understood the area, the more this would become impossible – particularly considering the focus by FAI on the area. The sheer mention of Herculaneum excavation site, the proximity to Vesuvius and the structural problems that this entails, as well as the presence of a widely regarded anti-racket association made this a somewhat futile endeavour.

IV: Questionnaire

The following thirteen pages contain the questionnaire that I distributed to members of the antiracket association “Ercolano per la legalità”. It was written in Italian, though an English version is available on request.

The FAI “guida per il consumatore critico antiracket 2014” provided a list of sixty-eight businesses that were members of the antiracket association. I went to each of these businesses by foot to see whether they could be used, and whether the guide had correctly written the address and other details, or whether the business still existed. The guide itself was somewhat outdated in parts, and had some incorrect information, particularly with regard to businesses that no longer existed. Examples such as incorrect street names,⁹⁰ businesses that had closed down and not been replaced, businesses that exist out of a garage and businesses that were self-employed individuals in their apartment block. It was likely that a number of these businesses had simply listed a postal address rather than the address where they could be found, and therefore were not contactable. Given the number of outdated or inaccessible businesses, the starting sixty-eight businesses was reduced to forty-five. Upon the distribution of questionnaire the number reduced again for a variety of reasons: on inquiry the owner did not realise that they were members; the business whilst having the same name at the same address now had different owners and was not involved with the antiracket; the boss or manager was not present; they clearly stated that they did not want to participate or they failed to complete the questionnaire. Of these forty-five usable businesses from the local antiracket, only twenty-three returned their questionnaire, which was narrowed down again to twenty-two due to incompleteness.⁹¹

⁹⁰ I spent a long time looking for a “Corso Mesina”, which was later revealed to be a typo in the guide of “Corso Resina”

⁹¹ Two participants only filled in part of their questionnaires, making much of their data unusable.

Breve descrizione del progetto

Questo progetto di ricerca è parte della mia tesi di dottorato, che verrà discussa presso l'Università di Bath (Regno Unito). L'obiettivo primario di questo lavoro è comprendere in che modo, ad Ercolano, i movimenti antimafia cercano di ostacolare le attività mafiose. Precisamente, l'oggetto della mia ricerca consiste nello studiare la società civile e la misura del capitale sociale nella città, intesi come reti di norme e valori condivisi che facilitano la cooperazione sia all'interno di un singolo gruppo che fra gruppi diversi. I principali interessi di ricerca riguardano: la resistenza al pizzo (denaro/favori/provvigioni) pagato regolarmente alla malavita organizzata dai titolari di attività commerciali e la reazione della società civile nei confronti del fenomeno mafioso.

Il presente questionario è del tutto anonimo e una volta terminata la compilazione, non sarà in alcun modo possibile risalire alle risposte di nessun autore. La ricerca ha lo scopo di raccogliere dati esclusivamente per fini accademici e statistici, e non ha alcun tipo di relazione con associazioni come partiti politici, sindacati, associazioni di categoria e organismi governativi.

La prego di completare il questionario in tutte le sue parti segnando con una [x] il riquadro che corrisponde alla sua posizione (indicare sempre una sola risposta, se non diversamente specificato). Se desidera ricevere i risultati dell'indagine non dimentichi di inserire il suo indirizzo di posta elettronica. Per eventuali informazioni e chiarimenti sono sempre a sua disposizione. Grazie per la sua collaborazione.

Distinti saluti

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Dati personali

1. Informazioni relative all'intervistato

☐ Maschio ☐ Femmina ☐ Altro

2. Anno di nascita

3. Domicilio

☐ Città di Ercolano

☐ Altro comune/provincia → specificare

4. Qual è il Suo attuale stato civile

☐ Sposato/a ☐ Convivente ☐ Divorziato/a / Seperato/a

☐ Vedovo/a ☐ Nubile/Celibe

5. Qual è il Suo titolo di studio?

☐ Nessuno

☐ Licenza elementare

☐ Licenza media

☐ Diploma di scuola secondaria superior (maturità)

☐ Laurea triennale

☐ Laurea specialistica / quadriennale / magistrale ciclo unico

6. Quanti figli ha? (figli SUOI, non quelli adottati, affidati o del partner)

Specifichi il numero di figli:

7. A parte Lei, chi vive nella sua famiglia?

(Vivere in famiglia' significa: trascorrere una media di quattro o più notti la settimana nella stessa casa. Includere nei figli presenti anche i figli del partner se vivono in famiglia, quelli adottati, quelli affidati e i figli studenti assenti temporaneamente)

Prego indicare con una [x]. Una risposta per riga

Persone che vivono nella sua famiglia	SI	NO	Numero
Compagno/a marito o moglie			
Figli			
Genitori			
Nonni			
Altri parenti			
Altri componenti non imparentati			

La Sua azienda

8. Il Suo negozio/impresa è:

- ☐ Una nuova attività
- ☐ Una attività che la sua famiglia si tramanda di generazione in generazione
- ☐ Una attività che già esisteva ma ha cambiato proprietario

9. Il suo negozio/impresa è ...

- ☐ Una impresa a conduzione familiare
- ☐ Una impresa individuale
- ☐ Una società (di capitali o di persone)

10. Ci sono altri suoi familiari che lavorano nel negozio/azienda pur non essendo proprietari o “manager”?

☐ Sì → specificare quanti

☐ No

11. Da quanti anni è aperto il suo negozio/impresa?

☐ Da meno di 2 anni ☐ Da 3 a 5 anni ☐ Da 6 e 10 anni

☐ Da oltre 10 anni

12. Da quanti anni il suo negozio/impresa è gestito dall'attuale proprietario?

..... anni

13. Quante persone lavorano nella sua Impresa? (Includere sia lavoratori part-time che full-time)

☐ 1-5 occupati

☐ 6-10 occupati

☐ 11 a 20 occupati

☐ 21 a 30 occupati

☐ 31-40 occupati

☐ 41-50 occupati

☐ Più di 51 occupati

14. Quali sono I Suoi clienti abituali? (tutto l'anno, non solo l'estate)
(inserisca un valore percentuale per ogni categoria di clienti facendo attenzione che il totale non superi il 100 per cento)

<i>Clienti piu frequenti</i>	%
Persone di Ercolano	
Persone di Napoli	
Clienti di altre zone in Campania	
Clienti di altre regioni italiane	
Clienti di altre Nazioni	
<i>Percentuale totale</i>	100

15. Qual è il fatturato annuo della Sua azienda?

Indicare con una [x] una sola risposta.

- ☐ Meno di 50 000 euro all'anno
- ☐ Da 50 000 euro a 100 000 all'anno
- ☐ Da 100 000 euro a 200 000 euro all'anno
- ☐ Da 200 000 euro a 500 000 euro all'anno
- ☐ Da 500 000 euro a 1 milione di euro
- ☐ Piu di 1 milione di euro

16. Il Suo esercizio paga per servizi di vigilanza privata?

- ☐ No ☐ Si (Specificare quale)

Vita privata

17. Quanto è interessato/a alla politica?

- ☐ Per niente interessato/a
- ☐ Non molto interessato/a
- ☐ Abbastanza interessato/a
- ☐ Molto interessato/a

18. Quanto spesso discute di politica con altre persone?

- ☐ Mai
- ☐ Raramente
- ☐ Qualche volta
- ☐ Spesso

19. Quanto spesso parla di politica con il tipo di persone qui sotto elencate?

Indicare con una [x] una sola risposta per riga

	Mai	Raramente	Qualche volta	Spesso
Amici				
Famiglia				
Vicini				
Colleghe di lavoro				
Membri di associazioni o organizzazioni di cui faccio parte				

20. Le persone utilizzano diversi mezzi per informarsi su ciò che accade nel proprio Paese e nel mondo. Per ognuna delle seguenti fonti di informazione qui sotto elencate, indichi quali ha usato nell'ultima settimana per informarsi

Prego indicare con una [x] una sola risposta per riga

Fonte di informazione	Non l'ho utilizzato nell'ultima settimana	L'ho utilizzato nell'ultima settimana
Quotidiano		
Notiziario TV o radio		
Riviste		
Approfondimenti TV o radio		
Libri		
Informazioni via Internet (Facebook, e-mail, siti internet, ecc.)		
Discussioni con amici, o colleghi		
Discussioni con famiglia		

21. Quanto nella sua vita crede sia importante ciascuno dei seguenti ambiti?

Prego indicare con una [x] una sola risposta per riga

	Per niente importante	Non molto importante	Abbastanza importante	Molto importante
Lavoro				
Famiglia				
Amici e conoscenti				
Tempo libero				
Politica				
Religione				

22. Indichi per ogni istituzione elencata, quanto fiducia ha in essa:
nessuna, poca, abbastanza o molta

Indicare con una [x] una sola risposta per riga

	Nessuna fiducia	Poca fiducia	Abastanza fiducia	Molta fiducia
La Chiesa				
La stampa				
La televisione				
I sindacati				
La polizia di stato				
I carabinieri				
La guardia di finanza				
La magistratura				
Il parlamento				
La pubblica amministrazione				
L'Unione Europea				
Confindustria				
I partiti politici				
Il Governo nazionale con sede a Roma				
Il Governo regionale con sede a Napoli				
Il comune di Ercolano				
Organizzazioni Anti- Camorra				

23. Le chiederemo ora qual è il grado di fiducia che ripone nei confronti delle persone che fanno parte di vari gruppi. Indichi per ognuno di loro se ripone nessuna, poca, abbastanza o molta fiducia

Prego indicare con una [x] una sola risposta per riga

Fiducia in:	Nessuna fiducia	Poca fiducia	Abbastanza fiducia	Molta fiducia
La Sua famiglia				
I Suoi vicini di casa				
Ercolanesi				
Persone che Lei conosce personalmente				
Persone che incontra per la prima volta				
I Napoletani in generale				
I meridionali in generale				
Gli Italiani in generale				
I colleghi di lavoro				
Gli stranieri in generale				

24. Che cosa influenza maggiormente la sua scelta del voto alle elezioni politiche?

- ☐ La fiducia nel candidato
- ☐ Il programma elettorale
- ☐ Le sue idee politiche
- ☐ La fiducia nei leader o partiti/schieramenti nazionali
- ☐ La sfiducia nei leader o partiti/schieramenti nazionali
- ☐ Il consiglio di amici, familiari, parenti
- ☐ Il giudizio sull'azione del governo in Italia

25. In politica di solito si parla di “sinistra” e di “destra”. Quale di questi due schieramenti rispecchia meglio la Sua posizione politica?

Cerchiare solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Sinistra

Destra

Commento:

Ercolano

26. A Ercolano, quante opportunità ha la gente comune di esprimere le proprie opinioni alla classe politica?

Cerchiare solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Nessuna opportunità

Molte opportunità

27. Quanta importanza dà la classe politica di Ercolano alle opinioni dei cittadini comuni? **Cerchiare** solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Nessuna opportunità

Molte opportunità

28. Come valuterebbe l'operato delle forze dell'ordine ad Ercolano nell'anno 2000? **Cerchiare** solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Pessimo

Ottimo

29. Come valuterebbe l'operato delle forze dell'ordine ad Ercolano oggi? **Cerchiare** solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Pessimo

Ottimo

30. Come valuterebbe l'operato della politica locale per il bene comune di Ercolano nell'anno 2000? **Cerchiare** solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Pessimo

Ottimo

31. Come valuterebbe l'operato della politica locale per il bene comune di Ercolano oggi? **Cerchiare** solo uno dei valori

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Pessimo

Ottimo

L'antiracket

32. Di quali associazioni anti-racket il suo esercizio è ufficialmente membro?

(In questa sezione è possibile indicare più di una risposta)

- ☐ Addiopizzo
- ☐ Federazione antiracket Italiana (FAI)
- ☐ Ercolano per la legalità
- ☐ Altro (prego specificare)
- ☐ Non sono membro di nessuna associazione

In che anno il suo esercizio è diventato membro?

33. Qualcuno l'ha invitato/a ad unirsi al movimento antiracket a Ercolano?

Indicare una sola risposta

Pensi bene alla Sua risposta prima di rispondere

- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un membro della mia famiglia
- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un/a amico/a
- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un/a collega di lavoro di Ercolano
- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un/a collega di lavoro (generico)
- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un vicino di casa
- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un cliente
- ☐ Me l'ha chiesto un attivista/membro dell'antiracket
- ☐ Nessuno me l'ha chiesto, ho contattato l'antiracket personalmente
- ☐ Altro → specificare

34. Fra quale qua sotto, che frase più identifica la sua esperienza?

- ☐ Non ho mai pagato il pizzo e non ho mai subito intimidazioni di natura estorsiva
- ☐ Non ho mai pagato il pizzo e ho sempre denunciato i tentativi di estorsioni subiti
- ☐ Ho pagato il pizzo fino al e successivamente ho denunciato l'estorsione
- ☐ Ho pagato il pizzo fino al
- ☐ Non voglio/posso rispondere

35. Secondo Lei, a Ercolano, su 100 esercizi commerciali quanti pagano regolarmente il pizzo?

Su 100 lo pagano almeno esercizi commerciali

36. Secondo Lei, perchè la gente paga il pizzo?

(In questa sezione è possibile indicare più di una risposta)

- ☐ Perché hanno paura
- ☐ Perché non c'è abbastanza protezione da parte del governo
- ☐ Perché non c'è abbastanza protezione da parte delle forze dell'ordine
- ☐ Per abitudine
- ☐ Perché non c'è collaborazione tra gli esercizi
- ☐ Perché pagare il pizzo equivale a protezione efficiente e a basso costo
- ☐ Altro (specificare)

.....

Inserire un asterisco [*] su ciò che ritiene più importante

37. Se un commerciante decide di denunciare il suo estorsore, quanto crede che le istituzioni siano in grado di tutelare i suoi diritti (arrestando l'estorsore, tenendolo per lungo tempo in galera e garantendo la sicurezza dal commerciante e della sua famiglia)?

- ☐ Per nulla in grado di tutelare i diritti del commerciante
- ☐ Poco in grado di tutelare i diritti del commerciante
- ☐ Abbastanza in grado di tutelare i diritti del commerciante
- ☐ Molto in grado di tutelare i diritti del commerciante

38. Sarebbe disposto a farsi intervistare dal ricercatore?

- ☐ Sì
- ☐ No

Il Suo indirizzo e-mail:

V: Log Book notes

This is a collection of log-book notes that I wrote during my time in Naples. I initially wrote these on paper, and then wrote them up on the computer for clarity's sake. I have given pseudonyms to individuals I met who are not already in the public eye, often indicated by a single letter. This is not a complete publication of my log-book notes, but instead an excerpt of those that I have deemed the most relevant/important/interesting.

10th January 2015

I'm exhausted after a long evening of non-stop chatter – I jotted down a lot of this down elsewhere so I could write it up this morning instead of last night.

I had been speaking to N online because he decided that he wanted to improve his English, so I arranged to meet up with him and his girlfriend for a pizza. They are from Torre del Greco, so on WhatsApp he offered to meet at 8 in Piazza San Ciro in Portici so save me walking, but there was a lot of traffic so he they didn't actually arrive until just before 9. Stood there on a Saturday evening I just watched the world around me – kids as young as 11 or 12 shouting, jumping, hitting one another for fun, sharing cigarettes. A group of girls who I guess were around 13 or 14 years old kept going in and out of the piazza and getting all jittery around some of the other older guys (18 or 20 years old) in the piazza, who looked pretty similar to what we in the UK would call "chavs". It seemed as if there was some kind of romantic connection between some of these two groups, but I couldn't be sure. It all seemed a bit odd to be to see younger kids out at this kind of time – but maybe that's just me.

Initially we drove to a pizzeria in San Giorgio a Cremano which apparently does fantastic pizza, but it was already packed with a long queue, so we decided to head to a pizzeria in Torre del Greco instead – "Joseph under the water" which used to be called the same, but in Neapolitan. N told me that they changed it to English make it appear more modern – but I'm not sure if he was joking or not.

Despite his interest in improving his English, we spoke almost exclusively in Italian – I think N was a bit apprehensive about making mistakes and embarrassing himself. Also, M speaks very little English, so it would have been a bit awkward for her I guess. They started telling me about themselves – N and M had been together for 9 years – something incredible when you consider that he was 29 and she was only 25, but they did seem to be very well suited and comfortable with one another. Like other Italian couples I've met, the woman is very much the boss, and actually talked more than he did! We talked about a number of things: family, home life, the differences between Italy/Naples and the UK. They seemed incredibly

shocked by the revelation that (1) I don't drive and (2) I no longer live with my family. They were particularly shocked that I almost exclusively cycle or use public transport – two things incredibly difficult to do in Naples. They told me how public transport doesn't work – so everyone buys a car instead. In Torre del Greco, for example, there is limited transport links – you can use one of the Circumvesuviana stations which is unreliable and sometimes infrequent, or busses which are even worse. They had taken a trip to Paris recently and were surprised that the Metro and other public transports were so frequent.

When we were leaving the pizzeria, N noticed me looking at the large amount of rubbish in the streets, explaining that Torre isn't normally like this, and it was because the private company hired to collect rubbish had a disagreement with the comune. They were dissatisfied with their service, so the company simply stopped collecting it. He said that it was bad now, but a few years ago it was a lot worse – with no rubbish collected for weeks.

It is reasons like this that make them want to pack up and leave the area forever. This is why they want to improve their language skills – M tells me that she is very competent in French, having studied for a year there, but she hasn't spoken English since she went on a language course to Cambridge with school when she was 15.

We continued to talk about the differences between Naples and the UK. M told me that she regarded the English to be rather “cold” – I've heard this before from other Italians, but I explained that it was because Italians show a lot more emotion than those in the UK. I said that the English generally only really show emotion when they truly mean it, or when they have been drinking – and also that the immense passionate emotions that Italians show can sometimes be perceived as invasive or full of hyperbole to the point of meaninglessness. She asked me what faith I was, where I told her that I was an atheist which surprised her a lot, even more so when I told her that churchgoing is not very common in the UK. Unsurprisingly, N and M are Catholic, though she attends church much more than he does.

We drove towards the port to get a sweet coffee where M asked me “do you know what the Camorra is?”. The question surprised me as it was a bit out of the blue, and I responded that I had. They were surprised, but I told them that *Gomorra* (book and film) was relatively successful in the UK and that the topic in general interested me. I remember seeing the book in a media shop in my hometown when it was first published in English, and buying it which got me interested in the topic. I'm almost positive that I read *Gomorra* before I saw films like the *Godfather*. We had only met that day, and I hadn't really got the chance to talk about my overall purpose for being in Italy yet – they had seemed quite content talking about cultural differences so I was a bit conflicted about how to react at this surprise question. She asked what I thought of the Camorra in general, so I thought that honesty was the best policy – I

wasn't going to play dumb. I responded that I knew that they were territorially defined groups who influence and gain power from the social and economic relations of the area, and that they should be understood as power systems, rather than "criminal" organizations. She seemed impressed, and agreed with me. Our conversation was cut short as we walked up to the café which had a large group of guys outside. N joked that we should start talking in English so that they wouldn't understand what we were talking about!

They both see the Camorra and mafia-type associations in general as normal phenomena which go hand-in-hand with politics – they seemed genuinely surprised when I said that organized crime simply did not exist in the same way in the UK as in Italy. M said that their existence is simply a given – it's part of the culture here and they are inseparable. The port we were walking around, they said, was infamous for the clans, much like other ports in the area – where there is a port there is the Camorra. I asked what people are doing about the Camorra – where they both answered in unison "Nothing!" I asked why not – they said the reason is because people get killed – if you stand up to them you get killed, if you hang around with them you get killed. The best option is to stay out of sight, and just get on with your life.

We left the port and headed through the centre of Torre towards the top of Vesuvius where they wanted to show me the panorama of Naples. N purposely drove through an area close to the port – an area with cracked façades and quite a bit of degradation, telling me that it is places like these that are home to the Camorra in Torre. I realised momentarily how accustomed I had become to seeing derelict buildings, crumbling walls and uneven roads and pavements. I asked why they thought that groups like the Camorra grew here and not in the North or in the rest of Europe. N responded with a rather biased history lesson that rehashed old myths about the evil northerners who ruined the south - a rather reductionist view. He told me how the *regno delle due sicilie* was incredible wealthy before the Piedmontese invasion, which, though true, ignores the comparative size of the middle classes between the industrialized North and the relatively recent feudal south, as well as the focus of wealth for the monarchy and the aristocracy rather than anyone else. To him, it was the greed of the North where the once poor Lombardia and Veneto are now rich, and the once rich south has become a colony of the north. He said that he hadn't read this at school, rather he learned it himself – "because they would never teach this stuff at school!"

26th January 2015

I met with A in Portici, a friend of mine who wants to improve her English. She noted my interest in the culture of the South compared to the North, and then Northern Europe in general and happily obliged. We started talking about the South in general, where she began telling me about a certain “southern” state of mind – how the inefficiencies of the State and lack of thinking of the community by individuals makes the place so much worse. She mentioned a large sum of money that the EU had put aside for the Circumvesuviana lines – most of which had disappeared. The trains that were modernized and replaced were changed for trains which did not fit alongside the platform – there was also an incident several years ago where a train de-railed and a few people died.

As a therapist for families she offered me some insight on competitiveness and the southern state of mind – one where schools and teachers separate kids into “serie a, serie b and serie c”, sometimes without thinking, and other times purposely. The government had talked about creating special schools for those struggling, but nothing had happened yet. – creating hierarchies in schools. Indeed I had seen this for myself whilst teaching in a primary school the other side of Vesuvio, where kids were actively competing against one another to get marks.

She offered me some thoughts on the Italian family and relationships. Italian partners appear to be closer, and the women are generally more controlling, but that is because the guy is more likely to be unfaithful – warranting the women to sometimes demand Facebook and phone passwords. In response, in her experiences, the guy just creates a new profile on Facebook.

She told me the difference between places like Naples proper, “provincia” like Portici and Ercolano and then the periphery. Naples is city living, and the chaos that goes with it. Places like Portici is for “snobs” (what I’d best define as bourgeois), whereas places like Ercolano, Torre del Greco, Torre Annunziata and Scafati is full of “tamarri”, roughly translated in English as “chavs “. In this context, she refers to “uncultured” young people with nothing really to do, but drive around on motorinis and cause trouble, with no real anchor to any association (other than maybe the Camorra).

I am becoming acutely aware of interconnectedness here: despite me meeting them separately, A knows some of the guys from Radio Siani, whereas R is actually a member – and also knows the guys from the British Community.

30th January 2015

I went to an event hosted at a church on Corso Resina in Ercolano about the concerns for the amount of toxic waste disposed locally – where the aim was to encourage civic awareness of the issue, all guided and clarified by local associations. It was hosted primarily by the church, but was organized by the *gruppo ambiente vesuvio di Ercolano*.

Around 200 people or so had turned up, and were generally 40+ years old, although there were younger people with their families and/or the church choir. At the beginning, the padre thanked to all of those who had turned up – including the Mayor, representatives from Radio Siani, the Forum dei Giovani and so on.

Representatives from the gruppo ambiente spoke of the issues that the city faced – particularly where the natural assets that the city has (Vesuvius and the sea) are being blighted by illegal waste dumping – often linked to the Camorra, but sometimes done by local businesses. They spoke of complete distrust that local people had had in the State and its institutions, but also where the increase in deaths linked to hazardous chemicals throughout the regions actually provoked a civic reaction to the issue itself. The group emphasised that they had found a genuine partner with regard to this issue with the Carabinieri, that they are very serious about the issue and that they merit trust in this regard. They underlined the need for citizens to report issues of illegal waste in order to tackle this issue.

The event itself had a strong police presence, mostly due to the Mayor who was escorted away in a police car at the end

10th February 2015

This evening I met Raffaella for dinner where we went to a pizzeria that she regularly frequents on IV Novembre. I began talking about my travels in Italy- how I'd spent New Years in Ravello, for example – in which she replied that she owns a house on the Amalfi Coast –which her and her husband are going to visit this weekend. It is then that I thought about it more. They own 3 shops, as well as a house here and on the Amalfi Coast. Furthermore, her daughter owns the opticians next door (also a member of the anti-racket association). This is a fairly wealthy family.

We talked for a while about her travels to London over 10 years ago until she started talking to me about Ercolano. She regards herself as the starting point for the movement in Ercolano, full stop. I asked what she thought of Radio Siani and the Forum dei Giovani, and her response set me back a little – it seemed to be her opinion that they aren't doing enough – they are all talk – and are both (Radio Siani in particular) highly politicised. She made it clear that she would not go into further details however. She refused to visit Radio Siani, for example. Elsewhere in the antimafia movement, she dislikes Roberto Saviano – thinking that he does not do enough for business people and is, again, all talk. Part of me doesn't want to write this – and perhaps this won't make the final write up, but she seems to me to be a quite a difficult person to deal with. Typically of the older generation in the *mezzogiorno*, she does not have very much formal education. Perhaps due to her role in the antimafia in Ercolano, or even due to her own character, but she was at times rather arrogant - talking about HER achievements in Ercolano – it was her show, so to speak – and not the antiracket movement. She is an important local figure with it, absolutely – but it was the overt and outward nature of her hyperbole which missed the grander picture which set me back a little. She had denounced the Camorra when they approached her, yes – and this is important, but the notion that she is the face of the entire antimafia movement is ludicrous. I remember her being rather forceful and demanding with the waiter in the restaurant, who appeared to only tolerate her presence out of politeness and normality because it seemed as if she would always be like this when she came to eat here- which made me feel incredibly uncomfortable. I really felt for the staff there – in the same sense that some shopkeepers could be caught in the social politeness trap and creeping normality of paying the pizzo, so here too was this waiter caught in a trap of continued politeness in the face of a regular customer's demands. This uncomfortableness that I felt made me think of her as like the colour grey – this heroic lady who stood up to the Camorra in the land of the Camorra was not the saint that my naïveté wanted her to be. This was for me a bit hard to digest – I guess from my own ideas I was imagining an anti-mafia civil society movement all working together – but this all seems to be skin deep where concrete cooperation between different organizations is concerned.

She claims that no more businesses pay the pizzo in Ercolano, but I'm not so convinced. Indeed as we were driving back, I asked about the new and well-furnished bar on IV Novembre that had opened recently, and whether they had joined the antiracket association – the answer was a resounding “no”.

I asked her and her husband what they thought of the recent PD scandal that was revealed last week and they simply remarked that it was such a shame after all the work that the antiracket association had done, for the PD to have such a scandal.

12th February 2015

This evening I met with the Forum dei Giovani for the first time in their headquarters at Palazzo Borsellino [yes, that Borsellino], in their main room “Peppino Impastato” [yes, that Peppino Impastato]. It was a meeting of 10 people or so who were discussion around a round table their plans for a market stall after organizing a clean-up of the seaside close to Via Marina. It was interesting to see how open and free-flowing this meeting was. I introduced myself to the guys there and they talked to me about the group’s formation and history. Their coordinator, B explained, as I suspected and had been led to believe, that the group is indeed an institutional association in that they use equipment, etc. and are paid for (lights, space etc.) by the comune. But she stressed that they are independent and that they attempt to stay as informal and separate from the comune as possible. They stressed too, that they try to steer clear from politics, and that their purpose is to provide a space and organize events for the young people in Ercolano – as there is nothing/very little to do in the city. It was founded in 2009, initially as an area for people to study when the communal library is closed. It subsequently evolved, and became a place for young people to meet and discuss ideas and make friends. The thing that intrigues me the most is how short their leash is from the comune – how independent they are in reality. I mentioned to the guys there that I am in a position to teach English/do a language exchange if anyone would like which was received very enthusiastically. I saw online before meeting them that they had worked with a researcher in a project that sought to understand how young people view the Camorra. On meeting them in person, I was handed a print-out of this data almost immediately. I’m going to try to interact with these guys as much as possible.

15th February 2015

I met with the forum again at an event of theirs for a local book that was being published. Despite expecting a full house, only around 15 or so people turned up – with a number of them being the organisers of the Forum.

After the event finished, A, one of the guys from the Forum offered to introduce me to someone of interest – Padre Pasquale. There is centre on Via Aldo Moro “La laconda di Emmaus” which used to be a Camorra affiliated pub before the Church acquired it and began using it as a community centre where kids could go and do their homework and generally interact with one another. We entered the centre which was packed – maybe 70/80 people or so – almost all families with cakes, sweets and so on. There was a special event due to Saint Valentino – but I understood the message – the Church in particular

alongside Padre Pasquale is very strong with regard to the anti-Camorra. On meeting the Padre I was surprised to learn that he speaks English, and fairly well too as he spent some time in Dublin – picking up a rather interesting accent when he spoke English (which he very much wanted to). He invited me to join one of his youth meetings with the “centro di pastorale giovanile” in the following weeks, which I happily accepted.

A and I were talking afterwards, where he was trying to make it clear to me that there is not simply ONE anti-Camorra movement in Ercolano, but many. There are influenced from the State and other national organizations like Libera or Addiopizzo but there are far more here on the ground too which work much closer with people. The church here is a fantastic example. But again, it is interesting how interconnected things are here.

Later I went for some drinks with some of the other guys from the Forum where one of the members introduced me to a guy he described as “the next Mayor of Ercolano” and he seemed to know the guys from the Forum pretty well. The guy, Ciro Buonajuto, was standing for election in the local PD primaries against and, 3 months later he really was elected as Mayor.

3rd March 2015

A lot has been happening in the last few weeks, so I’ll summarize here in order for some clarity. I met with Don Pasquale [Incoronato] and the rest of his youth church group at La Locanda di Emmaus on Via Aldo Moro. The common routine is arriving on a Friday evening, socialise with friends and catch up on the latest news & goings on, they take orders for a pizza delivery together then everyone sits at a long table with the Don at the head to listen to him whilst waiting for the pizza to arrive.

Pasquale begins by reading a pamphlet given to him by the Church on a particular issue which is accompanied by verses from the bible as well as quotes from the Pope. Pasquale encourages the members in attendance to read a paragraph from the pamphlet and ask questions about the topic – which he does his best to answer. This week’s issue was “legality”, particularly on the difference between “legality” (*legalità*) and “justice” (*giustizia*). On this, the Pasquale made it abundantly clear that the State and the Church’s version of “justice” are profoundly different. In the pamphlet, a question asked by the Pope was discussed by the group: “*per te, un buon cristiano deve essere necessariamente anche un buon cittadino?*” (do you think that a good Christian must also necessarily be a good citizen?) where Pasquale distinguished between the two. To Pasquale, absolute justice of

what is “right” is predetermined by God, which is in conflict with the law and what is legal (i.e. legality), meaning that that which is legal may at times correlate with that which is “good”, but not all of the time. Christian virtues of justice in this context supersede Statist and man-made notions of that which is “legal”. This becomes an incredibly interesting distinction when we talk of fighting for the “hearts and minds” of the people of Ercolano against the Camorra and criminality, when two “sides” of the anti-mafia movement are in deep disagreement about which virtues should be used to fight the problems in their city.

I should note here that this discussion made me feel somewhat uncomfortable. Not only am I not a Catholic, but I am not religious at all, and am in fact an atheist – though not an anti-theist. I went to a C of E (Anglican) primary school as a child, and was a Christian for a time. I am interested in religion and philosophy/ethics in general (and I have actually read more of the bible than some of my Ercolano-based Catholic friends) but I am nonetheless an unashamed unbeliever. I see the benefits that religious belief can bring to individual agency, but do not see religion as a prerequisite to being a “good” person. For this question of the good Christian as a good citizen, I dismiss the discussion entirely as reductionist, since the tenets of what makes a “good citizen” is debateable – do we define a good citizen as a citizen who follows the law, or is a good citizen (in principle) permitted to break bad laws where they believe them to be wrong? The answer given by Pasquale is one that says that Christian virtues of justice transcend Statist laws – but what of people who aren’t religious? This aspect is unaccounted for, and actually goes to the heart of the debate within the antimafia movement and its strategies in Italy. Where the State encourages dispositions of largely (neo)liberal notions of legality, the Church pushes dispositions of *its own particular notions* of justice – but what of people who dismiss laws that exist as immoral/unjust but do not share all of the Church’s tenets?

Similarly to other individuals I have met in my time in Italy, knowing I am English, I was asked whether I was “Anglican or Catholic”, rather than whether I was religious or not. The possibility that I could be neither was not considered. I wasn’t going to lie to my hosts, and so I told them that I was an atheist – after which I was looked at with what seemed like pity. One of the other Priests at the meeting told me how sad he was that only 4% of the UK was Catholic and that I should “let Jesus into my heart”.

During his sermon, Pasquale public remarked to me the differences between my Anglo-Saxon world and the *mezzogiorno* region – how we have a greater focus on ourselves (privately and individually), whereas the *mezzogiorno* is much more communal. Though in some respects true, it would be incorrect to say that public programmes (health, etc.) do not exist in the “Anglo Saxon” world. Indeed he remarked how money is the most important

aspect in the Anglo Saxon world and how (wrongly, I might add) we have to pay for our medical services “like in the US”. I chose to wait until the sermon was finished to correct him in private on his oversimplification, so as not to be rude. His generalisation says something about the world that he and parts of his culture understands. The South is poorer, but less individualistic, and therefore “happier”. It seemed a rather odd thought for him to consider that an individualistic Anglo Saxon country like my own to have any form of socialised healthcare – albeit one that works alongside private healthcare (similarly to Italy).

I have noticed this kind of comparison countless times previously when Neapolitans have talked about people from the North of Italy – they are “*freddi*” (cold) people – not like the warm people in the *mezzogiorno*. This is of course a stereotype, but nonetheless a persistent one. It does make me wonder how many Neapolitans actually know people from outside of their own communities, and how much this reproduces this stereotype. To many of my Neapolitan friends, I am the first *straniero* (foreigner) that they have met, let alone had a proper conversation with.

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One incredibly interesting thing I noticed between the Forum and La Locanda was the types of meetings that they were. The Forum encouraged conversations between everyone – bringing in the opinions of outsiders to the Forum to contribute their opinion on a particular issue – discussed in a “round table” format. La Locanda, however, was a long table of 30 or so, with one person deciding the topic and controlling the dissemination of information – moderating discussion and saying who is able to contribute to conversation and when. In this sense, the Forum was a lot more “democratic” and seemed to be full of more outgoing characters, as well as more open to “thinking outside of the box” and more engaged with other topics such as politics (local, regional, national and global). It is important to note the fluidity of these youth groups. I was only able to go to the event at La Locanda to begin with because one of guys, I met at the Forum, A, told me about the meeting with Don Pasquale, and invited me to go to the meetings with him. The brother of F, who occasionally helps at the Forum, and is the current President of an association that promotes tourism in Ercolano “Pro Loco Hercvlanevm” and former journalist for MetropolisWeb, also turned up at La Locanda – where during the evening – where he was told off by Pasquale for not going to the Church for 2 months

18th March 2015

I've become a more regular member of the British Community Naples (BCN), having been offered teaching job in an office they rent in the centre of the city. One of the main aims here was to see how interconnected some of the other Civil Society groups in Naples – and whether there is any link between the organizations here and the ones in Ercolano. After a few months of observing, I am genuinely surprised at how interconnected they are. One of the organisers of the community, is the president of BCN, a journalist for an association that highlights cultural/historical interests in the city, a volunteer for a homeless shelter and its affiliated publication “scarpe de tenis” – similar to the British “Big Issue” newspaper which gives homeless people the opportunity of a legal income. Much like particular members of Radio Siani and the Forum, it is people like her who appear to be the link between different organizations that facilitates collaboration. Indeed it is interesting to note that number of the BCN guys had actually been invited to Radio Siani to talk about their activities in the months previously. The British Community was keen to advertise itself so that it may offer more classes and expand its own socio-cultural events (in pubs, bars, etc.), and Radio Siani had a space by which they are able to accommodate them – as well as an opportunity to disseminate their own story and purpose.

I started talking to one of the guys from the Couchsurfing Napoli group again who messaged me and asked if we could meet so he could improve his conversational English. When we met, he revealed somewhat of a feud between some of the organizers of the group where one of the guys had fallen out with the main organizers due to the nature and frequency of events that they host. Unlike BCN or any of the other organizations I've come across, Couchsurfing Napoli is wholly voluntary and the product of its own members willingness to participate – understandable when you consider the general Couchsurfing mantra which offers travellers a free place to stay.

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I've continued seeing R a few times a week where we normally end up talking about the terrible working situation in the area and the general brain drain that this has created. He's begun studying German alongside English and Spanish to increase his chances of working away abroad.

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Today there was an organized march by all the schools in Ercolano of which Radio Siani, the comune and the law enforcement agencies took part. At the march I met a guy called who

happened to be the coordinator for “let’s do it Italy”, as well as a regular contributor for Radio Siani, and has gotten their members involved in environmentally conscious activities such as cleaning up beaches and so on. It seemed that there were quite a few other representatives from other associations present too. It seemed to be a huge success – purposely focussing on the youth as a means of fostering a culture of legality. I spoke to one of the students at one of the schools and part of the scouts in Ercolano, and he told me that for the last week or so, there had been a focus on “legality” in general, and that they had been encouraged to do something for the march. He had chosen to find a quote to read out at the conclusion of the march, choosing Albert Einstein: “The world is a dangerous place to live, not because of the people who are evil, but because of the people who don't do anything about it” alongside his peers. The younger students from the local primary schools were asked to make some placards and banners, which held up throughout the march. The image of the entirety of Ercolano’s youth parading through the streets “for legality” was a potent one – it literally made shopkeepers and passers-by stop what they were doing, and cheer as they marched passed.

The march’s conclusion was speeches in an urban park, complete with speeches, music and contributions by young people. There were quite a few speakers and performances during: There was a band of instrumentalists in Carabinieri uniform who played *fratelli d’Italia*, which some of the kids needed a bit of encouragement to sing along to, speeches by prominent Carabinieri officers, school teachers, Vincenzo Strazzullo (the Mayor), Giuseppe Scogniamiglio from Radio Siani, and then a performance by a school rock band. The speakers talked about the role of changing culture, and the role of trust for institutions. I took the liberty of recording some of this on a Dictaphone – here is some of the speech by one of the schoolteachers/organizers:

Like all of you, I also have a smartphone. I used it to understand the word “legalità” and what it referred to by our dearly loved resources. There was a thing that struck me. Legalità becomes adherence to the rules that protects the weak from the oppression of the strong. I know this because it has been referred to directly from my smartphone ... this today is a thing we need to underline – we are not weak. We need to protect the weak – we need to give hand to protect them. Here everyone today, you are not simply the citizens of tomorrow, you are the citizens of today. This is always better. We are not given a beautiful picture today of our society: corruption, problems, people disinterested in politics, people with nothing to look forward to in the future. But we need to carry on with the day.

These things that you have, because you all have them... Use them! Don't just use them to go on Facebook or other such like. Teach yourself and memorize the numbers of the Carabinieri, the Mayor, the Guardia di Finanza, the State police. It's not enough to say that you are here – it is better to denounce. It is the courage to say "this happened in this moment". Because the other side will say that what they are doing is not wrong [...]

The thing that you need to understand is that this morning the schools of Ercolano are here, the institution is here, the law enforcement is here [...] Legality is not simply obeying the law, because we need to pay our dues, or because we need to denounce others, instead legality is everything in our lives. We are legality. We need to be lawful. We have to face various points of view – the one we face today is that of the law enforcement. And today I want to thank the Carabinieri, the Guardia di Finanza, the State police, and the local police, who are always close to us.

Legality also means to learn. Us adults, have probably used our children – we have likely influenced our children's minds. On the taking of drugs, on prostitution against all the others – these are not good for you! It's something inhuman. They are things that make our society more inhuman. This is why you need to be ready and know what your rights are and what are your needs, and to respect one another. Also against your parents, and against your teachers – you need to know when your fight is a just one. This also is legality.

The speakers spoke mostly of a war against the Camorra that had been won, but also that there is still a lot that needs to be done. From talking to people present, it seemed that the march itself was the first mass march in Ercolano against the Camorra since 2009 when Radio Siani first started broadcasting, as Scogniamiglio said in his speech:

In this park we have many memories, particularly for marches. Here we planted an olive tree, dedicated to Giancarlo Siani. There was a march in 2009 which we participated in, very similar to this one where we wrote on one of the banners "le idee non si fermano con la paura". From 2009 until today many things have changed – with this march and this initiative it shows that the ideas and initiatives that we need to go forward against fear have been understood. A big thank you to the schools in Ercolano, and thank you for this opportunity to collaborate with you, and really help out children in difficulty in this territory that need a helping hand. I ask you to give a further hand to these associations like ours, because there is need to do this from the bottom-up through the children

After talking to R and some of the guys from Radio Siani after the march, I was told that there was a free space on a coach that they were taking up to Bologna for the national “Libera” march in a few days’ time, which I asked to take.

24th March 2015

On Friday I met with the guys from Radio Siani and some of their friends from Libera for the trip to Bologna. A coach was booked for the evening so that we would drive through the night and was shared between Radio Siani and another association based in Somma Vesuviana. I sat next to R for the journey and we spent a lot of the journey during the daytime practicing his English. I had a chance to meet some of the other guys from the Radio that I hadn’t already met – where I realised that we actually had quite a few friends in common through people linked to BCN. As well as broadcasting for Radio Siani, many of them are also journalists elsewhere.

When we arrived at the march in the morning, a thing that struck me was the importance of memory/memorialization. This is unsurprising considering the fashion in Italy of renaming places/organizations after martyrs or historical figures (for the antimafia, Falcone and Borsellino are common names). Members of Radio Siani prepared a list of names of innocent victims of organized crime in Italy which they read out in chronological order to be followed by chants.

E.g. “*GIANCARLO SIANI*”

“Giancarlo è vivo e lotta insieme a noi! Le nostre idee non moriranno mai!”

This was similarly used by organizers of the Libera march itself, where they read out every single victim’s name on tannoys. Present at the event were many other groups and slogans that we can generally designate as being “Left”: the communist party, nuclear proliferation, anti-war etc. who had decided to attend too. In addition to these, there was a strong presence from the scout movement

29th March 2015

I went out tonight with some of the guys from Portici to a pizzeria, where one of the girls recommended that I research a bit more about Drama groups in the area given that they are well attended by young people, and that they often do topics surrounding organized crime and the cultural fight against it, which I'll have to look at in more detail.

At the table we came onto the topic of religion, where the guys were mostly confronting P about his strong by-the-book Catholic beliefs. O, who is a Catholic too, for example, questioned him for not being critical of his own beliefs enough – noting that it is acceptable and human to not know the answers. It got a bit heated and awkward when one of the other guys started talking about evolution, and P started quoting bible verses. We tried our best not to seem as if we were ganging up on him, per se, but it was quite difficult given the circumstances – he just wasn't listening to any other view than his own, even when told about hypocrisies in his argument. I enjoy his company, and debating with him though.

On leaving the pizzeria we drove up Via Libertà through a load of traffic. In the stop and start traffic, a car behind us accidentally nudged our back bumper. We tried to get the other car's attention, asking them to wind down their windows so we could swap insurance details. The guy at the wheel said he didn't bump our bumper at all, and that he didn't need to swap details at all. Luckily we had already written down the licence plate. Q told him "okay, no worries, but we are going to report it to the insurance company anyway", at this point, the driver started shouting at us and getting irate. We locked the doors and did up the windows. We drove on for a few metres in traffic before one of their other passengers got out of the car to come to speak to us. Q wound down his window to speak to him, where this guy started aggressively bullying him into not contacting his insurance company. When he refused, this guy started hitting the car and windows, where we had to quickly drive off to get away from him. We drove around for a bit just to be sure before we arrived at a park so that we could assess the damage. There wasn't anything huge, but there was a definite dent on the back bumper, and small marks on the door where he hit it. We saw a similar car drive towards us, so we got back in and drive off again – but nothing came of it.

In the car, the guys were telling me that the driver probably had not paid for insurance, and that he was bullying Q so that he wouldn't have to pay anything. They were purposely using the uncertainty of knowing if they were camorristi and/or armed to try and influence Q's decision. They could have just been some regular guys, who didn't want the trouble of paying. F was quite shaken up, later apologizing to me "for his area" – saying how ashamed he was of these kind of people who make things worse for everyone. It's because of people like them, that everyone *needs* to buy insurance, and that the cost is so high.

Log book additions: Post-script – 18th March 2017

I recently moved back to Naples, not for fieldwork, rather it was to live in the city itself whilst finishing the remainder of this thesis as I have grown quite fond of it. Something unfortunate happened yesterday that I believe is interesting and relevant enough to add to these fieldwork notes.

Yesterday I was unfortunately robbed whilst in one of the central gardens of the city. No harm or anything, a group of 4 guys took my phone and about 30 euros cash – unfortunate and irritating, but not the end of the world by any means. The most pertinent part of this with regard to this project, however, was the process at which an individual denounces a crime to law enforcement agencies in the city. Law enforcement were contacted by telephone, and within 30 minutes or so a couple of Carabinieri officers arrived. They were initially concerned as to whether they would be likely to catch the thieves, but shifted their attention to more procedural matters fairly swiftly when it was obvious that it highly unlikely. They asked for relevant documentation so that they could log the crime, though, to my surprise, required me to go directly to a Caserma (either of the Carabinieri or Polizia di Stato) in order to give a statement. I was told that it was not possible to give a statement immediately, because the office was closed for the day (it was about 10pm). There and then they asked me to give a vague idea of what happened, though would take a more detailed statement if I chose to actually go to the Caserma the next day.

I went to the Caserma the next day but was incredibly surprised how unfriendly and how imposing and intimidating it was to actually enter into the Caserma. There were no signs, and no real assistance for individuals who had never actually denounced a crime before. I approached the front office where a Carabinieri officer sat behind a thick glass window, thick enough that you almost needed to shout to actually be heard. Then I had to wait in a cramped waiting room to be seen by another officer who would take my statement properly. The interaction with the officer who took my statement was friendly enough, and was clearly well disposed to encouraging victims to talk about crimes committed against them, but my initial interactions with the Carabinieri the day before, and in the time before giving the statement were much less positive. To put it simply, it is not easy enough to denounce. Not only do you not give a statement to the first officers you meet, but you may even have to return another day to actually denounce.

It is worth considering how a businessperson would feel in this situation. They are approached for pizzo, and, depending on the time of the approach, may have to wait until another time to actually denounce and give a statement properly. Given the environment, as well as the fear and uncertainty that such an approach can give a businessperson, this kind

of operational oversight may deter a businessperson from denouncing, and giving a statement. The intimidating and unfriendly nature of the Caserma I entered prior to giving my statement was almost enough to make me think that it wasn't worth denouncing at all. There was no doubt that it was the *right* thing to do, but there was also the consideration that *there is no point* in doing it. Waiting to give a statement, and entering into a fairly unfriendly environment was inconvenient, with little incentive to actually denounce. It is an interesting thought as to the number of businesspeople across the *mezzogiorno* who composed themselves enough to denounce, but then decided against it due to the sheer inconvenience and intimidating nature of the place.

What we saw in Ercolano was *individual* Carabinieri officers who took it upon themselves to smooth the process that businesspeople went through to denounce. Some businesspeople could bring themselves to report a crime, but may not have been able to bring themselves to trust the Carabinieri enough to give a statement. It may have been too difficult, too inconvenient. Maybe it is easier and less hassle to just pay the pizzo, it is only a small amount. The process of denouncing a crime is to admit that were unable to control a situation, which is, among other things, an issue of embarrassment and honour as one sees it. In a cost-benefit analysis, does an intimidated businessperson judge a relatively small pizzo a decent price to pay for avoiding embarrassment, inconvenience and to live a more peaceful life?

VI: Miscellaneous material:

VI.I “Programma Integrato Urbano (PIU) Europa” Introduction to Ercolano

The comune of Ercolano, in the province of Naples, located at the South-Western slopes of Vesuvio, along the coastiera vesuviana between Portici and Torre del Greco, to the average height of 44m above average sea level. The area has a wide altitude range, varying from zero up to 1275m summit of Vesuvio. The comune has an area of 19.64 sq km and a population density among the highest in Italy (2,813 inhabitants per sq km). The resident population is 55,261 inhabitants.

The city has a considerable and prestigious variety of natural, cultural and architectural assets: the archaeological ruins, 22 Vesuvian villas, the volcanic complex of Somma-Vesuviana, in part which is also part of the Parco Nazionale del Vesuvio, the sea and the favourable climate. In addition, it enjoys a privileged geographical position due to its proximity to the city of Naples, Pompei, which along with Oplonti, Castellammare and Boscoreale make up the prestigious Vesuvian archaeological system to Sorrento, Baia, Capri, Ischia and Pozzuoli.

...

Like Pompei, Herculaneum [the Roman city that Ercolano is built upon] entered the Roman orbit at the end of the 4th Century BC becoming its own municipality in 89 BC. After the plague of 1656, the eruption of Vesuvius from 1631 to 1698, the official identification of Herculaneum in 1709 was due to Emanuele d'Elboeuf, Prince of Lorraine. Subsequently the area was hit by flowering lavish holiday residences, the Vesuvian villas, in part by changing the trim of the families that in the two previous centuries had enriched their architectural heritage. The process continued throughout the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth century.

The area was badly hit by the bombing of 1941-43 and then the military occupation. From the second half of the twentieth century, the municipality became almost entirely saturated from building speculation: Urban expansion in the recent years had become massive – thickening the buildings along the existing roads and urban areas begin to occupy most of the areas between the main road and the Napoli-Salerno highway with extensive residential quarters and multi-storey building expansions. Residential expansions then spread even more uphill along the highway along the

lower slopes of Vesuvio with sparse buildings and the extension of existing residential nuclei.

The urban growth of Ercolano was strongly influenced by the presence of infrastructure for mobility on a regional scale that gradually occupied the territory in a longitudinal manner: the ancient Strada Regia per le Carabrie (then Miglio d'Oro now Corso Resina), the Napoli-Salerno State railway, the track of the Napoli-Torre Annunziata Circumvesuviana train and the A3 Napoli-Salerno highway, have in fact sliced into the same longitudinal sectors, each of which has developed its own difference and almost indifference to other neighbouring sectors over the last fifty years. This phenomenon was certainly encouraged by the poor development of roads which criss-cross one another, which has affected the part of the territory that goes from the sea to the highway. It goes without saying that the urban growth is oriented also by sector, mainly unravelling in the longitudinal direction, up to the "overflow" towards the adjacent sectors.

The Corso Resina axis along which focusses much of the city's history still preserves its original role as a centre of gravity compared to urban dynamics and is the only one with connective function and with great potential for improvement of the use of these resources. The most urbanized part of the city of Ercolano is between the A3 highway, the Corso Umberto and the municipal borders of Portici and Torre del Greco, as you climb towards the crater of Vesuvio the amount of buildings thins more and more. Of the current real estate assets in the municipal territory, about 80% has been built over the last 50 years with overall poor architectural quality which has significantly lowered the sense of urban identity perceived by citizens. The infrastructure deficit, inevitable in the presence of an urban growth of such size, has further depleted the newly expanding urban environment. At the same time, the centro storico [historical centre] ... lost its significance due to the lack of planning to address urban regeneration as it gradually became abandoned with an exception of the most vulnerable sections of the population, in which they acquired some kind of extra-territoriality to the rest of the city. Indeed, since the end of the 1960s, things became more unrecognizable whereby any new buildings were prevalently residential and intensively built, juxtaposed and superimposed amongst the other historical buildings, imposing themselves in a manner so completely indifferent to the values and the qualities of their areas.

The importance of the sea has gradually waned too whereby the physical barrier formed by the railway, alongside new building works that have claimed the areas

around the gardens of the Vesuvian villas, the lack of adequate pedestrian and cycle paths, coastal roads and the decline of fishing and shipbuilding has resulted in the coast becoming isolated resulting in, at times, the inability to perceive even the presence of the sea.

Another element of urban relevance is represented by the complicated relationship between the city and the archaeological excavations that, in many ways, have always represented an island almost positioned accidentally and indifferently alongside the structures and urban life. The building planning of recent years has aimed at enabling the desired integration process between the two cities through a systematic set of physical actions aimed both at improving the accessibility of the archaeological area as well as the integration between both the old city and the new city with the aim of an accessible archaeological city through various serving systems that are perfectly integrated to the system of environmental, historical and architectural resources within the territory.

(Città di Ercolano, 2008, pp.3-5)

VI.II An interview on Radio Siani between Giuseppe Scognamiglio, Concita De Gregorio (journalist for RAI), Pierpaolo Filippelli and Pasquale del Prete (Vice President of the antiracket association), 28 November 2016.⁹²

Scognamiglio: Here we are for a special broadcast for Radio Siani, as always from the house of a boss, that of a bene confiscato to tell you what has happened. We have here with us the Precoratore aggiunto, our, if I am permitted call him as such, friend, Dr Filippelli who has come here yet again to help us and tell us a bit about what has been happening. We are getting occasional bursts of life sentences that keep on coming – condemning acts committed against victims such as Salvatore Barbaro, illuminating us about the events, and asking for such an important sentence against the perpetrators – important regarding his homicide. Thank you Dr Filippelli for being here, for your availability in times such as these.

Filippelli: Thank you all, and thanks to all to the listeners. I want to say that the trials currently underway, is as always the result of team work, it is not a single individual – it is the work of an exceptional team of investigators helped by the Carabinieri company in Torre del Greco. There are important results because of this organisational body. The number of life sentences is a record, 42 to give the exact number – though this should not be interrupted because it is a grave error to be satisfied with this number. Instead it is the contrary since it is just demonstrative that control of the territory is both preventative and repressive and needs instead to be total control.

Scognamiglio: Likewise “non si torna” [no going back] is our new slogan which we will write and recount alongside all of you, in wanting to finally close the book on all of this. We don’t want to go back. We are talking about important numbers, about important events for our local history and to provide an example for other comunes which is well noted. However what I would be interested to know, since we have you here, a bit more about the local context [of the Camorras] such as the beginnings of alliances and the presence of Ercolano being part of a larger picture: the Birra clan with the Lo Russo and the Gionta, whereas there is the Ascione with the clans of Castellamare and Secondigliano – could you tell us a bit more about this? We understand the basics, but we know that Ercolano is just one arena of a much larger game outside of Ercolano and for the entire area.

Filippelli: This is not an easy thing to do, because the whole thing is complex, and of much greater synthesis which has changed over many years. The clans in Ercolano were networks of equal strategic and military importance – they understood that they could interweave themselves with drug trafficking contacts with bosses, all reinforced by military

⁹² <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MpKoFXf4W4Y>

alliances outside of Ercolano. For example, the Birra became close with the Gionta from Torre del Greco and the Lo Russo from Maiano and Secondigliano, as well as clans from the provincial Caserta area. Whereas the Ascione did the same with other clans in the general provincial area. In this Ercolano found itself at the centre, if we can put it like this, of a much broader criminal panorama – bringing Ercolano to the centre of other feuds: the *faida* di Torre Annunziata, di Maiano, di Secondigliano. It is in the most recent sentences that we can see the history of criminality in Ercolano. The perpetrators of a double homicide against the Ascione and the Montella clans [where the Birra clan killed the opposing clans bosses] in 2003 were condemned a few days ago. These perpetrators were not only those sent by the Birra clan, but also killers from the Lo Russo clan.

Camorra criminal clans are never to be measured in a strict communal sense, but instead as a network, if I can put it like this, containing those contacts in the drugs market. This is not only in the local area, but also in a national context.

Scognamiglio: To all of our listeners I'd like to introduce another one of our guests, a great journalist with us, Concita De Gregorio, who is going to be both an interviewer and an interviewee for us – and we are on the air with her where she will ask questions to us herself. In this sense I am not going to participate any further, I am instead going to follow what is being said. We have the good fortune of having her here in our studios to chat with us, so yeah, thank you for letting me have a word here!.

De Gregorio: Good evening, and thank you for your hospitality. I was listening to both of you with great interest because we arrived here with our own programme, *fuori Roma* to make the point that in order to see what has happened here in Ercolano, it is fundamental to understand what has been happening under the surface such as with this Radio with its symbolic importance and with the work of Dr Filippelli which has brought the results to which all of this is linked.

Many people do not know about the reality in Ercolano, and so I would like to ask some very simple questions. We say that the Camorra “families” have been decapitated, we say that all of these life sentences has genuinely affected the underworld here. I would like to ask, however, do you consider this social criminal underworld genuinely to be eradicated – I'm thinking of the wives, the children, the sisters, nieces, nephews, cousins and all of those who are left here. Those who are still alive, and those who are not in prison and are left waiting. What are they doing? Where are they? How do they organize themselves? What is the function of the women now in this reality? My second question I have for you is whether you have the feeling that there is a “legend” surrounding criminality that derives from things in television series, from films, from the *Gomorra*s of this world. I ask because I was coming

from Naples earlier and I was stopped in Marianella to see Enzo Avitabile [A Neapolitan singer] and Enzo said to me that all the youngsters mimic all of the “heroes” from Gomorrah. Television instructs, because there aren’t so many schools – television is a very important educational agency. My second question is whether television could become a sort of example in this sense. Michele Santoro presented his documentary “Robinù” in Venezia, which came out before Roberto Saviano’s book *La Paranza*. In this sense I mean these child soldiers, could you help us unpick these two things?

Filippelli: These are very challenging things, and would take a lot of time to be able to respond to both of these questions, in my opinion, Dr, there is too much to discuss. I’ll try to answer where I can in this moment. With regard to your first question, I think that you would have to say that the elements of the Camorra’s defeat, or at the very least, it’s curbing, would be if the camorristi’s children will not be camorristi in the future. This is the real objective. The children of the boss today will not be bosses or soldiers themselves – they will have a different fate. They will be good citizens, they will not follow the alternative path which leads to them becoming marginalized – and this is something that is incredible clear to see.

De Gregorio: This depends on their mothers?

Filippelli: Yes, this depends on their mothers, but not only this – it’s a number of things. It depends on school, it depends on society: there is a need to clothe oneself with schooling, with culture. There is a need to job opportunities and development for these people. It’s not enough, in our opinion, to just “take them”, in the sense of the judiciary or law enforcement. It’s an essential moment of course, but alone it is not enough

De Gregorio: Returning to the theme of the mothers and the women of the Camorra, have you been able to facilitate collaboration with them?

Filippelli: The response is something quite particular. This is because often it is the women who are the most sacred parts of this culture among the alleyways. When there is an opportunity or motivation for collaboration that has not yet been realised, it is often the women who want to do it. They are the ones who are often the most linked to the tradition and the mentality of the Camorra. There are also many women who have had the courage, the intelligence to think about their own children, and to have the courage to break away from this culture and to decide to collaborate

De Gregorio: From your experience, what is it that leads them to this decision? Their children’s future?

Filippelli: Their children's future. The will to not live on the street, to not have a future set in stone that will lead to being locked in prison with a life sentence. The person who used to live in this house we are in now was given a number of life sentences, his relatives too were also familiar with imprisonment. They are scared of this future, a future that could also lead to death. These women are definitely courageous, they know what often happens to the men, however in this context of the Camorra they often still care about them and the work they do. It is a mixed picture that we have to consider in light of other facts.

For the other discourse with regard to television, this is also a very complex topic to discuss. We never undervalue the importance of culture, especially on the streets. In Ercolano we had a trial that investigated the writer of a song that was called "O Capoclan". It was a song that was written by a boss of a clan here, the clan Birra, and then performed by affiliates of the clan with a video that was all filmed around Ercolano. For us, this was encouraging young Ercolanesi to affiliate themselves with the Camorra and their values. We know that the war against the Camorra is also one of culture in the street. This will never be undervalued. Absolutely, television is very important because it forms the culture of the youth and the way they view the world, their hopes and dreams, and also how they want to create their own future, and in this sense we have a great responsibility. You ask me about *Gomorrah*, and I don't want to talk so much about whether I like it or not.

De Gregorio: No no, I know that. Just tell us about the reality. As I was saying before, I saw an epic of the young soldiers, of young kids who wave their pistols around to show everyone how strong they are, the one I saw at the festival in Venice. I just wanted to know if these kinds of epics are based on something here too in reality, and what are the methods in which one can intervene.

Filippelli: Here it is absolutely present. The only thing for me that is missing in *Gomorrah*, and I don't want to enter into the discussion as to whether the series is actually a good thing or not, is that it misses the prospective of the victims, the perspective of the State – this is missing from the series. Instead of an epic about the Camorra, why not create an epic as we have in Ercolano, about the courageous shopkeepers that challenged the Camorra, have denounced the Camorra, courageously went to trial, standing face to face with the wrongdoers, condemning them.

De Gregorio: How many were there?

Filippelli: There were loads. In the one trial there were about 20, but we've had more trials too. It's a movement that keeps growing.

Scognamiglio: Almost 80, the association has about 80 members.

Filippelli: It is something that has really moved me. It is something where you had people crying in court, but it's also something that is quite freeing, it's a wonderful thing.

Scognamiglio: I am in complete agreement with Dr Fillippelli. With regard to culture, before *Gomorra*, the kids from Scampia and Secondigliano had pictures of Paolo Di Lauro⁹³ on their phones. It's very much a lack of cultural instruments and values. As you asked earlier, with regard to the decapitation and the control over the families and these top-down organisations, we already had a problem with the number of young kids who didn't have their fathers or mothers because they were in prison or killed, and as such the kids were in carehomes or whatever. They no longer have these instruments – if they go to school alone they just won't get them at all, just because there are loads of them [in this same situation]. So we are trying to conduct works in social recovery because with these kids we think it is very much the lack of perspectives. The Camorras and the mafias, as Don Ciotti⁹⁴ teaches us, are a cultural factor, but there is another important element. In my opinion this leads us to look at the desire of actually wanting to do something about all of this, which, again is always about culture. The lack of values and of money, become important particularly when you want to become *someone* through violence...

De Gregorio: This is something I want to look at again particularly when we look at the mothers of these children because these kids lack their fathers, and the wives lack their husbands- because this is important when we consider the way they act. There is a society of *vendetta* and getting your own back...

Scognamiglio: There are those kids who quite simply have a lack of human affection, that no longer have the feeling of love on the part of their parents, of their grandparents, of their aunts or uncles. They grow up to be naughty in the logic of the streets. We have kids in Ercolano who don't even realise that our town is actually has a seaside. We have kids that don't go into certain areas of the town because they already know that it is controlled by the rival clan. We had a phenomenon that seems to be weakened in the schools, particularly when the parents sign their kids up to be part of the clans when they are still in primary school. These are the things that we need to shake off, and to try to change as an important intervention. Otherwise these kids don't have any other perspectives or visions. We're trying to intervene, and to go to them afterschool as collaborators. For example, the paper-mache statue of Giancarlo Siani that we have in the entrance here was done by them. With regard to the women, we are trying to manage a network because we don't want to do things by

⁹³ A prominent boss who managed to garner his own cult of personality

⁹⁴ The founder of Libera

ourselves, but instead by involving all the positive sides of our town. We are involved in a centre that deals with violence against women – which in the last meeting had about 20 women who came there to report violence against them. There is a need to, how can I put it, get your hands dirty, in the town to help recover the generation, and stop these criminal mechanisms that are stopping this generations – and obviously this is not an easy task. It's a long and difficult path, but it's the one that will produce the most results.

De Gregorio: Thank you very much. We can hope for something done by State TV with a fiction about the shopkeeper of the antiracket in Ercolano [laughter]. It could be something very interesting and important – write it! Thank you very much for this meeting, and you can see it next Monday on Rai3.

[...]

[Interlude]

[...]

Scognamiglio: We carry on again now as we promised, with Concita and her troupe having a tour around the radio. We are joined now by Pasquale del Prete, the Vice-President of the anti-racket association, who joins Dr Filippelli who is still here with us. Before our chat there was some chat here in the studio these two, showing us the relationship of the anomaly that has broken through those factors that had made the town a Camorra town before. There was the divide with regard to law enforcement agencies, because, as we remember, there was a bit of a stereotype that policemen were bad, and the Camorra were good. For years, citizens turned to the bosses to resolve their problems of injustice rather than law enforcement agencies because there wasn't trust any more. Here, we are very much talking about *trust*.

So I would like to ask you both in your opinion, what happened? and why? beyond the prowess of the people who were operating in this area, is it very much the word *trust* that has overturned the *status quo* and led to this revolution?

del Prete: Historically, Ercolano has always been a difficult area. We don't need to go back as far as the post-war period, but rather in the period immediately after the earthquake in the eighties. Interest was shown in many fields, particularly in reconstruction, where there was a small amount of involvement in at all levels. So, certain dynamics made sure that there were good quotes in Ercolano which then led to them to be in a good position. Unfortunately in Ercolano in these years and up until 10 years ago, the residual part of this left a scant civic sense, and a scant, if not inexistent consideration towards State

institutions in general. This ranged from law enforcement agencies in general to politicians and schools. In this context, it was difficult for businesspeople and entrepreneurs to make a network of trust that said “enough!”. This is also because the dynamics of the pizzo and intimidation are so deeply rooted. We have been fortunate to live in such an important moment whose sum is of circumstance and an alignment of the stars. It was mainly, if I can say so, the star player on a football team which makes the difference. But if there a team that doesn't play at all, then it's difficult for such a star player to emerge. We can also attest that the *Modello Ercolano* that everyone now knows about, is based on something really simple, that is the most natural thing in the world: respect of the institutions. The importance of trusting the institutions to be honest, for example. When there are these factors of respect for the institutions: of living honestly and with civility, or culture, the *Modello Ercolano* can be repeated the whole world over. Because what did we do? We had trust in the institutions, in the first moment, in the first step that we took, it is that of having faith in the institutions. We are involved with faith in the institutions, particularly with the Carabinieri we found a family that will always be close to us. Many years have passed since our first secretive meetings and we can say without a shadow of a doubt that without this closeness, of walking together shoulder to shoulder, we would not have been given this real possibility to take notice of what they give us. The Carabinieri, the judiciary and Dr Filippelli who we won't forget here, really was our star player

[Filippelli protests at the notion that he was the principal actor, suggesting that del Prete is giving him needless compliments. This is followed by laughter from Scognamiglio and del Prete]

del Prete: Its not me trying to butter you up, it's the reality! I want to conclude with the judiciary, the law enforcement and Civil Society, represented in that historical moment, who contributed to the founding of the antiracket association with the then mayor of Ercolano, Dr Nino Daniele. It was the certain dynamics in the territory that managed to be released with Daniele's intelligence, culture and forcefulness, turning the common feelings of people in the area so that we felt protected by the institutions represented by the mayor, the judiciary and by law enforcement. We then saw that a good number of the citizen supported this, and we are still all close together.

[...]

Scognamiglio: Why was this movement born spontaneously? [...] Why didn't this happen before? All of this – what is the difference? Why did this all break out after 2007 with “operazione Reset”? In Ercolano there was a huge drugs market selling heroin and other drugs from everywhere. It was a completely unrestricted market. Why did it happen when it did?

Filippelli: This is a good question, but it is instead better to look forward from the present and towards the future, and look at this with good faith, and to never let our guard down. Not letting our guard down involves doing the work you do every day as a watchman of legality, completely involved in culture for the next generations. Thank you.

Scognamiglio: Thank you, and thank you both for your availability. We know that this team will always be vigilant and present in Ercolano, always growing. We will come back to this theme again with other guests, because, as Dr Filippelli said, we don't want to go back to how it was before. We will never let this theme go. Thank you, and have a nice evening.

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